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Introduction
Legal principles of due process and fair trial play a central role in the process 
of fostering the rule of law, human rights and democracy in the procedures 
implementing competition law in the European Union (EU), in particular, in 
relation to corporate bigness. The European Commission enforces EU compe-
tition law, cumulating investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative functions. 
At the same time, the judicial branch of the EU practices a deferential judicial 
standard of review in competition law cases which appears to favour the exec-
utive branch of the European Union in relation to powerful economic opera-
tors and persons affected in alleged violations of competition law.
This setup can lead to the erosion of democratic principles of governance in 
the EU, in particular, the separation of powers, accountability and the respect 
of individual fundamental rights. Such concerns are not new. Schwarze prophe-
sized in his classical work European Administrative Law, that “what appears 
to be an absolute subjection of the administration to the rule of law cannot 
be achieved”.1 Everson has voiced that “the dark hour of the executive poses a 
fundamental challenge to both the rule and role of modern law” in two partic-
ular and interrelated ways.2 The emphasis on the technical models of imple-
mentation and oversight of and by the government lead to the “scientification 
of large areas of human activity”, which raises concerns about the role of law 
as corrective action within the public sphere.3 More recently Chiti, while pre-
senting EU administrative law as a “genuinely complex gravitational field in 
which internal and external forces co- exist one next to the other”, highlighted 
that in its 60- year long history, EU administrative law remained underdevel-
oped in two major ways.4 EU administrative law has failed first, to recognize 
the relevance and role of administrative discretion, “which remains a taboo in 
EU institutional discourse” and, second, to develop fully- fledged accountability 
regimes.5
 1 Schwarze, Jürgen. European Administrative Law. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2006, p. 209.
 2 Everson, Michelle. “Agencies: the “Dark Hour” of the Executive?” Legal Challenges in EU 
Administrative Law: Towards an Integrated Administration. Eds. Herwig C.H. Hofmann and 
Alexander H. Türk. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2009, pp. 116– 135, p. 125.
 3 Everson, op. cit.
 4 Chiti, Edoardo. “Is EU Administrative Law Failing in Some of Its Crucial Tasks?” European 
Law Journal 22.5 (2016): pp. 576– 596, p. 581.













I question in this book whether the administrative practice of the European 
Commission in EU competition law contributes to the democratic deficit 
of governance in the European Union. This question becomes of particular 
importance in light of what Schmidt- Aßmann and Rademacher described as a 
worldwide trend “towards recognizing the individual right of effective review 
by an independent body as an important characteristic of the international 
legal order”.6 Schmidt- Aßmann and Rademacher describe the emergence 
in international law of “an overarching guarantee of protection of individ-
ual rights against acts of public power”.7 In her recent book Beyond Human 
Rights: The Legal Status of the Individual in International Law, Peters takes this 
argument a step forward by proposing that the individual’s position should be 
strengthened under international law.8 An individual who has access to inter-
national justice can bring claims and contributes – directly or, at least, indi-
rectly – to the creation of international law.
In this context, the case- law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
on the right to a fair trial provides safeguards which, if incorporated into the 
substance of EU law, could strengthen the democratic capital of the EU. The 
right to a fair trial – also referred to as Article 6(1) echr or due process – is 
defined in the European Convention on Human Rights (echr) as follows:
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any crim-
inal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hear-
ing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law.
This provision has generated a substantial number of cases that has affected 
the ECtHR to develop into a self- regulating tribunal. The principles developed 
in the case- law of the ECtHR concerning the independence of administrative 
agencies and the right to effective judicial protection are of particular impor-
tance in this context because they deal with both shortcomings identified by 
Chiti in EU administrative law, that is administrative discretion and account-
ability regimes.
 6 Schmidt- Aßmann, Eberhard and Timo Rademacher. “Rechtsschutzgarantien des internatio-
nalen Rechts.” Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 61 (2013): pp. 61– 88, p. 62. (per-
sonal translation).
 7 Schmidt- Aßmann and Rademacher, op. cit., p. 88. (personal translation).
 8 Peters, Anne. Beyond Human Rights: The Legal Status of the Individual in International Law. 








This monograph has the strong ambition of keeping a strong foothold in 
past scholarship in order to elucidate the question of addressing corporate 
bigness in modern democracies. Therefore, the work borrows and recycles 
notions that might be familiar to lawyers, political scientists and economists, 
such as self- regulation, administrative state, the economic man, problems of 
organized complexity, system thinking etc.
The second foothold attempts to stride forward a few ideas. The first idea is 
that the ECtHR remains relevant to the debate on bigness, especially due to its 
self- regulating nature. The second idea is that, the ECtHR and the EU are part 
of a pan- European system of fundamental rights protection. The EU and the 
ECtHR must find a way to work together, despite the current blockage of the 
accession of the EU to the echr by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(cjeu). The third idea is that the critique concerning the independence of EU 
Commission as competition enforcement agency and of the ensuing deferen-
tial judicial review is essentially a critique of the design of EU law.
The current book might be of interest to scholars concerned about funda-
mental rights in the EU and specifically to scholars interested in due process. 
The discussion in Part 3 about the independence of competition agencies might 
be of interest for the transposition of Directive 1/ 2019 meant to strengthen the 
independence of National Competition Authorities (nca s). In addition, in 
light of the fact that the accession of the EU to the echr has not been finalized 
yet, this book sheds a light on a few potential consequences of the accession. 
Also, some elements of the current analysis – independence of the European 
Commission and deferential review – could be applied in relation to the com-
mon agricultural law, EU pharmaceutical law or EU criminal law.
The current work is placed within a larger intellectual context which 
includes the evolution of the bureaucratic executive power, the curse of big-
ness and the changing constitutional design of the EU.
The Curse of Bigness – In a recent book, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the 
New Gilded Age, Wu notes that “we have managed to recreate both the econom-
ics and politics of a century ago – the first Gilded Age – and remain in grave 
danger of repeating more of the signature errors of the twentieth century”.9 He 
highlights that – as witnessed in the past – extreme economic concentration 
yields inequality and suffering, which in turn feed nationalistic and extremist 
tastes. The tendency towards bigness is not new in the history of mankind, 
as the history of former empires suggests. The history of industrialization, 
 9 Wu, Tim. The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age. New York: Columbia Global 





however, brought about a form of bigness not known before: the big organi-
zation. Public or private, the big organization posed new questions both about 
its operation from within and about controlling it from the outside. These 
questions strike at the core of the democratic debate which is necessarily con-
cerned about the governmental power to be exercised in relation to the big 
organization.
The concerns voiced by Wu result from observing the monopolization move-
ment that started in the late nineteenth century and led to a new economic 
form: the giant, monopoly corporation. This was accompanied by the Social 
Darwinism movement that went so far as to propose to diminish by slaugh-
ter the sick in order to speed the renewal of population. Early monopolists 
used Social Darwinism to justify the survival of only the strongest and fittest 
on the market. In this sense, Wu quotes Rockefeller having said that “growth of 
a large business is merely a survival of the fittest (…) the working out of a law 
of nature, and a law of God”.10
Nowadays, the rule of concentrated economic power affects industries like 
finance, media, airlines, telecommunications and, more importantly, the dig-
ital technology industry, where giants such as Google, Apple, Facebook and 
Amazon, play an important role in people’s lives.11 This debate is particularly 
astute in the context of the growing concerns about artificial intelligence 
and general artificial intelligence because there is a race in this field which 
is largely a race between companies. If the race is successful, the company 
that will control general artificial intelligence might also control the future 
of humanity.12
One – especially if one is a scholar – must however not fall prey to the 
biased tendency of connecting corporate bigness with evil. As Justice 
McKenna reminded in US Steel “we must adhere to the law and the law 
does not make mere size an offence, or the existence of unexerted power an 
offence”.13 It is in this context that Wu asks a fundamental question which is 
relevant to this book: “Are extreme levels of industrial concentration actually 
compatible with the premise of rough equality among citizens, industrial 
freedom, or democracy itself?”14 To answer his own question, Wu proposes to 
resurrect and renovate the main tenets of the Brandeisian economic vision 
 10 Wu, op. cit., p. 27.
 11 Wu, op. cit., pp. 11– 12.
 12 Chace, Calum. Surviving AI: The Promise and Peril of Artificial Intelligence. London: Three 
Cs, 2015.
 13 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).












which “took matters like bigness and concentration as inseparable from the 
very nature of democracy, and the conditions under which its citizens would 
live”.15
Louis D. Brandeis – an American lawyer who is regarded as one of the most 
important antitrust theoreticians to have ever sat on the US Supreme Court – 
helped Woodrow Wilson conceive his 1912 New Freedom electoral campaign 
by forging a link between the control of bigness – monopolies – and demo-
cratic principles. This vision remained popular in the US for the rest of the 20th 
century and is currently enjoying a revival.16 The neo- Brandeisians are primar-
ily concerned with more aggressive antitrust laws, merger control and trust- 
busting. At the same time, “the curse of bigness” that Brandeis coined referred 
not only at concentration of economic power. In fact, Brandeis believed that 
concentration of political or administrative power was akin to alienating the 
state from democracy and from the citizen. Bigness, as Brandeis suggested, was 
a curse wherever it occurred.17
These are thus some of the most interesting challenges of modern 
democracies:
 – Understanding corporate bigness and its impact on the society;
 – Deciding how to address corporate bigness in a democratic society;
 – Addressing corporate bigness while respecting fundamental rights;
 – The role that the law should play in the process of addressing bigness.
This book deals with the third and fourth challenge – the attempt to address 
bigness by the EU Commission and the cjeu.
In the EU, the European Commission is mandated by Articles 101 and 102 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (tfeu) to discipline 
and to sanction bigness – cartels and abuses of dominant position. In addi-
tion, the EU Commission is mandated by the Council Regulation No 139/ 2004 
(EU Merger Regulation) to implement merger control by prohibiting mergers 
and acquisitions which would significantly reduce competition in the Single 
Market.18
At the same time, when enforcing EU competition law, the European 
Commission represents the kind of bigness Brandeis warned against, by exer-
cising a wide discretion and policing powers that, at times, can appear limitless.
 15 Wu, op. cit., p. 34.
 16 Ramsey, David. Antitrust and the Supreme Court. El Paso: lfp Scholarly Publishing llc, 
2012, p. 40.
 17 Rosen, Jeffrey. Louis D. Brandeis: American Prophet. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016.
 18 Council Regulation (ec) No 139/ 2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations 










Administrative discretion could be limited in at least three ways: by the 
Treaties establishing administrative discretionary regimes, by the courts or by 
procedural participatory rights. In the EU, the exercise of administrative dis-
cretion in competition law proceedings is not contained by the EU Treaties. 
Second, both the General Court of the EU (former Court of First Instance, 
cfi) – which acts as a first instance court in EU competition law cases – and 
the cjeu – which acts as an appellate and last instance court in EU compe-
tition cases – perform a deferential judicial review. Most scholars agree that 
the deferential judicial review performed by the EU Courts does not limit the 
EU Commission’s administrative discretion. Lastly, the regime of procedural 
participatory rights in EU competition law – whose main engine is the princi-
ple of due process – is far from having a real impact on the EU Commission’s 
administrative discretion.
In the same vein, the role played by fundamental rights, including principles 
of due process, in EU law is growing. Thus, on the one hand, EU Commission 
fights bigness with a clear focus on powers of investigation and minimal due 
process during EU competition enforcement proceedings. On the other hand, 
the recent legislation adopted by EU concerning the direct enforcement of 
Articles 101 and 102 tfeu by nca s appears to prioritize fundamental rights. 
As a recent piece of EU legislation described in Section 7.6. below shows, the 
member states of the EU must ensure that nca s can operate in full indepen-
dence and impartiality when enforcing EU competition law.19 The same rules 
however do not apply to the EU Commission itself.
From Growing Power of the Bureaucratic Executive to Doubting Chevron – The 
industrial revolution seems to have been at the origin of corporate bigness. 
The same phenomenon of growth took place however in government, with 
an increasing power for the executive branch, a growing number of executive 
agencies and attacks against the judiciary when attempting to place limits on 
the executive. Bureaucratic theory, highlighted in Section 9.2.1. below, is one of 
the ideas developed to explain and support this phenomenon. Lawyers, how-
ever, have been rather divided both about the virtues of bureaucracy and its 
compatibility with democracy.
At the beginning of the last century the growing power of bureaucracy was 
associated with despotism and a voluntarily misleading view of the world. 
James M. Beck, former Solicitor General of the United States, wrote in his 
 19 Directive (eu) 2019/ 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 
2018 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective 







1932 book Our Wonderland of Bureaucracy, that bureaucracy “primarily refers 
in a democratic government to the aggrandizement of the Executive at the 
expense of the Legislative branch of the government”.20 In a broader sense, 
Beck argued, bureaucracy “refers to the irrepressible war between the individ-
ual and the State, and involves the question as to the just limits, under the 
higher law, of the State over the property and life of the individual”.21
On the other side of the Atlantic, Lord Hewart of Bury, Lord Chief Justice 
of England, argued in his 1929 book The New Despotism that there was “in 
existence a persistent and well- contrived system, intended to produce, and in 
practice producing, a despotic power which at one and the same time places 
Government departments above the Sovereignty of Parliament and beyond 
the jurisdiction of the Courts”.22 Hewart announced that “the time has come 
for the departmental despot, who shall be at once scientific and benevolent, 
but above the all a law to himself”.23 Hewart imagines that if the new depart-
mental despot had a soliloquy, it would comprise the following rules which, in 
the context of the present book, deserve full mention:
 1. The business of the Executive is to govern.
 2. The only persons fit to govern are experts.
 3. The experts in the art of government are the permanent officials (…).
 4. But the expert must deal with things as they are. The “foursquare man” 
makes the best of the circumstances in which he finds himself.
 5. Two main obstacles hamper the beneficent work of the expert. One is the 
Sovereignty of Parliament, and the other is the Rule of Law.
 6. A kind of fetish- worship, prevalent among an ignorant public, prevents 
the destruction of these obstacles. The expert, therefore, must make use 
of the first in order to frustrate the second.
 7. To this end let him, under Parliamentary forms, clothe himself with des-
potic power, and then, because the forms are Parliamentary, defy the Law 
Courts.
 8. This course will prove tolerably simple if he can: (a) get legislation passed 
in skeleton form; (b) fill up the gaps with his own rules, orders, and regu-
lations; (c) make it difficult or impossible for Parliament to check the said 
rules, orders, and regulations; (d) secure for them the force of statute; (e) 
make his own decision final; (f) arrange that the fact of his decision shall 
 20 Beck, James M. Our Wonderland of Bureaucracy. New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1932, p. x.
 21 Beck, op.cit., p. x.
 22 Hewart, Lord of Bury. The New Despotism. London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1929, p. 14.










be conclusive proof of its legality; (g) take power to modify the provisions 
of statutes; and (h) prevent and avoid any sort of appeal to a Court of Law.
 9. If the expert can get rid of the Lord Chancellor, reduce the judges to a 
branch of the Civil Service, compel them to give opinions beforehand on 
hypothetical cases, and appoint them himself through a business man to 
be called “Minister of Justice”, the coping- stone will be laid and the music 
will be the fuller.24
Von Mises contended that the voluntary abandonment of congressional rights 
through delegation as the main source of modern bureaucracy- making ren-
dered bureaucracy undemocratic.25 He warned that “delegation of power is 
the main instrument of modern dictatorship. It is by virtue of delegation of 
power that Hitler and his Cabinet rule Germany. It is by delegation of power 
that the British Left wants to establish its dictatorship and to transform 
Great Britain into a socialist commonwealth”.26 The process of “transfer of 
effective power over human lives from the constitutionally visible offices of 
government, the nominally sovereign offices, to the vast network that has 
been brought into being in the name of protection of the people from their 
exploiters” has not stopped.27 Anthropologist David Graeber called this phe-
nomenon total or predatory bureaucratization which was not just a political 
realignment, it was a cultural transformation in that bureaucratic techniques 
developed in financial and scientific circles such as performance reviews, 
focus groups, surveys “came to invade the rest of society – education, science, 
government – and eventually, to pervade almost every aspect of everyday 
life”.28
Other social scientists focused on less grim accounts of the bureaucracy. 
Bureaucracy appeared to Max Weber as a superior and inevitable form of 
social organization that wove rationality and formalism into the social fabric 
guaranteeing thus its strength:
The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has 
always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of orga-
nization. The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with 
 24 Hewart, op. cit., pp. 20– 21.
 25 Von Mises, Ludwig. Bureaucracy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944, p. 5.
 26 Von Mises, op. cit., pp. 5– 6.
 27 Nisbet, Robert A. The New Despotism. California: Institute for Humane Studies, Inc., 
1976, p. 4.
 28 Graeber, David. The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of 












other organizations exactly as does the machine with the non- mechanical 
modes of production. Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the 
files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of fric-
tion and of material and personal costs – these are raised to the optimum 
point in the strictly bureaucratic administration (…). As compared with 
all collegiate, honorific, and avocational forms of administration, trained 
bureaucracy is superior on all these points.29
In the same vein, public choice theorists have been concerned with “the use 
of economic tools to deal with traditional problems of political science”.30 
Buchanan, one of the founding fathers of the Public Choice Theory and a 
Nobel Prize winner, posited that (1) the individual persons were the basic 
component units of the social order and that (2) the government was “that 
complex of institutions through which individuals make collective deci-
sions, and through which they carry out collective as opposed to private 
activities”.31 The government and its extension, the bureaucracy, appear 
thus as a benevolent institution, motivated by the desire to promote the 
public good. Two immediate conclusions have been deducted from these 
initial hypotheses. The first is that substantive or procedural limits on the 
government imply limiting its ability to provide for general welfare and, 
therefore, to answer the individual persons’ desires. The second conclusion 
is that one of the main functions of the government was to limit failures of 
markets.32
The paradigm pendulum appears thus to be moving between opposite 
visions when it comes to the issue of the growing power of the executive 
branch. The public and academic debate accompanying the New Deal cap-
tured these intellectual tumults. In his book The New Deal and the Problem of 
Monopoly: A Study in Economic Ambivalence, historian Ellis W. Hawley, pres-
ents an extensive account of this dilemma:
 29 Weber, Max. “Technical Advantages of Bureaucratic Organisation.” From Max Weber: Essays 
in Sociology. Eds. Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press, 
Digital Print, 2007, pp. 358– 359.
 30 Tullock, G. “Public Choice.” The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Eds. Durlauf S.N., 
Blume L.E. London: Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2008.
 31 Buchanan, James. “An Economist’s Approach to Scientific Politics.” The Collected Works of 
James M. Buchanan: Volume 13: Politics as Public Choice. Carmel: Liberty Fund, 2000, p. 4.
 32 Clarck, J.R. and Lee R. Dwight. “The Impact of the Calculus of Consent.” Public Choice, 
Past and Present: The Legacy of James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock. Ed. Lee R. Dwight. 










The search in the twentieth- century America (…) was for some solution 
that would reconcile the practical necessity with the individualistic ideal, 
some arrangement that would preserve the industrial order, necessarily 
based upon a high degree of collective organization, and yet would pre-
serve America’s democratic heritage at the same time. Americans wanted 
a stable, efficient industrial system, one that turned out a large quantity 
of material goods, insured full employment, and provided a relatively 
high degree of economic security. Yet at the same time they wanted a 
system as free as possible from centralized direction, one in which eco-
nomic power was dispersed and economic opportunity was really open, 
one that preserved the dignity of the individual and adjusted itself auto-
matically to market forces. And they were unwilling to renounce the 
hope of achieving both.33
Control of the executive – expressed as growth of the bureaucratic capacity or 
its tempering – becomes thus a central issue for democratic systems. Simon 
argued that human behaviour should be factored in when constructing admin-
istrative theory. He wrote in his influential book Administrative Behavior that
the central concern of administrative theory is with boundary between 
the rational and the non- rational aspects of human social behaviour. 
Administrative theory is peculiarly the theory of intended and bounded 
rationality – of the behaviour of human beings who satisfice because 
they have not the wits to maximize.34 (original emphasis)
Simon distinguished between the economic man, who maximizes, always 
selecting the best alternative from all those available to him and the adminis-
trative man, who satisfices, preferring the course of action that is satisfactory 
or “good enough”.35 It is this impossibility to maximize, then, that requires con-
trol over the administration.
Unlike political scientists, legal scholars conceive of three main regimes to 
control the executive:
 (1) Large accountability regimes imposed on the administration;
 (2) Judicial review of administrative action and
 33 Hawley, Ellis W. The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly: A Study in Economic 
Ambivalence. New York: Fordham University Press, 1995, p. 473.
 34 Simon, Herbert A. Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision- Making Process in 
Administrative Organization (2nd edition). New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961.








 (3) Participatory rights for individuals in legal proceedings opposing the 
administration.
Judicial review thus steps into the forefront of the democratic debate because 
participatory rights can be successfully exercised against administrative action 
only if judicial review is permissive and large. The opposite – deferential judi-
cial review – is however still largely practiced in many modern democratic sys-
tems, including the EU.
Deferential judicial review – known as the Chevron doctrine in the US – 
originated in a case challenging the interpretation of an environmental stat-
ute and has been very influential in American administrative law.36 Initially, 
Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the following opinion on behalf of a unan-
imous court:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which 
it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the 
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for 
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress 
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does 
not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be nec-
essary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the 
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the ques-
tion for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissi-
ble construction of the statute.
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an 
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific pro-
vision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given 
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency 
on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, 
a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision 
for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.
In 2001, the US Supreme Court narrowed the scope of application of the 
Chevron doctrine of deference.37 Under a preliminary step called “Chevron 
 36 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).






step zero”, a court must first determine whether as a matter of design agencies 
or courts were intended to possess interpretive authority over a statute.38 One 
of the most outspoken critics of the Chevron doctrine recognized that “it is 
not immediately apparent why a court should ever accept the judgment of an 
executive agency on a question of law”.39 This, however, did not prevent the 
Chevron doctrine to become the consensus among the US Supreme Court.40 
In the same vein, deferential judicial review became the preferred modus 
operandi of the cjeu when interacting with the EU Commission on disputes 
involving complex and technical matters.
Recently, the fate of the Chevron doctrine appears to be changing. First 
of all, as the New York Times reported, “with surprising frankness, the White 
House has laid out a plan to fill the courts with judges devoted to a legal doc-
trine that challenges the broad power federal agencies have to interpret laws 
and enforce regulations, often without being subject to judicial oversight”.41 In 
the past, nominations for federal judgeship in the US depended on the nom-
inee’s opinion concerning abortion or other divisive social issues. Currently, 
one test guides the nomination – whether the candidate is ready to rein the 
administrative state.42
Second, the consensus concerning Chevron within the US Supreme Court 
appears to be broken. In fact, “open divisions about Chevron have appeared 
among the justices. (…) all nine justices have at least once signed an opin-
ion explicitly holding that Chevron should not apply in a situation where the 
administrative law textbooks would previously have said that it must apply”.43
These developments suggest that, at least in the US, the fate of the adminis-
trative state is changing.
The European Union has in many ways a unique executive and bureaucracy. 
Nevertheless, its claimed sui generis nature has not escaped the tumultuous 
intellectual debates surrounding the growth and control of its administration. 
The European Commission became a behemoth of power, combining legis-
lative, executive and adjudicative functions. Many of the warnings identified 
 38 Sunstein, Cass R. “Chevron Step Zero.” Virginia Law Review 92.2 (2006): pp. 187– 249.
 39 Scalia, Antonin. “Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law.” Duke Law 
Journal 1989.3 (1989): pp. 511– 521.
 40 Kagan, Michael. “Loud and Soft Anti- Chevron Decisions.” Wake Forest Law Review 53.37 
(2018).
 41 Peters, Jeremy H. “Trump’s New Judicial Litmus Test: Shrinking ‘the Administrative State.’ ” 
The New York Times. 26 May 2018. Available at https:// www.nytimes.com/ 2018/ 03/ 26/ us/ 
politics/ trump- judges- courts- administrative- state.html accessed on 23 February 2021.
 42 Peters, Jeremy H., quoted above.














by the early thinkers – the voluntary abandonment of the legislative power 
by the European Parliament, the delegation of power to unelected offices and 
deferential judicial review – abound in the EU. Whether the winds of change 
affecting the Chevron doctrine will also affect deferential judicial review in the 
EU is still to be seen.
The Growing Importance of Fundamental Rights in Europe and in the EU – In 
September 2019, the conference organized for the inauguration of Finland’s 
Presidency to the EU was dedicated to strengthening democracy, rule of law 
and fundamental rights as the “the essential building blocks of our societies 
and the very foundation of the European project”.44 The works of the con-
ference prove the central role played by fundamental rights. The Minister of 
Justice Anna- Maja Henriksson highlighted that
the international operating environment is increasingly difficult to 
predict, challenging both the EU and its member states. There is a risk 
that problems in the realization of fundamental rights, the functioning 
of democratic processes and the rule of law will start to undermine the 
foundations of our societies. The EU’s strength comes from its unity. That 
is why we need joint discussions and shared tools for strengthening the 
value base of our societies.45
In the same vein, Lasser, focusing on the influence of the ECtHR’s case- law, 
described the fundamental rights revolution taking place on the European con-
tinent. Fundamental rights have become a lingua franca across jurisdictions 
operating as “a common legal denominator and as a pool of common legal 
terms transferable within and across European polities”.46 The fundamen-
tal rights revolution is taking place within a complex and competitive inter- 
institutional arena that is also evolving because of the advance of fundamental 
 44 Finland’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union. “How to Strengthen 
Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights – Tools Discussed in a Presidency 
Conference.” News Item. Available at: https:// eu2019.fi/ en/ article/ - / asset_ publisher/ 
how- to- strengthen- democracy- the- rule- of- law- and- fundamental- rights- ideas- emerging- 
from- a- presidency- conference accessed on 23 February 2021.
 45 Finland’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union. “How to Strengthen 
Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights on Agenda in Helsinki on 10– 11 
September.” Press Release. Available at: https:// eu2019.fi/ en/ article/ - / asset_ publisher/ 
perusoikeudet- oikeusvaltioperiaate- ja- demokratia- esilla- helsingissa- 10- 11- syyskuuta?_ 
101_ INSTANCE_ YCurs8qvI1NM_ languageId=en_ US accessed on 23 February 2021.
 46 Lasser, Mitchel de S.- O.- L’E. Judicial Transformations: the Rights Revolution in the Courts of 








rights. Lasser also highlights that “the rise of judicial power and the advent of 
individual rights have (…) gone hand in hand”.47
Lasser concludes that
If European law takes precedence over domestic law, European funda-
mental rights effectively become the most powerful legal norms at both 
the domestic and the supranational levels. They reign supreme among 
superior European norms; and (…) they have become applicable virtually 
across the board in any and all controversies.48 (emphasis added)
The entry into force of the Treaty on European Union (teu) with its Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter) took place within 
the context described above and marked a new stage in the history of the EU. 
The Charter – except for becoming the most important document concerning 
fundamental rights in the EU, has affected the constitutional design of the EU 
in at least three ways.
First, as noted in 2011 by Presidents Costa and Skouris, the Charter “has 
become of primary importance in the recent case- law of the cjeu”.49 Second, 
the Charter’s potential federal effect may result in fundamental rights stan-
dards “applicable right across the EU regardless of whether national measures 
fall within or outside the scope of application of EU law”.50 Since most of 
EU law is implemented by the national administrative authorities of the EU 
Member States – which “often act as, and indeed are, the executive branch” of 
the Union – the Charter can be said to represent another stage of integration 
through law in the EU.51
Lastly, EU fundamental rights became integrated into a fresh vision of what 
the European political economy represented. This vision welcomed “the indi-
vidual more deeply into the process of European political economy, making it 
harder for her to assert her position against these processes. However, it also 
 47 Lasser, op. cit., p. 27.
 48 Lasser, op. cit., p. 4.
 49 ECtHR. Joint Communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris. 24 Jan 2011, paragraph 
1. Available at https:// www.echr.coe.int/ Documents/ UE_ Communication_ Costa_ Skouris_ 
ENG.pdf accessed on 23 February 2021.
 50 Groussot, Xavier, Laurent Pech and Gunnar Thor Petursson. The Scope of Application of EU 
Fundamental Rights on Member States’ Action: In Search of Certainty in EU Adjudication. 
Eric Stein Working Paper No. 1/ 2011, Czech Society for European and Comparative 
Law, p. 3.
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led to new possibilities for her to assert her position within these processes”.52 
(original emphasis) This point answers the dignitarians who have criticized 
the lack of concern for the dignity and position of the persons affected by the 
European governance.53
The Charter is relevant for the individual citizens of the EU, but also for 
the EU institutions. The provisions of the Charter, however, are far from being 
clear and generate numerous discussions concerning its interpretation.
For the purpose of this book, the relevant legal provisions of the teu and 
the Charter can be summarized as follows.
First of all, pursuant to Article 2 of the teu, the EU is founded on the values 
of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights. Article 6(1) teu stipulates that the Charter has the 
same legal value as the Treaties and Article 6(2) teu instructs that the Union 
shall accede to the echr. Finally, Article 6(3) stipulates that fundamental 
rights, as guaranteed by the echr and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the member states, constitute general principles of 
EU law.
Second, Article 52(3) of the Charter states that, in so far as the Charter con-
tains rights which correspond to those guaranteed by the echr, their meaning 
and scope are to be the same as those laid down by the echr. According to the 
explanation of Article 52(2), this provision is “intended to ensure the necessary 
consistency between the Charter and the echr by establishing the rule that, in 
so far as the rights in the present Charter also correspond to rights guaranteed 
by the echr, the meaning and scope of those rights, including authorized lim-
itations, are the same as those laid down by the echr”.54 In addition, the mean-
ing and the scope of the guaranteed rights are to be determined by the text 
of those instruments, but also by the case- law of the ECtHR and by the cjeu. 
Finally, anyhow, “the level of protection afforded by the Charter may never be 
lower than that guaranteed by the echr”.55
Lastly, Article 47(1) of the Charter provides that everyone whose rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by EU law are violated has the right to an effective remedy 
 52 Chalmers, Damien and Sarah Trotter. “Fundamental Rights and Legal Wrongs: The Two 
Sides of the Same EU Coin.” European Law Journal 22.1 (2016): pp. 9– 39, p. 27.
 53 Mendes, Joana. “Participation and Participation Rights in EU Law and Governance.” Legal 
Challenges in EU Administrative Law: Towards an Integrated Administration. Eds. Herwig 
C.H. Hofmann and Alexander H. Türk. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2009, pp. 257– 287, 
p. 286.
 54 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, oj C 303, 14.12.2007, pp. 17– 
35, p. 33.










before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this article. 
Article 47(2) stipulates that everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previ-
ously established by law. Everyone is to have the possibility of being advised, 
defended and represented. Article 47(3) provides that legal aid is to be made 
available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary 
to ensure effective access to justice.
According to the explanations relating to Article 47, which, in accordance 
with the third subparagraph of Article 6(1) teu and Article 52(7) of the Charter, 
have to be taken into consideration for the interpretation of the Charter, the 
second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter corresponds to Article 6(1) of the 
echr.56
One would expect that the developments in fundamental rights in the EU 
would spill over all areas of EU law, including competition law. This is not the 
case however and EU competition law remains adamantly unconcerned with 
the growing importance of fundamental rights in the Union. It is therefore 
both important and interesting to study the interplay between the growing 
momentum of fundamental rights in the Union and the enforcement of the 
EU competition law.
This study is also important due to one additional reason. As Figure 1 
below shows, when the domestic courts and the nca s enforce EU competi-
tion law they are bound to respect the Charter. However, since all the mem-
ber states of the EU are also signatories to the echr, they are also bound to 
respect the echr. On the other hand, since the EU has not completed its 
accession to the echr, when the EU Commission and the EU Courts enforce 
EU competition law, they are bound only by the Charter. This situation 
results therefore in a double burden on the nca s and the domestic courts 
of the EU member states which have to respect fundamental rights arising 
from two international instruments when implementing EU competition 
law. In addition, since the interpretation of the echr by the ECtHR and of 
the Charter by the cjeu differs, the burden on the nca s and the domestic 
courts is not only numerical. In fact, they must follow procedures that sat-
isfy both the echr, the Charter and the case- law outlining their respective 
interpretations.
Another way of looking at the problem enunciated in Figure 1 is to argue 
that, because Article 52(3) of the Charter establishes an equivalence between 
the provisions of the Charter and provisions of the echr, both the EU 





Commission and the cjeu must respect the echr. Arguments in favour of 
the indirect application of the echr in the EU could be drawn from this line 
of thought. Another idea that can be deduced from the principle of equiva-
lence established in Article 52(3) is that the EU and the ECtHR belong to a 
pan- European system of fundamental rights protection.
The Way Forward – This book sets out to examinee if and how the EU com-
petition law enforcement procedure fulfils the requirements of Article 6(1) 
echr which guarantees the right to a fair trial. Two concepts form the core 
of the right to a fair trial in competition law disputes: independence of the 
administrative agency acting as adjudicator and effective judicial review. These 
concepts will be analysed at length from the perspective of Article 6(1) echr.
This book works, as shown in Figure 2 below, with the overarching assump-
tion that the two supranational legal systems developed at the Council of 
Europe (CoE) and the European Union represent sub- systems of a single pan- 
European system that has fundamental rights protection as one of its functions. 
The fundamental rights system developed by the CoE is composed of the echr 
and the ECtHR. The system dealing with the enforcement of competition law 
in the EU is composed of the European Commission, the cjeu, the domestic 
competition authorities and the domestic courts of the EU member states.
The second overarching assumption is that, due to their proximity, the two sub- 
systems concerned with fundamental rights protection must influence each other. 
The core of the present book deals with the type and extent of this influence.
Pan-European System












The third overarching assumption is that a mismanaged influence between 
the elements of the same system can lead to the breakdown of the system 
itself. Thus, the two supranational legal systems may inevitably collide. Due to 
their size and importance, this collision can lead to damaging the components. 
The ECtHR risks taking the blow.
The monograph is divided into four parts. Part 1 is a presentation of the theo-
retical foundations underlying the research: EU competition law and the ECtHR.
Part 2 is also a prefatory chapter offering an in- depth analysis of the notion 
of due process and the right to a fair trial. Due process is a fundamental notion 
in the American legal system that is directly linked to judicial review as a tool 
for law- making and rebalancing the checks and balances system. However, 
when the echr was adopted, the wording used was that of the right to a fair 
trial. Whether the choice of wording was the result of a desire to distance the 
European tradition from the American one of judicial review is a matter of spec-
ulation. What is not a matter of speculation, however, is the fact that the ECtHR 
used the right to a fair trial to enlarge its jurisdiction. A detailed analysis of the 
case- law concerning the applicability of Article 6(1) echr shows that the ECtHR 
has progressively rendered the right to a fair trial applicable to disputes that 
have previously been considered as belonging to public law. This meant that 
the member states had to develop domestic normative frameworks and judicial 
practices in order to satisfy the guarantees enshrined in Article 6(1) echr. The 
chapter concludes that the ECtHR is a self- regulating tribunal and that it is due 
to its self- regulating nature that its case- law remains relevant in Europe.
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 figure 2  The influence of the Council of Europe human rights enforcement system on the 





Parts 3 and 4 follow a two- step analysis. First, they provide a detailed anal-
ysis of the case- law of the ECtHR on two of the most important guarantees 
enshrined in the right to a fair trial – the right to an independent and impartial 
tribunal and the right to an effective judicial review. Second, they attempt to 
apply the principles distilled from the case- law of the ECtHR to verify if the 
EU Commission can be deemed to be an independent and impartial tribunal 
and if the judicial review performed by the cjeu satisfy the requirements of 
Article 6(1) echr. For this purpose, Part 3, first, describes the legislative, exec-
utive and judicial functions that the EU Commission exercises and, second, the 
procedure for the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 tfeu. In the same vein, 
Part 4 describes the standard of review applied by the EU courts in competi-
tion law cases.
An important question can be raised at this point. Namely, why should the 
safeguard of independent and impartial “tribunal” be applicable to the EU 
Commission? The answer can be found in the interpretation of Article 6(1) 
echr, whose wording speaks about the “right to an independent and impar-
tial tribunal established by law”. The early case- law of the ECtHR applied a 
literal interpretation of the echr and interpreted the “tribunal established 
by law” meaning the courts and tribunals forming the judicial branch of 
a state.57 Two developments, however, changed this situation. On the one 
hand, the ECtHR developed its case- law and interpretation tools, gaining 
both self- confidence and external recognition. On the other hand, member 
states increasingly entrusted adjudicatory powers to numerous adminis-
trative agencies in order to satisfy the demands of the growing administra-
tive state.
The ECtHR, therefore, embraced a functional and teleological interpretation 
of the echr. The administrative agencies performing adjudicatory powers 
have thus been included in the notion of “tribunal established by law”.
In order to assess the independence and impartiality of administrative 
agencies performing adjudicatory powers, the ECtHR takes into account the 
design of the administrative agency at issue and the type of judicial review 
available against the decisions of the administrative agencies. As Figure 3 
shows, if the administrative agency with adjudicatory powers fulfils the inde-
pendence requirements enshrined in Article 6(1) echr, then minimal judicial 
review suffices to render the scheme compatible with the right to a fair trial. 
If, on the contrary, the administrative agency with adjudicatory powers does 
not fulfil the independence requirements enshrined in Article 6(1) echr, then 







only effective judicial review can render the scheme compatible with the right 
to a fair trial.
1 Scope
This book is placed at the intersection of EU competition law and fundamental 
rights. It asks the general research question of how the fundamental rights dis-
course and the changing constitutional design of the EU affects the nature of 
European competition law. Articles 101 and 102 tfeu which prohibit, respec-
tively, cartels and the abuse of dominant position are chosen as the main focus. 
Mergers are only studied marginally, although the findings remain relevant for 
mergers as well.
In order to answer this question, the current research is structured around two 
central points of interest: the case- law of the ECtHR on the right to a fair trial and 
EU competition law. On the one hand, the functioning of the ECtHR and its case- 
law on the right to a fair trial is scrutinized in great detail. This analysis is per-
formed in Part Two of the work. On the other hand, this research investigates how 
the right to a fair trial has affected the theory and practice of two highly debat-
able notions: the independence and impartiality of the European Commission 
and the deferential judicial review practiced by the EU courts in competition law 
cases. These issues will be analysed in Part 3 and Part 4 of the current work.
The commitment to simple research questions is complicated in the con-
text of the present book by the fact that the work itself is placed within the 
ratione materiae continuum formed by fundamental rights and competition 
law, and the jurisdictional continuum formed by the ECtHR and the cjeu. At 








right to a fair trial
 figure 3  The syllogism applied by the ECtHR to test the compatibility of adjudication 





the same time, working on the notion of a fair trial and due process necessarily 
touches upon bigger questions that are relevant in every democratic system. 
It is for this reason that the current research will occasionally invoke and rely 
on works of inter alia legal philosophers, political scientists, economists and 
anthropologists.
There are also a few peripheral points of interest that were chosen for their 
capacity to shed light of the main research question. They are described in 
Chapter 2 and resurge at various points as source of argument or counterargu-
ment. These issues are the following:
 – Systems thinking offers a novel perspective on the functioning of the ECtHR, 
one which supports the continuing importance of its case- law for EU law. 
System thinking is used in the current research to justify the proposal that 
the ECtHR is a self- regulating tribunal;
 – New Public Management Movement (npm) is a widely- researched topic 
with many tenets. In this book, npm is invoked to argument that resis-
tance to due process in EU competition law could be linked to npm’s focus 
on efficiency, abundant use of soft- law and preference for alternative 
procedures;
 – One question that arises throughout the book concerns the reasons for 
which EU competition law is considered special and thus falling outside the 
normal realm of law. Specialness is a central feature of EU competition law 
that affects both the practice of the EU Commission and the judicial review 
applied by the EU Courts;
 – EU competition law appears to remain focused on consumers, whereas the 
EU has changed its focus towards the citizen. This book suggests that this 
difference in language is not anodyne;
 – The EU must accede to the echr, despite the fact that currently this process 
is blocked by the cjeu.
2 Methodology
Aspiring scholars of EU law have many reasons to rejoice. In the past, European 
legal doctrine has been written “to a relatively large degree by the staff of 
administrative and judicial institutions and to a smaller extent by the academ-
ics”.58 A 1997 study found that almost 44% of European law doctrine has been 
 58 Schepel, Harm and Rein Wesseling. “The Legal Community: Judges, Lawyers, Officials and 






produced by non- academics: 17% by officials of the EU Commission, 11% by 
judges and 8% by lawyers.59 In addition, they showed that 24 of the 32 most 
prodigious EU law writers have been employed by one of the EU institutions.60 
Currently, the EU legal doctrine appears to be dominated by academics from 
both common law and continental law traditions, although writers who work 
or have worked for the EU institutions continue to play an important role in 
the debate.
A large variety of research methods are available to scholars of EU law. 
Monograph or survey, historical or theoretical, ancient or contemporary are a few 
of the options that scholars are advised to select from for elucidating research 
topics.61
At the same time, a developing critique of EU legal scholarship guards 
against some of the most common fallacies that trap legal minds. Much of 
the past scholarship on Community law has had two features. First, it was 
essentially sympathetic to the integration project and was built around the 
view that the cjeu was “a hero who greatly advanced the cause of integra-
tion”.62 Second, Community law scholarship was traditional in character in 
the sense that it was dedicated mainly to the description of legal doctrine 
and the analysis of case- law.63 Third, the “tendency towards reactive, event- 
driven and counter- dependent approach to EU legal studies” has been high-
lighted as a weakness.64 Walker noted that theoretical concerns in EU legal 
studies “often tend to be shaped by highly specific, infra- systemic develop-
ments and thus to highlight the peculiarity of EU «legal problems» rather 
than their continuity with problems which have stimulated theoretical 
reflection before or elsewhere”.65 Lastly, legal scholars have been criticized 
for “solutionism”, easily providing roadmaps for law- making, while having 
 59 Schepel and Wesseling, op. cit., pp. 172– 176.
 60 Schepel and Wesseling, op. cit., p. 174.
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“little knowledge about the facts and causes behind the problem they are 
studying”.66
Walker has also highlighted the important methodological implications of 
the fact that the EU and EU law are works- in- progress: “we lack both the confi-
dence and the knowledge of retrospective wisdom. Not only are we faced with 
a situation in which law is asked to contribute perhaps in unprecedented ways 
to the making of a political community, but we do not know how far or for how 
long it will succeed”.67
This book attempts to integrate a few of the critiques described above:
(1) The current study fully embraces and is based on traditional methods of 
legal research: literature review, analysis of the case- law of the ECtHR and anal-
ysis of the case- law of the EU Courts. It embraces a developmental approach to 
the case- law of the ECtHR and the cjeu on due process. The in- depth analysis 
of case- law is pursued with a desire to identify jurisprudential patterns and 
theoretical grounds because, as highlighted by Advocate- General Gant, “in any 
legal work, theory can be built only by successive stokes and emerges from the 
reconciliation of judgements; it is a culmination”.68 Also, a sense of history and 
genealogy can support understanding the status quo.69
(2) This exercise of comparison is placed within the larger intellectual frame 
of the dialogue between the ECtHR and the EU. This application allows to the-
orise that the ECtHR is a self- regulating tribunal and that it belongs, together 
with the EU, to a Pan- European system of fundamental rights. This conclu-
sion is arrived at using concepts from systems theory. In this sense, Arnull 
has written that current EU law scholarship “is in rude health” because “to 
the established tradition of sophisticated doctrinal analysis have been added 
the insights afforded by theoretical, contextual and interdisciplinary work”.70 
With some ambition towards interdisciplinarity, this book engages a dialogue 
between historians, political scientists and economists in order to grace the 
proposed arguments. Also, it combines sources from common law systems 
and continental systems, integrating opinions of scholars from the UK, the 
 66 Van Gestel, Rob and Hans- Wolfgang Micklitz. “Why Methods Matter in European Legal 
Scholarship.” European Law Journal 20.3 (2014): pp. 292– 316, p. 302.
 67 Walker (2005), op. cit., p. 9.
 68 C- 5/ 66 (Joined Cases C- 5/ 66, C- 13/ 66, C- 14/ 66, C- 16/ 66, C- 21/ 66), Kampffmeyer and Others 
v Commission of the eec, ecli:eu:C:1967:8.
 69 Hervey, Tamara, Robert Cryer, Bal Sokhi- Bulley and Ali Bohm. Research Methodologies in 
EU and International Law. Portland: Hart Publishing, 2011, p. 47.












US, France, Germany and Switzerland between others. Sources in French and 
German have also been consulted.
(3) Whereas some scholars focus on a “catalogue” approach to due process, 
analysing all the guarantees enshrined in Article 6(1) echr and how they are 
reflected in EU competition law, other scholars focus on only one or a few of 
these safeguards.71 The current book follows the second approach focusing on 
the independence of the EU Commission as adjudicator in competition pro-
ceedings and the deferential judicial review performed by the EU Courts.
(4) The current research combines holistic and reductionist perspectives 
to clarify the influence of the ECtHR on European competition law enforce-
ment. In this sense, Duxbury, comparing legal scholarship in the US and the 
UK, noted that “the English have preferred the microscope to the telescope, 
the Americans vice versa; both preferences can be commended, and both can 
be criticized”.72 This research assumes that applying the “telescope” – that is 
the holistic paradigm – to the interaction between the EU and the ECtHR is 
a worthy endeavour that can elucidate how the structural capital of the two 
systems is translated into relational capital between them. At the same time, 
the structural capital of the two elements cannot be fully grasped without a 
“microscope”, that is a reductionist approach to those elements.
(5) Unlike the US, where antitrust law belonged since its creation to the 
field of criminal law, EU competition law suffers from a few nuances.73 The 
issue of fundamental rights in EU competition law is approached in the lit-
erature using a two- step method of analysis. First, scholars presume that EU 
competition law is administrative – the orthodox vision – or criminal – the 
heterodox vision – in nature. Based on this categorization, they deduct a set 
of safeguards that should be secured during the proceedings. If EU compe-
tition law is administrative in nature, less strict fair trial guarantees should 
apply. If, however, EU competition law is criminal in nature, then fully- fledged 
fair trial safeguards should be guaranteed during the proceedings. A valuable 
representative of the former is Schwarze, who has described EU competition 
law as a part of EU administrative law, arguing that the sanctions imposed in 
EU competition law proceedings are administrative acts by an executive body, 
 71 Adreangeli, Arianna. EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2008.
 72 Duxbury, Neil. “A Century of Legal Studies.” The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies. Eds. 
Cane, Peter, Tushnet and Mark. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 950– 974.
 73 Although most enforcement actions are civil law actions, the Sherman Antitrust Act 
adopted in 1890 is also a criminal law that can lead to the prosecution and sentencing of 








exercised within an administrative procedure.74 This is indeed the predom-
inant paradigm in the literature. It is worth mentioning that older works on 
EU criminal law ignore both EU competition law and the uneasy question 
about the sanctions imposed by the EU Commission in competition cases.75 
Nevertheless, braver and more recent works on EU criminal law take a differ-
ent course. They acknowledge the fact that, even if EU criminal law and EU 
competition law appear disconnected both substantially and procedurally, the 
subjects should eventually collide in light of the growing domestic criminal 
law to pursue EU competition law offences.76
To address this conundrum, I have chosen to follow the case- law of the 
ECtHR which works with autonomous legal notions and presumes that com-
petition law proceedings are criminal in nature. It is important to highlight 
the fact that the “criminal in nature” jurisprudence and scholarship is differ-
ent from the scholarship focusing on the criminalization of competition law 
in Europe.77 The “criminal in nature” approach attaches a particular impor-
tance to the punitive character of competition law sanctions, but does not fully 
remove EU competition law from the field of administrative law. This appar-
ent contradiction is tempered by jurisprudential wisdom. On the one hand, as 
the in- depth analysis of the applicability of Article 6(1) echr demonstrates in 
Chapter 5, the distinction between administrative disputes and criminal dis-
putes is irrelevant for the purpose of applying Article 6(1) echr. What is more, 
even a minimal approach to Article 6(1) echr would require an independent 
and impartial tribunal to adjudicate EU competition law disputes. On the other 
hand, the ecj has held early on that the procedural safeguards guaranteed in 
competition law proceedings “are an application of the fundamental principle 
of Community law which requires the right to a fair hearing to be observed 
in all proceedings, even those of an administrative nature”.78 (emphasis added)
(6) The approach of most scholars interested in due process matters in EU 
competition law has been to consider that this issue has been settled in the 
case Menarini, in which the ECtHR found that the fines imposed in domestic 
 74 Schwarze, op. cit.
 75 Miettinen, Samuel. Criminal Law and Policy in the European Union. New York: Routledge, 2013.
 76 Harding, Christopher. “The Relationship Between EU Criminal Law and Competition 
Law.” Research Handbook on Criminal Law. Eds. Valsamis Mitsilegas, Maria Bergström and 
Theodore Konstadinides. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2016.
 77 Cseres, Katalin J., Maarten Pieter Schinkel and Floris O.W. Vogelaar, eds. Criminalization of 
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competition law proceedings were criminal in nature and that full judicial 
review should complete administrative proceedings involving agencies that 
lack independence.79 Most scholars use Menarini to justify the existing com-
petition law enforcement system. Thus, in a recent book, Ibáñez Colomo 
has argued that “if the review performed by EU courts fulfils de facto the 
Menarini conditions, it matters little that they show little willingness to give 
the Commission a margin of appreciation”.80
This approach consists in reducing the case- law of the ECtHR to a single 
case. Whereas some cases have in the past established legal principles and 
became precedents, the reduction of the case- law of the ECtHR on competi-
tion law to a single case is highly problematic. Therefore, this book pursues a 
detailed analysis of the large majority of cases adopted by the ECtHR which 
are of relevance to competition law disputes.
(7) In relation to the applicability of fundamental rights to legal persons, 
in deb, the cjeu has pointed out that the word “person” in Article 47 of the 
Charter “may cover individuals, but, from a purely linguistic point of view, it 
does not exclude legal persons”.81
(8) I make ample use of drawings and charts in this book in an attempt to 
render the subject more legible and interesting. In addition, visuals also con-
tribute to breaking the linearity that written verbal expression imposes and to 
rendering the perception process more compelling. Data from opinion polls 
and mass media are occasionally analysed and integrated as well.
 79 ECtHR. A. Menarini Diagnostics s.r.l. v. Italy, application no. 43509/ 08, judgement of 27 
Sep 2011.
 80 Ibáñez Colomo, Pablo. The Shaping of EU Competition Law. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018, p. 148.
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 chapter 1
Central Issues of Research
1.1 EU Competition Law – A Paradox within EU Law
Bork’s seminal book The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself started by 
pointing out the main features of American anti- trust. First of all, American 
anti- trust was a largely unknown policy despite being ubiquitous due to the 
“elaborate deployments of governmental force in areas of life still thought 
committed primarily to private choice and initiative”.1 Second, American anti- 
trust was popular as very little intellectual and almost no political opposition 
to its features was shown. Lastly, American anti- trust appeared to Bork export-
able as jurisdictions in Europe and Asia followed the American example.2 At 
the same time, anti- trust was a policy at war with itself because certain anti- 
trust doctrines preserved competition, while others suppressed it.3 This policy 
produced inconsistent case- law because the courts could not clearly spell the 
purpose of anti- trust laws.
The contours of European competition law are both similar and different 
from those described by Bork. They could be summarized as follows:
(1) The congenital nature of EU competition law – EU competition law was 
created and developed in the same time as the legal context that generated 
it, that is EU law. It therefore borrows some of the features of EU law, while 
remaining reminiscent of its ancestors, the American anti- trust law and French 
and German administrative law.
A seasoned writer about the European Union, Deirdre Curtin wrote that,
as an object of research, it is certainly true to say that the EU is uniden-
tified and travels at great speed. The EU is largely unidentified in that 
it escapes the conventional labels such as nation, state, empire, region, 
federation. Yet it possesses elements of several of these categorizations 
(international organizations, state, political system, etc.). The speed of 
institutional change is undeniable; from a weak advisory parliamentary 
assembly to a more powerful European Parliament with co- legislative 
 1 Bork, Robert H. The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself. New York: The Free Press, 
1993, p. 2.
 2 Bork, op. cit.










rights; from a weak court to a strong court, a court that can for example, 
rule on issues that would appear purely national.4
The institutional change within the European Union has been described using 
both fluid and static perspectives. Lord Denning referred to the EU as an incom-
ing tide, other authors viewed it as a day- by- day, brick- by- brick construction.56
While important parts of EU law bathe under the sun of constant trans-
formation, EU competition law remained adamantly resistant to change, its 
substance and procedure have suffered very little alteration over the years. 
Competition policy was at the heart of the European integration project, yet 
only three regulations and two implementing regulations have been adopted 
to provide guidance for this important field. Also, since the beginning, the 
great majority of legal rules handling the enforcement of competition law on 
the European market have been and remain soft law rules.
In addition, given the importance of European competition law experi-
ence, one might expect that experience to have been thoroughly studied and 
its story well told. However, the opposite appears to be true, as only small 
segments and limited aspects of European competition policy have been 
described at all. Gerber highlighted that, “as a result, both scholarly and pub-
lic images of these experience are fundamentally and dangerously flawed. 
Ideologies, national and linguistic boundaries and sheer ignorance have 
combined to generate images that are filled with half- truths, non- truths and 
distortions”.7
(2) Politization of separation of powers in EU competition law enforcement – 
Ad Geelhoed – an Advocate- General of the cjeu – has argued that EU law 
has mainly been, until recently, public economic law “aimed at the establish-
ment and proper functioning of the internal market” and that EU economic 
law was “characterized not so much by ethical preferences, but by choices of a 
more instrumental nature”.8 This initial arrangement had deep constitutional 
 4 Curtin, Deirdre. The Executive Power of the European Union: Law, Practices and the Living 
Constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 5.
 5 hp Bulmer Ltd v J Bollinger sa [1974] 2 wlr 202.
 6 De Witte, Bruno. “The pillar structure and the nature of the European Union: Greek tem-
ple or French gothic cathedral?” The European Union after Amsterdam: A Legal Analysis. Eds. 
T. Heukels, N. Blokker and M. Brus. The Hague: Kluver Law International, 1998, pp. 51– 68.
 7 Gerber, David J. Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 2.
 8 Geelhoed, Ad. “The expanding jurisdiction of the EU Court of Justice.” The EU Constitution: The 
Best Way Forward. Eds. D. Curtin, A.E. Kellerman and S. Blockmans. The Hague: TMC Asser 
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consequences. Advocate General Shapston highlighted in her opinion in kme 
Germany and Others v Commission that
EU competition law is shaped by the interplay between the Commission, 
as investigator, prosecutor, decision- maker, and the adjudicator, provid-
ing a measure of external control. However, the case- law has never clar-
ified the exact meaning, scope of rationale of the margin of discretion 
accorded to the Commission, having regard to the institutional balance 
between the two.9
This remains one of the most important critiques raised against EU competi-
tion law both by academics and practitioners. Except for the conflict of inter-
ests that it raises, considerable interdependence of procedural and substantive 
law results from the fact that the Commission acts both as a decision- making 
body and as a party. More precisely, in EU competition law, substantive rules 
contain procedural standards and a plethora of procedural rules comprise sub-
stantive rules.10
Indeed, the current system of enforcement of EU competition law con-
sists of two layers, as described in Figure 4 below: An administrative author-
ity – the European Commission – which assumes the functions of investigator, 
prosecutor, and decision- maker, and a judicial authority – the General Court 
(gc) or the Court of Justice of the European Union (cjeu) – which holds lim-
ited authority over the review of legality of the Commission’s decision and 
unlimited authority over the review of fines. The second, judicial, layer of the 
enforcement system is triggered only when the affected parties contest the 
Commission’s decision. Otherwise, EU competition law enforcement involves 
only the first, administrative layer.
In addition, as Figure 5 below shows, the decisions adopted by the EU 
Commission in competition law cases are prepared by the bureaucratic branch 
of the Commission – the Directorate- General for Competition (dg comp), 
assisted by other dg s – and are adopted by its political branch – the College of 
Commissioners.
Presidents of the US have occasionally been involved in shaping US anti- 
trust law by establishing the agendas of US anti- trust enforcement agencies, 
by stuffing them with pro- bigness or anti- bigness champions and by initiat-
ing “big cases meant to demonstrate the superiority of government power to 
 9 Opinion of Advocate General, C- 272/ 09 P, kme Germany and Others v Commission, 
ecli:eu:C:2011:63, point 44.








that of powerful private business”.11 Unlike the US, in the EU the participation 
of the political branch in competition law enforcement is constant. The EU 
Commissioners for Competition are politicians that are actively participating 
and deciding the procedural outcomes of competition enforcement proceed-
ings. This blunt involvement of the Union’s political forces into its adjudicative 
activities can be of concern. As Chapters 8 to 12 below will illustrate in detail, 
the enforcement of competition law raises a few serious concerns about bias 
that are not answered by the existing safeguards.
The second layer of the EU competition law enforcement system is rep-
resented by the judicial branch of the EU. Established in 1952, the European 
Court of Justice (ecj) has its seat in Luxembourg and consists currently of 
two courts: the Court of Justice of the European Union and the General Court 
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 figure 5  Decision- making process for the enforcement of EU competition law
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in 1988 for the purpose of dealing with disputes involving complex facts.12 
Competition and civil service litigation were the first types of disputes trans-
ferred to the gc. The gc became, thus, to be known as the “Competition court 
of the European Union”.13 Brunessen describes the gc as the “Administrative 
Court of the European Union” because one of its functions is to assess the 
legality of the decisions adopted by the EU Commission and other institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies.14 In competition law matters, the gc performs the 
functions of a first- instance court and the cjeu those of an appeal court.
The cjeu has built its reputation by audaciously asserting legal principles 
to protect and support the EU as a newly- created legal order. This exercise of 
audacity often went against the will of the member states or of the general 
public. At the same time, in the field of competition law, the cjeu has often 
imposed on itself a limitation that allows the European Commission to receive 
preferential deferential treatment in cases that concern complex economic 
and technical evidence. The deferential judicial review is increasingly hard to 
justify in view of the fact that competition law disputes tend to lack conceptual 
homogeneity, involve evidentiary hurdles that can border speculation and are 
prone to serious errors resulting in high costs.15
The cjeu has justified deferential judicial review by holding that an insti-
tutional balance characterizes the relationships between the EU institutions.16 
Craig has shown that, as opposed to strict separation of powers, institutional 
balance “characterized the disposition of legislative and executive power” in 
the EU from the outset.17 In competition law cases, the principle of institu-
tional balance partially accounts for the respect that the cjeu shows for the 
Commission’s margin of discretion and for the ensuing deferential judicial 
review.
 12 88/ 591/ ecsc, eec, Euratom: Council Decision of 24 October 1988 establishing a Court 
of First Instance of the European Communities, oj L 319, 25.11.1988. Date of end of valid-
ity: 31/ 01/ 2003.
 13 Prek, Miro and Silvère Lefèvre. “Competition litigation before the general court: Quality if 
not quantity?” Common Market Law Review 53 (2016): pp. 65– 90.
 14 Brunessen, Bertrand. Le juge de l’Union européenne, juge administratif. Bruxelles: Bruyant, 
2015, pp. 169– 183.
 15 Geradin, Damien and Nicolas Petit. “Judicial Review in European Union Competition 
Law: A Qualitative and Quantitative Approach.” The Role of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in Competition Law Cases. Eds. Massimo Merola and Jacques Derennes. 
Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2012, pp. 32– 36.
 16 C- 9/ 56, Meroni v High Authority, ecli:eu:C:1958:7, paragraph 133.
 17 Craig, Paul Philip. “Institutions, Power and Institutional Balance.” The Evolution of EU Law. 














(3) Growing importance of EU Commission- made competition law – Ibáñez 
Colomo has highlighted that “since its inception, the EU system has revolved, 
by and large, around expert administrative authorities”.18 An administra-
tion that combines the roles of investigator and decision- maker – as the EU 
Commission does – may be more prone to opportunistic behaviour than a 
competition law system centred around courts and private litigation. Ibáñez 
Colomo adds that
as a result, and somewhat paradoxically, it cannot be excluded that the sys-
tem eventually becomes less predictable, and also more prone to enforce-
ment errors, than one revolving around generalist courts. Administrative 
action tainted by opportunism may become less concerned with predict-
ability and consistency and more with advancing the policy objectives of 
the authority. This attitude may be exacerbated if the review courts show 
deference to the knowledge of the expert decision- maker.19
Prek and Lefèvre – Judge and Legal Secretary at the gc – have noted that a con-
stant decline in the proportion of competition litigation in the judicial activity 
of the gc can be observed.20 This is due, on the one hand, to the success of the 
commitments procedure and to the cjeu’s decision in Alrosa which prevents 
the gc from engaging into effective judicial review of the commitments deci-
sions adopted by the EU Commission.21 They suggest that “the move toward 
a less confrontational administrative procedure means that there is less like-
lihood that the undertakings concerned will challenge the outcome of this 
procedure”.22
On the other hand, the deployment of the Commission’s leniency pro-
gramme and the settlement procedure create more incentives for the con-
cerned undertakings to cooperate with the EU Commission and to, therefore, 
avoid litigation.23
(4) Specialness of EU competition law – Lawyers have a special interest and 
loyalty to ideas. They build and defend them in intellectual battles that can last 
 18 Ibáñez Colomo, op. cit.
 19 Ibáñez Colomo, op. cit., p. 68.
 20 Prek and Lefèvre (2016), op. cit., p. 65.
 21 T- 170/ 06, Alrosa v Commission, ecli:eu:T:2007:220.
 22 Prek and Lefèvre (2016), op. cit., p. 67.
 23 Waelbroeck, Denis. Le développement en droit européen de la concurrence des solutions 
négociées (engagements, clémence, non- contestation des faits et transactions) : Que va- t- il 
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for centuries. However, if Sigmund Freud or Carl Yung wrote this book, they 
would be concerned with other types of ideas than those which interest law-
yers. They would be looking for the beliefs that generate the ideas with which 
a lawyer operates.
Two such beliefs are of interest at this point. The first is the fact that EU law 
is special. As Walker explained “EU law was special first and foremost because 
the European supranational project was an indisputably good cause, a triumph 
of rationality over passions, of common interest over national insularity, and 
perhaps most seductively for the legal academic, of law over politics”.24
The second belief concerns the nature of competition law and seems to 
dominate the field. This is the idea that competition law is special and that it 
should, therefore, remain sealed away from exogenous influences. This idea 
is brought as argument in the majority of papers concerning the subject. It is 
used to justify every aspect of competition policy in the EU, starting with the 
constant increase of fines and finishing with the deferential judicial review 
performed by the EU courts. This dominant intellectual position should unset-
tle researchers breeding scholarly tolerance and learning to hold opposing 
views. A lawyer committed to logic might rightfully argue that every field of 
law is special and that a discussion about competition law being more special 
is both futile and impossible to argue using logic. Still, as Gerber has noted,
a central feature of European competition law tradition has been the 
idea that competition law is special and that using law to protect com-
petition moves outside law’s normal domain. In this view, competition 
law is a new type of law which deals with problems for which traditional 
legal mechanisms are inappropriate, and thus it requires correspond-
ingly non- traditional methods and procedures.25
This idea can be traced back to the beginnings of the EU. A review of the first 
Reports on the Activity of the European Community for Coal and Steel (eccs) 
shows that competition policy has been an integral part of the construction 
of the Common Market. In the early reports, competition policy was the only 
policy covered, other than the development of the Common Market.26
 24 Walker (2005), op. cit., p. 5.
 25 Gerber, op. cit., p. 12.
 26 European Community for Coal and Steel. “Summary of the Second General Report on the 
Activities of the Community (April 13, 1953- April 12, 1954).” Bulletin 4 (1954). Available at 








The first Competition Policy Reports issued by the Commission of the 
eccs, European Economic Community (eec) and European Atomic Energy 
Community (eaec) highlight the early emphasis placed on competition policy 
in somewhat self- aggrandizing statements.
The first Competition Policy Report highlighted that
competition is the best stimulant of economic activity since it guarantees 
the widest possible freedom of action to all. An active competition policy 
pursued in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties establishing 
the Communities makes it easier for the supply and demand structures 
continually to adjust to technological development. Through the inter-
play of decentralized decision- making machinery, competition enables 
enterprises continuously to improve their efficiency, which is the sine qua 
non for a steady improvement in living standards and employment pros-
pects within the countries of the Community. From this point of view, 
competition policy is an essential means for satisfying to a great extent the 
individual and collective needs of our society.27 (emphasis added)
A year later, the Commission showed that the general movement towards 
industrial combination was gathering strength in the Common Market. 
International concentration of operations in the Common Market showed a 
marked increase from 1966 to 1970. Consequently, the Summit Conference of 
Heads of State or of Government of the enlarged Community called for the 
broadest possible use of Article 235 of the eec Treaty, which empowered the 
Council, acting unanimously on Commission proposals, after consulting the 
Parliament, to take any powers not provided for elsewhere necessary to achieve 
a specific Community objective. This political decision led the Commission 
to advise the Council of its intention “to submit, independently of the appli-
cation of Article 86 to specific cases, proposals designed to introduce a more 
systematic control of merger operations of a given scale”.28 From that point on, 
the Commission’s tasks in the field of competition policy have only increased.
The early competition policy reports point to two aspects that will come to 
define competition policy in the EU. First, the Commission’s focus on the devel-
opment and enforcement of competition policy has not been accompanied by 
 27 Commission of the European Economic Community. First Report on Competition Policy. 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1972. p. 11.
 28 Commission of the European Economic Community. Second Report on Competition 
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a focus on procedure or due process guarantees for the participants. In fact, the 
reports describe the Commission as a solitary fighter guarding the Common 
Market against enterprises that are either unaware that their behaviour is dam-
aging the construction of the Common Market or which willingly behave in a 
way that hampers the Commission’s efforts. Second, the Commission had to 
work with the member states in order to prevent them from adopting protec-
tionist policies or to lobby them to adopt and implement fully- fledged compe-
tition policies.
The belief that competition law is special is widely shared within the aca-
demic community. Thus, Graells noted that,
given the specific architecture of the EU competition law enforcement sys-
tem under Regulation 1/ 2003, and as long as an effective (arguably, soft 
or marginal) judicial review mechanism is already available to the under-
takings affected by sanctions derived from EU competition law infringe-
ments, no significant changes are required in order to make the system 
comply with Articles 6(1) echr.29 (emphasis added)
A first mark of specialness identified by the author is the fact that the dg 
comp is among the most sophisticated competition law enforcement bodies 
worldwide, exhibiting a level of expertise that demands respect. Second, the 
European Commission and the nca s form part of the European Competition 
Network (ecn), a body that coordinates and facilitates the exchange of infor-
mation and best practices. The peer review exercised is a special and benefi-
cial type of control within the ecn.30 Also, as stressed by numerous authors, 
competition law enforcement is far from being a neutral exercise of economic 
regulation. Rather, it is a policy- oriented enforcement that adheres to incom-
plete and broad rules and “the final decision to be reached will be conditioned 
by the ultimate goal the competition authority wants to achieve”.31
(5) Indifference to fundamental rights – European competition law appears 
to have remained cloistered from the ongoing fundamental rights revolution in 
 29 Graells, Sanchez. “The EU’s Accession to the ECHR and Due Process Rights in EU 
Competition Law Matters: Nothing New Under the Sun?” The Accession of the EU to 
the ECHR. Eds. V. Kosta, N. Skoutaris and V. Tzevelekos. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014, 
pp. 255– 270.
 30 Graells, op. cit., pp. 260– 261.
 31 Marra, Alessandro, and Alessandro Sarra. “Incomplete Antitrust Laws and Private Actions 
for Damages.” European Journal of Law & Economics 30 (2010): pp. 111– 135. Crane, Daniel 
A. “Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication.” Washington and Lee Law Review 








the EU.32 While the European Union, its institutions and case- law have made 
strides towards greater legitimacy and accountability, the same cannot be said 
about competition law, which has remained deaf to the calls of scholars and 
practitioners. These elements create the environment for a type of exception-
alism that fails to marry easily with democracy.
In light of the features described above, the primary goal of this book is to 
investigate how the case- law of the ECtHR on Article 6(1) echr interacts with 
the system described above. In view of the accession of the European Union 
to the echr, it had initially been assumed, as Figure 6 below shows, that a 
successful accession would add a third level of control, tasked with monitoring 
the respect of fundamental rights during EU competition law proceedings by 
the ECtHR.
The failed accession of the EU to the echr led to the reassessment of the 
interaction between the case- law on the right to a fair trial and the EU compe-
tition law. One way to do this is to presume that the EU will accede to the echr 
and to imagine ways in which the enforcement of EU competition law should 
be changed to adapt to the conditions prescribed in the case- law of the ECtHR. 






Decision-maker on Substance and Fining
Limited judicial review on Substance
Unlimited judicial review on Fining
Respect of the human rights enshrined in 
the ECHR during EU Competition Law 
proceedings
 figure 6  The presumptive three- layered enforcement system of EU competition law 
following the accession of the EU to the ECtHR
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Another way is to assume that the accession of the EU to the echr will not be 
finalized and that the system of enforcement of EU competition law will stay 
as described in Figure 4 above.
Working with the “no accession” assumption – which at the time of writing 
stands true – raises important questions about the interaction between the EU 
and the ECtHR, at least in the field of fundamental rights protection.
1.2 The ECtHR – System Design as a Predictor of Success
Less than 200 km away from Brussels, another international organization was 
established in the wake of wwii. The Council of Europe was created in 1949 
with the goal of upholding democracy, human rights and rule of law in Europe. 
The echr, an international treaty drawn up within the CoE, was opened for 
signature in 1950 and entered into force in September 1953.
Under the system established by the echr, which prevailed until 31 October 
1998, three institutions were entrusted to enforce the obligations undertaken 
by the contracting states: the European Commission of Human Rights, the 
ECtHR and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.33
Under the original system, all applications brought by individual applicants 
or contracting states were subject to preliminary examination by the European 
Commission of Human Rights. The Commission determined the admissibility 
of each application and drew up a report expressing a non- binding opinion on 
the merits of the case. The Commission and/ or a government of a state con-
cerned could then decide to refer the case to the European Court of Human 
Rights for a final, binding adjudication. From 1 November 1998, the European 
Commission of Human Rights was replaced by a single, full- time ECtHR. The 
Court’s judgments were final and binding for member states. If the Court found 
a violation of the echr, it had no power to quash the decisions of the national 
authorities. Nevertheless, Article 50 of the Convention mandated the Court 
to award just satisfaction in the form of financial compensation for pecuniary 
and non- pecuniary damages and reimbursement of the successful applicants’ 
 33 Grabenwarter, C. European Convention of Human Rights: Commentary. Munchen: C.H. 
Beck, 2014.
Harris, D., M. O’Boyle, Ed Bates and C.M. Buckley. Law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Keller, H., and A. Stone Sweet, eds. A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on 






costs and expenses. Article 54 echr entrusted the Committee of Ministers to 
supervise the execution of the Court’s judgments.
The current book argues that the success of the human rights system gen-
erated by the echr is due to its design. As Figure 7 suggests, the design of the 
human rights protection system enforced by the ECtHR had five elements that 
cumulatively contributed to its success.
(1) Starting with the entry into force of Protocol No. 9 to the echr on 1 
October 1994, applicants could bring themselves cases before the ECtHR. The 
right to individual petition is the cornerstone of the Strasbourg human rights 
system. It allows all citizens and residents of the contracting parties who allege 
that their human rights have been disrespected, either by an action or a lack of 
action of a state, to petition the ECtHR after they have exhausted all domestic 
remedies. The right to individual petition is free of charge. In addition, unlike 
domestic proceedings, applicants do not need to be represented by a lawyer 
when lodging an application.
Currently, some 820 million citizens and residents of all member states of 
the CoE can petition the ECtHR in relation to their grievances. Even if most 
of the applications lodged at the ECtHR are rejected as inadmissible, it is fair 
to propose that the applicants are the agenda- setters for the ECtHR. In addi-
tion, these applications speak about the state of justice and democracy in 













The Right to Individual Petition
 figure 7  The five elements of the human rights system enforced by the ECtHR
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(2) The entry into force of the echr and the establishment of the ECtHR 
have benefitted from a novelty effect. Concerning the relation between the 
echr and the UK, Simpson wrote that “there is no simple answer to the ques-
tion why the members of the Council of Europe signed the Convention in 1950 
and its first protocol in 1952. Nor is there any simple answer to the question 
what it was that they were signing”.34 He explains that the prevailing view was 
that the Convention would have no significant domestic effects and that “since 
British law and practice respected human rights this was unlikely to cause any 
serious domestic problems”.35
These recent works show that, like the EU, the ECtHR also remained uniden-
tified, escaping known labels and denominations by politicians and lawyers. In 
addition, the ECtHR remained uninteresting to legal scholars for a long time, 
allowing it to test and hone its concepts and procedural rules.
Unlike the EU, the ECtHR did not grow at great speed. In fact, the ECtHR as 
an institution has developed slowly. From its creation in 1959 until 1998, when 
the Court became the only enforcer of the Convention, only 1000 cases were 
referred to it by the Commission or by governments.36 The Court delivered 
only 837 judgments and adopted 190 decisions rejecting applications.37 Article 
6(1) echr was raised in 455 of these cases and the ECtHR found a violation in 
303 of these cases.
(3) The powers of interpretation vested in the ECtHR allowed it to 
become a self- regulating tribunal. Self- regulation allowed the ECtHR to 
oscillate between legal imagination and consistent application of its own 
precepts. It is also self- regulation that enabled the ECtHR to provide inno-
vative solutions to a continent that was undergoing important democrati-
zation processes.38
(4) The interpretation of Article 6(1) echr led to an increasing number of dis-
putes previously considered as belonging to public law to become justiciable. 
This has led to a progressive enlargement of the ECtHR’s jurisdiction. Article 
6(1) echr provided fertile ground for the ECtHR’s quest towards self- regulation 
because of the central place it occupies in the Convention and because of the 
 34 Simpson, A.W. Brian. Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the 
European Convention. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
 35 Simpson, A. W. Brian. “Britain and the European Convention.” Cornell International Law 
Journal 34.3 (2001): article 4.
 36 ECtHR. ECtHR Survey – Forty Years of Activity – 1959– 1998, p. 4. Available at https:// www.
echr.coe.int/ Documents/ Survey_ 19591998_ BIL.pdf accessed on 23 February 2021.
 37 ECtHR Survey, quoted above.












variety of questions that can be debated around it, such as access to justice, the 
shape of judicial mechanisms and separation of powers.
(5) The enforcement mechanism put in place by the echr is a key element 
to the design of the Strasbourg human rights system. The member states have 
undertaken to comply with final judgments of the Court finding violations 
of the Convention, as well as with Court’s decisions taking note of friendly 
settlements.39 The execution of the ECtHR’s decisions is supervised by the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which reunites representa-
tives of the governments of the 47 member states, assisted by the Department 
for the Execution of Judgments of the ECtHR. The member states enjoy a mar-
gin of appreciation regarding the measures that should be taken to remedy 
a violation of the echr. These measures are identified by the member state 
concerned, under collective supervision of the Committee of Ministers.40 In 
other words, the supervision mechanism empowers the member state that has 
been found in breach of the Convention to be at the origin of the measure to 
remedy it. Lastly, the Committee of Ministers is also a collaborative platform, 
uniting members of the governments of the 47 member states, “trust thereby 
created is a major prerequisite for constructive cooperation between states in 
many matters, be they economic, legal or cultural”.41
1.3 ECtHR as a Self- Regulating Tribunal
The jurisdiction of a national tribunal is usually established by domestic 
instruments of varying constitutional weight, such as constitutions, procedural 
codes and ordinary or secondary laws. In addition, national tribunals benefit 
from theories of legal interpretation which all lawyers study thoroughly during 
their training. Finally, a two- tiered or three- tiered court system evens the rati-
one materiae jurisdiction over legal matters, with a Supreme Court harmoniz-
ing the approach to all matters of jurisdiction over lower courts. This system 
ensures that a criminal matter will be settled by a criminal tribunal, following 
criminal law, instead of landing on the agenda of an arbitration tribunal. By 
 39 Articles 46 and 39(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights.
 40 More information about the supervision process can be found at https:// www.coe.int/ en/ 
web/ execution/ the- supervision- process accessed on 23 February 2021.
 41 Council of Europe. Supervision of the Execution of Judgements and Decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights: 11th Annual Report of the Committee of Ministers 2017, 









Central Issues of Research 43
the same token, a legal issue concerning the applicability of an investment 
treaty will be handled by a specialized tribunal created to this end, instead of 
being settled by a military tribunal.
In other words, at the domestic level, the enquiries, “Who shall judge?”, “How 
should the case be judged?” and “What is justiciable?” – which form the trinity 
of questions to establish justiciability – are answered by a predictable hierar-
chy of rules and organs. In case of the ECtHR, answering these questions leads 
to the understanding that the ECtHR functions as a self- regulating tribunal.
System theorists describe self- organization, resilience and hierarchy, as the 
most important characteristics of successful systems.42 Meadows describe 
self- organization as the system’s “ability to learn, diversify, complexify and 
evolve”.43 Open, self- regulating systems are capable of learning in which case 
“the system performs a reflective knowledge function, interpreting the envi-
ronment based on its own knowledge”.44
The concept of self- organization or self- regulation applies easily and intui-
tively to systems existing in the natural world. However, applying this concept 
to the functioning of an international tribunal requires solid arguments. In the 
paragraphs below I attempt to build this argument.
For the purposes of the current work, a self- regulating tribunal is one that 
combines two powers:
 – It has competence to decide its own jurisdiction and
 – It is able to have an impact on the flow and quality of applications being 
addressed to it.
The sources of the ECtHR’s self- regulatory powers are both (1) internal and 
(2) external. The internal sources are (a) the design of the jurisdiction of the 
ECtHR and (b) the interpretation of the right to a fair trial. The external sources 
concern (a) the cooperation offered by the member states, including their judi-
ciaries, (b) the attitude of the academic community and (c) the zeitgeist. I will 
analyse these elements one by one.
(1) Internal Sources of the ECtHR’s Self- regulatory Powers
(a) The Design of the Jurisdiction of the ECtHR
At the ECtHR, the question “Who shall judge?” is answered in Article 19 echr 
by stipulating that “to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken 
by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto, 
 42 Meadows, op. cit., p. 75.
 43 Meadows, op. cit., p. 79.
 44 Mele, Cristina, Jacqueline Pels and Francesco Polese. “A Brief Review of Systems Theories 










there shall be set up a European Court of Human Rights (…). It shall function 
on a permanent basis”. Articles 20– 23 continue to answer the same question by 
describing the criteria for office, election and dismissal of judges.
The answer to the question “How the case should be judged?” is found in 
the provisions that prescribe that cases can only be decided by a single judge, 
a committee, a chamber and the Grand Chamber.45
The question – “What is justiciable?” – finds an interesting answer in the 
echr. Article 32(1) echr provides that “the jurisdiction of the Court shall 
extend to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the 
Convention and the Protocols thereto which are referred to it as provided in 
Articles 33, 34, 46 and 47”.
The jurisdiction of the ECtHR will be shaped, first of all, by an application 
being lodged by “any person, non- governmental organisation or group of indi-
viduals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting 
Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto”.46
Second, the jurisdiction of the ECtHR will be shaped by the admissibility 
criteria enounced in Article 35 echr:
 1. The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies 
have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of 
international law, and within a period of six months from the date on 
which the final decision was taken.
 2. The Court shall not deal with any application submitted under 
Article 34 that (a) is anonymous; or (b) is substantially the same as a 
matter that has already been examined by the Court or has already 
been submitted to another procedure of international investigation 
or settlement and contains no relevant new information.
The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted 
under Article 34 if it considers that:
 (a) the application is incompatible with the provisions of the 
Convention or the Protocols thereto, manifestly ill- founded, or an 
abuse of the right of individual application; or
 (b) the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless 
respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the 
 45 Articles 26, 27 and 28 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
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Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the 
merits and provided that no case may be rejected on this ground 
which has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal.
Lastly, Article 32(2) echr adds the most important ingredient for self- 
regulation. This provision stipulates that “in the event of dispute as to whether 
the Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall decide”. In other words, in the event 
of an application being lodged at the ECtHR alleging a violation of the echr, 
an allegation that is disputed by the member state against whom the appli-
cation is lodged, the ECtHR has the final say about its own jurisdiction over 
the case.
In addition, the rules of the ECtHR are adopted by the Court itself, with no 
apparent external input.47
(b) The Interpretation of the Right to a Fair Trial
The second internal element that has allowed the ECtHR to become a self- 
regulating tribunal is its case- law on the right to a fair trial. This provision is 
enshrined in Article 6(1) echr and appears to have been the main engine for 
expanding the jurisdiction of the ECtHR over numerous legal fields for which 
member states have initially claimed ratione materiae immunity. The case- law 
on the applicability of Article 6(1) echr has been the skeleton on which the 
ECtHR has built its self- regulation muscle.
There a few reasons for this, the most obvious of all being the need to meet 
a demand. Article 6(1) echr is invoked in almost all cases brought before the 
ECtHR, either independently, when applicants complain about the function-
ing of domestic jurisdictions, or in parallel with another provision of the echr. 
An example of the latter would be when applicants complain under Article 3 
echr about torture, inhuman or degrading treatment and under Article 6(1) 
echr about the impossibility to have their rights under Article 3 echr recog-
nized by domestic courts.
In addition, the cases brought under Article 6(1) echr are rarely political 
and attract little sustained attention from the public or the media. Compared 
to cases concerning the right to life or the right to private life, for example, 
cases that deal with the applicability of the right to a fair trial to employment 
disputes or constitutional disputes fascinate the minds of non- lawyers to a 
much lesser degree. This has provided the ECtHR with a safe, non- conflictual 
public environment to enlarge its jurisdiction.
 47 ECtHR. Rules of Court. Strasbourg: 2008. Available at https:// www.echr.coe.int/ Documents/ 





An exception to this, however, concerns cases in which Article 6(1) echr 
was applied to competition law proceedings. Cases like Menarini attract more 
attention due to the implications that they could bear for European competi-
tion law.48
(2) External Sources of the ECtHR’s Self- Regulatory Powers
(a) The Cooperation Offered by the Member States
Turning now to the external factors supporting the ECtHR’s self- regulation, it is 
important to highlight that the success of the ECtHR comes from the fact that 
its decisions are enforced voluntarily. Each time a member state party to the 
Convention enforces the decisions of the ECtHR issued against it, that member 
state behaves cooperatively. Cooperation, thus, is essential for the ECtHR’s self- 
regulatory powers.
(b) The Academic Community
The academic community has played an important role in promoting the work 
of the ECtHR and in training new generations of lawyers. Although more sci-
entific research is needed to substantiate this point, common sense and a look 
at the curricula of master degree programs offered in Europe support the idea 
that academic circles have contributed to the ECtHR’s self- regulatory quest. 
Academia can theoretically test the principles proposed by the ECtHR and can 
bring visibility to the ECtHR and its case- law by commenting on the ECtHR’s 
work and by organizing conferences.
An exercise in imagination can further validate this argument. If the aca-
demic circles in Europe and in the rest of the world had never written about 
the ECtHR, had never commented on its case- law and had not provided human 
rights law courses, would the ECtHR have benefitted from the same reputa-
tion? The answer is probably negative.
 48 ECtHR. A. Menarini Diagnostics s.r.l. v. Italy, quoted above. See for example, Waelbroeck, 
Denis and Sven Frisch. “Après l’Arrêt Menarini. L’impact de la Convention européenne 
de Sauvegarde des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés Fondamentales sur les Procédures 
en Droit de la Concurrence.” Scrutinizing Internal and External Dimensions of European 
Law. Les dimensions internes et externs du droit européen à l’épreuve. Liber Amicorum Paul 
Damaret, Vol. II. Eds. Inge Govaere and Dominik Hanf. Brussels: Peter Lang, 2013, pp. 
663– 691.
Bronckers, Marco and Anne Vallery. “EU Competition Law After The Menarini Case.” 
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(c) The Zeitgeist
The zeitgeist is the last external element that contributed to the ECtHR becom-
ing a self- regulatory tribunal. Europe after wwii was a continent that focused 
on peace- building through democratisation, removal of tariffs and deeper 
commercial ties. Transactional supranationalism played a key role as states 
decided to trade more intensely with each other while transferring parts of 
their sovereign powers to supranational institutions. This process intensified 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, when more states were accepted to partially 
trade their sovereignty for the right to belong and contribute to supranational 
organizations.
The ECtHR is one of the consequences of this process. In addition, the 
development and respect for international law has normalized the member 
states’ cooperation with the ECtHR’s.
The self- regulating nature of the ECtHR has been essential for the develop-
ment and the protection of human rights in Europe and for the construction 
of a strong and respected ECtHR. This aspect of the ECtHR must be taken into 
account when analysing its impact on European competition law.
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 chapter 2
Supporting Issues
The following peripheral issues help to deepen the understanding of the lim-
ited role that due process has played in EU competition law: (1) The grow-
ing importance of system thinking in social sciences; (2) The New Public 
Management movement; (3) The distinction between people, consumers and 
citizens; (4) The accession of the European Union to the echr and (5) The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights.
2.1 Systems Theory and Social Sciences
There are two main frameworks to analyse the world or any subject: topical, 
focused on one part only, or holistic, focusing on the whole that is formed by 
interacting parts. The second approach can be dated back to Aristotle’s claim 
that knowledge can only be derived from the understanding of the whole 
rather than its parts. It was, however, only in the 20th century that this adage 
broke free from the constraints of popular wisdom when systems theory began 
to be legitimized as an interdisciplinary tool for analysis. Although systems 
theory had been initially and predominantly used in cybernetics, chemistry 
and biology, it quickly rose to prominence within the analytical ranks of social 
scientists as well. Currently, systems theory provides one of the most potent 
tools for analysis in any field of study.
Systems theory produces interesting findings when unmoored from its ini-
tial, classical science background. Katz and Kahn, for example, have success-
fully applied systems thinking to organizations, defined by them as open sys-
tems constantly re- defined by their interactions with the environment.1 This 
has resulted in management gurus and practitioners fully embracing systems 
theory. Luhmann brought the systems theory matrix of analysis to sociology, 
politics and law, providing one of the most extensive, complex and compelling 
theories of society.2
A system is defined as “a set of things – people, cells, molecules, whatever – 
interconnected in such a way that they produce their own pattern of behaviour 
 1 Katz, Daniel, and Robert L. Kahn. The Social Psychology of Organization. New York: Wiley, 1966.








over time”.3 Von Bertalanffy places interaction between parts or between the 
parts and their environment at the core of every existing system.4 Tien and 
Berg go along the same lines when they define the types of systems and their 
components:
A system can be natural (e.g., lake) or built (e.g., government), physical 
(e.g., space shuttle) or conceptual (e.g., plan), closed (e.g., chemicals 
in a stationary, closed bottle) or open (e.g., tree), static (e.g., bridge) or 
dynamic (e.g., human). In regard to its elements, a system can be detailed 
in terms of its components, composed of people, processes and prod-
ucts; its attributes, composed of the input, process and output character-
istics of each component; and its relationships, composed of interactions 
between components and characteristics.5
Meadows highlights the relationship between the structure of the system and 
the behaviours exhibited by its elements and adds that “the least obvious part 
of the system, its function or purpose, is often the most crucial determinant of 
the system’s behaviour”.6
The current work attempts to apply the basic elements of systems theory to 
the field of fundamental rights protection in Europe. The use of systems theory 
can support attempts to explain why EU competition law has remained resis-
tant to the developments in the field of fundamental rights in the EU. Systems 
theory also provides a clarification of the deferential judicial review performed 
and preferred by the EU courts. Lastly, and probably most importantly, the 
exercise of applying systems theory to the ECtHR results in arguing that the 
latter is a self- regulating tribunal.
2.2 The New Public Management Movement
Neither the Commission, in all its roles, nor the ECtHR have escaped the 
influence of the most important movement in administrative theory from 
the second half of the 20th century – the New Public Management. This 
 3 Meadows, Donella H. Thinking in Systems: A Primer. London: Earthscan, 2009. Page 2.
 4 Von Bertalanffy, Ludwig. “General Systems Theory.” General Systems, Yearbook of Society for 
General Systems Research 1 (1956): pp. 1– 10.
 5 Tien, James M., and Daniel Berg. “A Case for Service Systems Engineering.” Journal of Systems 
Science and Systems Engineering 12.1 (2003): pp. 23– 24.











section provides a description of the npm movement and its influence on the 
Commission and the ECtHR.
The National Partnership for Reinventing Government and the National 
Performance Review were launched by US President Bill Clinton in March 
1993. The goal of the endeavour has been to “make the entire federal govern-
ment both less expensive and more efficient, and to change the culture of our 
national bureaucracy away from complacency and entitlement toward ini-
tiative and empowerment”.7 Based on this goal, the Phase i report, Creating 
a Government That Works Better and Costs Less, made 384 recommendations. 
It was supported by 38 “accompanying” reports which detailed 1,250 specific 
actions intended to save $108 billion in total, reduce the number of “overhead” 
positions, and improve government operations.8
What started as an American phenomenon quickly spread and gained 
momentum in the rest of the world as well. The importance of the American 
origin of this theory and phenomenon should not be overlooked. Caiden 
wrote that “most of the theories employed have originated in the United 
States. Most of the substantive measures advocated are drawn from American 
texts. Many of the experts employed by international bodies to expound the 
platform are Americans. Most models and sample laws are based on American 
sources”.9
In his seminal work Dismantling Democratic States, Suleiman points out 
that all US Presidents have launched programs for government reorganization 
and for the elimination of waste. The proposal put forward by the Clinton- 
Gore administration differed from all the previous programs in two ways. First, 
the scope of proposed changes had not been previously matched. Second, and 
more importantly, this proposal suggested the
embrace of norms that had hitherto been considered appropriate only 
for the private sector – customer orientation, entrepreneurism, compe-
tition among government agencies – and the implicit alliance that has 
 7 Remarks by President Clinton Announcing the Initiative to Streamline Government, 3 March 
1993. Available at https:// govinfo.library.unt.edu/ npr/ library/ speeches/ 030393.html accessed 
on 23 February 2021.
 8 National Partnership for Reinventing Government/ John Kamensky. “A Brief History.” January 
1999. Available at https:// govinfo.library.unt.edu/ npr/ whoweare/ history2.html accessed on 
23 February 2021.
 9 Caiden, Gerald E. “Administrative Reform – American Style.” Public Administration Review 








come to be made with social and political forces that seek to curtail the 
role of government for ideological or class interest.10
Suleiman describes four key concepts behind the npm and how they differ 
from the previous attempts to reorganize governments: (1) Entrepreneurism; 
(2) Customer Orientation; (3) Flattening Hierarchies and (4) Alternative Forms 
of Implementation. Suleiman highlights that “most important in this view is 
the idea that the dangers of bureaucratic discretion that are said to be con-
comitant with entrepreneurism are not really dangers at all if bureaucrats 
are motivated to serve the public interest”.11 He notes that some elements of 
the npm such as flexibility – defined as “a disdain for red tape coupled with 
emphasis on getting things done” – and the decreasing attention to formal 
rules and hierarchies hide a “scepticism about the existence of a public service 
institution”.12 Lastly, Suleiman points that “procedural due process, which is 
seen as the core legitimating concern that prompts the existence of red tape in 
the first place, is deemphasized in the literature on government reinvention”. 
(emphasis added)13
A few consequences follow from the embrace of the npm. First, there is 
a withering of the notion of public interest which, if construed as a flexible 
notion, justifies a diminished role for public bureaucracy.14
Second, in the npm model, the state becomes a producer of services with 
citizens as customers. Suleiman notes that “paradoxically, the attempt to pro-
mote the consumer and to make him central to the new democracy was an 
attempt to combat cartels and the plutocrats”.15 Boorstin’s work on consump-
tion communities has argued that “now men were affiliated less by what they 
believed than by what they consumed”.16 Suleiman suggests that “the contem-
porary attempt to see the government as facing a horde of consumers that it 
needs to satisfy rather than as citizens to whom it has responsibility” is the 
“antithesis of the kind of citizenship required to sustain a democratic polity”.17
 10 Suleiman, Ezra. Dismantling Democratic States. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2005, p. 44.
 11 Suleiman, op. cit., p. 45– 46.
 12 Suleiman, op. cit., p 47.
 13 Suleiman, op. cit., p 45.
 14 Suleiman, op. cit., p. 50.
 15 Suleiman, op. cit., p. 53.
 16 Boorstin, Daniel J. The Americans: The democratic experience. New York: Random House, 
1973, p. 147.


















Lastly, Suleiman highlights that the weakening of the idea of collective 
interest leads to statist minimalism and politics and to the state no longer 
being able to ensure the impartial arbitration between competing claims.18
The npm model was embraced in the European Union as well. The resig-
nation of the Santer Commission in 1999, following perceived runaway ten-
dencies of the European bureaucracy that culminated with a legitimacy cri-
sis, started a wave of npm reforms. The Committee of Independent Experts 
appointed by the EU Parliament in the wake of the crisis found that the 
EU Commission tolerated fraud and nepotism in breach of the principles 
of independence, integrity and discretion required from all members of the 
Commission.19 The first report of the experts also found “an admission of 
a loss of control by the political authorities over the Administration that 
they supposedly were running”.20 Ellinas and Suleiman, in their extensive 
appraisal of the process, suggested that the proposed solution was “to make 
European officials more responsible through the enhancement of manage-
ment practices”.21
The EU Commission’s White Paper on Governance of 2001 acknowledged 
that political leaders throughout Europe were facing a real paradox: “on the 
one hand, Europeans want them to find solutions to the major problems con-
fronting our societies. On the other hand, people increasingly distrust institu-
tions and politics or are simply not interested in them”.22 The White Paper on 
Governance proposed a wide- ranging series of reforms, some of which contain 
elements of npm: greater use of policy tools such as regulations, framework 
directives, guidelines and recommendations, co- regulatory mechanisms and 
the further creation and development of EU regulatory agencies.
The European Commission under Romano Prodi made administrative 
reform one of its top priorities. Neil Kinnock was appointed vice president of 
the Commission and was put in charge of the modernization process of the EU 
Commission in 2000.
 18 Suleiman, op. cit., pp. 55– 59.
 19 Committee of Independent Experts. First Report on Allegations Regarding Fraud, 
Mismanagement and Nepotism in the European Commission.15 Mar 1999. Available at 
http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/ experts/ pdf/ reporten.pdf accessed on 23 February 2021.
 20 Committee of Independent Experts, quoted above, p. 137.
 21 Ellinas, Antonis A., and Ezra Suleiman. The European Commission and Bureaucratic 
Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 99.
 22 Commission of the European Communities. European Governance: A White Paper. 
Brussels: com(2001) 428 final. Available at https:// ec.europa.eu/ europeaid/ european- 












Ellinas and Suleiman noted that there were four overarching themes of 
the modernization efforts put forward by the Kinnock Reforms.23 The first 
was a “culture based on service” that led to new standards of behaviour for 
Commissioners and a Code for Good Administrative Behaviour.24 The sec-
ond theme was efficiency: “echoing npm- type ideas (…) the overall goal was to 
encourage the various directorates and departments to focus more on results, 
rather than procedures”.25 The third theme of the reform proposal was the 
improvement of financial management and control, and the improvement of 
audit procedures. The last theme of the reform initiative was the moderniza-
tion of human resources policies, and management ability was identified as 
the most important criterion for appointments.26
The reform of the European Commission took place at the same time as 
the accession of the Eastern countries leaving behind a totalitarian past. 
Coincidentally, on 1 May 2004, Regulation 1/ 2003 entered into force and 10 new 
member states joined the European Union. As will be shown later, Regulation 
1/ 2003 put forward all the npm elements described above in the enforcement 
of competition policy in the EU: customer orientation, the flattening of hierar-
chies, preference for alternative forms of implementation and the disdain for 
due process that characterizes entrepreneurism- derived flexibility.
The Kinnock reforms have been widely discussed in the academic world. 
Some observers consider that they have been the most successful attempt 
at modernizing European bureaucracy.27 Other writers have remained scep-
tical. Ellinas and Suleiman concluded, after extensive interviews with the 
Commission’s officials, that the progress achieved by the Kinnock reforms 
in modernizing the Commission has come at the expense of increasing its 
bureaucratization. They highlight that “the Kinnock reforms are probably 
unique in the universe of npm- inspired administrative reforms in that they 
are thought to have reduced efficiency instead of enhancing it”.28
As to the ECtHR, a recent paper has analysed the impact of npm reforms 
put in place since at least 1994 to render the ECtHR more efficient.29 Lambert 
 23 Ellinas and Suleiman, op. cit., pp. 101– 104.
 24 European Commission (2001), quoted above.
 25 Ellinas and Suleiman, op. cit., p. 102.
 26 Ellinas and Suleiman, op. cit., p. 103.
 27 Bauer, Michael. “The Politics of Reforming the European Commission.” Management 
Reforms in International Organizations. Eds. Michael Bauer and Christoph Knill. Baden- 
Baden: Nomos, 2007, p. 52.
 28 Ellinas and Suleiman, op. cit., p. 122.
 29 Lambert Abdelgawad, Elisabeth. “The Economic Crisis and the Evolution of the System 
















Abdelgawad has shown that the efficiency- driven reforms have resulted in a 
different filtration of applications procedure, in a priority policy and in numer-
ous pilot judgements, allowing the ECtHR to freeze cases until the Member 
State from which the applications originate solves the matter at the origin 
of the large number of applications. Efficiency of courts, alongside indepen-
dence, has become a paramount principle. At the same time, the more wor-
risome trend has been to equate efficiency with the speed of the judicial 
decision- making process. Lambert Abdelgawad concluded that “nmp remains 
dominant if not domineering” and that “efficiency may have resulted in more 
rulings for each euro, but these savings have come at a very high price, to be 
paid by individuals whose Convention rights have been breached but who may 
be prevented from having access to the ECtHR in the very name of maximising 
the return of financial resources”.30
As it will be shown in Part 3, the npm movement and the Kinnock reforms 
have resulted in the adoption of measures strengthening the independence of 
the Commissioners, but also of the civil service of the EU Commission. At the 
same time, the impact of the Kinnock reforms on the adjudicatory branch of 
the EU Commission has rarely been described as positive.
2.3 Peoples, Consumers and Citizens
The difference between the almost right word and the right word is really 
a large matter. ’tis the difference between the lightning bug and the 
lightning.
mark twain
An analysis of the wording used by EU treaties and EU competition law legis-
lation might offer an additional explanation about the reasons for which the 
latter remained separated from the due process developments taking place 
elsewhere.
The Treaty of Rome of 1957 had as its main task to establish a common 
market and to progressively approximate the economic policies of member 
states, “to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development 
of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in 
stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations 
between the states belonging to it”.31 The beneficiaries of the Treaty of Rome 
 30 Lambert Abdelgaward, op. cit., p. 83 and 89.








appear to be the member states and its “peoples”. The word “person” appears in 
the Treaty of Rome as subject of the free movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital. The “person” of the Treaty of Rome is a rather passive one, as if car-
ried away by the flow of free movement. The “consumer” is a variation of the 
“person” and it can be either a beneficiary of common agricultural policy or of 
competition policy. The word “citizen” does not appear in the Treaty of Rome.
In the same vein, the early Annual Competition Reports indicate that the 
main beneficiary of the Commission’s work in the field of competition is the 
consumer. The Commission acknowledged that its competition policy
encourages the best possible use of productive resources for the greatest 
possible benefit of the economy as a whole and for the benefit, in partic-
ular, of the consumer. In this respect, the Commission is not only con-
cerned with increasing by means of the rules of competition the quantity 
of goods available for consumption, but is also taking action to promote 
better information for consumers.32 (emphasis added)
The Treaty of Maastricht was the first document to refer to citizenship and 
introduced the “citizen” as the subject of EU law. The “citizen” of the Treaty 
of Maastricht had the right to be in the close vicinity of the decision- making 
process, had the right to move and reside freely in the territory of the member 
states and had the right to petition the European Parliament and the European 
Ombudsman. The focus on the “citizen” continued throughout all of the fol-
lowing Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon Treaties. However, the competition rules 
established in the Treaty of Rome remained unchanged.
At the same time, competition policy viewed the “citizen” through its “con-
sumer” lens. Karel van Miert wrote in the introduction to the 1995 Annual 
Report on Competition that “the single market must first and foremost serve 
people. It must be ensured, through strict application of the competition rules, 
that consumers have freedom of choice between quality products at compet-
itive prices”.33 The same view appears to have been held by all subsequent 
Competition Commissioners. Commissioner Neelie Kroes wrote that “improv-
ing the functioning of markets for the benefit of European consumers and 
businesses remains at the heart of the European project”.34
 32 Commission of the European Economic Community (1972), quoted above, p. 12.
 33 European Commission. XXVth Report on Competition Policy 1995. Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, 1996, p. 7.
 34 European Comission. Report on Competition Policy 2007. Luxembourg: Office for Official 








The more recent Annual Reports on Competition make use of the term “cit-
izen” more often, but the term is still closely associated to the citizen as a con-
sumer. The 2017 Annual Report on Competition highlighted that 2017 marked 
the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome and of EU competi-
tion policy. The report noted that,
in the past decades, competition policy has made a big difference in 
people's lives: European citizens may not always be familiar with compe-
tition rules, but they deal with the market every single day. Competition 
drives businesses to compete on the merits – on prices, quality and 
innovation – and to meet consumers’ needs. By pushing companies to 
do better, competition puts power in the hands of consumers.35 (empha-
sis added)
Is the difference in wording important in this context? If yes, in which ways? 
The Cambridge Dictionary defines a “citizen” as “a person who is a member of 
a particular country and who has rights because of being born there or because 
of being given rights”.36
A “consumer” on the other hand is “a person who buys goods or services for 
their own use”.37 The word “citizen” has the notion of rights at its core, rights 
that come into being from a relationship with a country. This relationship 
implies continuity, loyalty and reciprocity. A “consumer”, in contrast, is some-
one – a state, organization or person – that is defined by the act of purchasing 
and consumption. This relationship implies discontinuity, opportunism and 
money or other units that can be used as a measure for the exchange.
Shrubsole noted that the use of the word “consumer” has steadily grown 
during the 20th century, slowly replacing the word “citizen” in books, media 
and policy documents.38 Another author found that “unlike the citizen, the 
consumer’s means of expression is limited: while citizens can address every 
 35 European Commission. Report on Competition Policy 2017. Brussels: com(2018) 482 final, 
p. 2. Available at http:// ec.europa.eu/ competition/ publications/ annual_ report/ 2017/ part1_ 
en.pdf accessed on 23 February 2021.
 36 Cambridge Online Dictionary, available at: https:// dictionary.cambridge.org/ dictionary/ 
english/ citizen
 37 Cambridge Online Dictionary, available at:https:// dictionary.cambridge.org/ dictionary/ 
english/ citizen
 38 Shrubsole, Guy. “Consumers Outstrip Citizens in British Media.” Open Democracy. 5 Mar 
2012. Available at https:// www.opendemocracy.net/ en/ opendemocracyuk/ consumers- 










aspect of cultural, social and economic life (…), consumers find expression 
only in the marketplace”.39
This shift in terminology can be considered an expression of what Berry 
called “tyrannese”. He wrote: “My impression is that we have seen, for perhaps 
a hundred and fifty years, a gradual increase in language that is either mean-
ingless or destructive of meaning. And I believe that this increasing unreliabil-
ity of language parallels the increasing disintegration, over the same period, of 
persons and communities”.40 He goes on to say that
in this degenerative accounting, language is almost without the power 
of designation, because it is used conscientiously to refer to nothing in 
particular. Attention rests upon percentages, categories, abstract func-
tions. It is not language that the user will very likely be required to stand 
by or act on, for it does not define any personal ground for standing or 
acting. Its only practical utility is to support with “expert opinion” a vast, 
impersonal technological action already begun. (…) It is tyrannical lan-
guage: tyrannese.41
The European Communities initially focused on constructing a Common 
Market to ensure the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital, 
and only later on a Union, whose citizens have rights and obligations. On the 
other hand, the fact that European Competition Policy has remained focused 
on consumers and has not updated its vocabulary to “citizenry” is surprising. 
This, however, can partially account for the reticence of competition officials 
to enlarge due process guarantees during competition law proceedings.
2.4 Accession of the EU to the echr
The Council of Europe and the European Union have developed in parallel, 
in largely the same geographic area and on the basis of similar principles. The 
concepts of human rights and fundamental rights have been key elements 
of institution- building, both for the Council of Europe and for the European 
Union. The proposed accession of the European Union to the echr highlights, 
 39 Lewis, Justin, Sanna Inthorn and Karin Wahl- Jorgensen. Citizens or Consumers: What 
the Media Tell Us about Political Participation: The Media and the Decline of Political 
Participation. Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2005.
 40 Berry, Wendell. Standing by Words. San Francisco: North Point Press, 1983, p. 24.









however, the menial and procedural aspects that prevent the successful 
enforcement of human rights at the supranational level.
According to well- established case- law of the cjeu, fundamental rights 
form an integral part of the general principles of EU law. For that purpose, 
the Court of Justice draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions com-
mon to the member states and from the guidelines supplied by international 
treaties for the protection of human rights on which the member states have 
collaborated or of which they are signatories.42
In paragraphs 34 and 35 of the Opinion 2/ 94, the Court of Justice considered 
that the European Community had no competence to accede to the echr.43 
Such accession would have required a substantial change in the existing 
Community system for the protection of human rights in that it would have 
entailed the entry of the Community into a distinct international institutional 
system as well as integration of all the provisions of that Convention into the 
Community’s legal order. Such a modification of the system for the protection 
of human rights in the Community would have been of constitutional signifi-
cance both to the Community and to the member states and would therefore 
have gone beyond the scope of the ec Treaty.
On 7 December 2000, the European Parliament, the Council of the European 
Union and the Commission proclaimed the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union in Nice.44 The Charter, which at that time was not a legally 
binding instrument, has the principal aim, as is apparent from the preamble 
thereto, of reaffirming
the rights as they result, in particular, from the constitutional traditions 
and international obligations common to the Member States, the Treaty 
on European Union, the Community Treaties, the [echr], the Social 
Charters adopted by the Community and by the Council of Europe and 
the case- law of the [Court of Justice] and of the [ECtHR].45
 42 C- 11/ 70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide 
und Futtermittel, ecli:eu:C:1970:114, paragraph 4.
C- 4/ 73, Nold kg v Commission, ecli:eu:C:1974:51, paragraph 13.
In that context, the Court of Justice has stated that the echr has special signifi-
cance: see, in particular, C-260/ 89, ert v dep, ecli:eu:C:1991:254, paragraph 41.
C-402/ 05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, 
ecli:eu:C:2008:461.
C-415/ 05 P, Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, 
ecli:eu:C:2008:30, paragraph 283.
 43 ecj, Avis 2/ 94, Adhésion de la Communauté à la cedh, ecli:eu:C:1996:140.
 44 Avis 2/ 94, Adhésion de la Communauté à la cedh, quoted above.










The Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, amended 
Article 6 teu which is worded as follows:
 1. The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in 
the [Charter], which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.
   The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the compe-
tences of the Union as defined in the Treaties.
   The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be inter-
preted in accordance with the general provisions in Title vii of the 
Charter governing its interpretation and application and with due 
regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter, that set out the 
sources of those provisions.
 2. The Union shall accede to the [echr]. Such accession shall not affect 
the Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties.
 3. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the [echr] and as they result 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, 
shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.
In that regard, Article 218(6)(a)(ii) tfeu provided that the Council was to 
adopt the decision concluding the agreement on EU accession to the echr 
(‘the accession agreement’) after obtaining the consent of Parliament. In addi-
tion, Article 218(8) states that, for that purpose, the Council is to act unani-
mously and that its decision is to enter into force after it has been approved 
by the member states in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements.
The Declaration on Article 6(2) teu, annexed to the Final Act of the 
Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, states as 
follows:
The Conference agrees that the Union’s accession to the [echr] should 
be arranged in such a way as to preserve the specific features of Union 
law. In this connection, the Conference notes the existence of a regular 
dialogue between the [Court of Justice] and the [ECtHR]; such dialogue 
could be reinforced when the Union accedes to that Convention.
Upon the recommendation of the Commission of 17 March 2010, the Council 
adopted a decision on 4 June 2010 authorizing the opening of negotiations 
in relation to the accession agreement, and designated the Commission as 
negotiator. On 5 April 2013, the negotiations resulted in agreement among the 
negotiators on the draft accession instruments. The negotiators agreed that all 
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those instruments constitute a package and that they are all equally necessary 
for the accession of the EU to the echr.
Later the same year, the European Commission requested the Court of 
Justice to issue an opinion concerning the compatibility of the proposed 
accession agreement with the Treaties. The Court of Justice issued its opinion 
on 18 December 2014 arguing that the envisaged agreement is not compatible 
with Article 6(2) teu or with Protocol No 8 EU in that:
 – it is liable to adversely affect the specific characteristics and the autonomy 
of EU law in so far as it does not ensure coordination between Article 53 
of the echr and Article 53 of the Charter, does not avert the risk that the 
principle of Member States’ mutual trust under EU law may be undermined, 
and makes no provision in respect of the relationship between the mecha-
nism established by Protocol No 16 and the preliminary ruling procedure 
provided for in Article 267 tfeu;
 – it is liable to affect Article 344 tfeu in so far as it does not preclude the pos-
sibility of disputes between Member States or between Member States and 
the EU concerning the application of the echr within the scope ratione 
materiae of EU law being brought before the ECtHR;
 – it does not lay down arrangements for the operation of the co- respondent 
mechanism and the procedure for the prior involvement of the Court of 
Justice that enable the specific characteristics of the EU and EU law to be 
preserved; and
 – it fails to have regard to the specific characteristics of EU law with regard 
to the judicial review of acts, actions or omissions on the part of the EU in 
Common Foreign and Security Policy matters in that it entrusts the judi-
cial review of some of those acts, actions or omissions exclusively to a non- 
EU body.
The Court stressed in particular the fact that the EU had a new kind of legal 
order – the nature of which is peculiar to the EU its own constitutional frame-
work and founding principles, a particularly sophisticated institutional struc-
ture and a full set of legal rules to ensure its operation, had consequences as 
regards the procedure for and conditions of accession to the echr. What is 
more, these essential characteristics of EU law have given rise to a structured 
network of principles, rules and mutually interdependent legal relations link-
ing the EU and its member states, and its member states with each other, which 
were now engaged, as is recalled in the second paragraph of Article 1 teu, in a 
process of creating an ever- closer union among the peoples of Europe.
A great deal of effort has been put into the protection of the specific charac-
teristics and the autonomy of that legal order. For this purpose, the Treaties have 
established a judicial system intended to ensure consistency and uniformity 
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in the interpretation of EU law. The accession of the EU to the echr risked 
endangering this system.
For example, the EU, like any other contracting party, would be subject to 
external control to ensure the observance of the rights and freedoms the EU 
would undertake to respect in accordance with Article 1 echr. In that context, 
the EU and its institutions, including the Court of Justice, would be subject to 
the control mechanisms provided for by the echr and, in particular, to the 
decisions and the judgments of the ECtHR. It is implicit in the very concept of 
external control that the interpretation of the echr by the ECtHR would be 
binding on the EU and its institutions, including the cjeu.
On the other hand, the interpretation by the Court of Justice of a right recog-
nized by the echr would not be binding on the control mechanisms provided 
for by the echr, the ECtHR in particular. The cjeu referred to its case- law 
that an international agreement providing for the creation of a court respon-
sible for the interpretation of its provisions and whose decisions are binding 
on the institutions, including the Court of Justice, should not, in principle, be 
incompatible with EU law, especially when the conclusion of such an agree-
ment is provided for by the Treaties themselves. The competence of the EU in 
the field of international relations, and its capacity to conclude international 
agreements, necessarily entails the power to submit to the decisions of a court 
which is created or designated by such agreements as regards the interpreta-
tion and application of their provisions.46 Nevertheless, the Court of Justice 
has also declared that an international agreement may affect its own powers 
only if the indispensable conditions for safeguarding the essential character of 
those powers were satisfied and, consequently, there were no adverse effect on 
the autonomy of the EU legal order.47
The cjeu also stressed that
the approach adopted in the agreement envisaged, which is to treat the 
EU as a State and to give it a role identical in every respect to that of 
any other Contracting Party, specifically disregards the intrinsic nature of 
 46 See Opinions, ecj, Avis 1/ 91, Accord eee – I, ecli:eu:C:1991:490, paragraphs 40 and 70. 
ecj, Avis 1/ 09, Accord sur la création d’un système unifié de règlement des litiges en matière 
de brevets, ecli:eu:C:2011:123, paragraph 74.
 47 See Opinions ecj, Avis 1/ 00, Accord sur la création d’un espace aérien européen commun, 
ecli:eu:C:2002:231, paragraphs 21, 23 and 26.
Avis 1/ 09, Accord sur la création d’un système unifié de règlement des litiges en matière 
de brevets, quoted above, paragraph 76.
See also, to that effect, C-402/ 05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v 






the EU and, in particular, fails to take into consideration the fact that the 
Member States have, by reason of their membership of the EU, accepted 
that relations between them as regards the matters covered by the trans-
fer of powers from the Member States to the EU are governed by EU law 
to the exclusion, if EU law so requires, of any other law.48
The Court of Justice has also been keen to protect the preliminary ruling pro-
cedure that risked losing its importance due to the accession of the EU to the 
echr. In particular, the Court stressed that a request for an advisory opinion by 
a court or tribunal of a member state “could trigger the procedure for the prior 
involvement of the Court of Justice, thus creating a risk that the preliminary rul-
ing procedure provided for in Article 267 tfeu might be circumvented, a proce-
dure which is the keystone of the judicial system established by the Treaties”.49
Lock had already suggested in 2011, in one of the first academic papers 
covering the accession of the EU to the echr, that “accession by the EU to 
the echr raises fundamental questions of constitutional significance”.50 He 
stressed that the accession agreement requires a difficult balancing between 
the task of preserving the autonomy of the EU legal order and practical and 
political demands, which might conflict with it. He concluded, that “all this 
makes the EU a difficult partner in negotiations”.51 Since then, the topic of the 
accession of the EU to the echr has been analysed both from the point of 
view of the technical challenges posed by the accession and from the point 
of view of the relationship between the ECtHR and the EU Courts, which has 
sometimes been characterized as contradictory.52 The Court’s opinion leaves 
 48 ecj, Avis 2/ 94, Adhésion de la Communauté à la cedh, ecli:eu:C:1996:140, paragraph 193.
 49 ecj, Avis 2/ 94, Adhésion de la Communauté à la cedh, ecli:eu:C:1996:140. Paragraph 198.
 50 Lock, Tobias. “Walking on a Tightrope: The Draft Accession Agreement and the Autonomy 
of the EU Legal Order.” Common Market Law Review 48.4 (2011): pp. 1025– 1054, p. 1053.
 51 Lock, op. cit., p. 1054.
 52 Eckes, Christina. “EU Accession to the ECHR: Between Autonomy and Adaptation.” The 
Modern Law Review 76.2 (2013): pp. 254– 285.
Dzehtsiarou, Kanstantsin and Pavel Repyeuski. “European Consensus and the EU 
Accession to the ECHR.” The EU Accession to the ECHR. Eds. Vicky Kosta, Nikos Skoutaris 
and Vassilis Tzevelekos. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014, pp. 309– 324.
Lock, Tobias. “The ECJ and the ECtHR: The Future Relationship between the 
Two European Courts.” The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 8 
(2009): pp. 375– 398.
Pavone, Tommaso. “The Past and Future Relationship of the European Court of Justice 
and the European Court of Human Rights: A Functional Analysis.” SSRN Electronic Journal 













no doubts as to the fact that the EU accession to the echr will have a major 
impact on EU law.
2.5 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union has been pro-
claimed on 7 December 2000 and entered into force on 1 December 2009, as 
part of the Treaty of Lisbon. The growing importance of the Charter and its 
relationship with other fundamental rights instruments in Europe feeds into 
the subject of this book.
The Preamble of the Charter announces that the EU contributes to the pres-
ervation and to the development of the universal values of human dignity, 
freedom, equality and solidarity. To this end the EU must “strengthen the pro-
tection of fundamental rights in the light of changes in society, social progress 
and scientific and technological developments by making those rights more 
visible”.
Furthermore, the Charter reaffirms the fundamental rights as they result 
from the constitutional traditions and international obligations common 
to the Member States, the echr, the Social Charters adopted by the Union 
and by the Council of Europe and the case- law of the cjeu and of the 
ECtHR. Therefore, the Charter should be interpreted with due regard to the 
explanations.
According to Article 51 of the Charter, the terms of the Charter are addressed 
to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the EU and to the national 
authorities when they are implementing EU law.
In order to provide the EU institutions and the EU Member States when 
implementing EU law with assistance and expertise relating to funda-
mental rights, the EU established the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights 
(the Agency).53 The Agency does large- scale surveys, comparative legal or 
social research and handbooks for legal professionals. The Multi- Annual 
framework defined nine thematic areas for the Agency’s work: (a) victims 
of crime and access to justice; (b) equality and discrimination; (c) infor-
mation society and, in particular, respect for private life and protection of 
personal data; (d) judicial cooperation; (e) migration, borders, asylum and 
Gragl, Paul. The Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014, p. 263.
 53 Council Regulation (ec) No 168/ 2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union 





integration of refugees and migrants; (f) racism, xenophobia and related 
intolerance; (g) rights of the child; (h) integration and social inclusion of 
Roma.54
In 2010, the Commission adopted a strategy to monitor and ensure the effec-
tive implementation of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter.55 
There, the Commission highlighted that the Charter was an innovative instru-
ment because it brought “together in one text all the fundamental rights pro-
tected in the Union, spelling them out in detail and making them visible and 
predictable”.56
The adoption of the Charter has been hailed by the academia as a long- 
awaited text. Morano- Foadi and Andreadakis performed in 2010 interviews 
with 19 cjeu judges and Advocates General about the importance of the entry 
into force of the Charter. Despite the fact that interviewees highlighted the 
central role played by the Charter, the respondents split into two groups: “the 
majority of them, more optimistic, believing that a new era of integration, 
based on rights, was inaugurated with Lisbon; and those a little bit more cau-
tious, who felt that that was not the case”.57 The second group of respondents 
underlined the fact that the cjeu has “recognised and protected rights for 
decades” and, not without importance, “questioned the balance of interests 
and rights”.58
A major concern raised by the opponents of the Treaty of Lisbon was that 
“the new legally binding status of the Charter would lead to an American- style 
legal revolution whereby the Court of Justice would have the jurisdiction to 
review national measures for their conformity with EU fundamental rights 
regardless of the absence of any link with Union law”.59
At the same time, many authors have placed the Charter within the “unset-
tled question of complexity inherent in talking about human rights within a 
 54 Council Decision (EU) 2017/ 2269 of 7 December 2017 establishing a Multiannual 
Framework for the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights for 2018– 2022, oj L 
326, 9.12.2017, pp. 1– 4, article 2.
 55 European Commission. Communication from the Commission. Strategy for the effective 
implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the European Union. com/ 2010/ 
0573 final.
 56 Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the 
European Union, quoted above, p. 3.
 57 Morano- Foadi, Sonia and Stelios Andreadakis. “Reflections of the Architecture of the 
EU after the Treaty of Lisbon: The European Judicial Approach to Fundamental Rights.” 
European Law Journal 17.5 (2011): pp. 595– 610, p. 599.
 58 Morano- Foadi and Andreadakis, op. cit.














framework of autonomy and supremacy”.60 Thus, Alonso Garcia, commenting 
on Article 53 of the Charter noted that
this clause, insofar as it entails the potential displacement of the 
instrument of which it forms part by others which offer a greater level 
of protection, poses in the case of the Charter a first complication in 
its interpretation: unlike the international treaties confined to human 
rights, which have the clear vocation of complementing the national 
system of protection, the Charter is part of a context, the Union con-
text, which is constructed in conceptual terms as an autonomous legal 
order with an integrating vocation that tends to displace, by means 
of the principle of supremacy, the disparities between the Member 
States.61
Indeed, Articles 52 and 53 of the Charter raise important questions of inter-
pretation concerning the relationship of the Charter with the echr and the 
ECtHR.
Article 52, titled Scope and interpretation of the rights and principles, states 
in paragraph 3 that insofar as the Charter contains rights which correspond to 
rights guaranteed by the echr, “the meaning and scope of those rights shall be 
the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not 
prevent Union law providing more extensive protection”.
Paragraph 4 of Article 52, by contrast, stipulates that insofar as the Charter 
recognizes fundamental rights “as they result from the constitutional tradi-
tions common to the Member States, those rights shall be interpreted in har-
mony with those traditions”.
Article 53 of the Charter, titled Level of protection, states that nothing in the 
Charter “shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, as recognized, in their respective fields of applica-
tion, by Union law and international law and by international agreements to 
which the Union or all the Member States are party, including the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
and by the Member States’ constitutions”.
Arold Lorenz, Groussot and Petursson have argued that Article 52 was “the 
most complex provision of the Charter and can be seen as akin to a Pandora’s 
 60 Alonso Garcia, R. “The General Provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union.” European Law Journal 8.4 (2002): pp. 492– 514, p. 510.






Box”.62 They call Article 52 the “limitation, homogeneity and clarification 
clause” which regulates “the functioning of the rights within the Charter (inter-
nal regulation) and its relationship with other sources of law related to the 
protection of human rights in Europe (external regulation)”.63 In addition, 
Morano- Foadi and Andreadakis observed that pursuant to Article 52 of the 
Charter, “the jurisprudence of the ECtHR constitutes the lowest minimum 
standard to be respected within the Union”.64 This, in turn, “leads the EU to be 
indirectly bound by the echr, as it must always be followed when restricting 
fundamental rights in the EU to ensure the EU maintains the same level of 
protection”.65
Advocate General Bot discussed Article 53 of the Charter in Melloni. He 
highlighted that
Article 53 of the Charter supplements the principles stated in Articles 51 
and 52 thereof (…), by pointing out that, in a system in which the plural-
ism of sources of protection of fundamental rights prevails, the Charter 
is not intended to become the exclusive instrument for protecting those 
rights and, also, that it cannot have the effect, on its own, of adversely 
affecting or reducing the level of protection resulting from those different 
sources in their respective fields of application.66
The cjeu did not refer to the Charter as a source of inspiration until 2006. 
One month after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the cjeu adopted 
the Kücükdeveci decision in which the Charter’s status has been mentioned 
for the first time.67 Since then, the Charter has been used by the EU Courts as 
 62 Arold Lorenz, Nina- Louisa, Xavier Groussot and Gunnar Thor Petursson. The European 
Human Rights Culture – A Paradox of Human Rights Protection in Europe? Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2013, p. 192.
 63 Arold Lorenz, Groussot and Petursson, op. cit.
 64 Morano- Foadi and Andreadakis, op. cit., p. 597.
 65 Douglas- Scott, Sionaidh. “The European Union and Human Rights after the Treaty of 
Lisbon.” Human Rights Law Review 11.4 (2011), pp. 645– 682, p. 655.
 66 Opinion of Advocate General, C- 399/ 11, Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal, 
ecli:eu:C:2012:600, paragraph 131.
 67 C- 555/ 07, Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. kg, ecli:eu:C:2010:21. For a com-
mentary, see Wiesbrock, Anja. “Case Note – Case C- 555/ 07, Kucukdeveci v. Swedex, 
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 19 January 2010.” German Law Journal 11.5 














regular source of inspiration, including for the interpretation of the right to a 
fair trial, which is the subject of the current book. However, as I will show in 
the following chapters, the Charter cannot be deemed to have clarified the fair 
trial issues raised by this book.
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 chapter 3
A Foot in the Past: Existing Literature
Scholars studying European competition law have focused both on its philosoph-
ical background and on its evolution.12 These works have dealt with the substan-
tive and procedural aspects of EU competition law in parallel, with little over-
all attention paid to due process.3 More recent monographs adopted a different 
approach by placing due process at the centre of their discussions of European 
competition law.4
The study of fundamental rights in Europe has also been divided into two sep-
arate clusters as well: the first, following the development of human rights by the 
ECtHR in Strasbourg; the second, focusing on the work of the EU institutions, 
including the cjeu.5 At the same time, scholars have always had a soft spot for 
topics that cover the dialogue between the two courts and the two legal systems.85
A recent trend in legal doctrine has been to bridge the gaps between dif-
ferent fields of law. It is in this context that “and human rights” writings have 
developed. Business and human rights, investment law and human rights and 
wto law and human rights are fields of study that have created intimacies 
between areas of law which previously remained separated, and that have 
highlighted a generalized readiness to engage with the field of human rights.6
 1 Amato, Giuliano. Antitrust and the Bounds of Power: The Dilemma of Liberal Democracy in the 
History of the Market. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997.
 2 Bellamy, C., and G. Child. Common Market Law of Competition. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 
1987.
Amato, Giuliano, and C. Ehlermann, eds. EC Competition Law: A Critical Assessment. 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007.
Townley, C. Article 81 EC and Public Policy. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009.
Ezrachi, A. Article 82: Reflections on its Recent Evolution. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009.
 3 Vogel, L. European Competition Law. Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2015.
 4 Van Bael, Ivo. Due Process in European Competition Proceedings. Bruxelles: Kluwer Law 
International, 2011.
 5 Grabenwarter, C. op. cit.
Harris, D., M. O’Boyle, Ed Bates and C.M. Buckley. op. cit.
Keller, H., and A. Stone Sweet, eds. op. cit.
 6 Cottier, Thomas. “Trade and Human Rights: A Relationship to Discover.” Journal of 
International Economic Law 5.1 (2002): pp. 111– 132.
Cottier, Thomas, Joost Pauwelyn and Elisabeth Bürgi, eds. Human Rights and International 
Trade. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Bird, Robert C., Daniel R. Cahoy, Jamie Darin Prenkert, eds. Law, Business and Human 
Rights: Bridging the Gap. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014.
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In this context, the increased intimacy between competition law and 
human rights law was inevitable. The perfect locus for creating this intimacy 
is the notion of procedural fairness, a tested human rights concept that chal-
lenged some of the ingrained procedural aspects of competition law. A few 
events have accelerated interest in the two fields.
First, a few cases such as Microsoft v Commision have spurred a new inter-
est in the subject of procedural fairness due to the fines imposed by the 
Commission and the procedural issues raised.7 Second, the accession of the 
European Union to the echr pushed the debate on procedural fairness in 
competition law to a new level.
The following sections provides a description of the discussions in the aca-
demic literature that are relevant to this book.
3.1 Legal Philosophy
The discourse on due process and fair trail is closely related to the discourse on 
the meaning of judicial review, which is then closely related to the discourse 
on law and the meaning of interpreting the law. It is therefore impossible to 
avoid a short incursion into legal philosophy which has provided very fertile 
soil for debating these issues.
Starting with Bentham, process and procedure, and the notion of fairness 
that accompanies them, constituted a core element of realizing the principles 
of morals and legislation. For Bentham, the process appears to be a corollary 
of the idea that judges are making the law; they do not simply discover it as 
defended by the natural law proponents.8
Modern philosophers, such as Ely and Dworkin, have written extensively 
about the meaning of law and the social basis for procedural justice. Both 
American scholars have widely argued in favour of judicial activism and 
against judicial restraint. Dworkin introduced the distinction between con-
cepts and conceptions, arguing that constitutional texts contain concepts that 
are best revealed as conceptions through judicial review.9
In his seminal work, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, Ely 
proposed an interpretivist theory of judicial review that should distance itself 
Baumann- Pauly, Dorothée and Justine Nolan, eds. Business and Human Rights: From 
Principles to Practice. New York: Routledge, 2016.
 7 T- 167/ 08, Microsoft v Commission, ecli:eu:T:2012:323.
 8 Bentham, Jeremy. The Principles of Morals and Legislation. New York: Methuen, 1982.









from dealing with the constitutional provisions as separate, self- contained 
units and embrace a judicial review committed to the interpretation of 
each provision in light of the constitution as a whole document.10 He then 
offered three reasons for a “participation- oriented, representation- reinforcing 
approach to judicial review”.11 The first is that examination of the nature of the 
US Constitution finds it to provide a guarantee of process, not a description 
of substantive values. The second is that judges should “confine themselves to 
policing the mechanisms by which the system seeks to ensure that (…) elected 
representatives will actually represent”.12 Lastly, noting that “the ins are chok-
ing off channels of political change” and that a majority is “systematically dis-
advantaging some minority” out of simple hostility or prejudice, Ely argues 
that judges, as “comparative outsiders”, are in an objective position to assess 
claims that the system is malfunctioning. In other words, judges should assess 
whether the process is worthy of trust.13
More recently, Galligan provided a compelling analysis of the concept 
of procedural justice when applied to the field of administrative law.14 For 
Galligan, procedural justice is an essential element for the attainment of law 
and the goals of politics, “for no matter how good and just the laws and polit-
ical principles supporting them may be, without suitable procedures they 
would fail in their purposes”.15 Procedures on the one hand are deeply rooted 
in the social context that has created them, and on the other hand reflect the 
beliefs prevailing in the society that has created them.
Galligan proposes three constitutive elements to the notion of procedural 
justice:
First, legal procedures are fair procedures to the extent that they lead to 
or constitute fair treatment of the person or persons affected. Second, 
within each type of legal process, there are authoritative standards based 
on the tiers of values relevant to that process which constitute the stan-
dards of fair treatment, so that a person treated in accordance with them 
is treated fairly. Thirdly, the basis of such treatment being fair treatment 
 10 Dworkin, op. cit., pp. 12– 14 and 41.
 11 Ely, John Hart. Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1980, p. 87.
 12 Ely, op. cit., p. 100– 101.
 13 Ely, op. cit., p. 102– 103.
 14 Galligan, D. J. Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of Administrative Procedures. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
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is the promise of society as a whole to each of its members that they will 
be treated in that way.16
He argues that the normative expectations of citizens in the field of procedural 
fairness both include and go beyond written legal principles.
Turning to the issue of procedural justice in administrative proceedings, 
Galligan suggests that in the administrative context, “the inadequacy of pro-
cedures is less dramatic but more pervasive”.17 He shows that the decisions 
of agencies, officials, and tribunals are seriously unreliable, with almost as 
much chance of being wrong as being right. To avoid moral harm “every effort 
should be made to devise the best procedures possible within the resources 
available”.18
Somewhat reminiscent of Ely, Galligan proposes that participation – even 
if not automatically required in all legal and administrative processes – pos-
sesses a few virtues which allow it to prevent or lessen the moral harm that 
results from administrative processes. First, participation is a necessary instru-
ment to seek for and reach fair outcomes. Second, administrative processes 
often fall between legal and political processes and incorporate elements of 
both. Participation can clarify these distinctions. A third reason why participa-
tion appears to be closely linked to procedural fairness
derives from the idea that it enables a person to exert influence over the 
processes by which he or she is affected. This idea taps a deep spring in 
modern political theory: it conveys the idea that persons ought to be in 
charge of their lives and future, and that being involved in any process 
affecting them is one way of doing so.19
3.2 A Renewed Debate on Human Rights
To say that the founders of the Strasbourg system of human rights protection 
were visionaries is to pronounce the truth. When Teitgen proposed the cre-
ation of an international Court, he meant “to create a conscience in Europe 
 16 Galligan, op. cit., p. 52.
 17 Galligan, op. cit., p. 116.
 18 Galligan, op. cit.











which will sound the alarm” and that it would be “a Court belonging to Europe 
itself”.20
Also, as Bates wrote, the entry into force of the European Convention of 
Human Rights represented “a quantum leap in international law”, because
for the first time a treaty was in place by which sovereign States promised 
to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction a number of rights and 
freedoms. Each ratifying State would be under an international legal obli-
gation to amend that law if necessary. For such reasons the Convention 
was revolutionary for its time, and the more so as the advances just men-
tioned were reinforced by the principle of collective enforcement.21
Despite the importance of the entry into force of the echr, the initial reac-
tions of the legal profession and the press were weak. Bates quotes the works 
of Cedric Thornberry, a British barrister who has represented many applicants 
at the ECtHR, criticizing the fact that the leading law schools in the United 
Kingdom have either dismissed the idea of offering human rights course on 
the grounds that human rights has nothing to do with law, or have treated 
human rights as some sort of exotic field of study.22
Interest in human rights and in the Strasbourg system of human rights pro-
tection has increased over time, somewhat proportionally to the number of 
decisions adopted by the Court. However, and in spite of the growing number 
of judgments delivered by the ECtHR, human rights law has traditionally been 
studied by only a small number of scholars.
Freeman noted that the study and the practice of human rights have been 
dominated by lawyers and that the human rights movement owed a great debt 
to them. He stressed that “there is a danger, however, that excessive attention 
to human rights law distorts our understanding of human rights”.23 He pro-
poses human rights as a concept that can help with understanding and orga-
nizing information about the world around us.24 For him, human rights is an 
 20 Teitgen, P.H. “The European Guarantee of Human Rights: A Political Assessment.” 
Proceedings of the Fourth International Colloqui about the European Convention on Human 
Rights, held in Rome in 1975. Ed. Council of Europe. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 
1976, p. 29.
 21 Bates, Ed. The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010, p. 108.
 22 Bates, op. cit., pp. 13– 15.
 23 Freeman, Michael. Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2011, p. 13.
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interdisciplinary concept that can be comprehensively tackled only within 
an interdisciplinary framework. Freeman highlights the contributions which 
recent studies in sociology, anthropology, social psychology and economy have 
made to the human rights debate and concludes that “there are then signs that 
the social science of human rights is beginning to wake up”.25
The writings of Freeman signal an important development in the field of 
study of human rights, specifically that human rights have become increas-
ingly interdisciplinary, blending law with other social sciences.
Political scientists have contributed greatly to the human rights discourse 
in recent years, adding novel perspectives of analysis. Brysk and Jimenez- 
Bacardi propose that the globalisation of law is a process that “refers to a 
linked ensemble of changes in the scale, scope, mode, and juridical forms” and 
which includes: (1) the global diffusion of legal norms and processes; (2) multi- 
layered pluralism including regional, indigenous and family law; (3) new global 
legal institutions like the International Criminal Court; (4) transnational law 
governing private cross- border activities; (5) new repertories of jurisprudence 
and practice, such as participation rights for noncitizens and (6) the growing 
salience of conventional interstate and comparative jurisprudence for domes-
tic practice, such as universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity.26 They 
conclude that the globalization of law has shifted the focus of the human 
rights debate from the inter- state perspective towards state- society relations.
Other political scientists have concerned themselves with the impact of the 
human rights instruments. Sandholtz has shown that, on the one hand, the 
effects of treaties on human rights performance partly depend on how domes-
tic legal institutions integrate with international law and, on the other hand, 
that human rights law is more effective when it creates a continuum between 
the national and international legal levels.27
Novel actors are identified within this renewed debate on human rights. 
Gaillet has shown that, starting with the 19th century, the individual person 
has been considered a secondary actor in the life of the state and a limit to the 
exercise of public power. At no point was the citizen seen as the foundation of 
legitimate power. She highlights that the political limits mitigating the recog-
nition of the citizen have been enhanced by the legal limits created to prevent 
 25 Freeman, op. cit., p. 10.
 26 Brysk, A., and A. Jimenez- Bacardi. “The Politics of the Globalization of Law.” The 
Politics of the Globalization of Law: Getting from Rights to Justice. Ed. Alison Brysk. 
New York: Routledge, 2013, p. 8.
 27 Sandholtz, W. “Treaties, Constitutions and Courts.” The Politics of the Globalization of 








the individual person from having standing in legal disputes.28 Gaillet then 
traces the entry into politics of the German nation and argues that the recog-
nition of what we now call “fundamental rights” has also altered the nature of 
the relationship between the individual and the exercise of public power.29 
She concludes that the recognition of fundamental rights and the legal stand-
ing to defend them constitute the main channel for subordinating the state 
administration to the law.30
Other scholars also suggest that human rights law has contributed to the 
rise of the individual as an actor in international law. Focusing on the work 
of the ECtHR, Cichowski argues that widened access to international judicial 
organizations can increase the monitoring and enforcement of laws by indi-
viduals and by interest and advocacy groups both at the national and interna-
tional levels.31 She notes that “this gives courts a greater opportunity to engage 
in important political issues through the strategy of incremental development 
doctrine. Private parties, rather than states, may be more likely to utilize these 
courts for strategic policy reform”.32 (emphasis added)
3.3 A Renewed Imagining of the Trial
Hirschl started his paper on new constitutionalism by arguing that the world 
has witnessed “a profound transfer of power from representative institutions 
to judiciaries, whether domestic or supranational”.33 The growing power and 
importance of the judiciary has been studied from various angles.34 Hirschl, in 
an earlier work, proposed that whereas the constitutionalisation of rights may 
promote procedural justice, it does little for advancing progressive notions of 
distributive justice. Hirschl calls this phenomenon juristocracy and shows that 
 28 Gaillet, Aurore. L’individu contre l’Etat: Essaie sur l’évolution des recours de droit public dans 
l’Allemagne du XIXe siècle. Paris: Dalloz, 2012, p. 166.
 29 Gaillet, op. cit., p. 170.
 30 Gaillet, op. cit., p. 462.
 31 Cichowski, Rachel. “Courts, Advocacy Groups, and Human Rights in Europe.” The Politics 
of the Globalization of Law: Getting from Rights to Justice. Ed. Alison Brysk. New York: 
Routledge, 2013, p. 108.
 32 Cichowski, op. cit., p. 109.
 33 Hirschl, Ran. “The New Constitutionalism and the Judicialization of Pure Politics 
Worldwide.” Fordham Law Review 75.2 (2006), p. 721.
 34 Shapiro, M., and A. Stone Sweet. On Law, Politics, and Judicialization. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002. Ferejohn, J. “Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law.” Law and 
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this trend is part of a broader process whereby proponents of powerful social 
and economic interests profess support for democracy by attempting to insu-
late policy- making from the vicissitudes of democratic politics.35
In the same vein, Tate and Vallinder argued that the global expansion of 
the judicial power is accompanied by negotiation and decision- making using 
quasi- judicial procedures.36
New constitutionalism generated a heated debate around justice and the 
future of the trial. Allan, in his seminal work on constitutional justice, pro-
posed that the rule of law and the separation of powers underlie the trial.37 
Due process plays a central role in his understanding of the trial and he argues 
in favour of a more robust definition of due process that can impose tangible 
limits on the power of government officials. In this conception, due process is 
a watchdog against partial political processes.38
Other scholars are committed to identifying new rules that can guide the 
trial in a world facing new challenges.39 Guinchard proposes that three prin-
ciples can be developed to answer them and the new expectations of the cit-
izens: (1) the principle of loyalty, with its many implications for professional 
ethics; (2) the principle of dialogue, including the dialogue between jurisdic-
tions and (3) the principle of speediness.40
3.4 Competition Policy
A few authors have captured the fate of competition policy in the EU with 
incredible acuity. Their works continue to inspire generations of curious law-
yers and economists.
Amato proposed that the dilemma of liberal democracy is the dilemma of 
antitrust itself: “The first sets the boundary of public power as far ahead as 
 35 Hirschl, Ran. Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New 
Constitutionalism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004.
 36 Tate, C. N., and T. Vallinder, eds. The Global Expansion of Judicial Power. New York: New York 
University Press, 1995.
 37 Allan, T.R.S. Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001.
 38 Allan, op. cit., p. 161.
 39 Flauss, J.- F. “Les nouvelles frontières du procès équitable.” Les nouveaux développ-
ments du procès équitable au sens de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. 
Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1996, p. 81.
 40 Guinchard, Serge. “Quels principes directeurs pour le procès de demain?” Mélanges 















possible, accepting the risk of private power; the second does not accept that 
risk and instead runs the risk of preventive intrusions by public order”.41 For 
Amato, the defining feature of European antitrust – a feature lacking to its 
American counterpart – is the attitude towards private power. Europeans were 
historically and culturally accustomed to private power and this explains why 
European antitrust is based on limiting private economic power, rather than 
negating it, as in the American example.
The more tolerant attitude of Europeans towards private economic power 
sheds new light on three defining features of European antitrust: (1) the coex-
istence of the classical, “surgical” nature of European antitrust with its regu-
latory nature; (2) the sensitivity of antitrust law to policies such as industrial, 
regional and social policies; and (3) the objective of market integration, which 
rigidified the case- law.42
Amato called for the “liberation of antitrust law from the multiple pur-
poses it has served in the past”, for the weakening of the regulatory propensity 
and for the creation of an independent European competition authority that 
would separate (political) regulatory powers from decision- making powers.43
Karagiannis suggested that there are four theoretical lenses concerning 
the origin of European competition policy.44 First, liberal intergovernmen-
talism argues that European competition law has been “born out of German 
or French government’s persistence in representing those organised interests 
which wished to see a policy institutionalised at the European level”.45
Second, the hegemonic theory argued that competition policy was adopted 
because “(1) anti- trust was popular in the United States; and (2) post- World 
War ii Europe was created in America’s own image as projected by American 
policy makers”.46
Third, the political transaction costs theory suggests that “parties that con-
template an otherwise efficient voluntary transaction may actually forego to 
transact by fear of being held- up”.47
Gerber starts his seminal work on law and competition with a meta-
phor: “Competition has been both God and devil in Western civilizations. It 
 41 Amato (1997), op. cit., p. 112.
 42 Amato (1997), op. cit., pp. 113– 114.
 43 Amato (1997), op. cit., p. 120.
 44 Karagiannis, Yanis. “The Causes and Consequences of the Collegial Implementation of 
European Competition Law.” European Law Journal 19.5 (2013), pp. 682– 704, p. 691.
 45 Karagiannis, op. cit., p. 691.
 46 Karagiannis, op. cit., p. 693.
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has promised and provided wealth and economic progress; it has also altered 
the distribution of wealth, undermined communities and challenged moral 
codes”.48 Gerber offers a comprehensive picture of the history of competition 
law and policy in Europe and traces many of its current features to early nine-
teenth century Austria.
Gerber notes that the idea of specialness of EU competition law explains 
why the traditional legal mechanisms have been considered inappropriate, 
while non- traditional methods and procedures have been embraced in the 
field of competition law.49
The non- traditional method that Gerber describes is the administrative 
control model of competition law – a constellation of ideas from the 1920s that 
were imported into the fabric of competition laws adopted by various Western 
countries and, later, by the European Union. Gerber writes that
the pervasiveness of this orthodoxy is a key to understanding the compe-
tition law dynamics of the period and to interpreting later developments 
on both the national and regional levels. Yet, it is precisely this element 
of European experience that has been obscured by the failure to employ 
a Europe- wide lens in considering national competition law systems.50
Administrative control is an idea structured around the fact that government 
officials are authorized to take measures against powerful firms when their 
actions on the market were seen as harmful. The primary decision- makers in 
this type of system are administrators, whose decisions are often subject to 
review. The enforcement of such systems tends to be rather soft: “the guiding 
notion is that administrators should not interfere too much with business con-
duct. They are supposed to use publicity and pressure as the primary or exclu-
sive means of achieving compliance”.51
Gerber notes that the administrative model accommodates well many of 
the features of competition law: vague norms, high levels of discretion, and 
avoidance of criminalizing behaviours. It is also a system that has very clear 
advantages both for politicians and administrators. First, it allows administra-
tors to directly influence the behaviour of large corporations rather than pass-
ing exhaustive pieces of legislation and leaving it to the courts to implement 
them. Second, those who manage competition laws can reap political gains by 
 48 Gerber, op. cit., p. 1.
 49 Gerber, op. cit., p. 12.
 50 Gerber, op. cit., p. 173.










going after the big businesses. Such systems can be operated with little cost 
and with few risks. Last, the opacity of the system makes it difficult for jour-
nalists – and therefore for the public – to assess companies’ behaviours or the 
actions taken by administrators. In fact, “businesses may find such a system a 
useful ‘cover’: it tells the public that economically powerful firms are subject 
to controls, but it can be operated in such a way that the controls have little 
bearing on business conduct”.52
Some authors have seen, in the special and privileged nature of competi-
tion law, the sign of a malefic presence for society. Pirovano proposed that the 
‘competition order’ was a “totalitarian cultural phenomenon”.53 In the same 
vein, Boy has suggested that the competition order creates risks of domina-
tion and violence.54 Catherine Prieto noted that the explanation for such views 
lies in the perception that European competition law is the highway for ultra- 
liberalism, “a faithless, lawless, purely liberal instrument”.55 She concludes that 
competition should have neither the caricatural nature, nor the privileged 
position in the hierarchy of values that is bestowed on it, but should merely be 
an instrument for the collective well- being.56
3.5 Competition Policy and Fundamental Rights
In light of the ideas discussed above, it becomes clearer why competition law 
and the human rights law have not yet had a deeper conversation. There might 
be first of all a fear of dilution. Competition law experts might fear that a more 
consistent approach to the fundamental rights issues arising in competition 
investigations would diminish their strength. Human rights law experts, on 
the other hand, might argue that the constant expansion of the realms that 
fundamental rights are called to defend can dilute the core meaning of those 
rights. Another question may be whether institution- building of the kind that 
 52 Gerber, op. cit., p. 178.
 53 Pirovano, Antoine. “L’expansion de l’ordre concurrentiel dans les pays de l’Union 
européenne.” L’Algérie en mutation: Les instruments juridiques de passage à l’économie de 
marché. Eds. Robert Charvin and Ammar Guesmi. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001, pp.129– 142, 
p. 133.
 54 Boy, Laurence. “L’ordre concurrentiel: Essai de définition d’un concept.”L’ordre concur-
rentiel: Mélanges en l’honneur d’Antoine Pirovano. Paris: Editions Frison- Roche, 2003, 
pp. 38– 40.
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the establishment of the EU involved is actually compatible with a parallel 
development of human rights.
There have been an increasing number of attempts to bridge the two fields 
in recent years. A telling example is offered by the work of Racine who argues 
that the relationship between competition law and human rights is in fact 
much deeper than is normally accepted. More precisely, competition could 
not exist or develop without the right to private property and freedom of 
speech.57 He even asks whether the right to competition is not in fact a new 
human right.58
Except for such occasional innovative proposals, the European academic 
debate surrounding the topic of competition law and fundamental rights has 
mainly focused on due process. This debate overgrew its simplistic begin-
nings, but remains heavily polarized. The debate was simplistic because it 
pre- emptively defined the width and depth of due process in competition 
law proceedings by focusing on either the administrative or criminal nature 
of European competition law. As I will show later, this distinction is artificial.
The academic debate on the topic of competition policy and fundamental 
rights is polarized around two extremes: some authors argue in favour of the 
maintenance of the status quo justified by the sufficiency of fair trial guaran-
tees and the need to protect the market integration process, whereas others 
propose that a reform of European competition law enforcement is needed.
Wills, a hearing officer with the dg comp and one of the most quoted 
scholars in this field, has been an ardent supporter of the maintenance of the 
status quo and has continuously shown that the existing procedures fulfil the 
requirements of due process. In the same vein, Adreangeli concluded that in 
view of the far- reaching consequences of a new due process clause in compe-
tition enforcement, the right to good administration enshrined in Article 41 of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights should be considered instead.59
On the other side of the debate, an increasing number of authors argued 
in favour of the reform of European competition enforcement to accommo-
date an enriched version of due process. Barristers involved in competition law 
proceedings, such as Forrester, and academics overtly raised complaints about 
 57 Racine, Jean- Baptiste. “L’ordre concurrentiel et les droits de l’homme.” L’ordre concur-
rentiel: Mélanges en l’honneur d’Antoine Pirovano. Paris: Editions Frison- Roche, 2003, 
pp. 423– 427.
 58 Racine, op. cit., pp. 429– 438.
 59 Andreangeli, A. EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights. Cheltenham: Edward 








the Commission’s lack of independence and the ineffectiveness of the judicial 
review of EU competition law.60
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Introduction to Part 2
Part Two of this book endeavours to highlight that due process and fair trial 
can be a force in the process of addressing corporate bigness, not only by 
respecting the rights of defence of the defendants, but also by requiring a 
certain quality of the process of justice delivery. It starts by describing the 
numerous attempts to define due process and the on- going debate over the 
function of this provision in the United States. A careful look at the existing 
literature in Europe indicates a similar fascination for the subject. More spe-
cialized interests, such as due process and competition law, also exist and are 
currently flourishing.
Next, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 offer an in- depth analysis of the right to a fair 
trial enshrined in Article 6(1) echr. Chapter 4 fixes the subject within the 
Strasbourg system of human rights enforcement. Chapter 5 describes the case- 
law of the ECtHR on the applicability of Article 6(1) echr, with special atten-
tion paid to the applicability of the right to a fair trial to economic law disputes 
and competition law disputes in particular. Chapter 6 develops the theory that 
the ECtHR is a self- regulating international tribunal and that the interpreta-
tion of the right to a fair trial has greatly contributed to this.
This painstaking analysis is important for two reasons. First of all, it high-
lights that the ECtHR has applied the approach developed for the applicabil-
ity of Article 6(1) echr for criminal disputes to economic disputes, including 
competition law. By doing so, this book shows that competition law disputes 
are by no means special as they are under EU law. Second, the in- depth analy-
sis of the applicability of Article 6(1) echr dispels allegations that the ECtHR 
is “navigating tides”.1 This book finds that, on contrary, the ECtHR has been 
exemplarily steady in its forging and use of concepts.
One difficulty accompanies this effort: the more one endeavours to under-
stand what due process is, the more this notion remains beyond definition. 
The reason for this is simple: due process is a legal principle and a doctrine 
with many names that is so ingrained in our culture, system of values and legal 
system that extracting its original meaning appears impossible.
Attempts to define due process have produced inspiring definitions. Justice 
Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in Joint Anti- Fascist Refugee Committee 
v. McGrath announced that
 1 Clacke, Robert. The ‘Conscience of Europe’? Navigating Shifting Tides at the European Court of 









‘due process’, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with 
a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. Expressing 
as it does in its ultimate analysis respect enforced by law for that feeling 
of just treatment which has been evolved through centuries of Anglo- 
American constitutional history and civilization, ‘due process’ cannot be 
imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any formula. Representing 
a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and more par-
ticularly between the individual and government, ‘due process’ is com-
pounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions, and stout confi-
dence in the strength of the democratic faith which we profess.2
For Pennock, due process is a mean of locomotion that “takes us deep into 
history, deep into philosophy, and, were it to be fully expounded – which is 
impossible – far into the future, for it is ever- growing. Its roots grow out of an 
intriguing blend of history and philosophy”.3
Resnick compares due process to a scale: just as the use of a scale at the 
post office helps identify a maximum number of letters with correct postage, 
due process is not only a just or humane way of depriving people of life, lib-
erty or property, it is also an instrument to minimize the number of unjust 
treatments.4
Lastly, Scanlon stated that the requirement of due process is “one of the 
conditions of the moral acceptability of those institutions that give some peo-
ple power to control or intervene in the lives of others”.5 He noted that both 
substantive and procedural due process appeal to the conception of the insti-
tution in question, its rationale and purpose.6
The origin of due process is considered to be Clause 39 of the Magna Carta 
of 1215 that claimed that
no free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or pos-
sessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any way, nor 
will we proceed with force against him, or send others to do so, except 
 2 Joint Anti- Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
 3 Pennock, James Roland, and John W. Chapman, eds. Due Process. New York: New York 
University Press, 1977, p. xv.
 4 Resnick, David. “Due Process and Procedural Justice.” Due Process. Eds. James Roland 
Pennock and John W. Chapman. New York: New York University Press, 1977, pp. 217– 218.
 5 Scanlon, T.M. “Due Process.” Due Process. Eds. James Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman. 
New York: New York University Press, 1977, p. 94.
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by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land (per legem 
terrae).7
Despite its resemblance with contemporary texts, Clause 39 initially guaran-
teed immunities only for feudal magnates. Vogler argues that the concept ‘due 
process of law’ appeared only incidentally in the legal texts prior to the mod-
ern era and that “its historical importance is largely retrospective and an inven-
tion of nineteenth- and twentieth- century myth- makers. (…) On the contrary, 
its might is predominantly modern and predominantly North American”.8
An important development was the insertion of the notion of due process 
into the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution. Initially, due process was 
intended to cover only criminal proceedings. However, over time the principle 
of due process was developed to include not only procedural safeguards, but 
also substantive due process that is concerned with placing limits on govern-
ment authority. Resnick argued that due process was an American phenome-
non, “a legal principle which has been shaped and developed through the pro-
cess of applying and interpreting a written constitution”.9
Wolfe has tied the rise of modern judicial review by the US Supreme Court 
to the Due Process Clause. He describes the early 19th- century traditional 
era of constitutional interpretation and judicial review characterized “by its 
assumption that the Constitution was both intelligible – it had a real or true 
meaning that could be known if one read it properly – and substantive – it 
established principles that were definite and clear enough to be enforced as 
legal rules”.10 In this traditional era, “judicial review was simply giving prefer-
ence to the rule of the Constitution over any legislative or executive act that 
conflicted with it”.11
Wolfe then highlights that, at the end of the 19th century, a profound change 
in the practice of judicial review took place. In this new stage, judicial review 
was transformed into a defence, not of the constitution, but of natural law 
expressed as natural rights, especially property rights. Wolfe argues that it 
was during this stage that the Supreme Court adopted and promoted “a par-
ticular understanding of the property rights guaranteed by natural law, that 
7  Davis, G.R.C. Magna Carta. London: British Museum, 1963, pp. 23– 33.
8  Vogler, Richard. “Due process.” The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law. 
Eds. M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajó. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 930.
9  Resnick, op. cit., pp. 206– 207.
 10 Wolfe, Christopher. The Rise of Modern Judicial Review: From Constitutional Interpretation 
to Judge- Made Law. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1994, p. 21.












of laissez- faire capitalism”.12 This was possible because “the development was 
nominally tied to the Constitution as a judicial interpretation of the due pro-
cess clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments”.13 This trend contin-
ued in the years preceding 1937 when the Supreme Court employed the due 
process clause and the commerce clause to strike down important pieces of 
state legislation and the New Deal. However, following measures taken by 
Franklin Roosevelt to limit the Supreme Court’s powers, the Court abandoned 
its review of economic regulation. Wolfe argues that whereas the “initial back-
ing off of the Court seemed to augur a new era of judicial deference, (…) in 
fact, the focus of judicial activism simply shifted from economic affairs to civil 
liberties”.14 Wolfe concludes that these events grounded the “victory of a dis-
tinctly modern understanding of judicial power as fundamentally legislative 
in character”.15
This development of the due process doctrine in US constitutional law 
might account for the reticence to import the notion of due process into 
other domestic and international texts. In fact, none of the important human 
rights conventions – the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the echr, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or the American 
Convention of Human Rights – speak of due process.
However, as Vogler claims, “constitutional abstention with regard to the 
terminology of due process of law does not mean that the concept itself has 
not been influential in many regions, particularly in the post- war period and 
particularly under the influence of US- led rule of law initiatives”.16 In contrast 
with the Anglo- American world where adversarial due process is increasingly 
under attack, the principle enjoys a “renaissance” elsewhere.17 This is particu-
larly true for countries leaving behind a totalitarian or colonial past and where 
due process inspired reforms are impressive to say the least. He concludes that 
the “shift towards adversarial due process in criminal procedure, which has 
been likened by some scholars to the reception of Roman law in the jus com-
mune period, has become one of the most important and ubiquitous cultural 
developments of our generation”.18
Speaking about the “due process explosion”, Michelman ties this notion 
to the legalisation, formalisation and proceduralisation of relations and 
 12 Wolfe, op. cit., p. 22.
 13 Wolfe, op. cit., p. 24.
 14 Wolfe, op. cit., p. 27.
 15 Wolfe, op. cit., p. 28.
 16 Vogler, op. cit., p. 933.
 17 Vogler, op. cit., p. 943.
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transactions. He notes that “this experience of rampant legalization seems to 
reflect an increasingly anomic world in which private entitlement backed by 
formal procedure apparently arises to fill a vacuum left by the withering of that 
certain spirit we may call community”.19
The “blessed versatility” of due process described above is both a curse 
and benediction. Indeed, due process has been invoked on both sides of the 
Atlantic as a descriptive principle, a normative principle and a constitutional 
principle in civil law, criminal law, administrative law and constitutional law. 
Its omnipresence fuels it with a power that no other principle of law can claim. 
From being an arbiter in the affairs pitting the individual against the govern-
ment, to being a principle of separation of powers within the state, due process 
is an unequalled regulatory tool, and a source of confusion.
Marshall has noted that “it is surprising that so fundamental an issue should 
remain one of the grey areas of constitutional law, though there are a number 
of firm conventions in existence”.20 He uses the example of a law enforcement 
agency that performs judicial functions. He argues that if due process is to 
be relevant to this situation, either the law enforcement function has to be a 
sui generis function standing outside the well- known realm of the legislative- 
executive- judiciary, or there must be a separation of powers within the law 
enforcement agency itself.21
In the same vein, Sullivan and Massaro highlighted that
few Americans understand the common constitutional source of these 
rights, its ancient history, or the ornate set of rights that today fall within 
the due process embrace. (…) Instead they often cherry- pick issues 
within the doctrine to criticize or praise specific pieces of the law, and 
are unmindful of the implications of these critiques for other rights that 
flow from the same due process artery.22
They propose that due process comprises two main dimensions: one that is 
primarily concerned with balancing the interests of the individual and society, 
 19 Michelman, Frank I. “Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process.” 
Due Process. Eds. James Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman. New York: New York 
University Press, 1977, pp. 148– 149.
 20 Marshall, Geoffrey. “Due Process in England.” Due Process. Eds. James Roland Pennock 
and John W. Chapman. New York: New York University Press, 1977, p. 73.
 21 Marshall, op.cit.
 22 Sullivan, E. Thomas, and Toni Marie Massaro. The Arc of Due Process in American 










and a second that is primarily concerned with judicial constraint, federalism 
and the separation of powers.23
Chapman and McConnell insisted on another misunderstanding relating 
to the Due Process Clause. They argue that, despite the continuing American 
tradition of due process as a rights- creating enterprise, the Clause was initially 
concerned only with ensuring the separation of powers. They argue that
due process was not at all about judicial creation of fundamental rights 
outside the reach of legislative amendment, and only secondarily about 
notice and the opportunity to be heard. Fundamentally, it was about 
securing the rule of law. It ensured that the executive would not be able 
unilaterally to deprive persons within the nation of their rights of life, 
liberty, or property excerpt as provided by common law or statute and as 
adjudicated by independent judicial bodies, and that legislatures would 
not be able to step beyond their properly legislative roles of enacting gen-
eral rules for governance of future behaviour.24 (emphasis added)
Speaking about the elements of due process, Sullivan and Massaro proposed 
that government action that affects life, property or liberty shall be limited by 
the following core features:
 – Fair procedures, especially notice and opportunity to be heard, but also 
political processes
 – Respect for settled expectations and traditions
 – Impartial decision makers
 – Prospective, rather than retrospective, law- making
 – Proportionality in terms of avoiding excessive government measures
 – Transparency and accessibility of government processes
 – Respect for individual autonomy and liberty in making fundamental life 
decisions
 – Respect for individual equality
 – Respect for separation of powers, geographical limits, and other structural 
and jurisdictional limits on government authority.25
When it comes to the European tradition of due process, Galligan has pointed 
out that much of what there is in terms of analysis in the field of due pro-
cess clause “has come from or been generated by discussion of the American 
 23 Sullivan and Massaro, op. cit., p. 91.
 24 Chapman, Nathan S., and Michael W. McConnell. “Due Process as Separation of Powers.” 
Yale Law Journal 121.7 (2012): pp. 1672– 1807.
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doctrine of procedural due process, and although that is a rich and interesting 
literature, it is not easily loosened from its native soil to provide the seeds for a 
more general understanding”.26 However, the recent constitutional history of 
the old continent shows that the doctrine of due process has the same impact 
on legal development in Europe as it does in the US, even if it is framed in less 
dramatic terms. In this sense, Marshall equates due process with the rule of 
law and argues that it is a fundamental issue for English constitutional law.27 
The European tradition of due process is formed by the domestic traditions of 
the European states and the supranational traditions developed by the ECtHR 
and the EU courts. Damaska has shown that on the European continent two 
different approaches to due process exist. The continental approach is built 
starting with the premises of a centralized government, a rigorous hierarchy 
of agencies in the administration of justice, and a general style of bureaucratic 
administration which affects all parts of the legal process, including the courts. 
The common law approach, on the other hand, has sprung from a liberal tra-
dition that distrusts concentrations of power and prefers a fragmentation of 
authority at all levels.28
This problem is further exacerbated in the European context where, unlike 
in the US where the constitution is the unique source of the doctrine of due 
process, a few treaties contain due process provisions.
At the supranational level in Europe, due process is called the “right to a fair 
trial”, “right to a fair legal process”, “right to be heard” or “rights of defence”. This 
choice of denomination cannot be arbitrary. On the contrary, it might carry 
with it a desire to distance the European tradition of due process from the 
American one, to avoid the difficult constitutional debates sparked by the Due 
Process Clause and to prevent supranational courts – the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg and the European Courts in Luxembourg – from 
developing powers similar to those of the US Supreme Court while working 
with this concept.29
Under the echr, due process was framed as a human right that every cit-
izen or resident of the contracting parties to the Convention had. The echr 
speaks in Article 6 about the right to a fair trial that is to be guaranteed in 
the determination of all disputes concerning civil rights or obligations and 
 26 Galligan, op. cit., p. 9.
 27 Marshall, op. cit., p.73.
 28 Damaska, Mirian R. The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Approach to 
the Legal Process. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986.
 29 Sharpe, Jonathan, ed. The Conscience of Europe: 50 Years of the European Court of Human 










criminal charges. This choice of language has provided a fertile battlefield for 
member states to argue that administrative law and economic law disputes 
belonged to the public law sphere and were thus not covered by the safeguards 
provided in Article 6(1) echr.
The cjeu has adopted an extractive approach to the interpretation of due 
process, identifying some of the guarantees contained in the right to a fair trial 
with the right itself. The ecj initially proposed that the rights of defence are 
fundamental principles of EU law. In later cases, the ecj introduced the con-
cept of a right to a fair hearing and a right to a fair legal process within a rea-
sonable time. However, a defendant involved in EU law proceedings is only 
heard in writing.
The adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the European Union 
is an attempt to unify fundamental rights development in the Union, but also 
and, more importantly, is a step towards the constitutionalisation of the Union. 
Article 47 of the Charter guarantees the right to an effective remedy and to a 
fair trial.
Taking into account the centrality of due process to democracy itself, it 
is surprising that it has remained marginal to the construction of EU law in 
general and to EU competition law in particular. It is also surprising that the 
due process embraced by the European competition law officers has remained 
minimal despite great strides in the field of human rights on the European 
continent.
A few factors might explain the marginal and minimal position of due pro-
cess in EU law and EU competition law. First, the main goal of the EU has been 
the establishment of a common market and, later, of an ever- closer union 
between the Member States. This has been accompanied by a parallel need 
to build strong institutions capable of creating and enforcing EU law. The 
European Commission has been entrusted with the mission of developing and 
implementing competition law, absent from many of the European jurisdic-
tions at that time. Derenne suggested that in the 1970s, the Commission played 
a fundamental role in shaping competition law.30 However, at that time, “the 
exemption contained in Article 81(3) ec had not been institutionalised and, by 
relying on it, the European Commission acted as a formal regulator and policy 
builder in specific sectors”.31 Since the exemption was not directly applicable 
to the national courts of the member states, the Commission “was involved in 
 30 Derenne, Jacques. “The Scope of Judicial Review in EU Economic Cases.” The Role of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases. Eds. Massimo Merola and 
Jacques Derennes. Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2012, p. 82.
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a part of the rule- making process, with which the Court was not permitted to 
interfere. When such policy- making is involved, the Court is only empowered 
to conduct a limited review, which is justified by the virtue of the category of 
the act”.32 In addition, in the 1980s, this analysis spread from the then Article 
85/ 81(3) eec/ ec to Article 81(1) and this resulted in the policy of deference to 
the Commission to be “extended to cover more general situations where the 
Commission conducted complex economic analyses”.33
The second reason for which EU competition law has remained staunchly 
attached to a minimal version of due process may be linked to the philoso-
phy promoted by the npm school. Concerned with “banishing” bureaucracy, 
npm proponents argued that “in a world of rapid change, technological rev-
olution, global economic competition, demassified markets, an educated 
workforce, demanding consumers, and severe fiscal constraints, centralized, 
top- down monopolies are simply too slow, too unresponsive, and too incapa-
ble of change and innovation”.34 The reform of the EU Commission and of EU 
competition policy focused on building responsive and, therefore, efficient 
EU institutions and policies. Efficiency, however, appears to sit uncomfortably 
within a structure like the EU Commission which combines political, bureau-
cratic and judicial functions. Cadiet has argued that “efficiency is an equivo-
cal notion whose usage coincides with a contemporary tendency of allowing 
justice to be absorbed by the commercial sphere, a phenomenon (…) called 
commercialization and the privatization of justice”.35 He proposed that a com-
petition model based on the search for efficiency has subtly colonized the 
judicial economy by “diffusing therein a management logic and preoccupation 
that determines not only the way in which an institution is managed – includ-
ing its judicial branch – but also the method for defining the most efficient 
procedural rules”.36 He finds that the quality of the justice delivered and the 
quality of the trial or process are necessarily linked. If it is true that the duty 
to improve the process of reaching a decision does not cancel out the duty to 
improve the administration of justice, it is also true that the duty to improve 
the administration of justice does not dispense with the duty to improve the 
process of reaching a decision.37
 32 Derenne, op. cit., p. 83.
 33 Derenne, op. cit. p 83.
 34 Osborne, David and Peter Plastrick. Banishing Bureaucracy: The Five Strategies for 
Reinventing Government. New York: Addison- Wesley, 1992, p. 17.
 35 Cadiet, Loic. “Efficience versus Equité?” Mélanges Jacques Van Compernolle. Bruxelles: 
Bruylant, 2004,p. 33.
 36 Cadiet, op. cit., p. 35.
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 chapter 4
The Right to a Fair Trial
Galligan has noted how little is known about the practical operation and effect 
of the procedural principles of Article 6(1) echr. He argues that the dearth of 
empirical research and the absence of a comprehensive study of types of pro-
cess covered by Article 6(1) echr make generalizations about its strength and 
weaknesses difficult to sustain.1
This chapter attempts to partially fill the gap identified by Galligan.
4.1 Formulation and Importance of Article 6(1) echr
Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights stipulates the following:
 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any 
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public 
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly 
but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial 
in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a demo-
cratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the 
private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary 
in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity 
would prejudice the interests of justice.
 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed inno-
cent until proved guilty according to law.
 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following mini-
mum rights:
 (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he under-
stands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him;
 (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his 
defence;
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 (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his 
own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal 
assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so 
require;
 (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to 
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his 
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
 (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot under-
stand or speak the language used in court.
The importance and impact of this provision are often misunderstood and 
ignored. I argue that the right to a fair trial is the most important provision of 
the echr both in terms of the number of decisions adopted and the impact on 
the enforcement system. The right to life and the prohibitions against torture, 
slavery or illegal detention are all important components of a democratic state 
and their enforcement is essential for the well- being and development of the 
individual. However, fair trial is the transmission belt that ensures the smooth 
functioning of power, by presenting the problems that the individual encoun-
ters to the authority that has the competence, the tools and, hopefully, the will 
to solve it. When the mechanism of state power has a functioning fair trial 
transmission belt, access to justice and effective judicial review ensure that 
all the other rights guaranteed by the Convention – and by the constitutions 
of the members states – become real. Indeed, if the right to a fair trial is guar-
anteed in a member state, an individual who alleges that his right to life – or 
another right – has been breached can have his claim heard and compensation 
awarded by the competent authority. In other words, justice will be restored. 
If, on the other hand, the member state lacks the capacity, tools or will to 
enforce due process rights and blocks the transmission of individual concerns, 
rights remain empty words and the victim will either give up the idea of state- 
provided justice altogether, by choosing a personal form of revenge, or will 
continue seeking to enforce it in an international forum.
This claim finds support both in numbers and in opinions. The yearly reports 
on the activity of the ECtHR show that almost all applications lodged with the 
Court raised an Article 6 complaint. Also, the majority of the cases delivered by 
the Court deal with the safeguards enshrined in the right to a fair trial. Thus, in 
2018, the right to a fair trial was at issue in 24.1% of cases in which a violation 
was found.2
 2 ECtHR. Annual Report 2018. Available athttps:// www.echr.coe.int/ Documents/ Annual_ 




The opinions concur. The Court itself has held that “the right to a fair trial 
holds so prominent a place in a democratic society that there can be no justifi-
cation for interpreting Article 6 § 1 of the Convention restrictively”.3
“An omnibus provision”, the right to a fair trial “is a basic element of the rule 
of law and part of the common heritage, according to the Preamble, of the 
Contracting States”.4
Ashworth has rightly noted that the right to a fair trial is part of a group of 
rights situated between non- derogable rights, such as the right to life, and qual-
ified rights. He calls these rights ‘strong rights’, “to demonstrate that they have 
a strength which is not qualified to the extent that the rights in Article 8– 11 are 
qualified”.5 Ashworth notes that “although strong rights are less fundamental 
than the non- derogable rights, any arguments for curtailing a strong right must 
at least be more powerful than the kind of ‘necessary in a democratic society’ 
argument that is needed to establish the acceptability of interference with one 
of the qualified rights”.6
Flauss has argued that the right to a fair trial is a procedural guarantee which 
has increasingly developed the relevance of the substantive rights enumerated 
in the Convention.7
Speaking about the variety of disputes brought by applicants to the ECtHR, 
some authors have shown that a majority of cases brought to the Court indeed 
concern civil and criminal cases. However, “they also involve, to an extent that 
could not have been predicted, proceedings before civil and administrative tri-
bunals and administrative decisions determining civil rights and obligations”.8
4.2 Influence of the Case- law of the ECtHR on Domestic Legislation
Bates describes that there was a generalized conviction in the 1950s that the 
Convention had no future and that it was going to have a minor influence, if 
any, on domestic law. He states that
 3 ECtHR. Perez v. France, application no. 47287/ 99, judgement of 12 Feb 2014, paragraph 64.
 4 Rainey, Bernadette, Elizabeth Wicks and Clare Ovey. Jacobs, White & Ovey: The European 
Convention of Human Rights (6th Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 242.
 5 Ashworth, Andrew. “Eroding the Structure of the European Convention.” Current Problems in 
the Protection of Human Rights: Perspectives from Germany and the UK. Eds. K.S. Ziegler and 
P. M. Huber. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013, p. 33.
 6 Ashworth, op. cit., p. 33.
 7 Flauss, op. cit., p. 81.
 8 Harris, D., M. O’Boyle, Ed Bates and C.M. Buckley. Law of the European Convention on Human 
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there was a surprising lack of comment on the Convention from the most 
distinguished contemporary commentators in the international legal 
world at this stage. In fact, if one browses through the leading interna-
tional law journals of the early 1950s one struggles to find references even 
to the fact that the echr had come into being, let alone any comment on 
the text itself and its significance.9
Even more, before the 1970s the few works that were published about the 
Convention came from a handful of authors that worked at the Council of 
Europe.10
The situation has changed since then. Although the ECtHR maintains a 
rather low profile, its case- law became increasingly known and respected. 
The ECtHR noted in Guincho that member states undertook the obliga-
tion of organising their legal systems so as to ensure compliance with the 
requirements of Article 6(1) echr, including that of trial within a reason-
able time.11 In addition, as Rainey, Wicks and Ovey noted, the case- law of 
the ECtHR has had a significant impact. For applicants bringing claims to 
Strasbourg, a favourable decision can lead to criminal proceedings being 
reopened or to the award of damages. Perhaps more importantly, “states all 
over Europe have amended and improved their legal procedures to comply 
with the Court’s rulings”.12 They note that following the ECtHR’s consistent 
approach to this matter, “the perennial problem of excessive length of pro-
ceedings is beginning to be addressed in a systematic fashion in a number of 
Contracting Parties”.13
Bates offers a few examples of the law reforms instituted in the UK as a 
result of a violation found by the ECtHR. The Sunday Times prompted the 
introduction of the Contempt of Court Act 1981.14 Marckx led to a 1987 Act 
which amended various legal provisions relating to affiliation.15 Young, James 
and Webster prompted new employment law legislation.16 And Sporrong 
 9 Bates, op. cit., pp. 9– 10.
 10 Bates, op. cit., p 10.
 11 ECtHR. Guincho v. Portugal, application no. 8990/ 80, judgement of 10 Jul 1984, para-
graph 38.
 12 Rainey, Wicks and Ovey, op. cit., p. 276.
 13 Rainey, Wicks and Ovey, op. cit., p. 276.
 14 ECtHR. The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom [gc], application no. 6538/ 74, judgement 
of 26 Apr 1979.
 15 ECtHR. Marckx v. Belgium [gc], application no. 6833/ 74, judgement of 13 Jun 1979.
 16 ECtHR. Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom [gc], applications nos. 7601/ 76 


















and Lönroth prompted new legislation concerning town and country 
planning.17
Violations of the right to a fair trial triggered numerous other changes on 
the domestic level. In order to highlight the impact of the ECtHR’s case- law on 
the domestic legal landscape, the Council of Europe offers a web- catalogue of 
the most important cases, in addition to the work performed by the Council of 
Europe’s Committee of Ministers.18
Thus, Airey prompted the Irish government to set up an independently 
administered legal aid scheme.19 Following a case of arbitrary detention in a 
psychiatric hospital, the Netherlands introduced new legislation instructing 
that, in all cases of involuntary admission to a psychiatric hospital, the patient 
has the right to be heard by a court.20 The law was also changed so that patients 
who are involuntarily admitted to a psychiatric hospital do not automatically 
lose control over their property.21
In Rumpf, the ECtHR found a violation against Germany of the right to a fair 
trial on account of the fact that the applicant’s administrative dispute lasted 
for 13 years and 5 months.22 This judgment and others led to a new law in 2011 
to tackle unreasonable legal delays. It gave applicants the opportunity to chal-
lenge the slow pace of proceedings and ask for a remedy. It also provided for 
a right to compensation. These reforms allowed Germany to overcome a long- 
standing structural problem concerning remedies for excessively long civil 
proceedings.23
In a case against Andorra, the ECtHR found a violation of the right to a 
fair trial due to the fact that the applicant could not lodge a complaint to the 
Constitutional Court without the prior approval of the State Council.24 As a 
result of this case, the legislation of Andorra has changed to allow everyone the 
right to lodge complaints with the Constitutional Court.25
 17 ECtHR. Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, applications nos. 7151/ 75 and 7152/ 75, judge-
ment of 23 Sep 1982, pp. 151– 152.
 18 Web- catalogue available at https:// www.coe.int/ en/ web/ impact- convention- human- 
rights/ right- to- a- fair- trial accessed on 23 February 2021.
 19 ECtHR. Airey v. Ireland, application no. 6289/ 73, judgement of 9 Oct 1979.
 20 ECtHR. Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, application no. 6301/ 73, judgement of 24 
October 1979.
 21 Council of Europe. Resolution of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers dh (82) 2.
 22 ECtHR. Rumpf v. Germany, application no. 46344/ 06, judgement of 2 Sep 2010.
 23 Council of Europe. Resolution of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers dh 
(2013) 244.
 24 ECtHR. Millan i Tornes v. Andorra, application no. 35052/ 97, judgement of 6 July 1999.
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Another important development took place in France, where, following 
Kress, the French Cour de cassation broke an old continental tradition and 
excluded the Advocates General from the Court’s preparatory debates and 
from the judicial deliberations.26
Lastly, following a few cases against Switzerland, a reform of panel proce-
dures was triggered resulting in the separation of the investigating and ruling 
judges in the Canton of Berne.
4.3 External Influences on the Case- law of the ECtHR
The right to a fair trial is a provision whose interpretation and enforcement have 
been shaped by the same events that shaped the destiny of the Contracting 
Parties to the Convention. In many ways this provision has a European destiny 
and reflects important legal developments at the domestic level. The right to a 
fair trial is a mutable provision that has allowed historical events to inform its 
substance, offering every generation of lawyers the opportunity to show where 
the mechanism of governmental power is lacking speed or essential parts.
Accession of new member states to the echr and their changing consti-
tutional landscapes, migration and modernization of life, as well as the mili-
tary conflicts in which member states are involved are all factors which raise 
questions about the interpretation of the right to a fair trial. For the member 
states leaving behind dictatorial pasts, questions about how to organize and 
balance the branches of government have been essential and the ECtHR did 
not fail to provide answers. Recently, the process of European integration and 
the accession of the European Union to the echr raised concerns about the 
human rights protection system in Europe and the coexistence of the ECtHR 
and the cjeu.
A point worth serious mention is that the ECtHR has not always been on 
a quest for enhancing its jurisdiction, as it is sometimes proposed. A pre- 
conceived view of the ECtHR is that it is a rights- creating or rights- enhancing 
machine. The facts speak to the contrary. The Court follows a refined and care-
ful approach to rights interpretation and this is especially true in relation to 
the right to a fair trial. On the one hand, the large number of applications orig-
inating from all member states concerning the right to a fair trial indicates a 
 26 ECtHR. Kress v. France, application no. 39594/ 98, judgement of 6 June 2001. See also, 
Andriantsimbazovina, Joël. “ Savoir c’est rien, imaginer est tout: Libre conversation autour 






general dissatisfaction with the manner in which justice is delivered on the 
domestic level. On the other hand, the Court is not in a hurry to translate this 
dissatisfaction into violations of the Convention and to therefore order the 
governments to change legislation or practice. Rather, the Court alternates 
between periods of expansion, stagnation and even contraction.
Thus, the evolution of the right to a fair trial is closely linked to the evolution 
of the Court itself. The ECtHR is a successful international tribunal: its deci-
sions are being implemented by the member states and its case- law is quoted 
by other international tribunals and during human rights law classes offered 
at numerous universities. This success, however, did not come easy. Rather, the 
ECtHR has built its reputation slowly and carefully by choosing only a handful 
of cases for consideration on their merits during the first years of its existence. 
Many of the initial cases of the Court dealt with the right to a fair trial. Indeed, 
this provision offered the Court the opportunity to spell out some of the most 
important general principles concerning the interpretation of the Convention. 
This original case- law impresses through its maturity and its capacity to resist 
the moods and fashions of changing times.
Thus, the case Golder concerned a serious disturbance in the prison where 
the applicant was serving his term and in which he was suspected of having 
been involved.197 The applicant decided to lodge a civil action for libel against 
the prison officer who accused him of having been involved in the disturbance. 
When the applicant’s request to the Home Secretary for permission to consult 
a solicitor with a view to bringing the civil action for libel was refused, the 
applicant complained at the ECtHR about a breach of his right to have access 
to a court.
The Court held that
it was not for the Home Secretary himself to appraise the prospects of the 
action contemplated; it was for an independent and impartial court to 
rule on any claim that might be brought. In declining to accord the leave 
which had been requested, the Home Secretary failed to respect, in the 
person of Golder, the right to go before a court as guaranteed by Article 
6 para. 1 (art. 6– 1).27
In Airey, the applicant complained about the impossibility to separate judi-
cially from her husband. She maintained that, since the prohibitive cost of 
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litigation prevented her from bringing proceedings before the High Court for 
the purpose of petitioning for judicial separation, there has been a violation of 
the right to a fair trial.
The Court agreed with the applicant and found that
the Convention must be interpreted in the light of present- day condi-
tions and it is designed to safeguard the individual in a real and practical 
way as regards those areas with which it deals. Whilst the Convention sets 
forth what are essentially civil and political rights, many of them have 
implications of a social or economic nature. The Court therefore consid-
ers, like the Commission, that the mere fact that an interpretation of the 
Convention may extend into the sphere of social and economic rights 
should not be a decisive factor against such an interpretation; there is no 
water- tight division separating that sphere from the field covered by the 
Convention.28
In Engel and Others, the applicants were military conscripts.29 They were pun-
ished for breach of discipline and were sentenced to a few days of light arrest. 
Their attempts to contest the disciplinary measure were unsuccessful. They 
complained at the Court about the unfairness of the disciplinary proceedings 
in which they were involved.
Thus, before the accession of the Eastern European members, the Court 
had considered a wide range of issues relating to civil and criminal justice in 
Western Europe.
The accession of the Eastern European states to the Council of Europe and 
the European Convention of Human Rights provided the ECtHR with a new 
impetus to consider the right to a fair trial. The exit from totalitarian regimes 
was marked by an upsurge of applications to the Court originating from Eastern 
European countries and by a generalized contestation of the power- exercising 
institutions. Also, if previously the Court was dealing with states that had a 
long record of democratic practices, after the 1990s, the case- law of the Court 
contributed to the creation and development of these practices in countries 
that were fully involved in the process of democracy- building for the first time 
in their history.
More and more cases were lodged at the Court starting in the 1990s to the 
point that the Court could not handle them all. At the beginning of 2012, there 
 28 Airey v. Ireland, quoted above, paragraph 26.







were 151,600 cases pending before the ECtHR.30 Many of these cases were 
repetitive and concerned systemic problems, that is, they required the imple-
mentation, reformulation or cancellation of a domestic statute.
In the context of a generalized outcry against the state of justice in Europe 
and the Court’s incapacity to deal with its increasing backlog, the Court put 
forward a strategy for dealing with systemic problems. More precisely, the 
Court launched a new procedure meant to address simultaneously all cases 
raising identical legal problems. This new procedure – called the pilot proce-
dure – is often employed in relation to fair trial issues such as non- execution of 
judgments or lengthy proceedings.31
The process of European integration raises new questions concerning the 
interpretation of the right to a fair trial. All members of the European Union 
are parties to the Convention. At the same time, the European Union itself is 
not a party thereto, at least not until its accession to the Convention is con-
cluded. This situation raises questions about the institutional position of the 
ECtHR within the Union, about the future of fundamental rights in the Union 
and about respect of the right to a fair trial by the Union’s institutions.
 30 ECtHR. Annual Report 2012, p. 149. Available at https:// www.echr.coe.int/ Documents/ 
Annual_ report_ 2012_ ENG.pdf accessed on 23 February 2021.
 31 ECtHR. The Pilot- Judgement Procedure: Information Note Issued by the Registrar. Available 
at https:// www.echr.coe.int/ Documents/ Pilot_ judgment_ procedure_ ENG.pdf accessed 
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 chapter 5
Applicability of Article 6(1) echr
All provisions in the echr have a limited scope of application and Article 
6(1) echr is not an exception to this rule. On contrary, the fair trial provision 
has long been the battlefield on which governments have claimed procedural 
immunity for disputes while applicants have argued that such immunities are 
incompatible with the principles of the rule of law. What was at stake in such 
cases was more than the outcome of any individual petition at the Strasbourg 
Court. It was the applicability of Article 6(1) echr to proceedings that, until 
that moment, were immune from international fair trial guarantees.
As a “pop- corn provision”, Article 6(1) echr has continued to puff up and 
grow over time, expanding the applicability of the fair trial guarantees to a 
broader range of case types. As the case- law developed, the governments lost 
more and more battles and were ordered to enforce fair trial guarantees with 
respect to a large number of disputes. Looking back on more than 50 years of 
case- law of the ECtHR, it might be fair to argue that Article 6(1) echr is the 
provision that contributed the most to the advancement of the rule of law and 
individual justice in Europe.
According to the case- law, Article 6(1) echr may be relied on by individuals 
who consider that an interference with the exercise of their rights is unlawful 
and complain that they do not have the possibility to submit that claim to a 
court meeting the requirements of Article 6(1) echr. As the Court put it in 
Golder, the right to a fair trial embodies the “right to a court”, of which the right 
of access, that is the right to institute proceedings, is one aspect.1
However, the right to a court is not absolute, as Article 6(1) echr applies 
solely for the purposes of determining civil rights and obligations or criminal 
charges. This apparently anodyne rule incentivized governments to argue that 
many of the domestic proceedings about which applicants complained fell 
outside the scope of Article 6(1) echr as they dealt neither with civil rights 
and obligations, nor with criminal charges. This was the case in numerous 
administrative proceedings challenged under Article 6(1) echr in Strasbourg, 
about which governments argued for a very long time that they did not con-
cern neither civil rights nor criminal charges.





What is at stake in such situations is far more important than the legal solu-
tion to a case: if the Court concludes that the proceedings at issue concern 
civil rights or criminal charges, it will perform its analysis and will eventually 
order the defending government to ensure fair trial guarantees in future dis-
putes. However, if the Court finds that the relevant proceedings do not concern 
civil rights and obligations or criminal charges, it will conclude that Article 6(1) 
echr is not applicable and it will reject the application for being incompatible 
ratione materiae with the Convention.
The right to fair trial has not only been used by the Court for the enhance-
ment of the individual’s position when opposing a government. On the con-
trary, the right to a fair trial is often relied on successfully by the governments 
as a barrier against the jurisdiction of the ECtHR.
The present chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.1. presents the case- 
law of the ECtHR concerning the disputes to which Article 6(1) echr is not 
applicable; Section 5.2. presents the case- law of the ECtHR concerning the 
applicability of Article 6(1) echr to disputes concerning “civil rights and obli-
gation”; and Section 5.3. presents the case- law of the ECtHR concerning the 
applicability of Article 6(1) echr to disputes concerning a “criminal charge”, 
including economic law disputes and competition law disputes.
5.1 Maintaining Pockets of State Sovereignty
Harris, O’Boyle, Bates and Buckley argue that “some of the more perplexing 
problems in the interpretation of the Convention concern the application of 
Article 6(1) to non- criminal cases”.2 They show that in its early jurisprudence, 
the Court interpreted the notion “in the determination of his civil rights 
and obligations” as imposing a distinction between the civil and public law 
spheres, a distinction that “has long been significant in civil law systems for 
jurisdictional and other purposes and has more recently become important 
in UK administrative law”.3 This distinction, however, is also at the origin of 
important difficulties for the Court because the dividing line between public 
and private law is more and more difficult to defend.
The claims that the Court considers as belonging to the sphere of public 
law, and that are therefore excluded from Article 6(1) echr protection are 
few. In Pierre- Bloch, the Court found that the right to stand for elections was 
 2 Harris, O’Boyle, Bates and Buckley, op. cit., p. 210.
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a political, not a civil right and therefore that the fair trial guarantees did not 
extend to the applicant’s case.4
In Maaouia, the same conclusion was reached as regards the expulsion of 
aliens. The Court held that “decisions regarding the entry, stay and deportation 
of aliens do not concern the determination of the applicant’s civil rights or 
obligations”.5
In Ferrazzini v Italy, the Court found that the duty to pay tax did not con-
cern a person’s civil rights because it clearly held the nature of a public law. 
The Court explained that relations between the individual and the state have 
changed in many spheres during the 50 years which have elapsed since the 
convention system was put in place. One defining feature has been that state 
regulation increasingly intervenes in private law relations. This has led the 
Court to find that procedures deemed under national law as being parts of 
‘public law’ could come within the purview of Article 6(1) echr if the out-
comes were decisive for private rights and obligations. Moreover, the state’s 
increasing intervention in the individual’s day- to- day life, in terms of wel-
fare protection for example, has required the Court to evaluate features of 
public law and private law before concluding that the asserted right could 
be classified as civil.6 However, the Court concluded that certain rights and 
obligations, such as the duty to pay tax, remain excluded from the protection 
offered by Article 6(1) echr because “they form part of the hard core of pub-
lic prerogatives”.7
5.2 Applicability of Article 6(1) echr to “Civil Rights and Obligations”
The current section of the book describes the case- law of the ECtHR concern-
ing the applicability of Article 6(1) echr to disputes concerning “civil rights 
and obligations”. This section covers (1) contestations of public policy deci-
sions, (2) disputes raising land issues, (3) disputes raising concerns in rela-
tion to the right to education, (4) disputes concerning social policy decisions, 
(5) constitutional disputes and (6) employment disputes which have long been 
considered as belonging to the sphere of public law.
 4 ECtHR. Pierre- Bloch v. France, application no. 24194/ 94, judgement of 21 Oct 1997, p. 202.
 5 ECtHR. Maaouia v. France, application no. 39652/ 98, judgement of 5 Oct 2000, paragraph 40.
 6 ECtHR. Ferrazzini v. Italy, application no. 44759/ 98, judgement of 12 Jul 2001, paragraph 27.











5.2.1 Public Policy Decisions and Individual Rights
In the case of Powell and Rayner the applicants’ access to the domestic courts 
in respect of aircraft noise nuisance was denied by Section 76(1) of the UK 1982 
Civil Aviation Act which set a statutory bar to this end.8 To the extent that no 
substantive right existed under domestic English law to obtain relief for expo-
sure to aircraft noise, the Court held the view that there was no civil right rec-
ognized under domestic law to attract the applicability of Article 6(1) echr.
This idea was further developed in the case of Roche which concerned an 
applicant who took part in chemical weapons research after joining the British 
Army.9 He found himself unable to apply for a service pension following health 
problems as Section 10 of the UK Crown Proceedings Act amounted to a proce-
dural bar to the right of action against the Crown.
The applicant complained at the Court that his right of access to a court was 
violated by the English domestic authorities. The Court recognized that, while 
Article 6(1) echr secures for everyone the right to have a claim relating to his 
civil rights and obligations being heard before a court, it does not guarantee 
any particular content for those rights in the substantive law of the member 
states.10
The Court thus acknowledged that the basis for the qualification of a right 
as being “civil” should be the qualification of the right in the relevant domestic 
law. The Court noted in this sense that Section 10 did not remove a class of 
claim from the domestic courts’ jurisdiction or confer immunity from liability 
which had been previously recognised. In fact, such a class of claims has never 
existed under English domestic law and it was not for an international tribunal 
to create it.
It is interesting to notice that even if the Court found that Article 6(1) echr 
was not applicable in the present case, it found a violation of Article 8 echr 
in respect of the inadequate access to information about the tests performed 
in Porton Down. The Court found that a “positive obligation arose to provide 
an effective and accessible procedure enabling the applicant to have access 
to all relevant and appropriate information which would allow him to assess 
any risk to which he had been exposed during his participation in the tests”.11 
(emphasis added)
 8 ECtHR. Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom, application no. 9310/ 81, judgement of 21 
Feb 1990, paragraphs 34– 36, Series A no. 172.
 9 ECtHR. Roche v. the United Kingdom [gc], application no. 32555/ 96, judgement of 19 
Oct 2005.
 10 Roche v. the United Kingdom [gc], quoted above, paragraph 116.
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In Athanassoglu, the applicants complained that they were denied effective 
access to a court in breach of Article 6(1) echr.12 They complained in partic-
ular that it had not been open to them under Swiss law to seek judicial review 
contesting the lawfulness of a decision of the Federal Council granting a lim-
ited operating license for the Benzau ii nuclear power plant.
The Court made a few important clarifications in this judgement. The Court 
noted that
the applicants are seeking to drive from Article 6 § 1 of the Convention 
a remedy to contest the very principle of the use of nuclear energy or 
at least a means for transferring from the government to the courts the 
responsibility for taking, on the basis of technical evidence, the ultimate 
decision on the operation of individual nuclear power stations.13
The Court further observed that Swiss law empowered the applicants to par-
tially contest the extension of the operating license of the power plant and 
to initiate ordinary civil proceedings for nuisance and de facto expropriation. 
However, “how best to regulate the use of nuclear power is a policy decision for 
each Contracting State to take according to its democratic processes. Article 
6 § 1 cannot be read as dictating any one scheme over another”.14
The Court concluded that the proceedings at issue were indeed important 
for the general question of extension of the operating license, but not for the 
determination of any of the applicants’ civil rights and obligations. The case 
was thus declared inadmissible under Article 6(1) echr.
Domestic administrative proceedings have raised issues concerning the 
applicability of Article 6(1) echr. In fact, for many years Governments insisted 
that domestic administrative proceedings did not concern civil rights or obli-
gations and that they fell outside the scope of application of Article 6(1) echr.
In a case against Turkey, the applicants successfully contested the granting 
of permits to operate a gold mine due to the environmental threats posed by 
the mining activity. Despite the existence of a final judicial decision prohibit-
ing the mining activity, the company at issue managed to circumvent it and to 
continue its actions.15
 12 ECtHR. Athanassoglou and Others v. Switzerland [gc], application no. 27644/ 95, judge-
ment of 6 Apr 2000.
 13 Athanassoglou and Others v. Switzerland [gc], quoted above, paragraph 53.
 14 Athanassoglou and Others v. Switzerland [gc], quoted above, paragraph 54.










The Turkish Government defended itself, arguing that the risks relied on 
by the applicants were only probable and hypothetical and did not therefore 
concern civil rights and obligations.
The Court started its analysis noting that, in contesting the mining per-
mit, the applicants attempted to obtain adequate protection of their physi-
cal integrity against the risk entailed by the operation of the gold mine under 
discussion.
The Court than noted that the risk presented by the gold mine had been 
clearly assessed by the domestic courts when cancelling the mining permit 
and that the proceedings instituted by the applicants were the single means 
under Turkish legislation to protect their right to live in healthy and balanced 
environment. The Court also noted that the outcome of the proceedings before 
the administrative courts, taken as a whole, were relevant for the applicants’ 
civil rights.16
In the case of Alatulkkila and Others v Finland, the applicants were own-
ers of water areas in Finland.17 In 1996, the Finnish- Swedish Frontier Rivers 
Commission prohibited all fishing of salmon and sea trout in the relevant 
waters during 1996 and 1997. Some of the applicants received compensation 
for the economic losses suffered due to the imposed restrictions.
The applicants complained under Article 6(1) echr about the impossibility 
to review the decision of the Finnish- Swedish Frontier Rivers Commission by 
a tribunal.
The Finish Government contested the applicability of Article 6(1) echr to 
the proceedings involving the decision of the Finnish- Swedish Frontier Rivers 
Commission, arguing that the right to fish belonged to the state, not to the 
applicants.
The Court held that “although Article 6 cannot guarantee a right of access to 
a court with power to invalidate or override a law enacted by the legislature, it 
must examine the direct effect of the decisions of the Finnish- Swedish Frontier 
Rivers Commission which prohibited fishing under the powers bestowed on 
them by various decrees”.18
In concluding that the right to fish was a civil right, the Court noted that 
prior to the ban, the applicants enjoyed an undisputed right to fish salmon 
and sea trout. Also, the Court attached a particular importance to the fact that 
 16 Taşkın and Others v. Turkey, quoted above, paragraphs 131– 134.
 17 ECtHR. Alatulkkila and Others v. Finland, application no. 33538/ 96, judgement of 28 
Jul 2005.
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some of the applicants received compensation for loss of income as profes-
sional fishermen arising from their inability to continue to fish.
In the case of X, the applicant complained of state negligence in relation to 
blood transfusions that infected him with the hiv virus.19 He complained at 
the Court about the length of the proceedings in which he was involved.
The French Government argued that the health policy contested by the 
applicant was covered by public law provisions and was not, therefore, covered 
by the Article 6(1) echr guarantees.
Holding that the outcome of the negligence proceedings initiated by the 
applicant were decisive for his private rights and obligations, the Court con-
cluded that Article 6(1) echr was applicable and that, furthermore, the rea-
sonable time of these proceedings had been exceeded.20
Further explanations concerning the issue of civil rights and obligations 
were offered by the Court in the case of Wós, in which the applicant was sub-
jected to forced labour during the Second World War on the territory of occu-
pied Poland.21
In 1991, an agreement was signed between the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the Republic of Poland addressing the issue of Polish nationals persecuted 
by the Nazi regime. The applicant applied to the Polish- German Reconciliation 
Foundation for compensation on account of his forced labour.
Upon the modification of the admissibility rules concerning the granting 
of compensations sponsored by the Government of the Federal Republic 
of Germany, the applicant applied for an increase of the amount initially 
received. When his application was declared inadmissible in law by the Polish 
Supreme Administrative Court, the applicant complained under Article 6(1) 
echr that he did not have access to a court in respect of his claim raised before 
the Polish- German Reconciliation Foundation.
The Polish Government argued that Article 6(1) echr was not applica-
ble to the present case due to the fact that the compensation granted by the 
Foundation was incidental in nature, had a symbolic rather than real economic 
value and was in no way similar to welfare allowances.
The Court noted that
there is no general obligation under the Convention for States to compen-
sate wrongs inflicted in the past under the general cover of State author-
ity. However, if such a compensation scheme were to be established, 
 19 ECtHR. X v. France, application no. 18020/ 91, judgement of 31 Mar 1992, Series A no. 234- C.
 20 X v. France, quoted above, paragraph 49.








the Court observed that substantive regulations which determined the 
eligibility criteria for any compensation would in principle fall outside 
the Court’s jurisdiction, unless the relevant criteria were manifestly arbi-
trary or blatantly inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the 
Convention. On the other hand, the Court noted that it could not be 
excluded that some procedural issues – related to the application of those 
eligibility criteria to the facts of individual cases – could arise. In other 
words, once a compensation scheme is put in place by a Government 
or with a Government’s consent, and regardless of the nature of the 
respective benefits, issues of compliance with Article 6 § 1 or Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1 may arise.22
To conclude, the case- law described in the section above concerns cases in 
which individuals were contesting public policies. The ECtHR drew attention 
to the fact that, whereas Article 6(1) echr can be relied when individuals have 
been personally affected by the contested policies, the situation is radically 
different when individuals are using Article 6(1) echr to contest policy ipso 
facto. In the latter case, Article 6(1) echr remains inapplicable.
5.2.2 Land Issues
In the case of Ortenberg, the applicant was a house owner.23 Following the 
decision of the district council to adopt a land- use plan and a development 
plan that designated as building land an area adjoining the applicant’s land, 
she challenged the lawfulness of these actions and complained about the nui-
sance that would be caused.
She complained that neither the Austrian Constitutional Court, nor the 
administrative court were “tribunals” for the purpose of Article 6(1) echr. The 
Austrian Government argued that the neighbours’ right to object to building 
plans was a public law right, guaranteed by public law statutes and that, conse-
quently, Article 6(1) echr did not apply to the present case.
The Court pointed out that Article 6 applies where the subject- matter of 
an action is pecuniary in nature and is founded on an alleged infringement of 
rights which are likewise pecuniary or where its outcome is decisive for private 
rights and obligations.
The Court noted that despite the fact that the applicant challenged a public 
law act, her motivation was to protect her pecuniary rights. More precisely, by 
 22 Woś v. Poland, quoted above, paragraph 72.
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challenging the building plans, she intended to protect her private property 
and to avoid the decrease of its market value. Thus, the close link between the 
proceedings brought by the applicant and the consequences of their outcome 
for her property meant that the right under discussion was a “civil” right and 
that Article 6 was applicable.24
A similar issue arose in the case De Geouffre de la Pradelle whose property 
had been declared an area of outstanding beauty and public interest.25 Mr de 
Geouffre de la Pradelle could not challenge the administrative decision at issue 
due to the fact that it was notified to him after the deadline for lodging complaints 
had expired. He complained under Article 6(1) echr that he has been deprived 
of his right of access to a court due to the uncertainty prevailing in French legisla-
tion as to the classification of decisions to designate places of interest.
Despite the fact that the French Government acknowledged that the deci-
sions to designate places of outstanding beauty are sui generis administrative 
acts, it did not argue that Article 6(1) echr was inapplicable in such cases.
In the present case, the Court found a violation of Article 6(1) echr on 
the grounds that the system was not sufficiently coherent and clear and that 
the applicant did not have a practical, effective right of access to the Conseil 
d’Etat.26
In conclusion, land dispute generate many cases at the ECtHR. The right 
to a fair trial is often invoked in these cases together with the right to prop-
erty. Such cases offered the ECtHR the opportunity to reason that pecuniary 
rights are linked to the “civil rights and obligations” as guaranteed by Article 
6(1) echr. In addition, many land disputes brought at the ECtHR concerned 
lack of effective remedy at the domestic level.
5.2.3 Right to Education and Detention Issues
Interesting issues concerning the applicability of Article 6(1) echr have 
arisen in relation to the right to education. In the case of André Simpson, the 
Commission held that Article 6 was inapplicable to proceedings concern-
ing the laws on education due to the fact that they fell within the public law 
domain, had no private law analogy and had no repercussions on private rights 
and obligations.27
 24 Ortenberg v. Austria, quoted above, paragraph 28.
 25 ECtHR. De Geouffre de la Pradelle v. France, application no. 12964/ 87, judgement of 16 Dec 
1992, Series A no. 253-B.
 26 De Geouffre de la Pradelle v. France, quoted above, paragraph 35.












Almost 20 years later, the ECtHR reached a different conclusion in a case in 
which the applicant could not be enrolled at a University due to the fact that 
she refused to provide identity pictures without wearing a headscarf.28 At the 
Court, the applicant complained about the unfairness of the administrative 
proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court.
The Court highlighted, first of all, that the public law aspect of a regula-
tion did not suffice to exclude the right to education from the category of civil 
rights and obligations. The Court also stated that “where a State confers rights 
which can be enforced by means of a judicial remedy, these can, in principle, 
be regarded as civil rights within the meaning of Article 6 § 1”.29
The Court has also noted that the applicant did not deal with the public 
authorities as holders of discretionary powers, but merely as providers of a 
public service. Lastly, the Court noted the importance of the applicant’s right 
to continue her higher education.30
In a case against Italy, the applicant, who was convicted for mafia- related 
crimes, was assigned by the prison authorities to a detention regime with an 
increased surveillance level. He was unable to challenge this assignment due 
to the fact that the measure was a discretionary act of the prison authorities.
In deciding whether the limitations imposed on the applicant’s freedom 
due to the special detention regime were civil rights, the Court relied on the 
argumentation of the Italian Constitutional Court that jurisdictional review 
was particularly important when administrative authorities are entitled to 
modify the detention regime of convicted persons.31
To conclude, access to education and the civil rights of detained persons are 
issues that have initially been considered belonging to public law. However, 
due to the developments at the domestic level – which allowed for judicial 
review of these matters – the ECtHR evolved its case- law to argue that access 
to education and the civil rights of detainee are covered by Article 6(1) echr.
5.2.4 Social Policy and Individual Rights
Important principles concerning the applicability of the right to a fair trial 
were established in the case of Feldbrugge, in which the applicant complained 
about the fact that she did not receive a fair hearing by a tribunal in the deter-
mination of her right to a sickness allowance.32 The Court acknowledged that 
 28 ECtHR. Emine Araç v. Turkey, application no. 9907/ 02, judgement of 23 Sep 2008.
 29 Emine Araç v. Turkey, quoted above, paragraph 21.
 30 Emine Araç v. Turkey, quoted above, paragraph 24.
 31 ECtHR. Musumeci v. Italy, application no. 33695/ 96, judgement of 11 Jan 2005.
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this was the first time it had dealt with the field of social security and more 
specifically, with the applicability of Article 6 to disputes concerning health 
insurance schemes.
The Court pointed out that under Dutch legislation, the right to health 
insurance was indeed a public law right. The Court highlighted that
there exists great diversity in the legislation and case- law of the Member 
States of the Council of Europe as regards the juridical nature of the enti-
tlement to health insurance benefits under social security schemes, that 
is to say as regards the category of law to which such entitlement belongs. 
Some States – including the Netherlands – treat it as a public- law right, 
whereas others, on the contrary, treat it as a private- law right; others still 
would appear to operate a mixed system. What is more, even within the 
same legal order differences of approach can be found in the case- law. 
Thus, in some States where the public- law aspect is predominant, some 
court decisions have nonetheless held Article 6 § 1 to be applicable to 
claims similar to the one in issue in the present case. Accordingly, there 
exists no common standard pointing to a uniform European notion in 
this regard.33
The Court then went on to analyse the public law features and the private law 
features of the health insurance scheme in the Netherlands and to compare 
them. The health insurance scheme in the Netherlands displayed three fea-
tures that justified its qualification as public law and therefore its exclusion 
from the realm of civil rights: (1) the character of the legislation, (2) the com-
pulsory nature of the insurance and (3) the assumption by the state of the 
responsibility for social protection.34
On the other hand, the Court also identified three private law features that 
defended the health insurance scheme as falling under the civil head of Article 
6(1) echr: (1) the personal and economic nature of the asserted right, (2) the 
connection with the contract of employment and (3) the affinities with insur-
ance under the ordinary law.35
Upon balancing the public law and private law features, the Court con-
cluded the latter to be predominant: “none of these various features of private 
law is decisive on its own, but taken together and cumulatively they confer on 
 33 ECtHR. Feldbrugge v. the Netherlands [gc], quoted above, paragraph 29.
 34 ECtHR. Feldbrugge v. the Netherlands [gc], quoted above, paragraphs 31– 35.








the asserted entitlement the character of a civil right within the meaning of 
Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6– 1) of the Convention which was thus applicable”.36
Almost ten years after the Court delivered its judgement in Feldbrugge, the 
issue concerning the applicability of Article 6(1) echr to welfare benefits was 
brought before the ECtHR again. In the case of Salesi, the applicant complained 
about the length of the proceedings concerning a disability allowance.37
The Italian Government maintained that, since the state financed the 
scheme and since the entitlement to the disability allowance was not depen-
dent on the payment of contributions, the subject was exclusively a public law 
matter.
The Court held that welfare assistance was different from the issue treated 
in the Feldbrugge case, namely social insurance, but did not choose to perform 
the long and detailed analysis provided in Feldbrugge. Three issues seemed to 
be of importance for the Court in the present case. First, state intervention was 
not sufficient to establish that Article 6(1) echr was inapplicable. Second, the 
applicant was not affected by her relations with the administration’s exercising 
of discretionary powers. On the contrary, Mrs Salesi was suffering an interfer-
ence with her means of subsistence and was claiming an economic right guar-
anteed by the Italian Constitution. Last, the Court acknowledged that disputes 
similar to that of the applicant came within the jurisdiction of ordinary courts.
It is interesting to note that, while in Feldbrugge the applicability of Article 
6(1) echr was decided by a vote of ten to seven, it was unanimously affirmed 
in Salesi that Article 6(1) echr was applicable to disputes concerning welfare 
benefits.
In another case against the Netherlands, the applicants – who were running 
a physiotherapy practice – failed to pay social contributions under the Health 
Insurance Act due to the fact that they were contributors to private funds.38
Since this was the first time the Court had to rule on the applicability of 
Article 6(1) echr to disputes concerning contributions to a social security 
scheme, the Government of the Netherlands insisted that the contributions in 
question were akin to taxation and therefore did not fall within the concept of 
civil rights and obligations.
On the substance of the case, the Court applied the Feldbrugge test and con-
cluded that when balancing the public law features of social security schemes 
(the character of the legislation, the compulsory nature of the schemes and the 
 36 ECtHR. Feldbrugge v. the Netherlands [gc], quoted above, paragraph 40.
 37 ECtHR. Salesi v. Italy, application no. 13023/ 87, judgement of 26 Feb 1993.
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assumption of the state) against their private law features (the personal and 
economic nature of the right, the link between the social insurance schemes 
and the contract of employment and the similarity between the social security 
schemes and the contract of employment), the latter features prevailed. The 
Court concluded that
the relative cogency of the features of public and private law present in 
the instant cases leads the Court to find that the private- law features are 
of greater significance than those of public law. On balance, the disputes 
in issue are to be regarded as having involved “the determination of civil 
rights and obligations” and Article 6 § 1 is therefore applicable.39
In conclusion, as the case- law described above indicates, social policy has 
been defended for a long time by European governments as public law, fall-
ing outside Article 6(1) echr. Unlike the land issues described in Section 
5.2.2. above, the ECtHR did not rely solely on the pecuniary interests 
involved. The Court provided in- depth analysis of the domestic legislation 
and progressively reached the conclusion that the private law features of 
social policy legislation were determinant for the applicability of Article 
6(1) echr.
5.2.5 Constitutional Disputes
Constitutional disputes offered another opportunity to consider the breadth of 
the applicability of Article 6(1) echr. In the case of Ruiz- Mateos the applicants 
lost their property as a result of an expropriation law.40 During the domestic 
proceedings contesting the expropriation, a preliminary question was referred 
to the Constitutional Court. As it appeared, the preliminary question proceed-
ings lasted for two years, contributing thus to the unlawful extension of the 
proceedings. In addition, the applicants complained that the counsel for the 
state – their opponent in the expropriation proceedings – was able to sub-
mit written observations to the Constitutional Court, whereas they were not 
allowed to do so because they lacked locus standi.
The Spanish Government, joined by the German and the Portuguese 
Governments, insisted that Article 6(1) echr was not applicable to proceed-
ings before the Constitutional Court by reason of their nature, structure and 
jurisdiction. They highlighted that the decision in the present case “would be 
 39 Schouten and Meldrum v. the Netherlands, quoted above, paragraph 60.








of great significance to those other Member States of the Council of Europe 
which have a constitutional court”.41
The Court disagreed and acknowledged by eighteen votes to six that – leav-
ing aside the abstract question of the applicability of Article 6(1) echr to con-
stitutional courts – in the case at issue, there was a close link between the 
subject matter of the expropriation proceedings and the constitutional pro-
ceedings. More precisely, only if the Constitutional Court had declared null 
and void the expropriation law on the basis of which the applicants’ goods had 
been expropriated, should the civil courts have allowed the applicants’ claims. 
The Court held that
in the present case, the civil and constitutional proceedings even 
appeared so interrelated that to deal with them separately would be arti-
ficial and would considerably weaken the protection afforded in respect 
of the applicants’ rights. The Court notes that by raising questions of 
constitutionality, the applicants raised were using the sole – and indi-
rect – means available to them of complaining of an interference with 
their right to property.42
Aside from the novelty introduced by this judgement concerning the principle 
of the equality of arms in constitutional proceedings, the case is also known 
for the roiling dissenting opinions expressed in it.
Judge Thor Vilhjalmsson argued that the Court “cannot demand that access 
to the Constitutional Court in Spain be regulated in a specific way as is required 
by the majority of our Court”.43
Judge Matscher wrote:
While I deplore the clearly unsatisfactory legal position in the case before 
us, it is not for the Convention organs to “allow” the applicants’ claims 
by having recourse to Article 6 in order to remedy the situation under 
domestic law, which is undoubtedly deficient from the point of view of 
the general principles of law, but not contrary to the Convention.44
Judge Matscher criticised the reference and use of such notions like “close link” 
and “so interrelated” for the purpose of extending excessively the applicability 
 41 Ruiz- Mateos v. Spain [gc], quoted above, paragraph 56.
 42 Ruiz- Mateos v. Spain [gc], quoted above, paragraph 59.
 43 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Thor Vilhjalmsson, Ruiz- Mateos v. Spain [gc], quoted above.
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of Article 6(1) echr and concluded that such tendencies “result inevitably in 
the limitation of the substance of the procedural guarantees contained therein 
in a way which is scarcely compatible with the aim of the provision”.45
Judge Pettiti, joined by Judges Lopes Rocha and Ruiz- Jarabo Colomer, 
insisted that raising objections of constitutionality should not confer upon 
individuals the status of “parties” to the proceedings because the constitu-
tional procedure was an institutional debate that excluded individuals.
The Ruiz- Mateos judgement concerned constitutional referrals lodged in 
parallel to the main proceedings. Later cases have been brought to the Court 
concerning constitutional appeals lodged by applicants after the exhaustion of 
the ordinary proceedings.
In Krcmar and Others, the applicants complained that they did not have a 
fair hearing before the Constitutional Court as the Court based its decision on 
documents that were not presented during the public hearing and were not 
shown to or discussed with the parties.46
The Czech Government did not dispute the applicability of Article 6(1) 
echr to the merits of the case. The Court then unanimously concluded that 
the applicants’ restitution claim was of a pecuniary nature and that Article 6 
was applicable to proceedings before Constitutional Courts.
It can be thus concluded that, during a period of ten years, the Court’s 
view as to the applicability of Article 6(1) echr to constitutional disputes 
has radically changed. After an initial period of deeming constitutional dis-
putes incompatible with Article 6(1) echr, the Court accepted, against a vocal 
minority, that when a close link existed between the ordinary civil proceedings 
and the constitutional proceedings, the latter were “civilized” and Article 6(1) 
echr became thus applicable. Henceforth, the issue remained undisputed in 
Strasbourg. This is due to the force of the judicial precedent in the Court’s case- 
law, but also to the fact that the minority judges were replaced with new judges 
holding new ideas about the applicability of Article 6(1) echr.
5.2.6 Employment Disputes
The case- law concerning employment of civil servants is a prime example of 
how the Court transitions from defining a field of law as falling outside the 
guarantees offered by Article 6(1) echr to acknowledging the contrary.
Initially, the Court considered that Article 6(1) echr was incompatible with 
disputes relating to the recruitment, careers and termination of service of civil 
 45 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Franz Matscher, Ruiz- Mateos v. Spain [gc], quoted above.








servants.47 Slowly, however, the Court recognized the economic nature of the 
rights involved in an employment dispute and used this as an argument to 
extend the legal protection afforded by Article 6(1) echr to them.
To reach this conclusion, the Court first distinguished between the situa-
tions in which employment disputes involved the exercise of discretionary 
power of the state – such as selection or termination of contracts of civil ser-
vants – from the cases in which the applicants had claims of a purely pecuni-
ary nature, such as disability entitlements related to the service performed.48
Later, the Court acknowledged that the absence of discretionary power 
and the economic nature of the dispute were difficult criteria to apply and left 
room for arbitrariness. Therefore, in Pellegrin the Court proposed a functional 
criterion, based on the nature of the employee’s duties and responsibilities.49 
The Court noted that
in each country’s public- service sector certain posts involve responsi-
bilities in the general interest or participation in the exercise of powers 
conferred by public law. The holders of such posts thus wield a portion 
of the State’s sovereign power. The State therefore has a legitimate inter-
est in requiring of these servants a special bond of trust and loyalty. On 
the other hand, in respect of other posts which do not have this “public 
administration” aspect, there is no such interest.50
The police and armed forces belong to the group of civil servants exercising 
public law powers and Article 6(1) echr does not apply to trials contesting 
their employment.
The post- Pellegrin case- law showed that the functional criterion was just 
as difficult to apply in practice as the previous criteria. In addition, it was a 
source of confusion and uncertainty. Consequently, the Court further devel-
oped its jurisprudence on the applicability of Article 6(1) echr to employ-
ment disputes.
In Vilho Eskelinen and Others, the applicants were policemen who lost their 
entitlement to a remote- area allowance following a collective agreement.51 
 47 ECtHR. Massa v. Italy, application no. 14399/ 88, judgement of 24 Aug 1993, Series A no. 265- 
B, paragraph 26.
 48 ECtHR. Francesco Lombardo v. Italy, application no. 11519/ 85, judgement of 26 Nov 1992, 
Series A no. 249- B.
 49 ECtHR. Pellegrin v. France, application no. 28541/ 95, judgement of 8 Dec 1999.
 50 Pellegrin v. France, quoted above, paragraph 65.
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They contested this decision before the domestic authorities, but lost the case. 
Upon lodging their application with the Court, the applicants complained 
about the length of their domestic proceedings that lasted for more than seven 
years and about the lack of an oral hearing.
The Court, sitting as Grand Chamber, took the opportunity to introduce a 
new criterion for deciding whether Article 6(1) echr was applicable to the 
applicants’ employment dispute. Cognizant of its previous case- law, the Court 
recognized the state’s interest in controlling access to a court for a certain cat-
egory of staff. However, it was
primarily for the Contracting States, in particular the competent national 
legislature, not the Court, to identify expressly those areas of public ser-
vice involving the exercise of the discretionary powers intrinsic to State 
sovereignty where the interests of the individual must give way. The 
Court exerts its supervisory role subject to the principle of subsidiarity. 
If a domestic system bars access to a court, the Court will verify that the 
dispute is indeed such as to justify the application of the exception to the 
guarantees of Article 6. If it does not, then there is no issue and Article 
6 § 1 will apply.52
Vilho Eskelinen and Others established a presumption that Article 6(1) echr 
applied to all disputes involving civil servants. Therefore, it was for the govern-
ment to prove that a civil servant is barred under domestic law from bringing 
an employment dispute before a domestic court and that the prohibition itself 
is justified.53
This jurisprudence was put to the test in a recent case concerning an 
employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Bulgaria responsible for counter- 
intelligence and recruitment of secret agents.54 In this case, the applicant’s 
superior attempted unsuccessfully to dismiss him on disciplinary grounds. He 
then asked the applicant to sit a psychological examination which concluded 
that the applicant was not fit to work for the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The 
applicant was dismissed from his position due to the unfavourable results of 
the psychological test. He unsuccessfully challenged this decision before the 
domestic courts. The domestic courts rejected the applicant’s action on the 
ground that the psychological test performed by the Ministry’s Institute was 
incontrovertible proof of fitness to work for the Ministry and that they could 
 52 Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [gc], quoted above, paragraph 61.
 53 Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [gc], quoted above, paragraph 62.








not replace their findings with the conclusions of the assessment at issue. Due 
to the classified nature of the case, the applicant had no access to the conclu-
sions of the psychological assessment and to the judicial decisions adopted in 
his case.
The Court considered that Article 6(1) echr was applicable, despite the fact 
that the applicant was an officer in the National Security Directorate of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and that the dispute he sought to resolve concerned 
his dismissal from that post. Bulgarian legislation allowed judicial review of 
the dismissal of officers employed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the 
applicant was able to challenge his dismissal at the Supreme Administrative 
Court despite the national security interests involved.55
To conclude, employment disputes involving civil servants have been con-
sidered belonging to public law for a long time. The consequence was that the 
parties to employment disputes did not benefit from fair trial guarantees, such 
as the right to be heard, equality of arms and the right to an effective remedy. 
The fact that the government was a party to an employment dispute was not 
sufficient to maintain the dispute in the realm of public law. It thus became 
established case- law that Article 6(1) echr was applicable to employment 
disputes.
5.3 Applicability of Article 6(1) echr to “Criminal Charges”
The current section of the book describes the case- law of the ECtHR concern-
ing the applicability of Article 6(1) echr to disputes concerning “criminal 
charges”. This section covers (1) disputes concerning disciplinary proceedings, 
(2) disputes concerning petty offences, (3) disputes concerning economic 
offences and (4) competition law disputes.
5.3.1 Disciplinary Proceedings
The Court analysed for the first time the issue of “criminal charge” in the 
case Engel and others.56 The case concerned military disciplinary proceed-
ings initiated against the applicants. The Dutch Government argued that the 
disciplinary proceedings brought against the applicants concerned neither 
their “civil rights and obligations” nor “a criminal charge”. The Court acknowl-
edged that
 55 Fazliyski v. Bulgaria, quoted above, paragraphs 51– 55.
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all the Contracting States make a distinction of long standing, albeit in 
different forms and degrees, between disciplinary proceedings and crim-
inal proceedings. For the individuals affected, the former usually offer 
substantial advantages in comparison with the latter, for example as con-
cerns the sentences passed. Disciplinary sentences, in general less severe, 
do not appear in the person's criminal record and entail more limited 
consequences. It may nevertheless be otherwise; moreover, criminal pro-
ceedings are ordinarily accompanied by fuller guarantees.57
Understanding the linguistic conundrum posed by proceedings that would 
be criminal in nature, but named to be disciplinary, the Court went on to 
define what has become one of the most important concepts in its case- law – 
the autonomy of concepts. The Court noted that the Convention allowed the 
member states, “in the performance of their function as guardians of the pub-
lic interest, to maintain or establish a distinction between criminal law and 
disciplinary law, and to draw the dividing line, but only subject to certain 
conditions”.58
The opposite choice, however, would be subject to stricter rules. The Court 
explained:
If the Contracting States were able at their discretion to classify an 
offence as disciplinary instead of criminal, or to prosecute the author of a 
"mixed" offence on the disciplinary rather than on the criminal plane, the 
operation of the fundamental clauses of Articles 6 and 7 would be subor-
dinated to their sovereign will. A latitude extending thus far might lead 
to results incompatible with the purpose and object of the Convention. 
The Court therefore has jurisdiction, under Article 6 (…) to satisfy itself 
that the disciplinary does not improperly encroach upon the criminal.59
The Court then moved to the three criteria for determining the content of the 
autonomous “criminal charge”. The first element is the classification in the 
domestic legal system, which should serve only as a starting point and should 
have a formal and relative value. The second element is the nature of the 
offence, and the third element is the degree of severity of the penalty that the 
person concerned risks incurring.60
 57 Engel and others v. the Netherlands, quoted above, paragraph 80.
 58 Engel and others v. the Netherlands, quoted above, paragraph 81.
 59 Engel and others v. the Netherlands, quoted above, paragraph 81.










On the facts of the Engel and others case, the Court noted that the maxi-
mum penalty that the applicants could have incurred was arrest lasting from 
two to four days and three- or four- months’ committal to a disciplinary unit. 
The Court concluded that such “charges” attracted the applicability of Article 6 
because their aim was the imposition of serious punishments involving depri-
vation of liberty.61
The case of Ezeh and Connors concerned the applicability of Article 6 to 
prison discipline proceedings and, more precisely, whether prison disciplinary 
proceedings can be deemed to constitute a “criminal charge”.62
The Court analysed the three Engel criteria and concluded that the factors 
taken into consideration for the analysis “even if they were not to themselves 
sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the offence with which the applicants 
were charged are to be regarded criminal for Convention purposes, clearly give 
them a certain colouring which does not entirely coincide with that of a purely 
disciplinary matter”.63
Relying on the principle defined in Stafford concerning the need “to look 
beyond the appearances and the language used and concentrate on the reali-
ties of the situation”, the Court found that prisoners were detained beyond the 
release date as a consequence of the disputed disciplinary proceedings, which 
were legally unconnected to the original conviction and sentence.6465
A long- standing tradition in Europe distinguished between criminal law 
and disciplinary law, whereas disciplinary law was deemed more efficient, hav-
ing less serious consequences for the accused person and guaranteeing less 
fair trial safeguards. The ECtHR took a serious stance against this practice, rea-
soning that Article 6(1) echr should be applicable whenever individuals were 
affected by the proceedings at issue.
5.3.2 Petty Offences
Petty offences are another issue that produced a considerable amount case- 
law under Article 6(1) echr. In the case of Adolf, the Court further developed 
the Engel criteria.66 The case concerned a criminal complaint lodged against 
 61 Engel and others v. the Netherlands, quoted above, paragraph 85.
 62 ECtHR. Ezeh and Connors v. the United Kingdom [gc], application nos. 39665/ 98 and 
40086/ 98, judgement of 9 Oct 2003.
 63 Ezeh and Connors v. the United Kingdom [gc], quoted above, paragraph 106.
 64 ECtHR. Stafford v. the United Kingdom [gc], application no. 46295/ 99, judgement 28 
May 2002.
 65 Ezeh and Connors v. the United Kingdom [gc], quoted above, paragraph 123.
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the applicant for allegedly having thrown a bunch of keys at the victim. The 
proceedings initiated against Mr Adolf were terminated on the ground that 
both the injury allegedly caused by Mr Adolf and his fault were insignificant.
The Court focused on only one of the three criteria enounced in Engel – 
the classification under domestic legislation – and concluded that Article 6(1) 
echr was applicable because domestic legal rules should be examined in the 
light of the object and purpose of Article 6(1) echr, namely the protection of 
the rights of defence.67
The applicability of the right to a fair trial was also at issue in another early 
case in which the applicant was involved in a car accident that resulted in the 
damage of two vehicles.68
The German Government argued that Article 6(1) echr was not applica-
ble in the case at issue because the applicant was not charged with a criminal 
offence due to the decriminalization of petty offences, including road offences.
The Court, relying on the position of the German Constitutional Court, 
noted that the member states were free to alleviate their criminal courts of the 
task of dealing with numerous petty offences. However, the Court also stressed 
that “conferring the prosecution and punishment of minor offences on admin-
istrative authorities is not inconsistent with the Convention, provided that the 
person concerned is able to bring any decision thus made against him before a 
tribunal that does afford the safeguards of Article 6”.69
By a fourteen- to- three vote, the Court concluded that Article 6(1) echr was 
applicable to decriminalized road offences. Judge Thor Vilhjalmsson made a 
declaration explaining his change of views from non- applicability to applica-
bility of Article 6(1) echr.70
In Lauko, the Court had occasion to consider if minor offences were cov-
ered by the protection granted by Article 6(1) echr.71 There the applicant was 
accused of causing a nuisance and fined 300 Slovakian korunas.
When the applicant complained about the partiality of the criminal pro-
ceedings initiated against him, the Government disputed the applicability of 
Article 6 to the proceedings at issue. It argued that the present case should 
be distinguished from other cases decided by the Court since it involved an 
offence of a minor nature that could not lead to imprisonment.
 67 Adolf v. Austria, quoted above, paragraph 30.
 68 ECtHR. Lutz v. Germany [gc], application no. 9912/ 82, judgement of 25 Aug 1987.
 69 Lutz v. Germany [gc], quoted above, paragraph 57.
 70 Dissenting opinion in ECtHR. Öztürk v. Turkey, application no. 22479/ 93, judgement of 28 
Sep 1999.












The Court argued however that the fact that an offence is not punishable 
by imprisonment is not decisive for the purpose of the applicability of Article 
6(1) echr as “the lack of seriousness of the penalty at stake cannot deprive an 
offence of its inherently criminal nature”.72
As with disciplinary proceedings, petty offences in Europe often concerned 
disputes that have previously been decriminalised. As the case- law described 
above indicates, the decriminalization process has been accompanied by a 
tendency to limit fair trial guarantees. In this context, the ECtHR invited the 
member states to look beyond the appearances and the names of procedures 
and to ensure that the right to a fair trial was guaranteed when individuals 
were affected by proceedings.
5.3.3 Economic Offences
In the early case of Deweer, the Court considered the meaning of the notion of 
a “criminal charge” within the context of a criminal investigation for an eco-
nomic offence.73 The applicant in this case was a retail butcher who was vis-
ited by an official of the Economic Inspectorate General who found that the 
meat the applicant was selling was overpriced. A few days later, the Louvain 
Procureur du Roi ordered the provisional closure of the applicant’s shop within 
forty- eight hours from notification of the decision. The decision stipulated 
that the closure was to come into effect after the payment of 10,000 Belgian 
Franks by way of a friendly settlement, or on the date on which a judgement 
was passed on the offence.
The applicant lodged a complaint at the ECtHR complaining about the 
imposition of a fine by way of settlement, under constraint of provisional clo-
sure of his establishment.
The issue concerning the applicability of Article 6(1) echr to the present 
proceedings was not raised by the Belgian government. The Court raised this 
issue, however, out of its own motion because the applicant was not arrested, 
no official notification of impending prosecution was issued and no criminal 
proceedings had been initiated against the applicant. In fact, the criminal pro-
ceedings against the applicant have been barred by the payment of the 10,000 
Belgian Franks fine as a friendly settlement. As such, no formal criminal charge 
had been formulated against the applicant.
However, “the prominent place held in a democratic society by the right to 
a fair trial” prompted the Court to prefer a “substantive”, rather than a “formal”, 
 72 Lauko v. Slovakia, quoted above, pargraphs 56– 59.
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conception of the “charge” contemplated by Article 6(1) echr and “to look 
behind the appearances and investigate the realities of the procedure in ques-
tion”.74 Thus, a detailed analysis of the wording used by the relevant Belgian 
legislation and in the documents issued in the applicant’s case suggested that 
the terms employed were criminal in nature: “offence”, “offender”, “gravity”, 
“heavy penalties”, “confession”, “flagrant offence” and “guilt”.
The Court unanimously concluded that
there accordingly exists a combination of concordant factors conclu-
sively demonstrating that the case has a criminal character under the 
Convention. The “charge” could for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 be 
defined as the official notification given to an individual by a competent 
authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence.75
A Swedish case concerned tax reports imposed on the applicant companies’ 
taxes and additional tax surcharges.76 Despite the fact that the applicants chal-
lenged the decisions and that the judicial review of the decision was on- going, 
they had to pay the taxes and the surcharges imposed on them.
Referring to the Ferrazzini case, the Swedish Government argued that tax 
disputes fell outside the scope of Article 6(1) echr, and the provision was thus 
not applicable to the proceedings at issue.
The Court agreed that, while Article 6(1) echr was not applicable to tax dis-
putes, the situation was different in the case of tax surcharges. Tax surcharges 
were not criminal penalties, but rather administrative sanctions.
Concerning the nature of the conduct imputed to the applicant, the Court 
noted that the two companies were found guilty of supplying incorrect infor-
mation on their tax returns. The tax returns were imposed in accordance with 
the tax legislation directed towards all persons liable to pay taxes in Sweden, 
not towards a limited group of people.
What distinguished tax surcharges in this case was the threat of a consider-
able financial penalty for non- compliance. It is true that the surcharges were 
imposed on objective grounds only. However, the Court concluded that “the 
lack of subjective elements does not necessarily deprive an offence of its crim-
inal character”.77
 74 Deweer v. Belgium, quoted above, paragraph 44.
 75 Deweer v. Belgium, quoted above, paragraph 45– 47.
 76 ECtHR. Västberga Taxi Aktiebolag and Vulic v. Sweden, application no. 36985/ 97, judge-
ment of 23 Jul 2002.










The same conclusion was reached by the Court in Janosevic, where the 
Court found that tax surcharges – which under Swedish law, had no upper lim-
its – were not intended as pecuniary compensation incurred as the result of 
the taxpayer’s fault, but rather “to exert pressure on taxpayers to comply with 
their legal obligations and to punish breaches of those obligations”.78
In a follow- up case, the Court acknowledged the importance of tax to the 
well- being of the State. However, the Court was not convinced that “removing 
procedural safeguards in the imposition of punitive penalties in that sphere 
is necessary to maintain the efficacy of the fiscal system or indeed can be 
regarded as consonant with the spirit and purpose of the Convention”.79
The Court further analysed the issue of the gravity of the criminal charge in 
the recent case of Dubus s.a.80 In this case, the applicant company was subject 
to an inspection from the Banking Commission, as a result of which a disci-
plinary investigation was initiated against the applicant and an official warn-
ing (blâme) was issued.
The applicant complained about the lack of independence of the Banking 
Commission, alleging that the Commission assumed both the investigation 
and judgement functions. The French Government argued that the official 
warning inflicted on the applicant had no pecuniary consequences and should 
not be deemed a criminal charge.
The Court observed that even if the actual sanction imposed on the appli-
cant was an official warning, the potential sanction that the applicant could 
have incurred was the striking off from the Companies’ Register and/ or a pecu-
niary sanction equal to its minimum capital. The Court considered that the 
“criminal pigmentation” of the sanction depended in the first place on the 
potential sanction, not on the sanction actually inflicted, and concluded that 
Article 6(1) echr was applicable to the proceedings at issue.
Economic law is a feature of modern law, covering inter alia the functioning 
of markets, banks and tax surcharges. Despite the member states’ argument 
that such disputes concerned the exercise of sovereign power, the ECtHR 
refused to create a separate legal regime for them. The ECtHR acknowl-
edged their importance for the economic development of a state, but argued 
that when economic law disputes arose, they should be covered by Article 
6(1) echr.
 78 ECtHR. Janosevic v. Sweden [gc], application no. 34619/ 97, judgement of 23 Jul 2002.
 79 ECtHR. Jussila v. Finland [gc], application no. 73053/ 01, judgement of 23 Nov 2006, para-
graph 36.
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5.3.4 Competition Law Proceedings
The Court has had occasion to analyse the applicability of Article 6(1) echr to 
national competition proceedings.
In the case Société Stenuit, the applicant was accused by the Minister of the 
Economy and Finance of having entered agreements dividing markets with 
other competitors and was ordered to pay 50,000 French Francs.81 The appli-
cant lodged a request seeking to benefit from the amnesty law of 14 August 
1981. This request was rejected by the Minister of the Economy and Finance 
on the grounds that the applicant was guilty of administrative, not criminal 
offences.
The applicant company complained under Article 6(1) echr about a breach 
of their right of access to a tribunal in that the French authorities refused to 
apply the amnesty provisions in their case.
Since the applicability of Article 6(1) echr to the present proceedings was 
disputed between the parties, an in- depth analysis of the issue was performed 
first by the Commission, then by the Court.
The Commission started its analysis by highlighting the findings of the 
Conseil d’Etat that the fine inflicted on the applicant company was administra-
tive, not criminal in nature. The indications provided by the domestic legisla-
tion having a relative importance, the Commission then focused on the other 
two Engel criteria.
First, the terms used by the French authorities belonged to the field of crim-
inal law more than they did to administrative law. “Crime” and “offender” were 
only a few examples used by the French competition authorities in a field they 
claimed to be “administrative”.
Second, the fine imposed on the applicant company – 50,000 French 
Francs – but also the maximum potential fine of 5% from their annual turn-
over, undoubtedly had a dissuasive effect.
The Commission concluded that the criminal character of the fine can be 
undoubtedly deducted from the “body of concordant indications” and not 
from a unique criterion.
The Court did not have a chance to offer its insights in this case as the French 
Government and the applicant company reached a friendly settlement and the 
proceedings ceased.82
In a case against the Netherlands, the applicant company was subject to a 
search of its premises in 1982. The public authorities confiscated the applicant’s 
 81 ECtHR. Société Stenuit v. France (dec.), application no. 11598/ 85, judgement of 11 Jul 1989.
 82 ECtHR. Société Stenuit v. France, application no. 11598/ 85, judgement of 27 Feb 1992, Series 







administration documents as there was a suspicion that the applicant was 
drawing false invoices. In 1985, the applicant was informed that the judicial 
proceedings initiated were to be terminated due to the time that had lapsed 
since the alleged offence was committed. However, despite the requests, the 
administration documents of the applicant’s company were only returned to 
it in 1987.
In 1990, the applicant lodged a complaint against the state seeking com-
pensation for the action of the police in 1982, when they were subjected to the 
search. The Dutch judicial authorities held that the state was indeed liable for 
damages, but refused to award them due to statements made by the applicant’s 
managing directors that false invoices had indeed been drawn up.
The applicant company complained under Article 6(2) echr about the 
refusal of the Dutch authorities to award them damages, despite the fact that 
criminal charges had been dropped.
It is interesting to note that in the present case the Government of the 
Netherlands did not invoke the inapplicability of Article 6(1) echr to the pro-
ceedings at hand. The Court assumed that the right to a fair trial applied to 
legal persons in the same way as it did to natural persons, but found that the 
applicant’s complaint was manifestly ill- founded.83
In the case of Fortum Corporation, the applicant company was the subject 
of proceedings initiated by the Competition Council with a view to cease the 
abuse of its dominant position on the market for motor engine fuel.84 The 
Competition Council imposed on the applicant a fine of 336,000 eur.
The applicant company complained that it had been denied a fair hearing 
in that the memoranda submitted by the Competition Council to the courts 
had not been communicated to it for possible comments.
The Finnish Government did not contest the applicability of Article 6(1) 
echr to the present competition law proceedings. The Court unanimously 
found that Article 6(1) echr was applicable under its criminal head and, on 
the merits of the case, found a violation of the right to a fair hearing. Also, the 
Court found that the finding of violation constitutes in itself sufficient just sat-
isfaction for the non- pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant company.
Another case in which the Government recognised that domestic competi-
tion law proceedings belonged to the criminal sphere of Article 6(1) echr was 
Lilly France s.a.85 The Court found in this case that the lack of communication 
 83 ECtHR. Aannemersbedrijf Gebroeders Van Leeuwen b.v. v. the Netherlands (dec.), applica-
tion no. 32602/ 96, judgement of 25 Jan 2000.
 84 ECtHR. Fortum Corporation v. Finland, application no. 32559/ 96, judgement of 15 Jul 2003.
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of the report drafted by the adviser of the Cour de Cassation to the applicant, 
while the same report was communicated to the defence, infringed Article 6(1) 
echr.86
In a case against the Russian Federation, an investigation was initiated 
against the applicant companies by the officials of the Ministry for Anti- 
Monopoly Policy and Business Support (“tu map”) for concerted practices 
aimed at increasing prices on the fuel market.87 The applicant companies were 
ordered to pay back the profit obtained as a result of the breach.
The applicant companies complained that they had no access to the pros-
ecution files during the investigation and the trial. The Government of the 
Russian Federation contended that Article 6(1) echr was not applicable 
under its criminal head in this case due to the fact that the applicants’ case 
was decided by commercial courts, not by criminal courts.
The Court started its assessment by noting that the Convention case- law 
did not contain “explicit conclusions” that competition law offences should 
be regarded as criminal within the meaning of Article 6(1) echr. Invoking the 
Engel test, the Court found that, even if the individuals responsible for compe-
tition law breaches – such as the managers of the companies under investiga-
tion – could bear criminal responsibility, this did not render the investigation 
criminal in nature.
As to the nature of the offence, the Court noted that Russian competition 
law applied only to relations which influence competition in commodity mar-
kets and was of a restricted, not universal, application. Also, the Court held 
that the powers of the competition authorities were aimed at prevention and 
restoration of disturbances, not at punishment or deterrence.
Turning to the last of the Engel criteria – the severity of the potential sanc-
tion – the Court noted that Russian competition law did not provide for any 
specific sanctions as such. Offenders nevertheless had to comply with the 
orders of tu map. These orders could range from a simple warning to cease 
monopolistic activity to compulsory division of the company. In the Court’s 
opinion, these powers of the tu map and the power to confiscate the unlaw-
fully gained profit belonged to the regulatory field.
In light of the above, the Court, by majority, concluded that Article 6(1) 
echr was not applicable in the present case.
 86 Lilly France s.a. v. France, quoted above, paragraph 26.
 87 ECtHR. ooo Neste St. Petersburg, zao Kirishiavtoservice, ooo Nevskaya Toplivnaya, zao 
Transservice, ooo Faeton, ooo ptk- Service v. Russia (dec.), application nos 69042/ 01, 






A few years later, the Court provided “explicit conclusions” as to the applica-
bility of Article 6 to competition law proceedings. Thus, in the famous Menarini 
case, the Court applied the Engel criteria and found unanimously that Article 6 
was applicable to competition law proceedings.88
Competition law cases receive more attention than other cases at the 
ECtHR. This might be due to the fact that the interpretation offered by the 
ECtHR to such cases is directly relevant for EU competition law. Indeed, the 
Menarini case has been cited by the cjeu and widely covered by academics. 
Despite this increased public scrutiny, the ECtHR applied the same standard 
of interpretation to competition law disputes as in other cases. Applying the 
Engel criteria, the ECtHR highlighted that Article 6(1) echr was applicable 
under its criminal head to competition law disputes, irrespective of the domes-
tic qualification of the case.
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 chapter 6
The Right to a Fair Trial – A Tool for Self- Regulation
Order is not pressure which is imposed on society from without, but 
an equilibrium which is set up from within.
ortega y gasset
∵
The analysis of the case- law on the applicability of Article 6(1) echr invites 
to the table a few conclusions about how the ECtHR has used this provision to 
enlarge the field of application of the echr and to strengthen its self- regula-
tory muscle.
A widely- shared misconception is that the ECtHR acts somewhat out of 
momentary caprice, opportunistically choosing when to enlarge its jurisdic-
tion. Another misconception is that, when the ECtHR enlarges its jurisdiction, 
it acts unilaterally, almost in a despotic way. The analysis in this chapter how-
ever dispels these misunderstandings. First, the case- law that I have described 
above indicates that the ECtHR adopts a progressive approach to the inter-
pretation of the rights enshrined in the echr. This approach involves a grad-
ual “dragging” of disputes from non- applicability towards the applicability of 
Article 6(1) echr, and from non- justiciability towards justiciability.
Second, the ECtHR decides alone, but works collaboratively. The process of 
progressive enlargement of the Court’s jurisdiction takes place with the coop-
eration offered by the member states, including their judiciary, the academic 
community and the zeitgeist. The Court’s work is successful and its identity as 
a self- regulating tribunal is possible only because these elements are cooper-
ative and cooperating. I provide a fuller description of these elements below.
6.1 The Process Towards Justiciability
The process of progressive “dragging” is accompanied by a simple, but consis-
tent reasoning offered by the Court across the different fields of law analysed. 
Autonomous concepts are created at the meeting point between legal imagi-
nation and common sense. In addition, they are far from being scandalous or 




wise use of language and the capacity to predict that member states will not 
use their limited resources to fight, for example, against the idea that petty 
offences are justiciable at the ECtHR, contributed to the creation of little visi-
ble opposition to the Court’s strides towards enlarged justiciability.
The tension between the exercise of legal imagination and the consistent 
application of concepts is solved by the ECtHR by prioritizing the latter. Thus, 
despite the Court renewing its judges every 9 years, the criteria used for argu-
ing in favour of the applicability of Article 6(1) echr to new fields of law have 
stayed the same. Consistency, thus, has been a key ingredient to the successful 
progressive enlargement of justiciability at the ECtHR.
Cross- fertilization has also been successfully employed by the ECtHR in 
its work of enlarging the applicability of Article 6(1) echr. The use of terms 
developed by the Court while working on other provisions of the Convention 
and of the terms developed during admissibility reasoning led to the harmo-
nization of the case- law and to the strengthening of the concepts used. In 
Airey, the applicant could not get a divorce from her abusive husband. When 
rendering the judgement, the ECtHR highlighted the prominent place held in 
a democratic society by the right to a fair trial. Later, the ECtHR referred to 
this principle in Deweer to flesh out its reasoning concerning the applicability 
of Article 6(1) echr to economic offences. In Stafford, a case that concerned 
Article 5, the ECtHR found that it was necessary to look beyond appearances 
and the language used and to focus on the reality of the situation. The same 
precept has been employed by the ECtHR to reason the applicability of the 
right to a fair trial to prison disciplinary proceedings. Conversely, the notion of 
autonomous meaning that the Court has developed in Engel and Others in rela-
tion to the concept of “criminal charge” has become one of the most important 
concepts used by the ECtHR to interpret the Convention.
The case- law analysed above indicates that there is no way back from justi-
ciability: once the ECtHR adopts a decision of applicability of Article 6(1) echr 
to a new field of law, there is very little chance that the Court will step back and 
decide that Article 6(1) echr is not applicable to that field of law. Exceptions 
to this rule exist, but, surprisingly, they seem to actually strengthen the system 
that produced them, instead of weakening it.
Thus, in the case of competition law proceedings, the ECtHR indicated in its 
early cases, Société Stenuit, Fortum Corporation and Lilly France s.a, that Article 
6(1) echr was applicable and that competition law proceedings are justiciable 
under the echr. In ooo Neste St. Petersburg and Others, however, the ECtHR, 
with a majority voting, found that there was no “explicit conclusion” in the 
ECtHR’s case- law about the applicability of Article 6(1) echr to competition 
law proceedings. This lack of “explicit conclusion” about the applicability of 
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Article 6(1) echr has been remedied in Menarini, where the ECtHR unani-
mously explained at length that the right to a fair trial was applicable to com-
petition law proceedings.
It thus appears that exceptions to the rule above do not shrink justiciabil-
ity and do not weaken the system. Contrary to expectations, these exceptions 
actually strengthen the system of human rights protection enforced by the 
ECtHR because they feed the public debate outside the Court. This makes 
ECtHR more visible and enriches its image.
6.2 The Role Played by the Academic Community
Academia plays a role not only in systematizing the fields of law, but, more 
importantly, in their development as well.1 In this sense, Arnull wrote that 
“important judgements are the subject of academic commentary which will be 
taken into account by the courts in the future” and that, especially in the civil 
law systems, “a critical academic consensus against a judgement may result in 
it being revisited by the courts”.2 Furthermore, some authors speak about “an 
integrated community between judges and the academic world”.3
Walker argued that judges, legal academics and professional commentators 
are “centrally implicated in the setting and pursuit of the juristic agenda” result-
ing from the failing of the Keynesian- Westphalian frame. Walker acknowledged 
that “in some respects the juristic agenda setters have remained too much in 
thrall to an older regulatory culture (…) to be particularly effective in the task 
of either diagnosis or treatment”. However, he also highlighted that, because 
of a lacking meta- principle of authority, it is the theorists and commentators 
who become in fact the “key and unusually privileged symbolic analysts” of the 
Keynesian- Westphalian, global frame.4
 1 Twining, William, Ward Farnsworth, Stefan Vogenauer and Fernando Tesón. “The Role of 
Academics in the Legal System.” The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies. Eds Mark Tushnet 
and Peter Cane. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Vogenauer, Stefan. “An Empire of Light? II: Learning and Lawmaking in Germany Today.” 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 26.4 (2006): pp. 627– 663.
Braun, Alexandra. “Professors and Judges in Italy: It Takes Two to Tango.” Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 26.4 (2006): pp. 665– 681.
 2 Arnull, op. cit., p. 427.
 3 Bell, John, Sophie Boyron and Simon Whittaker. Principles of French Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998.
 4 Walker, Neil. “Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of 












The academic community has played an important role in the process by 
which the ECtHR became a self- regulatory body expanding the applicabil-
ity of Article 6(1) echr to new areas of law. As idea- shapers, the members 
of academic circles commented and discussed the case- law of the ECtHR, 
making it, thus, more visible. Also, more and more universities in Europe 
offer human rights law courses, summer schools and conferences that have 
heralded the kind of intellectual freedom and stimulation that is sensitive to 
new ideas and to a progressive view of the legal zeitgeist. The academic com-
munity is therefore an important source for the legal zeitgeist because of the 
cross- generational input that it constantly brings, its innate hunger for new 
ideas and its incubating nature. Also, the academic community receives and 
exchanges members with the state governments, with the judiciary and with 
the ECtHR. Indeed, most judges at the ECtHR come from academia or join aca-
demia at the end of their terms, ensuring a necessary migration and healthy 
recycling of ideas.5
6.3 The Zeitgeist
The post- wwii period was a period of democratization in Europe, one that 
continued after the fall of the Berlin Wall and involved all the countries of the 
former Soviet bloc. Peace- building, democracy- strengthening, institutional 
re- imagination and community- building are all elements of the post- wwii 
Europe to which the ECtHR contributed. The unprecedented growth in impor-
tance and respect for international law and lawyers is another element of the 
zeitgeist. One can even argue that, in Europe, respect for the ECtHR’s decisions 
became part of the zeitgeist.
To this, one can add elements of popular culture that involve a growing 
number of documentaries, movies and tv shows about trials that can influ-
ence the expectations that citizens have of the quality of the trials in which 
they are themselves involved.
6.4 Cooperation with the ECtHR – Four Possible Models
A decision of the ECtHR establishing that Article 6(1) echr is applicable to a 
dispute that was previously considered incompatible with this provision has 
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a few consequences for the member state concerned, for the other member 
states parties to the echr and for the ECtHR itself.
First of all, the member state against which the decision has been adopted 
must enforce this decision. When Article 6(1) echr becomes applicable to a 
dispute – for example, an employment dispute – it means that the defendant 
member state must ensure that the guarantees enshrined in Article 6(1) echr 
are respected during all subsequent domestic employment disputes. The 
ECtHR does not, however, prescribe how a dispute should be solved. This is left 
to the member state itself and can involve changes in the domestic procedural 
codes, amendments to other pieces of legislation or changes in domestic judi-
cial practice.
At the same time, the other member states become concerned by the deci-
sion against the defendant member state because applicants from the other 
member states whose right to a fair trial has not been respected during employ-
ment disputes will be able to complain to the ECtHR. In order to prevent such 
disputes, the other member states are incentivized to ensure that their domes-
tic employment laws are compatible with Article 6(1) echr.
Finally, when the ECtHR decides that employment disputes are justiciable, 
it can expect more applications concerning such disputes being lodged at its 
registry.
In other words, the applicability of Article 6(1) echr to new areas of law 
involves more work for all the member state parties to the echr and for the 
ECtHR itself. This has proved at times to be an unintended consequence for 
the ECtHR, one that became so serious that the Court had to question and 
revise its admissibility criteria. Having progressively enlarged its jurisdiction, 
the ECtHR started receiving an increased number of applications in the 1990s. 
With no intention to increase its staff, the ECtHR found itself suffocated by the 
growing number of applications, most of which were dismissed as manifestly 
ill- founded.
At the same time, the ECtHR could not ignore these applications – the 
majority of which invoked violations of Article 6(1) echr – because they indi-
cated a general dissatisfaction with the judicial processes offered by the mem-
ber states. In other words, these applications can be interpreted as the member 
state not fully cooperating or engaging with the ECtHR.
Table 1 below indicates the importance of the cooperation offered to the 
ECtHR and highlights four possible models of cooperation. The categories 
tested for cooperation are the following: the defending member state (defend-
ing ms), that is the member state against whom the ECtHR has found a viola-
tion; the other member states (other ms), that is all the other member states 
except the defending member state; and academic circles.
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When the member states or the academic circles cooperate, this is marked 
with an “+”. When there is no cooperation, this is marked with “- ”.
Finally, Table 1 assesses the impact of the offered cooperation on the number 
of further applications received by the ECtHR and its capacity to self- regulate.
I argue that a few models of cooperation can be distinguished. These models 
assume that neither cooperation, nor refusal to cooperate can be permanent 
choices. The ECtHR’s self- regulatory wisdom has fully integrated this assump-
tion and worked around and with the member states that occasionally have 
been non- cooperative.
Model 1 – Full Cooperation: Both the defending ms and the other ms s are 
being cooperative. They implement the ECtHR’s decision by making legislative 
or practice changes. In addition, the academic circles cite and work with the 
ECtHR’s case- law. As a result, both the legal principles enounced in the case- 
law and the cooperative attitude of the ms s and the academic circles become 
part of the zeitgeist. Since the issue that has generated the application at the 
ECtHR has been settled in the defending ms and the other ms s, this leads to 
no further applications being lodged with the ECtHR on the subject matter. If 
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lodged, such applications would be rejected as manifestly ill- founded by a sin-
gle judge at the ECtHR, that is, with a minimal use of resources. In time, such 
applications would cease to be lodged. Finally, the self- regulatory muscle of 
the ECtHR is strengthened by the received cooperative feedback.
Model 2 – Partial Cooperation: The defending ms cooperates, but other ms s 
refuse to integrate the decision of the ECtHR. In this case, the academic estab-
lishment from the other ms s play a crucial role because they can either act as 
supporters or deniers of the ECtHR’s case- law. In either case, by debating the 
issue, the problem raised at the ECtHR remains known and public. The fact 
that a legal dispute has been declared admissible at the ECtHR under Article 
6(1) echr will mean that similar disputes from other ms s will be lodged at 
the ECtHR. This will allow the ECtHR the opportunity to repeat the princi-
ple formulated against the initial defending ms and to adapt it, depending on 
whether efficiency, stability or growth are to be satisfied first. Also, this will 
allow the ECtHR to reflect on and integrate into its newest cases the recent 
legal developments and the zeitgeist.
The self- regulation muscle of the ECtHR is weakened under this model 
because it sets a bad precedent of non- compliance. Also, if a large number 
of applications is received from the other ms s, the ECtHR risks being over-
whelmed. This was the case, for example, when the ECtHR started receiving 
applications concerning restitution of expropriated property originating from 
Romania. Even though the first cases on the issue of restitution of expropri-
ated property that the ECtHR decided concerned Poland, the number of appli-
cations from Romania greatly increased the ECtHR’s backlog.
The other, non- cooperating ms s will have, however, at least one incentive 
to embrace the solution proposed by the ECtHR against the defending ms. If 
the issue settled against the defending ms is of concern to the other ms s – as 
was the case with the restitution of expropriated property or with the length 
of proceedings in many member states – it is likely that applications from the 
other ms s will eventually be lodged at the ECtHR. This creates additional work 
for the legal service of the government that must defend itself at the ECtHR 
and might attract unwanted public attention to certain domestic policies.
Model 3 – Partial Cooperation: The defending ms does not cooperate, but the 
other ms s do. This model of partial cooperation is similar to the previous one. 
However, under this model, the possibility that the ECtHR’s self- regulatory 
muscle will be weakened by an untenable number of applications is statisti-
cally lower when compared to the previous model of partial cooperation. Also, 
the academic circles from the cooperating ms s can play a crucial role influenc-
ing the academic circles in the non- cooperating ms.
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Model 4 – Non- Cooperation: Neither the defending ms, nor the other ms s are 
cooperative, that is, all the members of the Council of Europe and the signato-
ries of the echr refuse to enforce the decision of the ECtHR. Of all the models 
proposed in this chapter, it is in this situation that the academic circles might 
play a decisive role. They can step into the debate as defendants of the princi-
ples proposed by the ECtHR, thus preparing future generations of lawyers to 
adopt them, or they can dismiss the proposed principles.
Due to the member states’ refusal to cooperate, the ECtHR risks receiving an 
increased number of applications from all the ms s concerning the matter set-
tled by the ECtHR against the defending ms. When the ECtHR is forced to act as 
a court of fourth instance, this weakens it internally because a large part of its 
resources will have to be allocated to dealing with the incoming cases. This situa-
tion also weakens the ECtHR externally because it shows the ECtHR as a tribunal 
whose decisions are not enforced and whose principles are heavily contested.
…
The first two parts of this book worked with the premises that first, the human 
rights system developed by the ECtHR became highly influential due to the 
design of the system, with the ECtHR at its centre as a self- regulating tribu-
nal and that, second, the design of the human rights system developed by the 
ECtHR allowed the ECtHR to interpret the right to a fair trial in a way that has 
progressively enlarged the ECtHR’s jurisdiction.
As it was proposed in Section 1.3. above, a self- regulating tribunal is one that 
displays two powers:
 (1) It has competence to decide its own jurisdiction and
 (2) It is able to have an impact on the flow and quality of incoming 
applications.
The ECtHR operates between coexisting but opposing needs – growth, effi-
ciency and stability. The possibility of alternatively satisfying these require-
ments in order to ensure the continuation of the system is a landmark of self- 
regulation. Self- regulation is marked by the ability to choose the strength of 
the Court’s intervention, of its influence on the zeitgeist. Sometimes, this is a 
forceful act of imposing an idea. Other times, it is about planting a seed; it is 
about the discrete inception of an idea whose time has not fully come.
The source of the ECtHR’s self- regulation is the last paragraph of Article 
32 echr which empowers the Court to decide its own jurisdiction in case of 
doubt over this matter.
Chapter 6 argued that Article 6(1) echr has been the main engine for 
enlarging the ECtHR’s jurisdiction and, therefore, for self- regulation. The 
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case- law concerning the applicability of Article 6(1) echr indicates that the 
ECtHR used this provision to offer its supervisory role to disputes that have 
originally been considered as belonging to the realm of public law and, there-
fore, excluded from the applicability of Article 6(1) echr such as constitu-
tional disputes, employment disputes, disciplinary disputes and competition 
law disputes, among others.
At the same time, Chapter 6 concluded that the progressive enlargement of the 
ECtHR’s jurisdiction and of its self- regulatory powers was possible only because 
of the cooperation offered by the member states, including their judiciary and 
academic circles, and the zeitgeist. A cooperating ms enforces the decisions of 
the ECtHR in a timely manner, by adapting the relevant legislation or judicial 
practice. A cooperating academic community follows the decisions of the ECtHR 
and includes its case- law in university curricula and conference agendas.
The analysis of the models of cooperation offered by the member states and by 
academic circles shows that four models of cooperation exist, ranging from full 
cooperation, beneficial both for the member states and for the ECtHR, to partial 
cooperation and non- cooperation which does not benefit any of the participants.
The work on the applicability of Article 6(1) echr is important for another 
reason. It indicates that the ECtHR has placed fair trial at the core of the erosion 
of public law in Europe. On the one hand, the growing importance of the state 
after the WWII has led to an increased regulation of life by the executive. On 
the other hand, both decriminalization and the development of administra-
tive law in the member states of the Council of Europe has been accompanied 
by a tendency to ensure minimal fair trial guarantees in the new proceedings. 
The ECtHR has consistently defended due process as a democratic principle 
that must be ensured by the member states, irrespective of the name or formal 
nature of the chosen procedure.
I have placed great emphasis on the inner working of the ECtHR. It is, 
however, also important to understand the external factors relevant for the 
functioning of the Strasbourg system. One matter to consider is the collateral 
damage to the ECtHR’s self- regulatory powers by forces outside the Court’s 
mandate. Recent historical events provide a prime example of this. The con-
flict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine has resulted in sanctions 
imposed onto the former. As a result, the Russian Federation has ceased to pay 
its yearly contribution to the budget of the Council of Europe.6 Soon after this, 
 6 Council of Europe. “Secretary General: Russia leaving the Council of Europe would be a “huge 
setback” for human rights.” Newsroom. 11 Oct 2018. Available at https:// www.coe.int/ en/ web/ 
portal/ - / secretary- general- russia- leaving- the- council- of- europe- would- be- a- huge- setback- 





Turkey threatened to do the same.7 Both the Russian Federation and Turkey 
are important members of the human rights system enforced by the ECtHR, 
both in terms of the number of applications received from these countries and 
the number of decisions adopted by the ECtHR against them. Their decision 
not to contribute to the budget of the Council of Europe weakens the system 
and, if prolonged or embraced by more member states, will become part of the 
zeitgeist and could threaten the existence of the whole system.
The same stands true for the relationship between the EU and the ECtHR. 
The process of accession of the EU to the ECtHR is currently blocked by the 
advisory opinion of the ecj with no solution in view. This extended block-
age hampers the ECtHR’s self- regulatory powers because, first, the ECtHR has 
no influence over the process and, second, because the blocked accession 
becomes entrenched with the passage of time, preventing it from taking place.
 7 Dermirtas, Serkan. “Turkey aims to exit from CoE monitoring process ASAP.” Hurriyet Daily 
News. 5 Nov 2018. Available at http:// www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ opinion/ serkan- demirtas/ 
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Introduction to Part 3
Part 3 of the present book focuses on how the notion of independence inter-
acts with the attempts by the EU Commission to control corporate bigness.
The topic of judicial independence – the classical locus of this notion – is 
fraught with the natural difficulty that accompanies all attempts to translate a 
moral value into a widely- applicable legal concept. Extracting independence 
from its natural location in order to apply it to administrative procedure adds 
another layer of difficulty. Finally, when these concepts are applied to a supra-
national bureaucracy like the European Commission, the task may appear 
insurmountable. However, it is often that which is the unbearable which 
requires urgent thought and action.
In the following chapters, I will attempt to answer the following questions:
 – What is judicial independence and why is it important for a democracy?
 – Who defines what judicial independence is?
 – What is the role played by the case- law of the ECtHR in shaping the notion 
of judicial independence?
 – What are the consequences of applying the notion of judicial independence 
to the procedures characterizing the administrative state?
 – How is the EU Commission engaging with the concept of independence as 
an institution, as enforcer of competition law and as bureaucracy?
In Figure 8 below I offer a visual description of the proposed work.
Pan-European System of Fundamental Rights Protection  



















The right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6(1) echr provides that “in the 
determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reason-
able time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”. As 
I have highlighted in the previous two chapters, this provision applies to dis-
putes concerning economic law, including competition law. Also, the ECtHR 
developed a functional and teleological interpretation of the notion “indepen-
dent and impartial tribunal established by law”, equating the administrative 
agencies performing adjudicatory powers with the “tribunal established by 
law” required by Article 6(1) echr.
There are two immediately visible threats to the independence of the EU 
Commission as adjudicator in EU competition law disputes. The first is that 
the EU Commission cumulates investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative 
functions when enforcing competition law. The second, as shown in Figure 5 
above, the decisions adopted by the EU Commission in competition law cases 
are prepared by the bureaucratic branch of the Commission – dg comp, 
assisted by other dg s – and are adopted by its political branch – the College 
of Commissioners. An argument regarding the Commission’s independence in 
this area requires an analysis of both branches of the Commission.
To achieve this, I provide in Chapter 7 an in- depth analysis of the notion of 
judicial independence in the context of the administrative state. In Chapter 8 
I review the case- law of the ECtHR on this subject. In Chapter 9 I describe the 
three constitutional functions that the EU Commission cumulates in the field 
of competition law – political, bureaucratic and enforcement. What is more, 
when the EU Commission acts as the enforcer of EU competition law, it cumu-
lates the investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative functions. For each of 
these functions, I identify the risks to independence and offer a description of 
the legal provisions to safeguard independence.
In Chapters 10, 11 and 12 I provide a description of the EU Commission’s 
powers of investigation and the existing limits on its powers.
Finally, in Chapter 13 I describe the risks to independent adjudication iden-
tified in the enforcement procedure for Articles 101 and 102 tfeu and com-
pare them to the existing safeguards provided in EU law. I conclude Chapter 13 
with a risk- based framework for safeguarding the independence of the EU 
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 chapter 7
The Debate on Independence at the Crossroads 
of the Administrative State, Delegation and ira s
Judicial independence is a cornerstone of the rule of law and, therefore, of 
democratic states. In private disputes, judges must be and be seen indepen-
dent in order to deliver impartial decisions. In public law disputes, judicial 
independence is an element of checks and balances that the cocktail called 
“democracy” offers: the judiciary is expected to control the excesses of the 
legislative and executive powers, while the legislative and the executive are 
expected to control the judiciary. Even more, “insofar as the state employs the 
judges, public law disputes might be thought to require an even greater degree 
of judicial distance, or structural capacity for independent evaluation of par-
ties’ claims”.1 These acts of mutual control are deemed necessary for a society 
in which there is trust in the state and its institutions. Two assumptions under-
lie this type of democratic system. First, checks and balances are necessary 
only if one presumes that the three branches of government would have the 
tendency to exercise their powers excessively or to the detriment of the other 
branches. If the presumption was that government power can be exercised 
without excess, checks and balances would not be necessary. Furthermore, 
power could be exercised in excess of its mandate only by imperfect beings. 
The source of the checks and balances existing in many democratic systems is, 
hence, the belief that human beings are imperfect.
Second, democratic systems aim to be trusted, embraced and validated 
during elections. A lack of trust may result in revolt, revolution, conflict and 
demise of the system. The citizen’s trust grounds democracy and justifies its 
existence. Therefore, the ultimate beneficiary of the processes constituting the 
checks and balances should be the citizen.
Trust is achieved by observation, engagement and participation. The citi-
zen most closely engages with the executive and the judiciary, sometimes on 
a daily basis. The image that the executive and the judiciary project plays a 
crucial role in maintaining the citizen’s trust and in safeguarding democracy.
 1 Jackson, Vicki C. “Judicial Independence: Structure, Context, Attitude.” Judicial Independence 





Independence is a notion that is intimately associated with the judiciary 
and the performance of justice. Russell has shown that it was in the “more 
well- established liberal democracies” that contemporary concerns about judi-
cial independence have been triggered.2 Judicial independence is considered 
“a fundamental instrument in order to establish and implement a system of 
impartial and fair rules”.3 Feld and Voigt introduced the distinction between 
de jure and de facto judicial independence and showed that there is a relation 
between judicial independence and economic growth and even between judi-
cial accountability and higher income and less corruption.4
Classic works on judicial independence highlight the fact that this concept 
encompasses more than just freedom from blunt interventions by the other 
branches of the government or from within the hierarchy. In fact, judicial inde-
pendence imposes system requirements that deal with recruitment patterns, 
allocation of cases and financial independence.5 Such works pay generous 
attention to domestic law and less attention to international law. Also, these 
early efforts have led to the adoption of international standards for judicial 
independence.6
If the growth of judicial power and judicial activism has been accompanied 
by discussions about judicial independence, the growth of the administrative 
state has been supplemented by a debate about administrative justice.
Zellick has noted that all countries have a court system and most coun-
tries have a “parallel system of court- like bodies that adjudicate on a range 
 2 Russell, Peter H. “Judicial Independence in Comparative Perspective.” Judicial Independence 
in the Age of Democracy: Critical Perspectives from Around the World. Eds. Peter H. Russell and 
David M. O’Brien. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2001, p. 301.
 3 Guarnieri, Carlo, and Daniela Piana. “Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law: Exploring 
the European Experience.” The Culture of Judicial Independence: New Conceptual Dimensions 
and Conceptual. Eds. Shimon Shetreet and Christopher Forsyth. Leiden: Brill, 2011.
 4 Feld, Lars, and Stefan Voigt. “Economic Growth and Judicial Independence.” European Journal 
of Political Economy 19.3 (2003): pp. 497– 527. A confirmation of the results of this initial study 
has also been published: Voigt, Stefan, Jerg Gutmann and Lars Feld. “Economic Growth and 
Judicial Independence, a Dozen Years On: Cross- Country Evidence Using an Updated Set of 
Indicators.” European Journal of Political Economy 38 (2015).
Voigt, Stefan. “The Economic Effect of Judicial Accountability: Cross- Country Evidence.” 
European Journal of Law and Economics 25.2 (2008): pp. 95– 123.
 5 Shetreet, Shimon, and Jules Deschenes, eds. Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate. 
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985.
 6 iba, New Delhi Minimum Code of Judicial Independence, 1982. These standards have been 
reviewed a few times since the 1980s. The last set of standards has been adopted in 2008 
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of specialized disputes, usually between the citizens and the administration”.7 
Zellick highlights the problematic nature of the term “administrative jus-
tice” which
implies that administrative justice is materially different from the ordi-
nary civil justice administered by the courts; that it is really a part of the 
State’s administrative arrangements rather than an integral part of its 
judicial system; and that administrative tribunals are fundamentally and 
conceptually distinct, and different, from those bodies labelled courts.8
The purpose of administrative justice is to provide a speedy and simple alter-
native to the “mainstream legal system with its notorious delays, complex pro-
cedures and expense”.9 Zellick adds that a feature of administrative tribunals 
is that, “unlike courts, they can be multi- disciplinary and may include psychia-
trists, economists, surveyors, valuers or other experts in addition to lawyers”.10 
In this context, the notion of the independence of justice proposes new chal-
lenges to democracy because judicial independence is not easily applicable 
to administrative tribunals that form part of the executive and in which the 
executive may be the defendant.
In the following paragraphs I will highlight the growing importance attached 
to the notion of independence in international forums and the solutions 
offered to the conundrums posed by the application of judicial independence 
to the institutions which spring from the administrative state.
7.1 The Rise of the Administrative State, Delegation and ira s
When Woodrow Wilson wrote in his essay on administration that, “it is getting 
harder to run a constitution than to frame one”, he was probably not envis-
aging that one and a half century later the “the fourth branch” of the govern-
ment was still growing.11 Indeed, the growth of the administrative state has 
 7 Zellick, Graham. “Administrative Justice and the Independence of the Judiciary.” The 
Culture of Judicial Independence in a Globalised World. Eds. Shimon Shetreet and Wayne 
McCormack. Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2016, p. 68.
 8 Zellick, op. cit., p. 68.
 9 Zellick, op. cit., p. 69.
 10 Zellick, op. cit.
 11 Wilson, Woodrow. “The Study of Administration.” Political Science Quarterly 2.June 













been intensely criticized by scholars.12 The administrative state can be defined 
simply as a constitutional order in which unelected bureaucrats, not elected 
representatives, are in charge of formulating policies, implementing them and 
adjudicating on them, sometimes using coercive powers. The term is used to 
describe both the growth of the government in general and the growth of the 
regulatory state.
Observing the phenomenon already in 1948, Waldo proposed in his seminal 
book on the administrative state that there was an intrinsic tension between 
democracy and bureaucracy that should invite public servants to protect dem-
ocratic principles. Waldo argued that the dichotomy between politics and 
administration was false. However, he has championed the ideas that govern-
ment should not be run like a business. Rather, he proposed that the public 
servants must impart to due process and access to government the efficiency 
found in scientific management.13
The notion of independence does not easily find its place in the concep-
tual framework presented above. However, recent works of political scientists, 
economists and lawyers stress independence as an important structural and 
procedural safeguard to be incorporated by government institutions.
The rise of the administrative power has been accompanied by the process 
of delegation of an increasing number of tasks in an increasing number of fields 
to Independent Regulatory Agencies (ira  s). Levi- Faur noted in 2005 that “such 
change is commonly captured in the notions of privatization and deregulation 
and understood as the outcome of the rise of neo- liberalism and the sweeping 
forces of economic globalization. Yet it has significant regulatory components 
that go largely unnoticed and that are incompatible with either neoliberalism 
or economic globalization”.14 He argues that the new order of regulatory capi-
talism, which has been in the making since the 1980s, differs from older forms 
of capitalist governance in its reliance on rules and rule enforcement. This 
in turn leads to (1) a new division of labour between state and society, (2) an 
increase in delegation that he defines as “remaking the boundaries between 
 12 Freedman, James. Crisis and Legitimacy: The Administrative Process and American 
Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
Lorch, Robert. Democratic Process and Administrative Law (Revised Edition). Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1980.
Lowi, Theodore. The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States. 2nd 
edition. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1979.
 13 Waldo, Dwight. The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American Public 
Administration. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948.
 14 Levi- Faur, David. “The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism.” The ANNALS of the 
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the experts and the politicians”, (3) proliferation of new technologies of regu-
lation, (4) formalization of inter- institutional and intra- institutional relations 
and the proliferation of mechanisms of self- regulation in the shadow of the 
state, and (5) the growth in the influence of experts in general and of inter-
national networks of experts in particular.15 Vogel showed that these develop-
ments have changed the relationship between governments and corporations 
and have led to a stronger state, the true driver of this development.16
ira s are the foundation of regulatory capitalism and three factors can 
describe their expansion: bottom- up, top- down, and horizontal. First, the 
establishment of ira s was an attempt to improve credible commitment 
capacity when liberalizing and privatizing utilities and to alleviate the polit-
ical uncertainty problem, namely, the risk to a government that its poli-
cies will be changed when it loses power. Second, in Europe, the process of 
Europeanization favoured the creation of independent regulators. Third, indi-
vidual decisions were interdependent, as governments were influenced by the 
decisions of others in an emulation process where the symbolic properties of 
independent regulators mattered more than the functions they performed.17
Guidi noted that despite the increasing interest in ira s, the existing 
research is unsatisfactory, either because it lacks any comparative perspective, 
or because it focuses only on the process of establishment of ira s, leaving 
aside important questions concerning the amount of administrative discretion 
delegated to them. He observed that interest in the independence of ira s is 
topical and the results of the studies conducted so far cannot be generalized.18 
Guidi notes that especially in the field of regulatory authorities and competi-
tion policy, “scholars who study ira s tend to analyse their institutional fea-
tures without paying enough attention to the legislative and administrative 
framework in which agencies are embedded”.19
 15 Levi- Faur, op. cit., p. 27.
 16 Vogel, Steven. Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial 
Countries. New York: Cornell University Press, 1996.
 17 Levi- Faur, David and J. Jacint. “Preface: The Making of a New Regulatory Order.” The 
ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 598.March (2005): pp. 
6– 9.
Gilardi, F. “The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Capitalism: The Diffusion 
of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe.” The ANNALS of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 598.March (2005), p. 84.
 18 Guidi, Mattia. “Delegation and Varieties of Capitalism: Explaining the Independence of 
National Competition Agencies in the European Union.” Comparative European Politics 
12.3 (2014): pp. 343– 365.












Scholars of political science assume that politicians have very little incen-
tive to delegate powers to independent authorities, such as in the field of com-
petition law. They use the principle- agent theory to propose that the legislator 
– the principal – and the competition authority – the agent – pursue different 
goals and would prefer to remain separated.20 Other scholars propose that 
delegation can help politicians to diminish their workload, to understand and 
regulate highly complex technical issues.21 Also, delegation allows shifting the 
responsibility for the decisions adopted.22
Similarly, some authors argue that, as a general rule, the government should 
not delegate wide policy discretion to the agent because the exercise of discretion 
is difficult to control.23 Other authors propose the contrary argument; for them 
the wide discretion of the agent justifies closer control by the government.24
In addition, Gilardi argues that delegation to independent authorities can 
be a means for politicians to increase the credibility of their policy commit-
ments. In line with this view, regulators have been found to be formally more 
independent in utilities than in other economic regulation, and in economic 
regulation more than in social regulation. On the other hand, the political 
uncertainty argument states that delegation can be employed by a government 
fearing replacement to prevent policies from being changed by the next gov-
ernment. The analysis has shown that, consistent with this reasoning, the for-
mal independence of regulators first increases as replacement risk increases, 
but then decreases when frequent changes in the partisan composition of 
governments implies that a party or coalition is likely to gain office at regular 
intervals. Finally, it has been shown that the institutional context matters: reg-
ulators tend to be less independent in countries with many veto players.25
 20 Miller, G.J. “The Political Evolution of Principal- Agent Models.” Annual Review of Political 
Science 8.1 (2005): pp. 203– 250.
Ross, S. A. “The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem.” The American 
Economic Review 63.2 (1973): pp. 134– 139.
 21 Franchino, Fabio. “Efficiency or credibility? Testing the Two Logics of Delegation to the 
European Commission.” Journal of European Public Policy 9.5 (2002): pp. 677– 694.
 22 Fiorina, M. P. “Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative 
Process?” Public Choice 39.1 (1982): pp. 33– 66.
 23 Ottow, A., and S. Lavrijssen. “The Legality of Independent Regulatory Authorities.” The 
Eclipse of the Legality Principle in the European Union. Eds. Leonard Besselink, Frans 
Pennings and Sacha Prechal. Wolter Kluwer, 2011, pp. 73– 95.
 24 Kovacic, W.E. “Competition Agencies, Independence, and the Political Process.” 
Competition Policy and the Economic Approach. Eds. J. Drexl, W. Kerber and R. Podszun. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011, p. 292.
 25 Gilardi, F. “The Formal Independence of Regulators: A Comparison of 17 Countries and 7 
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Lastly, Gilardi proposed five dimensions to assess the formal indepen-
dence of regulators: the status of the agency head (for example, term of office, 
appointment and dismissal procedure), status of the members of the man-
agement board, relationship with government and parliament, financial and 
organizational autonomy and regulatory competencies.26 All these can act as 
safeguards towards a regulator’s independence.
Independence is usually regarded as a positive characteristic for regulatory 
agencies and competition authorities.27 First of all, the functions of these bodies 
are para- judicial and this places an expectation on them that they make decisions 
solely on the basis of law and that they judge facts impartially. Second, an inde-
pendent competition authority is attractive for private investment and creates a 
healthy business environment that is insulated from political fluctuations. Third, 
in many countries, national governments still own important market players and 
it is crucial for the national and international competitors operating in those mar-
kets to have an executive which handles competition issues impartially.28
An important question concerning the justification for a competition 
authority’s independence is its impact on the authority’s performance and 
welfare effects.29,30
A few respected authors contest the relevance of the notion of indepen-
dence to the work performed by competition authorities. Thus, Monti argues 
that, rather than speaking of independence from government or from business 
or consumer interests, the public debate would be better off speaking of an 
authority’s appropriate degree of dependence.31 Monti suggests that a more 
convincing justification for the independence of competition authorities is 
linked with the commitment that the state has made towards a particular eco-
nomic order.32
 26 Gilardi, op. cit., p. 146.
 27 Jenny, F. “Competition Authorities: Independence and Advocacy.” The Global Limits of 
Competition Law. Eds. I. Lianos and D.D. Sokol. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012, 
p.166.
Mateus, A. “Why Should National Competition Authorities Be Independent and How 
Should they Be Accountable?” European Competition Journal 3.1 (2007).
 28 Guidi (2014), op. cit.
 29 Guidi, Mattia. “The Impact of Independence on Regulatory Outcomes: the Case of EU 
Competition Policy.” Journal of Common Market Studies April (2015).
 30 Bergman, Mats. “Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Or Measuring and Evaluating the 
Effectiveness of Competition Enforcement.” De Economist 156.4 (2008): pp. 387– 409.
 31 Monti, Giorgio. Independence, Interdependence and Legitimacy: The EU Commission, 
National Competition Authorities, and the European Competition Network. eui Working 
Paper Law No. 2014/ 01, European University Institute.
















In 2008, the United Nations Secretariat on Trade and Development (unctad) pub-
lished a note highlighting that most countries recognized that it was desirable to 
prevent the implementation of narrow interest group goals when enforcing com-
petition law. To this end, countries have put in place various checks and balances 
to ensure the independence and accountability of competition authorities.33
The note acknowledged that there was widespread agreement that “inde-
pendent regulators were at the core of regulatory governance in liberalized 
economies and a globalized world economy”.34
Also, the note stressed that the unctad Model Law on Competition was 
formulated on the assumption that the most efficient type of administrative 
authority for competition enforcement “is likely to be one that (a) is quasi- 
autonomous or independent of the Government, with strong judicial and 
administrative powers for conducting investigations and applying sanctions; 
and (b) provides the possibility of recourse to a higher judicial body”.35 In a 
more recent document, the unctad proposed that independence of compe-
tition authorities was “variable and it is often more useful to speak in terms 
of degrees of independence rather than absolute independence” because “no 
competition authority can be completely independent from the Government 
structure of which it is an integral part”.36
The unctad acknowledged that the structure of a competition enforce-
ment system has an important bearing on the authority’s independence or per-
ceived independence. The following elements are listed to influence the inde-
pendence of the competition authorities: (1) separation of the investigatory 
arm from the adjudicating decision- making body; (2) physical location away 
from the supervising ministry building; (3) budget independence; (4) appoint-
ment procedure of officials of the competition authority and (5) qualifications 
of members of the competition authority.37
 33 unctad. Independence and Accountability of Competition Authorities. Document 
td/ B/ com.2/ clp/ 67 of 14 May 2008. Available at https:// unctad.org/ meetings/ en/ 
SessionalDocuments/ CCPB_ IGE2014_ UNCTADNOTE_ EMCF_ en.pdf accessed on 23 
February 2021.
 34 unctad (2008), quoted above, p. 3.
 35 unctad. The Model Law on Competition. Available at https:// unctad.org/ en/ Pages/ DITC/ 
CompetitionLaw/ The- Model- Law- on- Competition.aspx accessed on 23 February 2021.
 36 unctad. Good Governance Guidelines: Independence and Transparency. Document 
unctad/ ditc/ clp/ 20016/ 2 of 22 June 2016, p. 1. Available at https:// unctad.org/ en/ 
PublicationsLibrary/ ditcclp2016d2_ en.pdf accessed on 23 February 2021.












Debate on Independence 151
7.3 oecd Roundtable on Changes in Institutional Design of 
Competition Authorities
In December 2014, the Organisation for Economic Co- operation and 
Development (oecd) organized a roundtable meeting on recent changes in 
institutional design which focused on three major topics: (1) the combination 
of different functions in a single authority; (2) the notion of independence; 
and (3) the internal governance of the authority.38
In relation to the topic of multi- function authorities, Fels highlighted a 
recent trend of integrating competition enforcement, consumer protection 
and regulatory powers within the same authority.39 He observed that “there 
is kind of a ‘North Sea dumping’ effect in the world of competition law, which 
means that governments often resolve a given problem by delegating it to the 
competition authority”.40
In relation to the question of independence of competition authorities, 
Professor Kovacic presented a paper in which he pointed out that the insu-
lation of competition authorities from political process is a highly desirable 
characteristic and a sign of institutional maturity. However, complete isolation 
from politics is both unattainable and undesirable.41
The representative of the oecd’s Directorate for Public Governance and 
Territorial Development noted that, due to the rather “tricky” nature of the 
problem, the oecd could not come up with a set of normative criteria for inde-
pendence. He stressed, however, that a survey carried out in 2013 indicated 
that a majority of the regulators receive strategic direction for their long- term 
strategy, but “most of them operate with a high degree of independence on 
individual cases and appeals”.42
The Business and Industry Advisory Committee of the oecd (biac) argued 
in their submission that the institutional design of competition authorities is 
 38 oecd. Summary Record of the Roundtable on Changes in Institutional Design. daf/ comp/ 
M(2014)3/ ANN4/ final. Available at http:// www.oecd.org/ officialdocuments/ public-
displaydocumentpdf/ ?cote=DAF/ COMP/ M(2014)3/ ANN4/ FINAL&doclanguage=en 
accessed on 23 February 2021.
 39 Fels, A. and H. Ergas (2014). Institutional Design of Competition Authorities. daf/ comp/ 
wd(2014)85 Paper drafted as a Background Note for the Competition Commission’s ses-
sion on Changes in Institutional Design. Available at: http:// www.oecd.org/ officialdoc-
uments/ publicdisplaydocumentpdf/ ?cote=DAF/ COMP/ WD(2014)85&doclanguage=en 
accessed on 23 February 2021.
 40 oecd (2014), quoted above, p.3.
 41 Kovacic, op. cit.













critically important for the jurisdiction’s effectiveness and should ensure the 
most pro- competitive outcomes possible. The biac stressed, however, that 
“it must do so in a manner that will maintain the confidence of businesses 
and citizens alike, without which the enforcement of competition laws will 
ultimately lack political, legal and economical legitimacy. A successful design 
must also reflect the increasing reality that government agencies operate with 
strict budgetary constraints”.43
The biac showed that there is evidence to suggest that greater indepen-
dence from the government was the factor most frequently identified as likely 
to lead to better promotion of competition law.44
Turning to the issue of the separation of the investigative and adjudicative 
functions of the competition authorities, the biac noted that
housing both investigative and adjudicative functions ‘under one roof ’ 
can lead to significant cost benefits. However, as with the lack of inde-
pendence from government, the lack of separation between the inves-
tigative and adjudicative functions can raise significant concerns over 
the perception of fairness or bias, rising to the level of legal concern in 
certain jurisdictions.45
7.4 International Competition Network
The 2019 Conference of the International Competition Network (icn) has 
been dedicated between others to practices for the investigative process during 
competition law proceedings. The published recommendations acknowledge 
that fair and effective agency investigative process is essential to sound compe-
tition law enforcement and that the credibility of competition agency is closely 
linked to both the agency’s integrity of investigative process and the public’s 
understanding of such process. At the same time, icn highlighted that fair-
ness can be achieved using different approaches. icn proposed that fairness of 
 43 oecd. Roundtable on Changes in Institutional Design of Competition Authorities, Note 
by biac. daf/ comp/ wd(2014)126, p. 2. Available at http:// www.oecd.org/ officialdocu-
ments/ publicdisplaydocumentpdf/ ?cote=DAF/ COMP/ WD(2014)126&doclanguage=en 
accessed on 23 February 2021.
 44 oecd. Global Forum on Competition: The Objectives of Competition Law and Policy. ccnm/ 
gf/ comp(2003)3. Available at http:// www.oecd.org/ daf/ competition/ 2486329.pdf 
accessed on 23 February 2021.








Debate on Independence 153
investigative process includes “availability and use of effective agency investi-
gative tools, transparency and engagement with those subject to an investiga-
tion (investigated parties and third parties), internal checks and balances on 
enforcement process, and protection of confidential information”.46
icn proposed twelve recommendations for effective and fair investigative 
process:
 (1) Competition authorities should have appropriate resources and investi-
gative tools to enforce competition law;
 (2) Investigative tools for competition law investigations should be based 
on an appropriate legal framework setting out criteria and procedural 
requirements for their use;
 (3) Competition agencies’ internal procedures should address the use of 
their investigative tools and the information gathered during an inves-
tigation. For example, before issuing a request for information, compe-
tition agencies should weigh the circumstances of the case against the 
principles of proportionality, relevance and burden;
 (4) Competition law and policies that govern competition law enforce-
ment should be transparent, reinforcing the values of accountability, 
predictability and fairness;
 (5) Transparency to parties during a competition law investigation is a 
basic attribute to effective competition law enforcement. At the same 
time, the extent of the investigative transparency is subject to the agen-
cy’s discretion and should not limit its discretion to pursue new or addi-
tional theories;
 (6) Engagement between the agency and the parties under investigation 
on important factual, legal, economic and procedural matters is a basic 
attribute of sound and effective competition enforcement;
 (7) Engagement with third parties also promotes more informed 
enforcement;
 (8) Internal agency safeguards – such as internal procedures and practices 
to ensure consistent and impartial investigative processes – are a basic 
attribute of sound and effective competition enforcement;
 (9) Investigative recommendations and findings should be thoroughly 
evaluated before being implemented. Personal bias, political interfer-
ence, national protectionism or interests of the industry should not 
play a role in the enforcement process;
 46 icn. icn Recommended Practices for Investigative Process. Available at: https:// www.
internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2019/ 05/ RPs- Investigative- 




 (10) Confidential information should be protected during competition 
enforcement;
 (11) Competition agencies should have clear policies concerning the disclo-
sure of information;
 (12) Applicable legal privileges should be respected.47
7.5 Independence of European Regulators
Whereas the discussions concerning the independence of nca s and the 
European Commission are relatively new, European law contains a plethora of 
legislative provisions and case- law concerning the independence of National 
Regulatory Authorities (nra s).
In the field of telecommunications, member states have to guarantee the 
independence of nra s by ensuring that they are legally distinct from and 
functionally independent of all organisations providing electronic communi-
cations networks, equipment or services.48 Where member states retain own-
ership or control of undertakings, they have to ensure effective structural sep-
aration of the regulatory function from activities associated with ownership 
or control. Member states must also ensure that nra s exercise their powers 
impartially and transparently.49
In addition to ensuring that the nra s are independent, member states must 
ensure the right to appeal for any user or undertaking affected by a decision of 
the nra. The appeal body must be independent of the parties involved, and 
must have the appropriate expertise available to carry out its functions and to 
ensure that the merits of each case are duly taken into account.50
In the field of energy, the preamble to Directive 2009/ 72 acknowledged that 
the effectiveness of regulation is frequently hampered by the lack of indepen-
dence of regulators from government, as well as insufficient powers and dis-
cretion.51 Energy regulators need to be fully independent from any public or 
 47 icn, quoted above, pp. 2– 10.
 48 See Directive 2002/ 21/ ec of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 
on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and ser-
vices, oj L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 33 as amended by Directive 2009/ 140/ ec of the European and 
of the Council of 25 November 2009, oj L 337, 18.12.2009, p. 37.
 49 Directive 2002/ 21/ ec, quoted above, Article 3.
 50 Directive 2002/ 21/ ec, quoted above, Article 4.
 51 Directive 2009/ 72/ ec of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 con-
cerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/ 
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private interests and the independence requirement is fully compatible both 
with judicial review and parliamentary supervision in accordance with the 
constitutional laws of the member states.52 To address this issue, the directive 
imposes minimum independence criteria for the transmission system owner, 
the transmission system operator, for their staff and management and, lastly, 
for the nra. The nra in particular must have independent decision- making 
powers, staff and budget to allow it to act impartially and transparently.53
In the field of railways, Directive 2012/ 34/ EU imposes independence 
requirements on railway undertakings, on the essential functions of infrastruc-
ture manager, and on nra s.54 According to the directive, the nra
shall be a stand- alone authority which is, in organisational, functional, 
hierarchical and decision- making terms, legally distinct and indepen-
dent from any other public or private entity. It shall also be indepen-
dent in its organisation, funding decisions, legal structure and decision- 
making from any infrastructure manager, charging body, allocation body 
or applicant. It shall furthermore be functionally independent from any 
competent authority involved in the award of a public service contract.55
The directive requires member states to provide clear and transparent rules 
for the appointment of board members of nra s, appointment which has to be 
based on merit, competence and relevant experience. In particular,
Member States shall ensure that these persons act independently from 
any market interest related to the railway sector, and shall therefore 
not have any interest or business relationship with any of the regulated 
undertakings or entities. To this effect, these persons shall make annually 
a declaration of commitment and a declaration of interests, indicating 
any direct or indirect interests that may be considered prejudicial to their 
independence and which might influence their performance of any func-
tion. These persons shall withdraw from decision- making in cases which 
concern an undertaking with which they had a direct or indirect connec-
tion during the year before the launch of a procedure.56
 52 Directive 2009/ 72/ ec, quoted above, Article 33– 34.
 53 Directive 2009/ 72/ ec, quoted above, Article 35.
 54 Directive 2012/ 34/ eu of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 
establishing a single European railway area, oj L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 32.
 55 Directive 2012/ 34/ eu, quoted above, Article 55.












Lastly, in the field of data protection, EU law acknowledges that “complete 
independence” of the supervisory authorities is an essential component of the 
protection of individuals in instances when their personal data is processed.57 
EU law requires that all institutions dedicated to the protection of data set up 
in the member states – the personal data protection official, the supervisory 
authority and the Working Party on the Protection of Individuals – must be 
independent and act independently.58
7.6 The European Competition Network
The economic crisis that started in 2008 and the budgetary cuts performed in 
some member states of the EU had a surprising consequence – the initiation of 
discussions concerning the independence of the national competition author-
ities. In 2010, the Meeting of Heads of the European competition authorities 
published a resolution showing the central role played by effective competi-
tion enforcement in the functioning of market economies.59 The resolution 
also stressed that nca s are “trusted advisors to governments and legislators, 
advocating pro- competitive approaches and promoting a culture of compe-
tition in their jurisdictions”.60 However, in order to fulfil the roles assigned to 
them, nca s need appropriate infrastructure and expert resources to intervene 
and handle complex matters of law and economics.61
The Commission included the concerns raised by the Meeting of Heads 
of the European competition authorities in its communication Ten Years of 
Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/ 2003 and its accompanying docu-
ments.62 The Commission noted that in the vast majority of member states, 
the nca s benefit from a certain degree of independence but the extent of their 
 57 Directive 95/ 46/ ec of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data, oj L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31.
 58 Directive 95/ 46/ ec, quoted above, Article 18(2) and Article 28 respectively.
 59 European Competition Network. Resolution of the Meeting of Heads of European 
Competition Authorities of 16 November 2010 on Competition Authorities in the European 
Union – the Continued Need for Effective Institutions. Available at http:// ec.europa.eu/ com-
petition/ ecn/ ncas.pdf accessed on 23 February 2021.
 60 European Competition Network, quoted above, p. 1.
 61 European Competition Network, quoted above, p. 2.
 62 European Commission. Commission Staff Working Document. Enhancing competition 
enforcement by the Member States’ competition authorities: institutional and procedural 
issues. swd(2014) 231/ 2. Available at http:// ec.europa.eu/ competition/ antitrust/ legisla-
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independence and the degree of supervision exercised by other state bodies 
varies. The Commission also pointed out that some nca s may be subject to 
general supervision or to general instructions by executive or the legislative 
powers. More importantly, the degree of supervision
may range from guiding and coordinating the nca's activities or outlining 
the nca's activities without intervening or deciding on individual cases 
or on the actual application of the law, to giving instructions regarding 
the general application of the law or regarding budgetary issues or gen-
eral policy matters which is also directed to other governmental institu-
tions. In a number of Member States, the minister may instruct the nca, 
for example, to carry out sector inquiries or competition studies or analy-
ses, which the nca cannot otherwise initiate itself, but without, however, 
directing the outcome.63
The Commission also addressed the issue of multi- function authorities, show-
ing that while a minority of nca s are exclusively responsible for competition 
enforcement, the majority of nca s now have additional responsibilities in var-
ious areas such as consumer protection, public procurement and the supervi-
sion of liberalised sectors (energy, post, telecommunications and railways).64
The communication emphasized the Commission’s achievements in the 
field of competition law and proposed a few fields for further consideration, 
the first being the institutional position of the nca s. Despite the progress 
made by some member states in the field of independence and impartiality 
of nca s, the achievements are “fragile and can be rolled back at any time”.65 
A few elements can ensure that progress continues to be pursued in this field:
 – minimum standards to ensure the independence of the nca s, but also of 
their management or board members;
 – sufficient financial and human resources;
 – budgetary autonomy;
 63 European Commission. Commission Staff Working Document. Enhancing competition 
enforcement by the Member States’ competition authorities: institutional and procedural 
issues, quoted above, p. 6.
 64 European Commission. Commission Staff Working Document. Enhancing competition 
enforcement by the Member States’ competition authorities: institutional and procedural 
issues, quoted above, p. 9.
 65 European Commission. Commission Staff Working Document. Enhancing competition 
enforcement by the Member States’ competition authorities: institutional and procedural 








 – clear and transparent appointment procedures for the nca s management 
or board members;
 – objective dismissals;
 – rules concerning conflicts of interests and incompatibilities of nca s man-
agement board.66
Furthermore, in December 2014, the EU Director- General for Competition, 
Alexander Italianer, addressed the issue of the independence of National 
Competition Authorities in a speech delivered at a competition conference 
in Vienna. He highlighted the importance of the nca s being “independent, 
properly funded and adequately staffed”.67
Italianer noted that there are currently two models of institutional design in 
Europe: the administrative model, which is based on the cumulation – within 
the same institution – of enforcement and judicial control functions; and the 
judicial model, which has an administrative authority entrusted with the inves-
tigation of cases and a court entrusted with taking a decisions on substance, 
sanctions or both. A large majority of members of the EU have an administra-
tive model. Italianer noted however that “independence is a key requirement 
regardless of institutional design”.68
Second, Italianer stressed that the independence and impartiality of the 
nca s are closely linked and affect their legitimacy, credibility and efficacy.69 
Practices such as the direct government influence over appointments, staff 
rotation of nca s following elections, misuse of nca budgets by govern-
ment to gain leverage or as retaliation measures, and intrusive investiga-
tions into nca s’ decision- making by governments go against the principle of 
independence.70
 66 European Commission. Commission Staff Working Document. Enhancing competition 
enforcement by the Member States’ competition authorities: institutional and procedural 
issues, quoted above, p. 9.
 67 European Commission. Commission Staff Working Document. Enhancing competition 
enforcement by the Member States’ competition authorities: institutional and procedural 
issues, quoted above, p. 2.
 68 European Commission. Commission Staff Working Document. Enhancing competition 
enforcement by the Member States’ competition authorities: institutional and procedural 
issues, quoted above, p. 2.
 69 European Commission. Commission Staff Working Document. Enhancing competition 
enforcement by the Member States’ competition authorities: institutional and procedural 
issues, quoted above, p. 4.
 70 European Commission. Commission Staff Working Document. Enhancing competition 
enforcement by the Member States’ competition authorities: institutional and procedural 
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Third, Italianer stressed that the independence of nca s in the EU should be 
built on three elements: independently appointed staff, unfettered discretion 
to choose which cases to investigate and control over budgets.71
He concluded that “being able to function without the threat of interference 
from political authorities and vested interests is a cornerstone of the rule of 
law”.72
7.7 Empowering nca s – Directive 1/ 2019
At the beginning of 2019, the EU adopted a directive meant to empower the 
nca s to be more effective enforcers of competition law in light of the direct 
applicability of Articles 101 and 102 tfeu.73
This document is relevant to the topic of this book for a few reasons. On 
the one hand, the first provision of the directive is dedicated to the need to 
respect fundamental rights by the nca s and the member states while they are 
enforcing Articles 101 and 102 tfeu.74 The second provision of the directive is 
dedicated to the need to guarantee the nca s independence when enforcing 
Articles 101 and 102 tfeu.75 This textual prioritization of fundamental rights and 
independence during EU competition law enforcement is in line with new con-
stitutional design of the EU that has fundamental rights as one of its priorities.
On the other hand, Directive 1/ 2019 imposes independence and impartiality 
standards that are very close to the standards formulated by the ECtHR in this 
field. For example, the directive stipulates that member states must ensure 
 71 European Commission. Commission Staff Working Document. Enhancing competition 
enforcement by the Member States’ competition authorities: institutional and procedural 
issues, quoted above, p. 6.
 72 European Commission. Commission Staff Working Document. Enhancing competition 
enforcement by the Member States’ competition authorities: institutional and procedural 
issues, quoted above, p. 3.
 73 Directive (EU) 2019/ 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 
2018 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective 
enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, quoted above.
 74 Directive (EU) 2019/ 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 
2018 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective 
enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, quoted above, arti-
cle 3.
 75 Directive (EU) 2019/ 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 
2018 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective 














structural, operational and budgetary standards of independence and impar-
tiality for the nca s.76
7.8 The Difficult Case for the Independence of the European 
Commission
It was common practice in the 1990s and the 2000s for all the US presidents 
to personally intervene in EU competition proceedings in favour of anti- trust 
clearances of US firms.77 A well- known case is the General Electric/ Honeywell 
merger during which the Commissioner for Competition Mario Monti has 
complained about the alleged interference of the US president George Bush in 
the following terms: “I deplore attempts to misinform the public and to trigger 
political intervention”.78
In addition, the press recounts multiple instances of political pressure 
exerted on national competition authorities in the European Union.79 At the 
same time, the appointment of each new Commissioner for Competition 
is accompanied by a debate concerning the proposed candidate’s involve-
ment with business. In this respect, Neelie Kroes – who was nominated 
Commissioner for Competition in 2004 – had been an active politician in the 
Netherlands and served as minister of transport, public works and water man-
agement in the 1980s. She then took a number of corporate jobs and sat on 
the boards of Royal P&O Nedlloyd, New Skies Satellites, Thales Netherlands, 
MM02, and Volvo amongst others. Neelies Kroes listed 25 corporate jobs 
in her nomination cv. The press noted that “EU officials acknowledge that 
they have never dealt with a commission candidate with such extensive 
business ties – and potential conflicts” and that, in addition, Neelies Kroes 
 76 Directive (EU) 2019/ 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 
2018 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective 
enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, quoted above, arti-
cle 4.
 77 Karagiannis, op. cit., p. 686.
 78 “Monti Slams US Critics.” BBC. 18 Jun 2001. Available at http:// news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/ hi/ busi-
ness/ 1395739.stm accessed on 23 February 2021. Reporting President G. W. Bush’s inter-
vention in favour of allowing the ge/ Honeywell merger.
 79 Brown, K. “Keeping Watchdogs on a Short Leash: The Government’s Approach to 
Competition Has Increased Suspicions That It Will Not Tolerate Truly Independent 
Regulators.” Financial Times. 10 Mar 2000, p. 23.
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has not actually disclosed all of her former employers, including the arms 
manufacturer Lockheed Martin.8081 Lastly, at the end of her assignment as 
Commissioner for Competition, Neelies Kroes accepted two positions that 
raised further questions concerning conflict of interests: special government 
envoy for start- up companies in the Netherlands and special adviser to the 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch.82
Other commissioners have also been criticized for their involvement with 
various businesses.83 Taking into account that the College of Commissioners 
adopts all decisions concerning competition on the European market, it 
becomes increasingly important to reflect on the impact of a commissioner’s 
background on the adopted decisions.
Political scientists have long been concerned with hybrid executive power 
whose civil servants are concomitantly expected to act as impartial techno-
crats and as partial participants in the political process. Several institutional 
characteristics exacerbate this tension within the European Commission:
In conjunction with the College of Commissioners, the officials of the 
European Commission have a constitutional obligation to set the legisla-
tive agenda because they have exclusive formal competence to draft EU 
legislation. (…) They promote the policies of their directorate to private 
interests, politicians, public, and, last but not least, reluctant Commission 
colleagues. They direct negotiations between the Commission, on the 
one hand, and the Council of Ministers’ working groups, the European 
Parliament, and interest groups, on the other. They broker legisla-
tive negotiations between the Council of Ministers and the Executive 
Parliament. Yet, as career civil servants, they also execute and administer 
political decisions taken by elected leaders.84
 80 Barrionuevo, A. and D. Michaels. “EU Antitrust Nominee Did Not Disclose All Ties.” Wall 
Street Journal. 21 Oct 2004.
 81 Corporate Europe Observatory. Neelies Kroes. Revolving Door Report, 1 Mar 2015. Available 
at http:// corporateeurope.org/ revolvingdoorwatch/ cases/ neelie- kroes accessed on 23 
February 2021.
 82 Corporate Europe Observatory. Neelies Kroes, quoted above.
 83 See for example, Flues, Fabien. “The many business dealings of Commissioner- designate 
Miguel Arias Canete.” Corporate Europe Observatory. 23 Sep 2014. Available at http:// 
corporateeurope.org/ power- lobbies/ 2014/ 09/ many- business- dealings- commissioner- 
designate- miguel- arias- canete accessed on 23 February 2021.
 84 Hooghe, Liesbet. The European Commission and the Integration of Europe: Images of 











However, despite growing general concerns about untamed administrative 
power and specific concerns about individuals nominated as commissioners, 
the case for the independence of the Commission is rather difficult to make.
The first difficulty stems from the fact that the issue of independence of the 
Commission is inevitably placed at the crossroads of notions that are them-
selves charged with multiple meanings. The separation of powers, the growing 
importance of executive power, the changing nature of modern bureaucracy, 
the delegation of powers, and the discretion and autonomy of the executive 
are concepts that carry all the contradictions of modern democracies and that 
inevitably affect attempts to define the notion of independence.
The second difficulty arises from the continuous tension between develop-
ments in the field of independence at the national and international levels. 
The development of national competition authorities, independent regula-
tory authorities and other national regulatory authorities has partially focused 
on independence as a core element of institution- building. The European 
Commission has been a champion and a supporter of this transition. However, 
this exercise of transformation has been accompanied only partially by an exer-
cise in self- reflection on the same subject. To what extent achievements in legal 
thinking at the national level are to be reflected at the supranational level is an 
old debate that does not spare the issue of the independence of the Commission.
Lastly, the waves of critique directed at the European Commission and 
its resulting transformations have inadvertently been rooted in the idea that 
independence can strengthen the Commission’s autonomy, thus sheltering it 
from its political masters’ whims. However, this view favours a politicized view 
of independence as a tool in the counter- offensive against the hunt for runaway 
bureaucracies. Also, this view distances itself from the notion of independence 
as a binding legal requirement across the democratic world, a burden and a 
responsibility that ensures fair play during a legal process, but also a constant, 
unaffected modus operandi.
Those who oppose the case for a more independent EU Commission offer 
structural and procedural reasons. Thus, Karol von Miert has famously pro-
claimed that competition policy was not neutral, it was in fact “politics”.85 
Focusing on enforcement procedures, Monti argues that, although the deci-
sions in individual competition law cases are voted on by the College of 
Commissioners, the bulk of the work is carried out by the dg comp.86 On 
 85 Wilks, S., and L. McGowan. “Competition Policy in the European Union: Creating a 
Federal Agency?” Comparative Competition Policy: National Institutions in a Global Market. 
Eds. G.B. Doern and S. Wilks. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, pp. 225– 267.
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the one hand, important decisions concerning procedural issues that precede 
the adoption of a final decision, such as decisions to initiate proceedings, 
to reject complaints or to issue statement of objections, are vested with the 
Commissioner for Competition or delegated to the Director General.87 On the 
other hand, Monti notes that “in the vast majority of cases the College defers 
to the dg comp’s proposed course of action. This is evidenced by the fact 
that most competition decisions are agreed with written procedure, which 
reduces the scope for discussing the wider policy ramifications of a proposed 
decision”.88
Monti concludes that the work of dg comp is relatively well- insulated from 
the influence of politics and private interests both during the procedures by 
which the cases are screened for being placed on the agenda and during the 
investigation and adjudication stages. He accepts however that there is a risk 
of lobbying from parties seeking favourable treatment.89
More recently, Karagiannis has argued that “collegiality corresponded to 
an ingenious institutional solution to the problem of committing to a far- 
reaching, exclusive, open- ended, and, therefore, highly risky agreement” and 
that “the institution of collegiality in the ec is not aimed at securing commit-
ment to specific policy options, but commitment to a negotiated implementa-
tion of the Treaty”.90
 87 The legal basis for this is Commission Decision of 24 February 2010 amending its Rules 
of Procedure 2010/ 138/ EU, Euratom, oj L 55, 5.3.2010, p. 60, Article 13. See also the 
European Commission. Antitrust: Manual of Procedures: Internal DG Competition Working 
Documents on Procedures for the Application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. March 2012, 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3. Available at http:// ec.europa.eu/ competition/ antitrust/ antitrust_ 
manproc_ 3_ 2012_ en.pdf accessed on 23 February 2021.
 88 Monti, op. cit., p. 9.
 89 Monti, op. cit., p. 9– 10.
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 chapter 8
The Case- law of the ECtHR on the Right to an 
Independent and Impartial Tribunal
The case- law of the ECtHR on the right to a fair trial provides that a “tribunal” 
is compatible with the requirements of the echr when (1) it is established by 
law, (2) it is independent and (3) it is impartial. This section provides a detailed 
analysis of these concepts.
8.1 Established by Law
Article 6(1) echr requires that all disputes involving the determination of 
“civil rights and obligations” or of “criminal charges” be settled by a tribunal 
“established by law”. This is a general requirement that deals both with issues 
of hierarchy in constitutional law and with the quality of the law. However, the 
ECtHR has consistently stated that it does not impose on the member states 
any constitutional arrangements.
First of all, the established- by- law procedure requires that tribunals be 
established by a Constitution or by a law. Thus, in the early case Zand, the 
applicant – who was involved in an employment dispute – argued that the 
labour court assigned to decide his case was not a tribunal fulfilling the condi-
tions enshrined in Article 6(1) echr due to the fact that it was established by 
a governmental decree, not by a law. The applicant complained in particular 
about the fact that a labour court could be established and removed by an 
administrative decision based on temporary needs.
The Commission recalled that the object of the term “established by law” in 
Article 6(1) echr was to ensure “that the judicial organisation in a democratic 
society did not depend on the discretion of the executive, but that it was regu-
lated by law emanating from Parliament”.1
In a more recent case, Savino and Others, the Court was faced with the question 
of whether or not the internal judicial bodies operating employment- related 
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disputes within the Italian Chamber of Deputies were established by law as 
required by Article 6(1) echr.2
The Court noted first of all that its goal is not “to impose upon the States a 
constitutional model concerning the relationship and interaction of different 
State powers. The choice of the Italian legislator to preserve the autonomy and 
independence of the Parliament from the ordinary jurisdiction does not raise 
as such an issue before the Court”.3
The Court noted that as a matter of principle, delegation of judicial power is 
acceptable if it is provided for by the constitution of the state concerned.4 The 
Court concluded that, since the judicial bodies within the Italian Chamber of 
Deputies were established on the basis of secondary legislation which had its 
source in the Italian Constitution, they were established by law as required by 
the right to a fair trial.
In relation to the establishment of specialized courts, such as the 
Constitutional Court or the Board of Visitors, the court found that they are 
compatible with Article 6(1) echr if they are established and are endowed by 
the law with the judicial function of adjudicating cases.56 The Court empha-
sised that the word “tribunal” in Article 6(1) echr “is not necessarily to be 
understood as signifying a court of law of the classic kind, integrated within 
the standard judicial machinery of the country”.7 However, the specialized 
nature of a tribunal should not prevent it from displaying the following require-
ments: independence from the executive and the parties, guaranteed duration 
of its members’ term of office, and guarantees afforded by its procedure.8
Thus, in a case concerning the right to periodic review of detention in men-
tal health institutions, it was established that mental health review tribunals 
comply with the requirements of the right to a fair trial when they are inde-
pendent and when sufficient procedural safeguards are in place. The Court 
stressed that an important feature of a tribunal “established by law” is juris-
diction to decide the lawfulness of a detention and to order release. In case 
 2 ECtHR. Savino and Others v. Italy, applications nos. 17214/ 05, 20329/ 05 and 42113/ 04, judge-
ment of 28 Apr 2009.
 3 Savino and Others v. Italy, quoted above, paragraph 92.
 4 Savino and Others v. Italy, quoted above, paragraph 94.
 5 ECtHR. Crociani and Others v. Italy, application nos. 8603/ 79, 8722/ 79, 8723/ 79, 8729/ 79, 
judgement 18 dec 1980.
 6 ECtHR. Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom, application nos. 7819/ 77 and 7878/ 77, judge-
ment of 28 Jun 1984.
 7 Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom, quoted above, paragraph 76.
 8 ECtHR. Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, application nos. 6878/ 75 and 7238/ 















a tribunal has only advisory functions, it cannot be deemed to be a tribunal 
“established by law”.9
At the same time, as one author noted, the established- by- law requirement 
has been interpreted by the Court in respect of other provisions “as imposing 
also a certain quality of the relevant law”.10 Thus, in a case that concerned the 
taking into care of the applicants’ three children by social services, the Court 
held that “in accordance with the law” does not “merely refer back to domes-
tic law but also relates to the quality of the law, requiring it to be compatible 
with the rule of law; it thus implies that there must be a measure of protection 
in domestic law against arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the 
rights safeguarded”.11
8.2 Independence
The ECtHR has a rich case- law on the issue of the independence of justice, 
dealing with the organisation of ordinary courts, specialised tribunals and 
administrative courts. The case- law concerning independence of tribunals 
described in this section deals with (1) the duty not to intervene with the func-
tioning of the judicial branch; (2) the cumulation of functions; (3) the princi-
ple that justice should not only be done but should also appear to be done and 
(4) the safeguards that can compensate for a lack of independence.
8.2.1 Interference
The first and most obvious corollary concerning the independence of justice 
is that tribunals should be free from the interference of the other branches of 
the government. A second is that the tribunals should be free from internal 
interference, from within the judicial branch as well.
Thus, in a few cases against Ukraine, the applicants complained about the 
interference of state authorities with the applicants’ proceedings. The ECtHR 
noted first of all that, indeed, various state bodies, including the Prime Minister 
and the President of Ukraine, intervened in an open, persistent and sometimes 
blatant manner in the applicants’ proceedings. The Court established to be of 
 9 ECtHR. X v. the United Kingdom, application no. 7215/ 72, judgement of 5 November 1981, 
paragraph 61.
 10 Loucaides, Loukis G. The European Convention on Human Rights: Collected Essays. 
Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007, p. 214.
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no importance “whether the impugned interventions actually affected the 
course of the proceedings. Coming from the executive and legislative branches 
of the State, they reveal a lack of respect for the judicial office itself and justify 
the applicant company’s fears as to the independence and impartiality of the 
tribunals”.12
The Court emphasized that the scope of the state’s obligation to ensure a 
trial by an independent and impartial tribunal also
implies obligations on the executive, the legislature and any other State 
authority, regardless of its level, to respect and abide by the judgments 
and decisions of the courts, even when they do not agree with them. 
Thus, the State’s respecting the authority of the courts is an indispens-
able precondition for public confidence in the courts and, more broadly, 
for the rule of law.13
The ECtHR stressed, however, that in order to respect the above- mentioned 
principle, “the constitutional safeguards of the independence and impartial-
ity of the judiciary do not suffice. They must be effectively incorporated into 
everyday administrative attitudes and practices”.14
In the case Khrykin the applicant was involved in an employment dispute.15 
He complained that the first- instance court lacked independence because of 
the pressure exercised by the President of the Regional Court that resulted in 
the re- opening of his case and quashing of the final judgement in his favour.
The Court held that the independence of the judiciary is only possible when 
individual independence exists alongside the institutional independence, 
working together towards impartial decision making. Thus, independence of 
the judiciary “characterizes both a state of mind and a set of institutional and 
operational arrangements. The former is concerned with the judge’s impartial-
ity and the latter with defining relations with other bodies, in particular other 
state powers”.16 The Court also noted that judicial independence required that 
those judged “be free from instructions or pressures from the fellow judges and 
vis- à- vis their judicial superiors”.17
 12 ECtHR. Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, application no. 48553/ 99, judgement of 25 Jul 
2002, paragraph 80.
 13 ECtHR. Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, quoted above.
 14 ECtHR. Agrokompleks v. Ukraine, application no. 23465/ 03, judgement of 6 Oct 2011.
 15 ECtHR. Khrykin v. Russia, application no. 33186/ 08, judgement of 19 Apr 2011.
 16 Khrykin v. Russia, quoted above, paragraphs 28– 29.














In the case Parlov- Tkalcic the Court added that internal judicial indepen-
dence required that judges “be free from directives or pressures from the fellow 
judges or those who have administrative responsibilities in the court such as 
the president of the court or the president of a division in the court”.18 The 
Court highlighted a few institutional characteristics to be taken into account 
when performing such analysis. First, it is important that the managerial func-
tions are clearly separated from the judicial functions, so that the managers 
could not influence the composition of the panels, the way files were distrib-
uted between panels or their outcomes.19 Also, it is important to limit the pow-
ers of the hierarchically superior judged over career advancement or discipline 
of their subordinates.20
8.2.2 Cumulation of Functions
Closely linked to the idea that justice is independent when it is free from exter-
nal and internal pressure is the argument that the cumulation of functions is 
detrimental to the independence of justice. The increased amount of litigation 
in Europe and the omnipresence of the administration in the public life can 
produce conditions in which the government acts both as a party and as the 
decision- maker in a case. According to the ECtHR, such arrangements are not 
compatible with the independence of justice as required by Article 6(1) echr.
One of the early authorities on this subject is the De Cubber case in which 
the applicant was prosecuted and convicted for theft. He complained that the 
investigative and the trial judge in this case were one and the same person.21
The Court noted that, under the Belgian law, the investigating judge was sub-
ordinate to the prosecutor and had wide- ranging investigative powers. Also, the 
investigation was inquisitorial and secret, and not conducted in the presence of 
both parties. The Court also noted that one might understand the unease that 
an accused can feel when he observes that the person sitting on the bench to 
hear his case has intensely interrogated him during the investigation, ordered 
his detention on remand or taken other investigative measures in his/ her case.
The Court argued that
through the various means of inquiry which he will have utilised at the 
investigation stage, the judge in question, unlike his colleagues, will 
 18 ECtHR. Parlov- Tkalcic v. Croatia, application no. 24810/ 06, judgement of 22 Dec 2009, 
paragraph 86.
 19 Parlov- Tkalcic v. Croatia, quoted above, paragraphs 88– 90.
 20 Parlov- Tkalcic v. Croatia, quoted above, paragraphs 91– 93.
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already have acquired well before the hearing a particularly detailed 
knowledge of the – sometimes voluminous – file or files which he has 
assembled. Consequently, it is quite conceivable that he might, in the 
eyes of the accused appear, firstly, to be in a position to enable him to play 
a crucial role in the trial court and, secondly, even to have a pre- formed 
opinion which is liable to weigh heavily in the balance at the moment of 
the decision.22
The Court found such an arrangement to be incompatible with the right to 
a fair trial and concluded furthermore that such defects cannot be cured by 
subsequent appeal courts.23
In another case, this time against the United Kingdom, the applicant com-
plained about the independence of the court martial that sat in the criminal 
case initiated against him.24 Mr Findlay argued that all appointed officers were 
subordinate to the convening officer who acted as a prosecutor in his case. 
Furthermore, the applicant argued that the officers lacked the necessary legal 
background or experience that would support them in acting as an indepen-
dent or impartial tribunal.
The Court noted that the convening officer performed important prosecu-
torial tasks before the beginning of the applicant’s court proceedings. He had 
(1) decided which charges should be brought against the applicant, (2) decided 
which type of court martial was the most appropriate for the applicant’s case, 
(3) convened the court martial, (4) appointed the members of the court mar-
tial, the prosecuting and the defending officers, (5) sent an abstract of the evi-
dence to the prosecuting officer and the judge advocate, and (6) procured the 
attendance of witnesses for the prosecution. He was also involved in the estab-
lishment of the charge.
The Court found that the fact that all members of the court martial were 
subordinate in rank to the convening officer might have raised serious doubts 
as to the independence of the court. Even more, the Court found incompati-
ble with fair trail principles the fact that the convening officer also acted as a 
confirming officer. Under the rules in place in the United Kingdom at the time, 
the decision reached by the court martial would only become binding if the 
convening officer confirmed it.25
 22 De Cubber v. Belgium, quoted above, paragraph 29.
 23 De Cubber v. Belgium, quoted above, paragraph 33.
 24 ECtHR. Findlay v. the United Kingdom, application no. 22107/ 93, judgement of 25 Feb 1997.










Considering that none of the existing guarantees – including the involve-
ment of the judge advocate and judicial review – could correct the defects con-
cerning the independence of the court martial, the Court concluded that the 
court martial was not an independent tribunal and found a violation of Article 
6(1) echr.
In Benthem, the applicant intended to open a gas station for motorcycles. He 
was initially granted a license by the municipal authorities.26 However, upon 
appeal by the Health Inspector, the Administrative Litigation Division issued 
an opinion recommending that the license be refused; a draft of the decree to 
be adopted was attached thereto. By a decree in the same terms as the draft, 
the Crown quashed the municipal authorities’ decision to issue a license for 
the applicant.
The applicant complained that his case has not been heard by an indepen-
dent and impartial tribunal, but by administrative authorities that did not ful-
fil the criteria required by Article 6(1) echr. First, as to the Administrative 
Litigation Division, the Court noted that, despite its name and the appear-
ances, the division was not a tribunal for the purposes of Article 6, as it lacked 
the power to adopt binding decisions.27
As for the Crown, the Court noted first that it was the head of the executive. 
Second, the Court stressed that the Crown operated by means of royal decrees 
that were – as form and substance – administrative acts that emanated from 
the government. Lastly, the Court noted that the royal decrees could not be 
challenged by means of judicial review as required by Article 6(1) echr.28
In Beaumartin, the applicants’ shares of a Moroccan company had been 
expropriated.29 France and Morocco concluded an international treaty that 
obliged Morocco to pay France compensation in a single lump sum and 
France to distribute it to the citizens who had lost their assets in Morocco. 
The applicants lodged a compensation request with the committee appointed 
for this purpose. The committee comprised representatives of the following 
ministries: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior 
and Ministry of Economy. The committee issued a decision compensating the 
applicants only partially. They therefore challenged this decision before the 
Conseil d’Etat.
The Conseil d’Etat requested instructions from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs concerning the way in which the Franco- Moroccan treaty should be 
 26 ECtHR. Benthem v. the Netherlands, application no. 8848/ 80, judgement of 23 Oct 1985.
 27 Benthem v. the Netherlands, quoted above, paragraph 40.
 28 Benthem v. the Netherlands, quoted above, paragraphs 41– 43.
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interpreted in the applicants’ case. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied 
that the applicants had correctly received only partial compensation for their 
assets and that the treaty at issue did not allow for a different interpretation. 
Consequently, the Conseil d’Etat dismissed the applicants’ case on the grounds 
that the interpretation it received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
binding on it and could not be departed from. The Court noted that, despite 
the fact that in the meantime, France had changed its legislation, at the rele-
vant time the domestic courts did not have jurisdiction to interpret interna-
tional treaties. The Court noted that the nature of the proceedings was such 
that the applicants had as their opponent the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
which was also one of the issuing parties of the decision that the applicants 
were challenging. In addition, the applicants had no means of challenging the 
Ministry’s involvement in the proceedings, nor the referral procedure by which 
the Conseil d’Etat asked for instructions the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.30 The 
Court concluded that, in the view of the Ministry’s involvement in the pro-
ceedings at issue, the Conseil d’Etat could not be deemed to be an independent 
tribunal.
In a case against Italy, the Court was called to decide if the Commission of 
the Chamber of Deputies was an independent and impartial tribunal.31 In that 
case, the applicants held different administrative positions in the Chamber of 
Deputies. They sued their employer concerning a recruitment opportunity. 
They complained that the Human Resources Commission of the Chamber 
of Deputies that was called to decide their trial was not an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law. The Court agreed with the applicants 
and stressed that independent and impartial tribunals played an important 
role in every democracy because they inspire confidence in the public.32
In a few French cases, the Court was faced with the question of indepen-
dence of specialized courts. In Didier, the applicant had been sanctioned 
during disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Financial Markets Board 
(Conseil des marchés financiers – fmb). The fmb ordered the suspension of the 
applicant’s trade license for six months and the payment of a fine of 5,000,000 
French francs. The applicant complained about the fact that the rapporteur 
who investigated his case participated in the deliberations.33 The Court stated 
that in order to assess if the concomitant exercise of investigative and decision- 
making functions by the same person respect the principle of impartiality, a 
 30 Beaumartin v. France, quoted above, paragraph 38.
 31 Savino and Others v. Italy, quoted above.
 32 Savino and Others v. Italy, quoted above, paragraph 105.










detailed analysis of the tasks performed needs to be undertaken. The Court 
noted that in the case at issue, the rapporteur has been investigating the appli-
cant’s case upon appointment by the Financial Markets Board, but that he has 
not been involved in formulating the charges against the applicant. The Court 
noted that “bias is excluded when a judge does not bring charges despite his 
in- depth knowledge of the case”.34 The Court added that as the rapporteur was 
not involved in the formulation of the charges, he was not competent to close 
a case or to extend the object of the investigation. Instead, his duty was to 
check the facts and to report in writing on the results of his investigation. The 
Court concluded that the preliminary assessment performed by the rappor-
teur during the hearing did not endanger the principle of impartiality since 
the accused would have an opportunity to react and to have the last word.35
A different conclusion was reached by the Court in another case against 
France, where the applicant – an investment fund – complained about the 
dependence and the mpartiality of the French Banking Commission that had 
initiated disciplinary proceedings against the applicant and issued a blame for 
failing to respect the existing legal provisions.36 The applicant complained in 
particular about the Banking Commission’s concomitant exercise of adminis-
trative and adjudicatory functions.
The Court observed that the French Banking Commission exercised two 
types of functions: first, a control function that encompassed both adminis-
trative control and injunction power and on the basis of which the Banking 
Commission could issue preventive measures, recommendations or injunc-
tions; and second, a disciplinary function that enabled the Banking Commission 
to issue sanctions and which, for this purpose, rendered it an administrative 
adjudicator (jurisdiction administrative).37 The Court highlighted in particu-
lar the “lack of precision of the legal texts that describe the procedure before 
the Banking Commission, especially concerning the composition and the 
functions of the organs called to exercise the different functions entrusted 
to it”.38 More precisely, there was no internal regulation separating the pros-
ecution, taking of evidence and adjudication of the case before the Banking 
Commission. On the contrary, the Banking Commission initiated the proceed-
ings, performed the investigation, acted as the accusing party during the oral 
hearing and finally sanctioned the applicant. Under such circumstances, the 
 34 Didier v. France, quoted above, p. 7.
 35 Didier v. France, quoted above, p. 8.
 36 ECtHR. Dubus s.a. v. France, application no. 5242/ 04, judgement of 11 Jun 2009.
 37 Dubus s.a. v. France, quoted above, paragraph 55.
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applicant’s doubts as to the Banking Commission’ impartiality were objec-
tively justified.39
The Court raised an interesting point concerning the Banking Commission’s 
power to initiate its own investigations (faculté d’auto- saisine). Without question-
ing its legality, the Court highlighted, however, that the power to initiate its own 
investigations must be subordinated to the principle of impartiality: “it is neces-
sary to define with clarity the power to initiate investigations ex officio, in such a 
way that the impression that the guilt of the applicant had already been estab-
lished from the opening of the proceedings themselves be erased”.40
In Sigma Radio Television, the applicant complained about the cumulation of 
functions in prosecuting, investigating, trying and deciding cases and imposing 
sanctions of the Cyprus Radio and Television Authority (crta).41 In addition, the 
applicant complained that the members and staff of the crta had a direct and 
personal interest in imposing fines as the amounts thus collected were deposited 
in the crta’s Fund from which their salaries and remuneration were paid. The 
Court found that despite the existence of safeguards, the combination of different 
functions of the crta and, in particular, the fact that all fines are deposited in its 
own fund for its own use, gave rise to legitimate concerns that the crta lacked the 
necessary structural impartiality to comply with the requirements of Article 6.42
8.2.3 Appearances
One of the most important theories developed by the ECtHR to assess the inde-
pendence and impartiality of courts is the theory of appearances. The theory 
of appearances – which is an application of the adage justice must not only be 
done, but also seen to be done – was first developed in relation to the principle 
of impartiality and later extended to the principle of independence.4344
In Delcourt, the Court was faced with the question of whether or not the 
Belgian Court of Cassation was independent in light of the fact that a mem-
ber of the Procureur général’s department participated in secret deliberations 
during the applicant’s criminal proceedings.45
 39 Dubus s.a. v. France, quoted above, paragraphs 59– 62.
 40 Dubus s.a. v. France, quoted above, paragraph 60.
 41 ECtHR. Sigma Radio Television Ltd. v. Cyprus, applications nos. 32181/ 04 and 35122/ 05, 
judgement of 21 Jul 2011.
 42 Sigma Radio Television Ltd. v. Cyprus, quoted above, paragraph 150.
 43 See ECtHR. Hauschildt v. Denmark, application no. 10486/ 83, judgement of 24 May 1989.
 44 ECtHR. Kleyn and others v. the Netherlands, application nos. 39343/ 98, 39651/ 98, 43147/ 98, 
46664/ 99, judgement of 6 May 2003, paragraph 192, in which the Court indicated that the 
notion of independence and objective impartiality are closely linked.
















The Court first noted the unusual and unique – among the member states 
of the Council of Europe – character of the Belgian system. The Court also 
acknowledged that an accused who sees a member of the Procureur général’s 
department accusing them in open court and then leaving the courtroom with 
the judges for secret deliberations, might have serious doubts as to the inde-
pendence of the court.46 The Court stressed, however, that while appearances 
were important, they were not decisive.
The Court pointed out that the Belgian system was constructed in such a way 
as to exclude the influence of the Minister of Justice on the Procureur général’s 
department acting within the Court of Cassation. At the same time, the 
Procureur général’s department within the Court of Cassation could guide the 
public prosecutors from the lower courts only in matters of doctrine, excluding 
thus the possibility of giving guidance concerning case- handling. Second, the 
Procureur général was not an accusing party during criminal proceedings, its 
role being to safeguard the interests of the society. During the deliberations, 
the Procureur général “upholds a different interest, that which is concerned 
with the observance by the judges of the law and not with the establishment 
of the guilt or innocence of the accused”.47 Lastly, the Court highlighted that 
“the Procureur général’s department at the Court of Cassation is an adjunct 
and an adviser of the Court; it discharges a function of a quasi- judicial nature. 
By the opinions which it gives according to its legal conscience, it assists the 
Court to supervise the lawfulness of the decisions attacked and to ensure the 
uniformity of judicial precedent”.48
The Court concluded its argument in favour of the Belgian system with an 
unusual argument. It stated that, despite it being unique among the Member 
States of the Council of Europe, it was a legitimate system. Its legitimacy 
stemmed from the fact that the system existed for more than one and a half 
century from the fact that the Belgian Parliament has twice considered but 
maintained it. The Court seemed furthermore impressed by the fact that nei-
ther the legal professions, nor the public opinion tried to challenge this judicial 
system.49 The Court concluded that, despite the Procureur général’s participa-
tion in the deliberations during the applicant’s case, the criminal proceedings 
against him were not biased.
In the Campbell and Fell case, the applicants were sanctioned disciplinarily 
for breaches of prison discipline in an incident that involved both them and 
 46 Delcourt v. Belgium, quoted above, paragraph 30.
 47 Delcourt v. Belgium, quoted above, paragraph 33.
 48 Delcourt v. Belgium, quoted above, paragraph 34.
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prison guards. The Board of Visitors punished them with a total of approxi-
mately 570 days’ loss of remission. As a result, they were released from prison 
almost two years later than their initial prison sentence. The applicants 
claimed that the Board of Visitors was not an independent tribunal within 
the meaning of Article 6(1) echr in that it was appointed and guided by the 
Home Secretary and was under the control of the prison authorities who were 
involved in the incident.
The fact that the Board of Visitors was appointed and received guidelines 
from the Home Office was of little importance to the Court since the mem-
bers were appointed for only three years, they were unpaid and did not receive 
guidelines concerning the performance of their adjudicatory functions. The 
Court remained unimpressed by the lack of any rules concerning the irremov-
ability of the members of the Board or by the lack of separation between its 
supervisory and adjudicatory functions. The Court did not analyse the exist-
ing institutional overlap of these functions, but merely pointed that “the 
impression which prisoners may have that Boards are closely associated with 
the executive and the prison administration is a factor of greater weight”.50 
However, the Court concluded by a majority that there has been no violation 
of Article 6(1) echr because “the existence of such sentiments on the part of 
inmates, which is probably unavoidable in a custodial setting”, was not suffi-
cient to establish a lack of independence.51
In another case, the applicant, Mrs Belilos, had taken part in an unautho-
rized street demonstration following which a police officer imposed a fine 
on her.52 The applicant challenged the fine first before the Police Board. The 
Police Board found that the facts had been established correctly and that the 
legal qualification and the fine were correctly assessed. The applicant brought 
further proceedings seeking to declare void the fine and the criminal proceed-
ings against her before the Criminal Cassation Division of the Vaud Cantonal 
Court. The latter, however, dismissed the applicant’s action because it had only 
a limited jurisdiction over fines imposed by the Police Board. The same con-
clusion was reached by the Federal Court upon public law appeal proceedings.
The applicant complained that the Police Board was not an independent 
tribunal within the meaning of the Article 6(1) echr. The Police Board was 
an administrative body formed of one policeman that would be necessarily 
biased when called to review the sanctions imposed by his/ her colleagues.
 50 Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom, quoted above.
 51 Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom, quoted above, paragraphs 79– 82.








The Court first analysed the status of the Police Board in Swiss legislation 
and case- law. As it appeared, the relevant laws considered the Police Board 
a “municipal authority”. Furthermore, the Federal Court described the Police 
Board in its judgments as an “administrative authority”, term that has been 
employed by the Swiss Government in its submissions before the Court in 
Strasbourg.53 Second, the Court emphasized the importance of appearances 
in cases such as that brought by the applicant. The Court pointed out that “the 
member of the Police Board is a senior civil servant who is liable to return to 
other departmental duties. The ordinary citizen will tend to see him as a mem-
ber of the police force subordinate to his superiors and loyal to his colleagues. 
A situation of this kind may undermine the confidence which must be inspired 
by the courts in a democratic society”.54
In a number of Turkish cases, the issue of the independence of military tri-
bunals has been considered. In Ergin, the applicant published an article argu-
ing against mandatory military service.55 He was then prosecuted and con-
victed by the Turkish Military Court. The ECtHR found that only in exceptional 
cases can civilians be convicted by the military courts and only in the presence 
of serious guarantees.56
The Court noted that both in the Inter- American and the UN systems, 
change has occurred in the sense of excluding civilians from being tried by 
military courts.57 The Court highlighted the apprehension that the applicant 
must have felt appearing before judges belonging to the army and concluded 
that military tribunals cannot be deemed independent or impartial in such 
instances.
In a few Austrian cases, the Court was faced with the question if the 
Regional Commission – an institution vested with approval powers concern-
ing real estate transfers – was an independent tribunal for the purposes of 
Article 6(1) echr.
In Ringeisen, the applicant’s sale concerning a plot of land was blocked by 
the Regional Commission on the grounds that the applicant intended to use 
the land for industrial purposes instead of agricultural purposes.58 The appli-
cant challenged, in particular, the fact that the Regional Commission was 
appointed by the local government and was therefore not independent.
 53 Belilos v. Switzerland, quoted above, paragraph 66.
 54 Belilos v. Switzerland, quoted above, paragraph 67.
 55 ECtHR. Ergin v. Turkey (no. 6), application no. 47533/ 99, judgement of 4 May 2006.
 56 Ergin v. Turkey, quoted above, paragraph 47.
 57 Ergin v. Turkey, quoted above, paragraphs 21– 25.
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The Court rejected as a matter of principle the allegation that a body 
appointed by the executive is biased by the sole reason of its appointment.59 
Without going into a deeper analysis, the Court found that the Regional 
Commission was simply a tribunal independent from the executive and from 
the parties that had its members appointed for a five- year mandate and that it 
was operating on the basis of sufficient procedural guarantees.60
Almost a decade later however, the Court considered a similar case and 
reached a different conclusion. In Sramek, the applicant signed a sales con-
tract concerning a plot of land and made an initial payment to the seller.61 The 
Regional Commission comprised at the relevant time (1) a farmer, who was the 
mayor of a municipality in the Tyrol, as chairman, (2) a judge of the Innsbruck 
Court of Appeal, (3) another farmer, sitting as an agricultural expert, (4) a law-
yer and (5) three civil servants from the Office of the Land Government, one 
of whom acted as rapporteur. The Court stated that, with the exception of the 
three civil servants, no issues concerning independence arose in relation to 
the other members of the Regional Commission. However, even if no norma-
tive incompatibility existed between the requirements of the Convention and 
the fact that Government nominees sit on tribunals, a problem might arise 
when the Governmental body becomes a party to the proceedings. Thus, in 
the applicant’s case, the Land Government represented by the Transactions 
Officer acquired the status of a party when it appealed to the Regional 
Authority against the first- instance decision in the applicant’s favour, and in 
that the Transactions Officer was the superior one of the three civil servants in 
question. What was decisive in this case was the fact that the civil servant at 
issue occupied a key position within the Regional Commission. As rapporteur, 
he had to set out and comment on the results of the investigation and then to 
present conclusions. Also, the secretariat for the Regional Commission’s meet-
ings was supplied by the department of the Transaction Officer.
The ECtHR noted that it could not
confine itself to looking at the consequences which the subordinate sta-
tus of the rapporteur vis- à- vis the Transactions Officer might have had as 
a matter of fact. In order to determine whether a tribunal can be consid-
ered to be independent as required by Article 6, appearances may also 
be of importance. Where, as in the present case, a tribunal's members 
include a person who is in a subordinate position, in terms of his duties 
 59 Ringeisen v. Austria, quoted above, paragraph 97.
 60 Ringeisen v. Austria, quoted above, paragraph 95.








and the organisation of his service, vis- à- vis one of the parties, litigants 
may entertain a legitimate doubt about that person's independence.62
In light of the above, the Court concluded that the Regional Commission was 
not an independent tribunal for the purposes of the Convention.
8.2.4 Safeguards
The ECtHR has considered a variety of safeguards developed by the Member 
States of the Council of Europe in order to ensure independence of justice.
In the case of Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, the Court considered 
that the Appeals Council – an adjudicatory body functioning within the Order 
of Medical Doctors – was independent due to the equal number of medical 
practitioners and members of the judiciary sitting on it and to the limited 
duration of their term of office (six years).63
In Piersack, the Court found that Belgian legislation provided for enough 
guarantees against possible pressure on the court of assize, the most important 
of which was the strict rules concerning the nomination of the jurors.64
In the case Henryk Urban and Ryszard Urban, the applicants were con-
victed by a single- judge court formed of an assessor for the administrative 
offense of refusing to disclose their identity to the police.65 The Court noted 
that the assessor at issue could at all times during her mandate be removed 
by the Minister of Justice and that there were no guarantees against the abu-
sive exercise of this power. The Court held that “it is not necessary to con-
sider other aspects of the status of assessors since their removability by the 
executive is sufficient to vitiate the independence of the Lesko District Court 
which was composed of the assessor”.66 The Court also found that the short-
coming in question could not be rectified on appeal since the appeal court 
did not have the power to quash the judgment delivered by the assessor.67 
The Court relied on the findings of the Polish Constitutional Court, conclud-
ing that the way in which Poland had legislated the status of assessors was 
deficient.68
 62 Sramek v. Austria, quoted above, paragraph 42.
 63 Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, quoted above, paragraph 57.
 64 ECtHR. Piersack v. Belgium, application no. 8692/ 79, judgement of 1 Oct 1982, paragraph 27.
 65 ECtHR. Henryk Urban and Ryszard Urban v. Poland, application no. 23614/ 08, judgement 
of 30 Nov 2010.
 66 Henryk Urban and Ryszard Urban v. Poland, quoted above, paragraph 53.
 67 Henryk Urban and Ryszard Urban v. Poland, quoted above, paragraph 54.
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The situation of assessors has also been analysed in a few Austrian cases. In 
Stechauner, the applicant was a practitioner of general medicine. The dispute 
that arose between the applicant and the Regional Health Insurance Board 
was heard and decided by the Regional Appeals Commission.69 The applicant 
complained that two assessors sitting for the Regional Appeals Commission 
were employees of the Regional Health Insurance Boards.
The Court noted that assessors, who have special knowledge and experi-
ence in the relevant field, “contribute to a court’s understanding of the issue 
before it and appear in principle to be highly qualified in the adjudication of 
the disputes. Moreover, the inclusion of lay assessors is a common feature in 
many countries”.70 In the applicant’s case, however, the Court noted that the 
assessors were not appointed by the Regional Health Insurance Board, but 
by the Federal Minister of Justice. In addition, the Austrian legislation for-
bade employees of the Regional Health Insurance Board to sit as assessors in 
cases where the defendant is their employer.71 The Court found these two ele-
ments sufficient for concluding that, in the case at issue, the Regional Appeals 
Commission was an independent and impartial tribunal.72
In Bryan, an enforcement notice was served on the applicant to demolish 
two buildings that he had allegedly erected in breach of planning legislation.73 
Upon the applicant’s appeal to the Secretary of State for the Environment, an 
inspector was appointed to perform an investigation and to decide the appeal. 
Mr Bryan contended that the proceedings which he had brought before a plan-
ning inspector to challenge the planning enforcement notice served on him 
did not comply with Article 6(1) echr in that the planning inspector was not 
independent.
While the Court agreed that the relevant statutory provisions in place 
required the planning inspector to decide on the applicant’s appeal in a quasi- 
judicial, independent, impartial and fair manner, the same provisions gave the 
right to the Secretary of State to revoke the planning inspector at any stage of 
the proceedings. The Court held that
in the context of planning appeals, the very existence of this power avail-
able to the Executive, whose own policies may be in issue, is enough to 
 69 ECtHR. Stechauner v. Austria, application no. 20087/ 06, judgement of 28 Jan 2010.
 70 Stechauner v. Austria, quoted above, paragaph 55.
 71 Stechauner v. Austria, quoted above, paragaph 58.
 72 The same conclusion was reached by the Court in ECtHR. Puchstein v. Austria, application 
no. 20089/ 06, judgement of 28 Jan 2010.












deprive the inspector of the requisite appearance of independence, not-
withstanding the limited exercise of the power in practice as described 
by the Government and irrespective of whether its exercise was or could 
have been in issue in the present case. For this reason alone, the review 
by the inspector does not of itself satisfy the requirements of Article 6(1) 
echr, despite the existence of various safeguards customarily associated 
with an independent and impartial tribunal.74
8.3 Impartiality
Impartiality is freedom from bias. While it is indeed questionable if freedom 
from bias is possible at all, in the context of adjudication this is an essential 
piece of the right to a fair trial that seeks to ensure that the path between the 
adjudicator and the case is illuminated only by the facts, the evidence and 
the adjudicator’s reasoning.75 These three elements are all prone to manipu-
lation during a trial; the facts and the evidence appear as they are presented 
by the parties and the adjudicator’s reasoning will be influenced by his legal 
education, personal preferences and background. However, impartiality as 
a procedure of the fair trial principle accepts the facts, the evidence and the 
adjudicator’s reasoning as the basis for delivering a justice system that creates 
confidence and social cohesion.
Despite its central role, impartiality is not an easy concept to measure as it 
requires the assessment of the adjudicator’s behaviour in the courtroom, but 
also, of his moral preferences and of his inner life. This is both an intrusive 
and a difficult exercise that can sometimes lead to approximate results. This is, 
furthermore, a complicated test to perform for an international tribunal such 
as the ECtHR. The ECtHR recognizes this and cases concerning impartiality are 
rare and often linked to the related notion of independence. Also, when the 
ECtHR performs the impartiality test on its case- law, it borrows notions used 
to assess the independence of courts.
8.3.1 Prior Involvement with the Case
The question of impartiality is often raised before the ECtHR in cases where 
the adjudicator has been previously involved with the case.
 74 Bryan v. the United Kingdom, quoted above, paragraph 38.
 75 Beignier, Bernard and Corinne Bléry. “L’impartialité du juge, entre apparence et réalité. ” 
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Hauschildt was one of the earliest cases at the ECtHR in which the Court 
was faced with the question of the impartiality of a tribunal. The applicant 
criticized the Danish judiciary system whereby a judge was entrusted with a 
supervisory role in the investigation process and was later expected to conduct 
the trial “with a mind entirely free from prejudice”.76
The Court noted that “this kind of situation may occasion misgivings on 
the part of the accused as to the impartiality of the judge, misgivings which 
are understandable, but which nevertheless cannot necessarily be treated as 
objectively justified. Whether they should be so treated depends on the cir-
cumstances of each particular case”.77
In Fey, the applicant complained that the district court judge had both 
undertaken preliminary investigations and tried his case.78 Further, the appli-
cant complained that the regional court judges who had rejected his request 
for release were subsequently called upon to rule on his appeal.
The Court undertook a detailed analysis of the tasks performed by the case 
judge during the pre- trial investigation. These tasks included collecting infor-
mation, transmitting the case- file to the Innsbruck District Court so that it 
could put further questions to the applicant and setting the case down for trial.
The Court stated that impartiality can be determined according to a subjec-
tive test, that is on the basis of the personal conviction of a particular judge in 
a given case, and according to an objective test, that is ascertaining whether 
the judge offered guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this 
respect.79
The Court noted that, as a matter of principle, the mere fact that a judge has 
made pre- trial decisions in a case is not sufficient to ground the fear of impar-
tiality. What is decisive is the extent and the nature of those measures.
The Court concluded, however, that the various measures taken prior to the 
trial by the judge deciding the case were not such as could have led her to reach 
a preconceived view on the merits. The Court especially highlighted the fact 
that the judge under consideration acquitted the applicant on one of the two 
accounts.80
In Fatullayev, the applicant was a journalist who, after publishing two arti-
cles concerning the Khojaly massacre, was convicted of terrorism and ordered 
to pay civil damages.81 He complained that the judge who had examined 
 76 Hauschildt v. Denmark, quoted above, paragraph 43.
 77 Hauschildt v. Denmark, quoted above, paragraph 48.
 78 ECtHR. Fey v. Austria, application no. 14396/ 88, judgement of 24 Feb 1993.
 79 Fey v. Austria, quoted above, paragraph 28.
 80 Fey v. Austria, quoted above, paragraphs 32– 35.














allegations against him in the context of a civil action could not have an impar-
tial position when examining the same allegations in the criminal context.
The Court noted that as a matter of principle, a situation where the same 
judge examines the questions of both civil liability and criminal liability aris-
ing from the same facts does not necessarily affect the judge’s impartiality. 
However, on the facts of the case, the Court considered that having decided 
the civil case against the applicant, the judge had already given an assessment 
to the applicant’s statements and, more importantly, had qualified those 
facts as false information that defamed the survivors of the Khojaly massa-
cre. Under these circumstances, doubts could be legitimately raised as to the 
appearance of impartiality of the same judge who was later called to give his 
opinion about the same allegedly defamatory statements, but in a criminal 
context.82
In Elezi, the applicant complained about the impartiality of the lay judges 
because they were provided a copy of the bill of indictment that contained 
the prosecution’s main findings.83 The Court noted the findings of the domes-
tic courts that the bill of indictment should not be disclosed to the lay judges 
as they risked mixing up the prosecution evidence with the matters from the 
main hearing.84 The Court noted however that, after the bill of indictment was 
presented to the lay judges, twenty more hearings were held in the applicant’s 
case and that the applicant did not raise an objection concerning the impar-
tiality of the lay judges in the domestic proceedings. On the basis of this, the 
Court found that the applicant’s fear as to the lay judges’ impartiality could not 
be justified objectively.85
An interesting issue was raised in the case Perus, where the applicant was 
involved in a long- standing employment dispute.86 He complained that one of 
the judges involved in the proceedings concerning his appeal on points of law 
could not be considered impartial because of his prior involvement in the case 
as a judge of the Higher Court. The Court noted that nine years had elapsed 
between the date of the judgement adopted by the Higher Court’s panel pre-
sided over by judge L.F. and the judgement of the panel of the Supreme Court 
of which judge L.F. was a member. The Court drew attention to the fact that, 
despite the long period of time between the different parts of the proceedings, 
judge L.F. played very important roles at different levels of jurisdiction: he was 
 82 Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, quoted above, paragraphs 138– 140.
 83 ECtHR. Elezi v. Germany, application no. 26771/ 03, judgement of 12 Jun 2008.
 84 Elezi v. Germany, quoted above, paragraph 47.
 85 Elezi v. Germany, quoted above, paragraphs 51– 54.
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the presiding judge in the Higher Court’s panel and he was the judge rappor-
teur during the proceedings before the Supreme Court.
The Court concluded that there was no indication in the case- file that judge 
L.F. was aware of or remembered her prior involvement in this particular case. 
It observed, however, that there was “a risk of problems arising in a system 
which lacks safeguards to ensure that the judges are reminded of their prior 
involvement in particular cases, above all where such matters rely on the 
judges’ own assessment”.87
8.3.2 Expression of Views
Impartiality can also be at issue when the adjudicator expresses publicly views 
about the outcome of the case before the case is settled.
In Olujic, the applicant was a judge and the former President of the Supreme 
Court.88 Disciplinary proceedings were conducted against the applicant by the 
National Judicial Council (njc) for having socialized in public places with two 
individuals who had criminal backgrounds. As a result of the disciplinary pro-
ceedings, the applicant was dismissed from the office of judge and from that 
of President of the Supreme Court. The applicant complained that the three 
members of the njc were not impartial since they had expressed opinions 
against him in the national newspapers during the disciplinary proceedings.
The Court noted that all three members of the njc, including its president, 
publicly used expressions that implied they had already formed an opinion 
about the applicant’s guilt before the finalization of the proceedings. In addi-
tion, the statements were such as to justify the applicant’s fears as to their 
impartiality.89 The Court found therefore a breach of Article 6(1) echr.
In a case involving the gaming industry in the United Kingdom, the Court 
was called to decide if the Gaming Board was an independent and impar-
tial tribunal.90 In that case, the applicant was the sole executive director of a 
company managing six of the twenty casinos licenced to operate in London. 
Following a raid by the Gaming Board, the applicant’s employment contract 
was terminated. In addition, the president of the Gaming Board had publicly 
stated during an industry lunch that the applicant was not a fit and proper per-
son to exercise the function of an executive director. Later, the Gaming Board 
initiated special proceedings – called Section 19 proceedings – to deprive the 
 87 Perus v. Slovenia, quoted above, paragraph 39.
 88 ECtHR. Olujic v. Croatia, application no. 22330/ 05, judgement of 5 Feb 2009.
 89 Olujic v. Croatia, quoted above, paragraphs 62– 67.











applicant of the right to exercise managerial functions in the gaming industry 
in the UK and affiliated jurisdictions.
The Court noted that it appeared from the facts of the case that the Gaming 
Board had already formed the opinion that the applicant was not a fit and 
proper person before a hearing was held in this case. The three members who 
subsequently adjudicated the Section 19 proceedings against the applicant 
were all present and voted in favour of the decision of the Gaming Board that 
the applicant was not a fit and proper person to be a casino director. The Court 
concluded that for this reason the panel hearing this dispute did not present 
the necessary appearance of impartiality as required by Article 6(1) echr.91
8.4 The Relevance of the ECtHR’s Case- Law on Independence and 
Impartiality
Two main questions should guide the modern debate about the independence 
and impartiality of justice. First, is independence an end in itself or should it be 
pursued in order to achieve other goals, and if so, which other goals? Second, 
should the approach to independence be holistic or atomistic? These ques-
tions are particularly important for the conversation surrounding the indepen-
dence of administrative justice. Thus, for example, pursuing independence for 
the purpose of achieving efficiency is a different effort from pursuing indepen-
dence for the purpose of trust- building or maintaining a healthy separation of 
powers. Also, an approach to independence wherein one safeguard can render 
an administrative tribunal independent is a different approach from conceiv-
ing an administrative process that ensures independence as a whole.
The case- law of the ECtHR on independence and impartiality appears to 
be well- equipped to answer these questions and to inform the modern con-
stitutional debates outlined at the beginning of this chapter concerning the 
independence of administrative justice. The ECtHR initially formulated the 
principles concerning the interpretation of the notions of independence and 
impartiality in criminal cases. Over the years, however, the same principles 
have been successfully applied to administrative disputes covering various 
issues facing the citizen and the state. Irrespective of the disputed judicial for-
mations – assessors, single- judge courts, Supreme Administrative Courts or 
even the Crown in the UK – and of the types of disputes – land planning dis-
putes, medical disputes, banking disputes or disputes concerning the financial 
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markets – the ECtHR maintained that Article 6(1) echr required tribunals to 
be independent and impartial.
Article 6(1) echr requires three conditions to be satisfied for a tribunal to 
be deemed compatible with the Convention: the tribunal must be established 
by law, it must be independent and it must be impartial. The ECtHR highlights 
that its goal is not to impose upon the states a constitutional model concern-
ing the relationship and interaction of different state powers.92 However, the 
ECtHR’s case- law on independence and impartiality appears to achieve the 
opposite. In relation to the condition that a tribunal must be established by 
law, the ECtHR found that a tribunal compatible with Article 6(1) echr must 
be established respecting a constitutional chain of delegation: citizens choose 
the parliament or vote for the constitution, the parliament or the constitu-
tion establish tribunals and tribunals deliver justice to citizens. In addition, a 
tribunal established by law must also specifically be endowed with a judicial 
function.
Independence is a concept dealing with external features of the judiciary 
and it requires a constitutional setup whereas other branches of the govern-
ment do not encroach on the performance of justice. From this point of view, 
independence acts like a fence. Impartiality, on the other hand, is a concept 
that deals with the internal and intimate features of the judiciary, describing 
both the peer relationships within the judiciary, and also the relationship that 
a judge has with his own beliefs. Impartiality thus describes what should take 
place inside the fence. Although the ECtHR maintains the distinction between 
independence and impartiality, sometimes it uses them interchangeably.
Based on the case- law described above, I suggest that, when assessing 
the independence and impartiality of an administrative tribunal, the ECtHR 
takes into account four elements: (1) cumulation of functions, (2) safeguards, 
(3) appearances and (4) availability of judicial review. These elements are 
often interlinked.
A salient feature of administrative tribunals is the concomitant exercise 
of investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative functions. Since the ECtHR 
requires two fresh eyes and a fresh brain to perform decision- making tasks, tri-
bunals that cumulate functions would a priori be contrary to Article 6(1) echr 
because of the pre- formed opinions that the decision- makers would have gath-
ered. This is not an absolute rule, however, and the ECtHR elegantly qualifies 
it. On the one hand, cumulation of functions is starkly visible and can easily 
offend the sense of justice of a citizen involved in trial against the state. On the 
 92 Savino and Others v. Italy, quoted above, paragraph 92. 
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other hand, the ECtHR distinguished in Didier between simple case- handling 
functions such as checking the facts and reporting on them and more offen-
sive forms of cumulation of functions that would combine the formulation of 
charges with the power to close cases or extend investigations.93 In the same 
vein, the ECtHR showed in Dubus s.a. that both legal texts and internal regula-
tions of the banking industry should clearly separate the tasks of prosecution 
from taking evidence and from adjudication.94
The case- law of the ECtHR on independence and impartiality pays close 
attention to the safeguards engrained in the analysed systems. The ECtHR has 
pointed out that clear rules concerning the appointment and removability of 
adjudicators by the executive, the presence of technical specialists alongside 
generalists on specialized tribunals, and internal rules concerning the sepa-
ration of functions contribute to a tribunal’s independence and can prevent 
abuses during the trial.
Three general ideas can be deduced from the case- law analysed above. First, 
lack of individual independence can be compensated for by strong fair trial guar-
antees during the trial or corrected during judicial review. Thus, if an adjudicator 
has been previously involved with a case, posing thus a threat to independent 
adjudication, rules of procedure concerning the disclosure of the previous 
involvement or the change in the bench, may suffice to compensate for the 
lack of independence. Also, the appeal court, may assess the alleged lack of 
independence, reconsider the case independently or re- send the case to the 
concerned adjudicator. In any case, what is important is that the procedure as 
a whole allows for the assessment and correction of the lack of independence.
The second idea deduced from the case- law of the ECtHR is that structural 
lack of independence can neither be compensated, nor corrected by judicial review. 
Indeed, judicial review can play a role as a safeguard for the independence 
of justice only when the lack of independence is personal, not structural. For 
example, as Beaumartin highlighted, there are instances when judicial review 
cannot remedy the lack of independence of an administrative procedure due 
to the deference shown during judicial review to the administrative authority 
at issue.95 In other words, deference by a court to an administrative authority 
performing judicial functions that lacks independence is not compatible with 
the right to a fair trial.
Finally, it appears that the ECtHR proposes a relationship of direct pro-
portionality between the consequences of the lack of independence and 
 93 Didier v. France, quoted above.
 94 Dubus s.a. v. France, quoted above.
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the existing safeguards, including the availability of judicial review. In Sigma 
Radio, the ECtHR found that the fines imposed by an administrative author-
ity cumulating prosecutorial and adjudicative functions were used to pay the 
salaries of the administrative authority’s employees.96 In Campbell and Fell, 
the ECtHR took note of the fact that the disciplinary measures applied by the 
Board of Visitors – a body having overlapping supervisory and adjudicatory 
functions – delayed the defendants’ release from prison by two years.97
As Figure 9 above suggests, when a procedure has serious consequences for 
the individuals affected, courts or tribunals should be able to perform effective 
judicial review.
Independence and impartiality are intimately linked to the design of the 
justice- imparting institutions and their procedures. The duty of indepen-
dence is thus individual, behavioural and systemic. Individual adjudicators are 
required to act independently and impartially. However, this is not sufficient. 
The design of the justice system must be construed to support institutional, 
procedural and financial independence at all stages and to correct the lack of 
independence through judicial review.
To conclude, I suggest that the protective attitude of the ECtHR towards 
the judicial function in Europe – irrespective of the fact that this function is 
performed in a court or an administrative tribunal – indicates that the ECtHR 
embraces a holistic approach towards independence. Administrative justice 
 96 Sigma Radio Television Ltd. v. Cyprus, quoted above.









 figure 9  Relationship between seriousness of consequences of a given procedure and 








should be imparted independently, and the standards that the ECtHR uses for 
this purpose do not differ from the standards applied for classical court pro-
ceedings. However, procedural defects that affect the independence of admin-
istrative proceedings should be corrected during the process of effective judi-
cial review.
In the following chapters, I endeavour to analyse how these precepts are 
reflected in the work of the EU Commission as enforcer of EU competition law.
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 chapter 9
The Structure of the European Commission 
as Enforcer of Competition Law
The history of competition policy is closely linked to the history of the EU. The 
Treaty of Paris of 1951 establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ecsc) dealt in Article 65 with agreements and concerted practices between 
firms and associations of firms which tend directly or indirectly to prevent, 
restrict or distort normal competition within the Common Market. Article 66 
of the same treaty dealt with mergers and Article 67 with the abuse of domi-
nant positions. These articles of the ecsc Treaty became the blueprint for the 
competition law provisions that were adopted in the treaties establishing the 
European Communities and the European Union.
The Treaty of Paris entrusted the High Authority with all issues concerning 
the enforcement of competition policy, a task that the Treaty of Rome later 
placed in the hands of the European Commission.
The first implementing regulation was adopted after the entry into force of 
the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (eec). Regulation 
17/ 1962 established the European Commission’s mandate and investigative 
powers for the enforcement of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty (now Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu).1 This regulation remained in force from 1962 until 2002 
when it was replaced by Regulation 1/ 2003 (Regulation on Procedure) with 
the purpose of meeting the challenges of an integrated market and a future 
enlargement.2
When the Commission acts as the enforcer of EU competition law, it com-
bines investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative functions. What is more, 
the adjudicative functions that the Commission performs are split, as shown 
in Figure 5 above, between dg comp, which prepares decisions, and the 
College of Commissioners, which adopts the decisions. Therefore, the current 
analysis follows the European Commission first as a political institution, and 
second as a bureaucracy (Chapter 9). I then focus on enforcement procedure 
and the Commission’s powers of investigation in the field of competition law 
 1 Regulation No 17 First Regulation Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, oj P 013, 
21.2.1962, pp. 204– 211.
 2 Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules 









(Chapters 10 and 11). Lastly, I highlight the due process elements present in the 
procedure and propose a framework for assessing the Commission’s indepen-
dence (Chapters 12, 13 and 14).
9.1 The European Commission as a Political Institution
The European Commission is described as the “core executive” of the European 
Union.3 It is seen by some as displaying many of the characteristics of national 
governments.4 However, as Curtin rightly noted, the European Commission is 
not only in the business of service delivery, but has also outstanding policy-
making and regulation tasks, as well as limited enforcement tasks in the fields 
mandated by the Treaties.5
Article 17(1) teu states that the European Commission
shall promote the general interest of the Union and take appropriate ini-
tiatives to that end. It shall ensure the application of the Treaties, and of 
the measures adopted by the institutions pursuant to them. It shall over-
see the application of Union law under the control of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union. It shall execute the budget and manage pro-
grams. It shall exercise coordinating, executive and management func-
tions, as laid down in the Treaties. With the exception of the common 
foreign and security policy, and other cases provided for in the Treaties, 
it shall ensure the Union’s external representation. It shall initiate the 
Union’s annual and multiannual programming with a view to achieving 
interinstitutional agreements.
The European Commission has been the subject of a series of reforms in the 
last fifteen years, the most important of which led to the politicisation of the 
Commission’s leadership. The politicisation of the Commission is an import-
ant phenomenon to take into account when assessing its independence. Three 
factors contributed to the politicisation of the Commission’s leadership: (1) 
changing recruitment patterns; (2) changing role conceptions and (3) altering 
the interaction pattern between the Commissioners and the senior officials 
 3 Hix, S. The Political System of the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005, p. 32.
 4 Egeberg, M. “The European Commission.” European Union Politics. Ed. M. Cini. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003, pp. 131– 147.
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of the Commission.6 This shift leaned toward controlling the influence that 
the Commission exerts over the design and execution of the policy making 
process. The motivation for this shift was “that the Commission’s services were 
perceived as too powerful, and too unresponsive to political direction, and 
unable to ensure efficient performance”.7
The Commissioners appointed nowadays tend to have serious political 
careers behind them, having had very often lead roles in, or even headed, min-
istries or large domestic agencies. In addition, the procedure for the appoint-
ment of the Commissioners has been politicised as well, since the European 
Parliament continues to play an increased role in the selection process. Lastly, 
the background of the Commissioners has changed towards a generalist edu-
cation as opposed to the more specialized training of the senior officials. Wille 
concludes that “generalist political executives will be less able to contest issues 
on substantive grounds than executives with more specialized training”.8
Another issue related to the Commission’s independence is the posterior 
careers embraced by the Commissioners. Wille, in her insightful study of the 
subject, has noted that the politicisation of the Commission has led to a change 
of heart concerning the Commissioners’ involvement with domestic politics. 
In the past, Commissioners were expected to remain above domestic politics 
while pursuing their European mandates in order to ensure independence in 
decision- making. However, this
requirement has slowly been eroded as the institution has become more 
politicised. Commissioners no longer cut themselves off from national 
politics when they move to Brussels. Politics, at both national and inter-
national level, are important for political professionals, as they provide 
access to the accumulated resources for a career following their stint in 
the EU Commission.9
In this sense, Wille shows that Prodi and Monti became Prime Ministers of 
Italy, Grybauskaitė became president of Lithuania and Lamy was appointed 
Director- General of the wto.
 6 Wille, Anchrit. “Senior Officials in a Reforming European Commission: Transforming the 
Top?” Management Reforms in International Organizations. Eds. M.W. Bauer and C. Knill. 
Baden- Baden: Nomos, 2007, pp. 37– 50.
 7 Wille (2007), op. cit., p. 34.
 8 Wille (2007), op. cit., p. 18.
 9 Wille, Anchrit. The Normalization of the European Commission: Politics and Bureaucracy in 










Lastly, ex- commissioners also move to business and commercial positions 
after leaving the Commission by joining lobbying groups or think- tanks. Eleven 
out of the fifteen outgoing commissioners of the first Barroso Commission were 
recruited for corporate positions within six months of leaving that commission.10
9.1.1 Cumulating Constitutional Functions
The European Commission cumulates three constitutional powers in the field 
of competition law enforcement: legislative power, executive power and judi-
cial power. These functions can be shared with other EU institutions, or exer-
cised individually by the Commission only.
The European Commission participates in the development of EU compe-
tition law by submitting proposals for legislative action to the Council and to 
the European Parliament. Most often, the Commission shares the legislative 
power with the Council of Ministers – the main legislative body of the union – 
and with the European Parliament. Other bodies that are involved with com-
petition law- making are the Advisory Committee, which attends hearings and 
makes comments on the Commission’s proposed decisions or legislation in the 
field of antitrust, and the Economic and Social Committee, which has an advi-
sory role with regard to competition policy.
The Commission can also act as unique legislator when it adopts imple-
menting regulations, the most recent of which is Commission Regulation 
773/ 2004 that is binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all member 
states.11
Another instance in which the Commission acts as unique legislator in the 
field of competition law is when it adopts the so- called block exemption reg-
ulations, which are used to declare certain categories of state aid compatible 
with the tfeu. If certain categories of state aid fall under the ambit of the block 
exemption regulation, they are exempted from the otherwise regular duty of 
prior notification and Commission approval. Thus, the block exemption reg-
ulation concerning de minimis aid exempts aid amounts up to 200,000 euro 
per undertaking over a three- year period because they are deemed to have no 
impact on competition and trade in the internal market.12 Measures that fulfil 
 10 Wille (2013), op. cit., p. 77.
 11 Commission Regulation (ec) No 773/ 2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of pro-
ceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the ec Treaty, oj L 123, 
27.4.2004, pp. 18– 24.
 12 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/ 2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of 
Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de mini-
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the criteria of the regulation do not constitute state aid according to the mean-
ing of EU rules and therefore do not need to be notified to the Commission 
for approval before they are implemented. The General Block Exemption 
Regulation (gber) has considerably extended the scope of exemptions from 
prior notification of state aid granted to companies.13 Under the revised gber, 
member states are able to grant more aid in higher amounts without having to 
notify them to the Commission for prior authorisation, because they are less 
likely to lead to undue distortions of competition.
In addition to implementing Council regulations and adopting its own reg-
ulations pursuant to powers delegated by the Council, the Commission can 
adopt non- legislative measures such as notices and guidelines, also called 
soft law. Although the legal status of these instruments is open to debate, 
what is certain is that they provide important information and clarification 
on the Commission’s practice and can trigger legitimate expectations. The 
Commission’s notice on immunity from fines (hereafter, Leniency Notice) 
clarified the information an applicant needs to provide to the Commission 
to benefit from immunity and introduced a procedure to protect corporate 
statements made by companies.14 The Guidelines concerning the Method of 
Setting Fines provided that companies may be fined up to 10% of their total 
annual turnover.15 Within this limit, the guidelines provided that fines may be 
based on up to 30% of the company’s annual sales to which the infringement 
relates, multiplied by the number of years of participation in the infringement. 
Moreover, a part of the fine – the so- called “entry fee” – may be imposed irre-
spective of the duration of the infringement.
The European Commission is the main executive body of the EU ensur-
ing that the provisions of the tfeu, the regulations, the directives and the 
decisions are implemented in accordance with the principles of EU law. In 
the field of competition law, Article 105 tfeu provides that the Commission 
shall ensure the application of Articles 101 and 102 tfeu, shall investigate any 
infringements and shall bring to an end those that are incompatible with the 
internal market.
 13 Commission Regulation (EU) 651/ 2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid 
compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty, 
oj L 187, 26.6.2014, pp. 1– 78.
 14 Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, oj C 
298, 8.12.2006, pp. 17– 22.
 15 Guidelines of method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation 








Until 1st of May 2004, the Commission was composed of twenty mem-
bers: two for each of the larger member states – Germany, France, the UK, 
Italy and Spain – and one for each of the smaller member states – Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Sweden. The waves of accession have, however, changed the 
Commission’s structure and the College of Commissioners – the body ensuring 
the Commission’s political leadership – is now composed of 28 Commissioners, 
one from each EU country. The Commissioners are elected for a term of five 
years and each Commissioner is entrusted with a specific policy area by the 
President of the Commission.
The Commission is also responsible for international cooperation in com-
petition matters. For this purpose, the Commission cooperates on a regular 
basis with competition authorities from the countries with whom the EU has 
concluded agreements concerning cooperation in competition matters: the 
United States, Canada, Japan, South Korea and, more recently, Switzerland. The 
Commission also works with the icn, the oecd, the unctad and the wto.
The Commission has a parallel competence with the nca s and the national 
courts to enforce competition law whenever a breach of Article 101 or Article 
102 tfeu has taken place. As Van Bael has noted, “in addition to its pivotal role 
in the allocation of cases, the Commission retains some further control over 
the proceedings taking place before nca s and national courts”.16
During enforcement procedures of Articles 101 and 102 tfeu, the 
Commission exercises judicial functions: the Commission decides which 
cases to investigate from those that are notified and which cases not to pur-
sue, which investigative measures to use, which facts to support with evidence, 
which questions to ask about the relevant undertakings and what measures to 
employ to end the damaging behaviour.
Cases that end with a formal decision can be challenged before the gc, 
exercising jurisdiction at the first instance in actions brought against the 
Commission pursuant to Article 263 tfeu (action for annulment), Article 
232 (failure to act) and Article 229 tfeu (review of penalties imposed by the 
Commission).
The decisions of the gc can be challenged before the cjeu that became a 
court of appeal insofar as competition decisions of the Commission are con-
cerned. In addition, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction, pursuant to Article 267 
tfeu, to give preliminary rulings at the request of domestic courts concerning 
 16 Van Bael, op. cit., p. 85. 
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the interpretation or the validity of community law provisions, including in 
the field of competition law.
9.1.2 The Reform and Independence of the Commissioners
The Treaty attaches particular importance to the independence of the 
Commission and prescribes both substantive and procedural standards of 
independence. Substantively, Article 17(3) tfeu requires that the members 
of the Commission be selected from persons whose independence is beyond 
doubt. Procedurally, the Treaty provides that in carrying out its responsibili-
ties, the Commission shall be independent. In addition, the members of the 
Commission shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government or 
other institution, body, office or entity. They shall also refrain from any action 
incompatible with their duties or the performance of their tasks. Lastly, Article 
245(1) tfeu requires the member states to respect the Commission’s indepen-
dence and to refrain from influencing them in the performance of their tasks.
The tfeu empowers the President of the Commission to request the resig-
nation of a Member of the Commission.17 Also, Members of the Commission 
no longer fulfilling the conditions required for the performance of their duties 
or guilty of serious misconduct may be compulsorily retired or deprived of 
pension rights or other benefits.18
Important developments concerning the notion of independence have 
been introduced by the Code of Conduct for the Commissioners. The 1999 Code 
of Conduct for Commissioners, adopted after the resignation of the Santer 
Commission, developed the obligations of independence and integrity 
imposed upon the members of the community by the treaties. Following sev-
eral studies concerning the effectiveness of codes of conduct for the holders 
of public office worldwide and within the European Union, President Barroso 
announced his intention to review the Code of Conduct for Commissioners.19
The 2011 Code of Conduct for Commissioners strengthened the notion of inde-
pendence by establishing clearer rules on political activities, on the activities 
 17 Article 17(6) of the Treaty on the Functioniong of the European Union.
 18 Articles 245 and 247 of the Treaty on the Functioniong of the European Union.
 19 Demmke, Christoph, Mark Bovens, Thomas Henökl and Timo Moilanen. Regulating 
Conflicts of Interest for Holders of Public Office in the European Union. Luxembourg: Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2008.
European Parliament. Directorate General For Internal Policies. The Code of Conduct 
for Commissioners – improving effectiveness and efficiency: Study. 2009. Available at 
http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/ document/ activities/ cont/ 200907/ 20090728ATT59122/ 









performed by the commissioners after leaving the Commission and by estab-
lishing a procedure for dealing with the conflicts of interest.20
The 2018 Code of Conduct for Commissioners replaced the previous one 
and has been adopted with the view of integrating the experience gained in 
its application and in order to be “up to the high ethical standards that are 
expected of the Members of the Commission”.21
The 2018 Code of Conduct for Commissioners stresses the fact that the 
Members of the Commission have political responsibility and are collectively 
accountable to the European Parliament. In view of this, the code stresses that 
“members shall behave and perform their duties with complete independence, 
integrity, dignity, with loyalty and discretion” and “shall observe the highest 
standards of ethical conduct”.22 Also, interestingly, the code stipulates that 
members shall not act or express themselves “in a manner which adversely 
affects the public perception of their independence, their integrity or the dignity 
of their office” and shall avoid any situation which may give rise to a conflict of 
interest or which may “reasonably be perceived as such”.23 (emphasis added) 
In case of a conflict of interest, members must recuse themselves from any 
decision or instruction of the file and from the participation in any discussion, 
debate or vote in relation to the matter creating a conflict of interest.24
The code provides for the establishment of the Independent Ethical 
Committee in order to assist the Commission in the application of the Code 
of Conduct.25
9.2 The European Commission as an Autonomous Bureaucracy
The tfeu does not contain any provisions concerning the functioning of the 
European Commission as a bureaucracy. This is surprising, taking into account 
the size and the importance of this administration. The Commission accounts 
 20 European Commission. Code of Conduct for Commissioners. C(2011) 2904 final. 20 
Apr 2011. Available at https:// ec.europa.eu/ info/ sites/ info/ files/ code- of- conduct- for- 
commissioners_ april2011_ en.pdf accessed on 23 February 2021.
 21 European Commission. Commission Decision of 31.1.2018 on a Code of Conduct for the 
Members of the European Commission. C(2018) 700 final, p. 2. Available at https:// 
ec.europa.eu/ info/ sites/ info/ files/ code- of- conduct- for- commissioners- 2018_ en_ 0.pdf 
accessed on 23 February 2021.
 22 European Commission. C(2018) 700 final, quoted above, Article 2.
 23 European Commission. C(2018) 700 final, quoted above.
 24 European Commission. C(2018) 700 final, quoted above, Article 4.
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for 46.6% of the total EU budget for administration and has more than 32,000 
posts of public servants.26
9.2.1 The Autonomy of the European Commission
Carpenter defines autonomy as the capacity of a bureaucracy to “take sus-
tained patterns of action consistent with its own wishes, patterns that will not 
be checked or reversed by elected authorities, organized interests, or courts”.27
The literature on the autonomy of bureaucracies focuses on how power is 
gained, distributed and redistributed in a state. Weber’s model of ideal bureau-
cracy is an apolitical organization separated from the realm of politics. Even 
so, Weber recognized the “pure interest of the bureaucracy in power” and its 
“pure power instinct”.28 Ideal bureaucrats who limit themselves to adminis-
tering policies put in place by politicians are rare, though. Most commonly, 
they are thought to be playing the power game alongside politicians. This ten-
sion between elected and appointed, representative and administrative insti-
tutions leads to the “distinctive puzzle of the contemporary state, reflecting 
as it does the clash between the dual and conflicting imperatives of technical 
effectiveness and democratic responsiveness”.29
The political- bureaucratic interface of the Commission has been a subject of 
research, concern and debate. Günter Verheugen – a politician himself – pre-
sented in harsh terms the problematic relationship between the political and 
the administrative heads of the Commission. He has criticized Commission 
bureaucrats for the “permanent power struggle between the commissioners 
and their high- ranking bureaucrats”, highlighting that “the whole development 
in the last ten years has brought the civil servants such power that in the mean-
time the most important political task of the 25 commissioners is controlling 
this apparatus”.30
 26 European Commission. European Commission Key HR Figures 2019, available at: https:// 
ec.europa.eu/ info/ about- european- commission/ organisational- structure/ commission- 
staff_ en accessed on 23 February 2021.
 27 Carpenter, D. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy 
Innovations in Executive Agencies, 1862– 1928. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001, p. 14.
 28 Weber, Max. “On Bureaucracy.” From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Eds. Hans Gerth and 
C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, p. 233.
 29 Aberbach, J., R. Putnam and B. Rockman. Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western 
Democracies. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981, p. 3.
 30 Manhony, Honor. “Commission bureaucrats are getting too powerful, says Verheugen.” EU 














Although surprising, the affirmation of Günter Verheugen, was not sig-
nalling a novel phenomenon. The relationship between politicians and civil 
servants is one of the most complicated relationships of many governance 
systems because while each has their role in running the public sector, “it 
is often assumed that both have their own goals, interests, resources and 
commitments”.31
As a seminal study on the autonomy of the European Commission has 
shown, “even though the Commission is in many ways a typical Weberian 
bureaucracy, it is also a unique administration with features that set it apart 
from the most national and international public bureaucracies”.32 The auton-
omy of the European Commission stems from the following sources: (1) Formal 
authority granted by law; (2) Legitimacy derived from a combination of tech-
nical expertise and functional monopoly and (3) Organizational culture.33 
The authors argue that the waves of transformation that have affected the 
Commission have not diminished its autonomy. On the contrary, they have 
contributed to the Commission’s increased autonomy vis- á- vis its political 
masters.
9.2.2 The Reform and Independence of the EU Commission’s Civil Service
Curtin describes three categories of civil servants working in the 
Commission: (1) core Eurocrats – civil servants located predominantly in 
the Commission, working either in the Policy Directorates General or in the 
General Secretariat; (2) seconded national experts – national civil servants 
involved in EU policymaking and funded by the national governments; and 
(3) national civil servants and scientific experts – civil servants with technical 
backgrounds.34
The perception of the European civil service has rarely been positive. In fact, 
the perception of “Eurocrats” has been that they “had too much power, that 
they were poor managers, and that their recruitment was mainly the result 
of patronage”.35 Therefore, the 2001 Kinnock reforms described in Section 2.2. 
above, radically reformed the Commission’s management. However, these 
reforms resulted in other, unforeseen consequences.
 31 Wille, Anchrit. “Bridging the Gap: Political and Administrative Leadership in a Reinvented 
Commission.” Institutional Dynamics and the Transformation of Executive Politics in 
Europe. Ed. M. Egeberg. Mannheim: connex Report Series 3, 2007, pp. 7– 41.
 32 Ellinas and Suleiman, op. cit., p. 196.
 33 Ellinas and Suleiman, op. cit., pp. 18– 35.
 34 Curtin, op. cit., pp. 106– 113.
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Wille has criticised the de- professionalisation and, instead, “managerialisa-
tion” of the upper echelons of the Commission’s civil service, as a result of 
which “policy- oriented professionalism is replaced by managerial skills, per-
formance measurement and financial control. The focus for most senior offi-
cials is shifted from a professional policy advisory role with a clear focus on 
content to a role of process management”.36
While the recruitment of senior civil servants in the Commission has been 
removed from the influence of the member states, political capital and previ-
ous experience working for a commissioner played an important role in secur-
ing a position as a Director- General.37 Georgakakis showed that “the adminis-
trators of Europe tend to be involved in a long- term process of construction of 
European social positions, closely linked to European institutions, while those 
who embody their authority – Commissioners – are less and less involved”.38
EU legislation contains significant provisions seeking to ensure that the 
members of the European civil service will act independently and impartially. 
Article 11 of the EU Staff Regulations provides that “an official shall carry out 
his duties and conduct himself solely with the interests of the Union in mind. 
He shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government, authority, 
organisation or person outside his institution. He shall carry out the duties 
assigned to him objectively, impartially and in keeping with his duty of loyalty 
to the Union”.39
Before recruiting an official for an EU institution, the appointing authority 
must examine if the candidate has “any personal interest such as to impair 
his independence or any other conflict of interest”.40 Furthermore, “an official 
may neither keep nor acquire, directly or indirectly, in undertakings which are 
subject to the authority of the institution to which he belongs or which have 
dealings with that institution, any interest of such kind or magnitude as might 
impair his independence in the performance of his duties”.41
Lastly, the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour for Staff of the European 
Commission in their Relations with the Public also calls for the staff “to be cour-
teous, objective and impartial”. This code also asks that “staff shall always act 
 36 Wille (2007), op. cit., p. 23.
 37 Georgakakis, Didier. “Tensions within Eurocracy?” European Consortium of Political 
Research. Aug 2009, Potsdam, Germany.
 38 Georgakakis, op. cit., p. 30.
 39 Regulation No 31 (eec), 11 (eaec), laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials and the 
Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Economic Community 
and the European Atomic Energy Community. oj P 045, 14.6.1962, p. 1385.
 40 Regulation No 31 (eec), quoted above, article 11.














objectively and impartially, in the Community interest and for the public good. 
They shall act independently within the framework of the policy fixed by the 
Commission and their conduct shall never be guided by personal or national 
interest or political pressure”.42
9.2.3 The Directorate- General for Competition
“It is clear that the actual physical task of carrying out an organization’s 
objectives falls to the persons at the lowest level of the administrative 
hierarchy. The automobile, as a physical object, is built not by the engi-
neer or the executive, but by the mechanic on the assembly line. The fire 
is extinguished, not by the fire chief or the captain, but by the team of 
firemen who play a hose on the blaze”.
herbert. a. simon
The Commission is organised into thirty- three departments known as 
Directorates- General (dg s) and eleven services. Every dg is specialised in one 
area. The department specialized in the area of competition law is dg comp, 
which comprises nine sector- based directorates:
Directorate A: Policy and Strategy
 1) Antitrust Case Support and Policy
 2) Mergers Case Support and Policy
 3) State Aid Strategy
 4) European Competition Network
 5) International Relations
 6) Private Enforcement
Directorate B – Markets and Cases i: Energy and Environment
 1) Antitrust: Energy, Environment
 2) State Aid i
 3) State Aid ii
 4) Mergers
Directorate C – Markets and Cases ii: Information, Communication and Media
 1) Antitrust: Telecoms
 2) Antitrust: Media
 42 European Commission. Code of Good Administrative Behaviour: Relations with the Public. 
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 3) Antitrust: it, Internet and Consumer Electronics
 4) State Aid
 5) Mergers
 6) Antitrust: E- commerce and data economy
Directorate D – Markets and Cases iii: Financial Services
 1) Antitrust: Payment Services
 2) Antitrust: Financial Services
 3) Task Force Financial Crisis
 4) State Aid: Financial institutions i
 5) State Aid: Financial institutions ii
 6) State Aid: Financial institutions iii
 7) Mergers
Directorate E – Markets and Cases iv: Basic Industries, Manufacturing and 
Agriculture
 1) Antitrust: Pharma and Health Services
 2) Antitrust: Consumer Goods, Basic Industries, Agriculture and 
Manufacturing
 3) State Aid: Industrial Restructuring
 4) Mergers
 5) Task Force Food
Directorate F – Markets and Cases v: Transport, Post and Other Services
 1) Antitrust: Transport, Post and Other Services
 2) State Aid: Transport
 3) State Aid: Post and Other Services
 4) Mergers
Directorate G – Cartels
 1) Cartels i
 2) Cartels ii
 3) Cartels iii
 4) Cartels iv
 5) Cartels v
Directorate H – State Aids: General Scrutiny and Enforcement
 1) Infrastructure and Regional Aid
 2) R&D&I, ipcei and environment
 3) Fiscal Aid
 4) Enforcement and Monitoring
 5) Tax Planning Practices
Directorate R – Horizontal Management
 1) Registry and Transparency
202 Chapter 9
 2) Finance and Internal Compliance
 3) Information Technology43
dg comp had – as of 31.12.2018 – 799 staff members, including managers, 
case- handlers and assistants.44 dg comp is led by a Director- General, who 
is assisted by three Deputy Director- Generals, one Chief Economist and one 
Principal Adviser. There are also two hearing officers who report directly to the 
Competition Commissioner. The mission of the hearing officers is to ensure 
due process, to safeguard the parties’ procedural rights and to contribute to 
the quality of the decision- making. dg comp stated in 2014 that its staff was 
committed to “adhere to the highest standards of professionalism, intellectual 
rigour and integrity so as to ensure the highest standards in the enforcement 
of competition law”.45
The dg comp highlighted that its mission was to
enable the Commission to enhance consumer welfare in the EU and effi-
ciently functioning markets by protecting competition and promoting a 
competition culture. This is done through the enforcement of competi-
tion rules and through actions aimed at ensuring that regulation takes 
competition duly into account among other public policy interests.46
dg comp publishes Annual Reports on Competition Policy, Annual 
Management Plans and Annual Activity Reports that provide extensive yearly 
information on the work accomplished and the challenges encountered. dg 
comp regularly evaluates its policies and samples of its case work. These eval-
uations represent
constructive- critical, evidence- based judgement of how well an EU mea-
sure (for instance legislation or soft law) adopted a few years ago has 
achieved its stated objectives, by looking at positive and negative aspects 
 43 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. Organigramme of dg 
comp. Available at http:// ec.europa.eu/ dgs/ competition/ directory/ organi_ en.pdf 
accessed on 23 February 2021.
 44 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. 2018 Annual Activity Report. 
Ares(2019)3820496 – 14/ 06/ 2019, p. 62. Available at https:// ec.europa.eu/ info/ sites/ info/ 
files/ comp_ aar_ 2018_ final.pdf accessed on 23 February 2021.
 45 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. Management Plan 2014, 
p. 14. Available at http:// ec.europa.eu/ competition/ publications/ annual_ management_ 
plan/ amp_ 2014_ en.pdf accessed on 23 February 2021.
 46 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. Management Plan 2014, 
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and intended and unintended impacts. It goes beyond a description of 
what has happened and analyses why and how certain impacts occurred. 
It helps the Commission to learn lessons from the past and improve its 
policies and interventions in the future.47
Most evaluations will focus on the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, EU- 
added value and coherence of the legislation or of the adopted measures.
The dg comp officials also offer training courses upon request to govern-
ment officials, especially in relation to newly- adopted legislation.
The European Commission became more image- aware over time and 
invested resources in building and maintaining the image of a European 
administration that is approachable, communicative and responsive. This is 
particularly true about the dg comp that – due to the nature of its work – is 
in constant dialogue with the business and the legal communities in Europe.
In 2010, dg comp commissioned a Eurobarometer Stakeholder Report in 
order to obtain feedback on perceptions of the quality of its activities from 
its most important professional stakeholders: law firms, economic consul-
tancies, business associations, companies, national competition authorities 
and EU Member State governments. A separate report was produced for 
each group and a final, aggregate report, was published in July 2010. The 
study covered all of the dg comp’s enforcement, policy and advocacy activ-
ities, and feedback was sought in particular in relation to the soundness of 
its legal and economic analyses, its transparency and procedural fairness, 
its economic effectiveness, and finally, its communication and international 
advocacy.
The dg comp argued that it would use the findings of the study to achieve 
“more targeted and dynamic communication and interaction with its profes-
sional stakeholders and with the general public” in order to detect “areas of 
possible improvement in its cooperation and interrelations with stakehold-
ers” and prioritise “its projects to achieve a greater impact on the markets”.48 
Finally the findings would serve to measure “its performance in a number of 
fields related to the quality and impact of its work”.49
 47 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. Evaluation. Available at 
http:// ec.europa.eu/ dgs/ competition/ evaluation_ en.htm accessed on 23 February 2021.
 48 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Study: Aggregate Report. July 2010, p. 4. Available at http:// ec.europa.eu/ competition/ 
publications/ reports/ aggregate_ report_ en.pdf accessed on 23 February 2021.
 49 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 








The study enhances the Commission’s image as a flexible, self- critical, com-
municative administration. In addition, its findings are interesting and beg 
closer analysis.
As a general rule, nca s were the least critical of the dg comp’s activi-
ties; they often used words of praise for the Commission’s work in the field of 
competition law. Member state governments, however, often expressed more 
reserved views and offered suggestions concerning possible ways of improving 
the directorate’s work. The most critical stakeholders were, however, the law 
firms, economic consultancies, business associations and companies. These 
offered unique insights into their relationship with the dg comp.
In the field of soundness of legal and economic analysis, the law firms 
praised the expertise of dg comp’s case handlers. However, a majority of 
respondents noted that the clarity of the legal analysis varied according to the 
area of competition policy involved. In cartels, for example, the legal analysis 
can be flawed by the Directorate’s exclusive reliance on the information pro-
vided by leniency applicants.50
Predictability was perceived as a strong point in the Commission’s work in 
the field of competition, with the exception of cartel decisions that seemed 
to be very difficult to predict.51 Other exceptions included instances where 
dg comp changed its views mid- case, thus raising suspicions about political 
influence.52
Predictability of fines was perceived as a strong point, but some stakehold-
ers expressed the view that the current level of fines had increased uncertainty 
for companies and this, in turn, had a negative impact on their accounts, share 
value, image and relationships with creditors.53
The legal community welcomed the increased involvement of economists 
in competition cases, however they also indicated that this impacts the length 
of the case and the data requests placed on the companies.54
 50 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Study: Stakeholder Report: Lawyers. August 2010, p. 7. Available at http:// ec.europa.eu/ 
competition/ publications/ reports/ lawyers_ en.pdf accessed on 23 February 2021.
 51 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Study: Stakeholder Report: Lawyers, quoted above, p. 10.
 52 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Study: Stakeholder Report: Lawyers, quoted above, p. 9.
 53 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Study: Stakeholder Report: Lawyers, quoted above, p. 12.
 54 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
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One of the most criticised aspects of the Commission’s work was its market 
understanding. Law firms complained that the Directorate’s rotation policy, an 
over- academic outlook and lack of business experience affect its understand-
ing of the market. One respondent argued that “even more important than 
their lack of business experience is their lack of business understanding; how 
commercial developments take place, how contracts work. That makes them 
over- suspicious. More practical experience would help”.55 A few respondents 
argued that a way for dg comp to improve its market and business under-
standing is a better communication with other dg s that possess in- depth 
knowledge about their respective fields.56
The dg comp has also been criticised for the lack of transparency in its 
way of handling information before the adoption of the decisions, in particu-
lar requests for information that were sent out with extremely short deadlines 
or before holidays.57 Respondents praised the Commission’s practice of con-
sulting the public on new proposed legislation. However, they also noted that, 
despite wide public participation, the Commission almost never took into 
account the views expressed during this process.
An interesting part of the report refers to the dg comp’s respect of proce-
dural rules. Although the respondents were merely invited to state their views 
on the observance of procedural rules by the Commission, they offered exten-
sive input on the content of these rules as well. The respondents argued that 
the Commission complies with the existing rules, but that the rules themselves 
are “flawed and unfair”. In particular, the fact that no independent, external 
authority was involved in the decision- making process and in the establish-
ment of fines undermined the fairness of the procedure.58
The role of the hearing officer came under fire in particular, with one respon-
dent stating that “the hearing officer made sure that the coffee is served at the 
right time and that the interpreters aren’t too tired. They have no real role”.59
The respondents argued that the burden on business had increased in 
recent years with the dg comp asking more questions. They noted that no 
 55 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Study: Stakeholder Report: Lawyers, quoted above, p. 16.
 56 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Study: Stakeholder Report: Lawyers, quoted above, p. 18.
 57 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Study: Stakeholder Report: Lawyers, quoted above, p. 22.
 58 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Study: Stakeholder Report: Lawyers, quoted above, p. 23.
 59 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 












rules concerning the number and content of the questions existed and that the 
directorate’s case handlers made large use of this instrument. As one respon-
dent put it, “No official ever got sacked for asking questions”.60 They referred to 
the pharmaceutical sector inquiry during which questionnaires were sent out 
every Friday for six months and 200 people worked for five months to meet the 
dg comp’s request for information.61
In the field of economic effectiveness of the Commission’s detection pol-
icy, the respondents criticised the over- reliance on leniency programmes and 
stated that the large fines were beginning to have some negative or counter- 
productive effects.62
The speed of decision- making was the most criticised aspect of the dg 
comp’s work, especially in the field of cartels where timing is of particular 
importance: “Some cartel cases take forever, creating huge commercial uncer-
tainty for the companies concerned. That uncertainty, dragging on for five 
or six years, is a real problem”.63 The legal community also noted that their 
rights of defence “kick in” only after the dg comp issues a statement of objec-
tions. Between the start of the case and the statement of objections though, 
the companies benefit from no procedural rights but have to answer all the 
Commission’s questions.64
Another qualitative study was requested by dg comp to focus on the per-
ceived quality of the dg’s enforcement work (antitrust and cartel, merger and 
state aid control) and policy and advocacy activities.65 The new study tar-
geted the “dg Competition’s professional stakeholders who are knowledge-
able about its work, either by concrete involvement in case work as part of 
dg Competition’s enforcement activities or indirectly, by having influenced or 
benefited from policy work”.66
 60 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Study: Stakeholder Report: Lawyers, quoted above, p. 25.
 61 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Study: Stakeholder Report: Lawyers, quoted above, p. 25.
 62 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Study: Stakeholder Report: Lawyers, quoted above, p. 30.
 63 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Study: Stakeholder Report: Lawyers, quoted above, p. 30.
 64 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Study: Stakeholder Report: Lawyers, quoted above, p. 30.
 65 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Survey: Aggregate Report. December 2014. Available at http:// ec.europa.eu/ competition/ 
publications/ reports/ survey2014/ aggregate_ report_ en.pdf accessed on 23 February 2021.
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On the subject of soundness of legal and economic arguments, some law-
yers noted that the quality of decision- making was dependent on the members 
of the case team and on the personality of the Commissioner. Thus,
prior to Neelie Kroes, Commissioners were considered by several partic-
ipants to act more as administrators and they favoured sound decisions 
that took a long time to be produced. Neelie Kroes and Joaquin Almunia 
were seen by the same participants as politicians who regard competi-
tion law as a means of government and consequently put pressure on 
their staff to deliver faster decisions.67
In the same vein, some companies noted that where political motivations and 
influences were evident, the soundness of legal arguments tended to be less 
clear. Some companies also noted that the Commission occasionally seemed 
to decide the case up front and build legal argument opportunistically.68
The dg comp’s economic analyses were graded highly by the stakehold-
ers and regarded as comprehensive, detailed, and data- driven and therefore 
trusted.69 However, critiques were expressed in relation to staff turnover 
and its impact on market knowledge. Also, some participants proposed the 
appointment of an independent Chief Economist, outside the Commission, to 
provide a more objective view.70
Unlike other topics discussed with the stakeholders which generated 
harmonized or clearly polarized views, highly varied views were expressed 
regarding the transparency of the dg comp’s work at different stages of 
the process and in different types of cases.71 Interestingly, transparency 
was also associated with the independence of data/ information and judge-
ment. The dg comp was perceived as comparing and evaluating its own 
data which led to final decisions lacking independence. One participant 
noted that the
 67 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Survey: Aggregate Report, quoted above, p. 12.
 68 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Survey: Aggregate Report, quoted above, p. 13.
 69 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Survey: Aggregate Report, quoted above, p. 19.
 70 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Survey: Aggregate Report, quoted above, p. 20.
 71 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 












dg Competition does not handle the materials they are receiving (like 
documentation and expert opinions) independently since at the same 
time they also produce their own material which supports their own 
views and there is not an independent party included like there usually 
is in the US [or other countries] – in the court of law there is always a 
court which evaluates independently the opinions of both participants 
and after that reaches its verdict.72
Observance of procedural rules and of fairness standards were criticized more 
than other aspects of the dg comp’s work. Stakeholders noted that, although 
hearings were an opportunity to present a case, very little was seen to change 
as a result. Also, the fact that oral hearings were held late in the process 
meant that their impact on the outcome of the procedure was fairly limited.73 
Although the hearing officer acted independently from the dg comp during 
oral hearings, some stakeholders noted that in cartel cases, the process was not 
satisfactory, as they perceived the dg comp to be acting simultaneously as 
“judge, jury and prosecutor”.74 In addition, certain participants suggested that 
there should be an independent decision- maker for cartel cases.75
Some participants were concerned about the reactive nature of detection 
policy which resulted from dg comp relying heavily on complaints and its 
leniency policy.76 In addition, investigations to detect infringements were per-
ceived as inefficient, because they were too thorough in proportion to the sus-
pected offence.77
Some business associations, companies, lawyers and economic consultan-
cies suggested that sometimes political pressure influences the dg comp in 
choosing which cases to pursue. They argued that “politicians, business lob-
bies or competitors (including other countries) with disruptive intentions 
can all exercise such pressure. For example, one lawyer mentioned that dg 
 72 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Survey: Aggregate Report, quoted above, p. 23.
 73 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Survey: Aggregate Report, quoted above, p. 29.
 74 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Survey: Aggregate Report, quoted above, p. 30.
 75 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Survey: Aggregate Report, quoted above, p. 25.
 76 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Survey: Aggregate Report, quoted above, p. 34.
 77 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
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Competition focuses on the pharmaceutical sector because of political the 
influence, which has as purpose reducing the price of medicines”.78
Settlement and commitment procedures were generally considered effec-
tive, but a few concerns were raised in relation to them. First, participants 
feared that the use of these procedures would lead to a lack of case- law and, 
consequently, a lack of clarity. Second, settlement and commitment proce-
dures could be used by market actors in abusive ways and should be employed 
by the dg comp judiciously. Lastly, these procedures may become arbitrary 
through their lack of precision and insight into how the dg comp reasons.79
 78 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
Survey: Aggregate Report, quoted above, p. 40.
 79 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. dg Competition Stakeholder 
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 chapter 10
The Procedure for Enforcement of Article 101 and 
102 tfeu
Administration is ordinarily discussed as the art of getting things 




In this part chapter, I set out to test whether the European Commission is 
an independent and impartial tribunal when it enforces European compe-
tition law. This question has been prompted by the fact that the European 
Commission appears to cumulate investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative 
functions, and by the growing case- law of the ECtHR that suggests such insti-
tutional set- ups pose a threat to the independent delivery of administrative 
justice. Chapter 9 above was dedicated to understanding the political- bureau-
cratic interface that defines the Commission’s work and the elements that seek 
to guarantee the Commission’s independence at the macro level. The current 
chapter is dedicated to analysing the procedure for the enforcement of Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu and the existing fair trial guarantees.
European competition law has known for a very long time only one enforce-
ment procedure. Under this procedure, the European Commission collected 
evidence concerning an alleged breach of Articles 101 or 102 tfeu and adopted 
a prohibition decision against one or more undertakings, imposing fines or 
remedies.
The development of competition law and policy in Europe has led to the 
adoption of new enforcement procedures that, despite being intended for 
exceptional cases, are widely used by the Commission. These procedures 
include the commitment procedure, under which the Commission will reach 
an agreement with the undertakings involved and will adopt that agreement 
as binding, and the settlement procedure, which can take two forms, informal 
and formal. It is thought that the settlement procedure has eased the burden 
placed on the undertakings. As one author noted
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cartel investigations are comparatively frequent and procedural costs may 
be high because of the multiplicity of parties and languages involved and 
the fact that the average cartel file numbers tens of thousands of pages, 
all of which have to be screened for confidentiality issues, while only a 
few hundred of those pages, on average, are actually used in evidence.1
In the following section I describe the procedure used for the enforcement 
of Articles 101 and 102 tfeu and the Commission’s powers of investigation. 
I conclude with the mapping of the due process guarantees accompanying 
the procedure. The purpose of this mapping exercise is to grasp whether the 
guarantees offered during this procedure are sufficient to conclude that, when 
enforcing EU competition law, the European Commission acts as an indepen-
dent and impartial tribunal.
10.1 The Investigation Phase
10.1.1 Complaints
When the Commission believes that a breach of Articles 101 or 102 tfeu has 
taken place, it may decide to open an investigation. The case may originate 
from a formal complaint, from the Commission’s own initiative (ex officio), or 
from leniency applications submitted by one or more participants in the car-
tel. In addition to this, the Notice on Best Practices points that information 
from citizens and undertakings is important in triggering investigations by the 
Commission and the Commission, therefore, encourages “citizens and under-
takings to inform it about suspected infringements of the competition rules”.2 
Recently, the Commission has created whistleblowing tools that allow individ-
uals to share market information anonymously with the Commission.
Informal complaints – that is information voluntarily offered to the 
Commission outside the framework of a formal investigation – may reach the 
Commission from various sources and in various forms, without creating any 
rights for the person offering the information or duties for the Commission. 
The regulations contain very little guidance as to the legal status of informal 
complaints and the case- law has rarely considered this matter.
 1 Tierno Centella, Maria Luisa. “The New Settlement Procedure in Selected Cartel Cases.” 
Competition Policy Newsletter 3 (2008), p. 31.
 2 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 101 








Very little is known about the number of informal complaints received by 
the Commission, about how this information is stored, accessed and used. 
The same is true about the information received via the whistleblowing tools, 
which are in fact simply an e- mail address and a telephone number.
Formal complaints are complaints that fulfil the formal and substantive con-
ditions required by EU legislation. First, the complaint must be formulated by 
a legal or natural person who has a “legitimate interest” in the case, mean-
ing “any person who could plausibly claim to have suffered as the result of an 
infringement”.3 The following categories of applicants are considered to have 
legitimate interest to lodge a complaint with the Commission: competitors, 
trade unions, trade associations, associations of undertakings, consumer asso-
ciations and even individual consumers. Member states are privileged com-
plainants; they are presumed to have legitimate interest in all cases for which 
they choose to lodge a complaint.
The rules concerning the content of a complaint are enumerated in Article 
7(2) of Regulation 1/ 2003, Article 5(1) of the Implementing Regulation and Form 
C annexed to the latter. The complainant should provide copies of the docu-
ments that prove the allegations or otherwise indicate where the Commission 
can obtain them. The Commission can also dispense the complainant from the 
duty to provide information when it considers that such information does not 
serve the purpose of the case and is therefore irrelevant.
The complainant can request anonymity and provide explanations as to 
why the Commission has to protect its identity. In cases when the Commission 
considers the complainant’s request for anonymity justified, it will not disclose 
the complainant’s identity to the companies concerned. The complainant also 
bears the initial responsibility for identifying the confidential information in 
its complaint or any business secrets.
Complaints do not give rise to an automatic right to obtain a decision. The 
Commission alone has the discretion to decide when to initiate an investigation.
In Automec, the applicant argued that the Commission has the duty to 
investigate all complains. The Court of Justice disagreed with the applicant 
arguing first of all that European Community legislation indeed required the 
Commission to respect some procedural rights of applicants during its inves-
tigations. However, the Commission could not be compelled to carry out an 
investigation. The Court concluded that
 3 European Commission. Dealing with the Commission Notifications: complaints, inspections 
and fact- finding powers under Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty. Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, 1997, p. 18.
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in the case of an authority entrusted with a public service task, the power 
to take all the organizational measures necessary for the performance of 
that task, including setting priorities within the limits prescribed by the 
law – where those priorities have not been determined by the legisla-
ture – is an inherent feature of administrative activity. This must be the 
case in particular where an authority has been entrusted with a supervi-
sory and regulatory task as extensive and general as that which has been 
assigned to the Commission in the field of competition. Consequently, 
the fact that the Commission applies different degrees of priority to the 
cases submitted to it in the field of competition is compatible with the 
obligations imposed on it by Community law.4
The Commission refers to the community interest in order to determine the 
degree of priority to be applied to the complaints it receives. In Automec, the 
Court of Justice made the distinction
that, unlike the civil courts, whose task is to safeguard the individual rights 
of private persons in their relations inter se, an administrative authority 
must act in the public interest. Consequently, the Commission is entitled 
to refer to the Community interest in order to determine the degree of 
priority to be applied to the various cases brought to its notice. This does 
not amount to removing action by the Commission from the scope of 
judicial review, since, in view of the requirement to provide a statement 
of reasons laid down by Article 190 of the Treaty, the Commission cannot 
merely refer to the Community interest in the abstract. It must set out 
the legal and factual considerations which led it to conclude that there 
was insufficient Community interest to justify investigation of the case. It 
is therefore by reviewing the legality of those reasons that the Court can 
review the Commission's action.5
Community interest thus cannot be defined in abstracto; the Commission per-
forms a factual and legal analysis of the particulars of each case. The Court 
indicated that the Commission should, in particular, balance the significance 
of the alleged infringement as regards the functioning of the common market, 
the probability of establishing the existence of the infringement and the scope 
 4 T- 24/ 90, Automec v Commission, ecli:eu:T:1992:97, paragraph 77.






of the investigation required in order to fulfil, under the best possible condi-
tions, its task of ensuring respect for competition law.6
In practice, the Commission has discretion to grant priority to cases which 
present a community interest and reject complaints that do not justify fur-
ther investigation. This initial assessment is not public and very little is known 
about who handles these cases within dg comp and who participates in the 
decision not to investigate.
The Notice on the Handling of Complaints indicates that the number of cri-
teria for the assessment of the community interest to which the Commission 
may refer is not limited, nor is the Commission required to have recourse 
exclusively to certain criteria. As the factual and legal circumstances may dif-
fer considerably from case to case, it is permissible to apply new criteria which 
had not been considered before.7
10.1.2 Allocation of Cases
An important part of the initial assessment performed by the Commission 
is the allocation of cases within the ecn. Regulation 1/ 2003 introduced the 
general principle of parallel competences according to which all competition 
authorities have the power to apply Articles 101 and 102 tfeu. A corollary of 
this principle is the rule that a case could be re- allocated to another network 
member if the latter is better placed to deal with it.
Competence to deal with Article 101 and 102 tfeu complaints may belong 
to one nca, a few nca s in parallel or to the Commission. The Commission may 
not exercise enforcement activities in parallel with other nca s. The Network 
Notice indicates that in most instances, the authority that receives a complaint 
will remain in charge of the case. Re- allocation of cases within the network 
should thus be exceptions and should be performed at the outset of the pro-
cedure.8 The re- allocation procedure should be a quick and effective process 
and not hold up on- going investigations.9 Case re- allocation issues should be 
resolved swiftly, within a maximum of two months from the date when the 
first information about the case is circulated.10
 6 T- 24/ 90, Automec v Commission, quoted above, paragraph 86.
 7 Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 
and 82 of the ec Treaty, oj C 101, 27.4.2004, pp. 65– 77, p. 70.
 8 Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 
and 82 of the ec Treaty, quoted above, p. 65.
 9 Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 
and 82 of the ec Treaty, quoted above, p. 65.
 10 Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 
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The rule on the basis of which the competent authority is chosen is the well 
placed authority to deal with the case. The Network Notice explains that a well- 
placed authority should fulfil the following three cumulative conditions:
 – The agreement of practice has substantial direct actual or foreseeable 
effects on competition within its territory, is implemented within or origi-
nates from its territory;
 – The authority is able to effectively bring to an end the entire infringement, 
i.e., it can adopt cease- and- desist order the effect of which will be sufficient 
to bring an end to the infringement and it can where appropriate, sanction 
the infringement adequately;
 – The authority can gather, possibly with the help of other such authorities, 
the evidence required to prove such infringement.11
The notice indicates that the Commission is particularly well- placed if one 
or several agreements or practices have effects on competition in more than 
three member states (cross- border markets covering more than three member 
states or several national markets).12
The question of forum shopping was raised in France Télécom where the 
undertaking had been fined earlier by the Commission, but complaints against 
it kept being lodged at the Commission.13 The case was investigated by the 
French nca when the Commission requested to investigate its premises.
The Court noted that with regard, first of all, to the division of powers 
between the Commission and the nca s, Regulation No 1/ 2003 put an end 
to the previous centralised regime and, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, established a wider association of nca s, authorising them to 
implement European Community competition law for this purpose. However, 
the scheme of the regulation relies on the building- up of close cooperation 
between the Commission and the competition authorities of the member 
states organised as a network, the Commission being given responsibility for 
determining the detailed rules for such cooperation. Furthermore, the reg-
ulation does not call into question the general power that the Commission 
is acknowledged to enjoy by the case- law. The Court concluded that “the 
Commission in effect has very wide powers of investigation under Regulation 
No 1/ 2003 and is in any event entitled to decide to initiate proceedings relating 
to an infringement, which entails removing the case from the Member State’s 
 11 Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 
and 82 of the ec Treaty, quoted above, p. 66.
 12 Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 
and 82 of the ec Treaty, quoted above, p. 66.








competition authorities. The Commission thus retains a leading role in the 
investigation of infringements”.14 In fact, it may take over a case even when a 
national authority is investigating it, provided that the Commission explains 
to the national authority and to the other members of the network the reasons 
for the takeover.15
The Court has also considered the content of the obligation to cooperate 
in good faith within the ecn. The Court found that “the principle of cooper-
ation means that the Commission and the national competition authorities 
may, at least in the preliminary stages of the cases with which they deal, work 
in parallel”.16
Commenting on the France Télécom case, Monti argued that the ecj had yet 
to pronounce itself about the operation of the re- allocation of cases system, 
but in its judgments, it has given strong indications that the Commission enjoys 
extensive powers over nca s. He concluded that the competence to apply com-
petition law in the EU is not parallel, but concurrent: “the nca has the power to 
apply EU competition law only up to the point when the Commission decides 
to exercise its powers. At that moment the Member States’ executive compe-
tence is suspended”.17
10.1.3 Initial Assessment and Duty of Vigilance
Lodging a complaint with the European Commission alleging an infringement 
of EU competition law triggers what is called the duty of vigilance. Van Bael has 
written that the duty of vigilance means that the Commission “should examine 
the facts and legal arguments put forward carefully and impartially in order to 
decide whether the competition rules of the Treaty were infringed in a given 
case”.18
The European Courts themselves do not use the term “duty of vigilance”, but 
note that the Commission is obliged “to examine carefully the factual and legal 
particulars brought to its notice by the complainant in order to decide whether 
they disclose conduct of such a kind as to distort competition in the common 
market and affect trade between Member States”.19
 14 T- 339/ 04, France Télécom v Commission, quoted above, paragraph 79.
 15 T- 339/ 04, France Télécom v Commission, quoted above, paragraph 85.
 16 T- 339/ 04, France Télécom v Commission, quoted above, paragraph 86.
 17 Monti, Giorgio. “Legislative and Executive Competences in Competition Law.” The 
Question of Competence in the European Union. Ed. Loic Azoulai. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014, p. 116.
 18 Van Bael, op. cit., p. 122.
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Turning now to the assessment itself of complaints that the Commission 
has to perform, the gc identified three stages in Automec I. This practice was 
gradually consolidated into the legislation.
First, following the submission of a complaint, the Commission has to col-
lect the information that will serve as the basis for the decision that it will 
later adopt. The Court explained that this “stage may include inter alia an 
informal exchange of views and information between the Commission and 
the complainant with a view to clarifying the factual and legal issues with 
which the complaint is concerned and to allowing the complainant an oppor-
tunity to expand on his allegations in the light of any initial reaction from 
the Commission”.20 At this stage, the Commission may give an initial reac-
tion to the complainant allowing the latter an opportunity to understand the 
Commission’s point of view and to expand on the allegations in light of that 
initial reaction.21
The Court notes that the preliminary observations made by Commission 
officials in the context of informal contacts cannot be regarded as measures 
open to challenge.22
During the second stage, the Commission may investigate the case further 
with a view to initiating proceedings. Where the Commission considers that 
there are insufficient grounds for acting on the complaint, it will inform the 
complainant of its reasons and offer the complainant the opportunity to sub-
mit any further comments within a time limit which it fixes.23
The Court of Justice ruled that this notification is similar to a statement of 
objections. However, whereas the statement of objections must guarantee the 
observance of the right to a fair hearing, the notification under discussion “is 
intended to defend the procedural rights of the complainants, which are, how-
ever, not as far- reaching as the right to a fair hearing of the companies which 
are the object of the Commission’s investigation”.24 The Court added that it 
was clear from the judgment in ibm that the statement of objections was not 
a decision, but merely a procedural measure preparatory to the final decision. 
Thus, “if that is true of the statement of objections, the legal importance of 
 20 T- 64/ 89, Automec v Commission, ecli:eu:T:1990:42, paragraph 45.
 21 Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 
and 82 of the ec Treaty, quoted above, p. 71.
 22 T- 64/ 89, Automec v Commission, quoted above, paragraph 45.
 23 Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 
and 82 of the ec Treaty, quoted above, p. 71.












which is greater than that of the notification (…), it follows that the latter can-
not be treated as a decision either”.25
The direct consequence of this is that such notifications cannot be chal-
lenged before the Courts because this might move the European judicature to 
arrive at a decision on questions upon which the Commission had not yet had 
an opportunity to state its position. This would not only anticipate the argu-
ments on the substance of the case and confuse different administrative and 
judicial procedural stages, but would also
be incompatible with the system of the division of powers between the 
Commission and the Courts of the European Communities, with the 
system of remedies laid down by the Treaty and also with the require-
ments of the sound administration of justice and the proper course of 
the administrative procedure to be followed by the Commission.26
If the complainant fails to make known its views within the time limit set by 
the Commission, the complaint is deemed to have been withdrawn. In all other 
cases, in the third stage of the procedure, the Commission takes cognisance of 
the observations submitted by the complainant and either initiates a proce-
dure against the subject of the complaint or adopts a decision rejecting the 
complaint.27 The Commission must reason its decision, but it is not obliged to 
respond to all arguments raised by the complainant. The decision adopted by 
the Commission at this stage of the procedure can be challenged under Article 
263 tfeu before the European Courts.
Van Bael argues that a Commission’s decision to reject a complaint does not 
have a res judicata value, as nca s, national courts and even the Commission 
itself at a later stage might reopen the proceedings and find an infringement 
on the same facts.28
Finally, the Notice on the Handling of Complaints provides that through-
out the procedure, complainants benefit from procedural rights. However, 
proceedings of the Commission in competition cases do not constitute adver-
sarial proceedings between the complainant on the one hand and the compa-
nies which are the subject of the investigation on the other hand. Accordingly, 
the procedural rights of complainants are less far- reaching than the right 
 25 T- 64/ 89, Automec v Commission, quoted above, paragraph 46.
 26 T- 64/ 89, Automec v Commission, quoted above, paragraph 46.
 27 Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 
and 82 of the ec Treaty, quoted above, p 71.
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to a fair hearing of the companies which are the subject of an infringement 
procedure.29
10.1.4 Possible Outcomes of the Investigation Phase
Once the Commission has reached a preliminary view of the main issues raised 
by a case, different procedural paths may be envisaged.
 (1) Prohibition Procedure: The Commission may decide to proceed towards 
the adoption of a statement of objections with a view to adopting a pro-
hibition decision relating to all or some of the issues identified at the 
opening of proceedings.
 (2) Commitment Procedure: The parties subject to the investigation may 
consider offering commitments which address the competition con-
cerns arising from the investigation, or at least show their willingness to 
discuss such a possibility; in that case, the Commission may decide to 
engage in a discussion with a view to reaching a commitment decision.
 (3) Decision to Close the Case: The Commission may decide that there are 
no grounds to continue the proceedings with regard to all or some of 
the parties and close the proceedings accordingly. If the case originated 
from a complaint, the Commission shall, before closing the case, give 
the complainant the possibility to express their views.30
10.2 Prohibition Procedure
10.2.1 Opening of Proceedings and Statement of Objections
When an initial assessment performed by the Commission leads to a conclu-
sion that there is a case that warrants further investigation, the Commission 
will open the proceedings. The opening of the proceedings is a formal proce-
dural step provided for by Article 11(6) of the Regulation 1/ 2003.
Van Bael has argued that during the investigation phase, the parties are 
often in an “uncomfortable situation” as they usually have no precise knowl-
edge of the reasons for or scope of the investigation. He writes that, “in the 
course of the investigation, the undertakings have many obligations but very 
few rights. They are the subject of the investigation, but not really actors in it”.31
 29 Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 
and 82 of the ec Treaty, quoted above, p 71.
 30 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu, quoted above, p. 20.











However, this changes with the formal opening of the proceedings, which 
in the case of cartel investigations coincides with the formulation of the state-
ment of objections.32 The opening of the proceedings signals the commitment 
on the part of the Commission to further investigate the case and to allocate 
resources for dealing with it in a timely manner.33
In addition, the opening of proceedings signals the allocation of the case 
within the ecn.34
The opening of the proceedings will also situate the case in time and iden-
tify the persons affected. It will describe the scope of the investigation, the 
territory and the sectors investigated and the behaviour that constitutes the 
alleged infringement.35 On certain occasions, the Commission will issue a 
press release to inform the public about its decision to open an investigation. 
The opening of the proceedings does not limit the right of the Commission to 
extend the scope and/ or the addressees of the investigation at a later point in 
time.36
The importance of the opening of the proceedings is further highlighted by 
the way in which the Commission communicates its decision to the public. 
First, the Commission will inform the parties to the investigation, sufficiently 
in advance, of its intention to make the opening of the investigation public. 
This communication can take place orally or in writing and is intended to 
allow the parties to prepare in advance for questions from the press or from 
the public.
Second, if the Commission decides to make the opening of the proceedings 
public, it can do so on the website of the Directorate- General for Competition 
and issue a press release. When such communications risk harming the inves-
tigation, the Commission has the discretion to keep the investigation away 
from the public eye.
Due to the important consequences of publishing such information in the 
press, the Commission emphasises that the opening of proceedings does not 
prejudge in any way the existence of an infringement. It merely indicates that 
 32 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu, quoted above, p. 12.
 33 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu, quoted above, p. 11.
 34 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu, quoted above, p. 11.
 35 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu, quoted above, p. 11.
 36 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
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the Commission will pursue the case further. This important clarification will 
be mentioned in the decision opening the proceedings (notified to the par-
ties), as well as in all public communications concerning the opening of the 
case.37
The statement of objections is signed by the Director- General of dg comp. 
The Notice on Best Practices states, however, that the adoption of a statement 
of objections does not prejudge the final outcome of the investigation.38
It is interesting to note that the language used by the Notice on Best Practices 
clearly suggests that the purpose of the statement of objections is to protect 
the participants’ rights of defence:
Before adopting a decision adversely affecting the interests of an 
addressee, in particular, a decision finding an infringement of Article 101 
and 102 tfeu and ordering its termination and/ or imposing fines, the 
Commission will give the parties subject to the proceedings the opportu-
nity to be heard on the matters to which the Commission has objected. 
The Commission will do this by adopting a statement of objections, 
which is notified to each of the parties subject to the proceedings.39
The statement of objections marks the passage towards a stage of the proceed-
ings in which the undertakings that are being investigated have procedural 
rights. The dormant rights of defence are awakened from this point until the 
end of the proceedings.
When additional objections are issued or the intrinsic nature of the infringe-
ment with which an undertaking is charged is modified, the Commission shall 
notify this to the parties in a supplementary statement of objections and fix a 
new time limit for the reply to it.40
The procedural rights which are triggered by the adoption of the statement 
of objections apply mutatis mutandis where a supplementary statement of 
objections is issued, including the right of the parties to request an oral hearing. 
 37 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu, quoted above, p. 11.
 38 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu, quoted above, p. 20.
 39 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu, quoted above, p. 21.
 40 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 










Access to all evidence gathered between the initial statement of objections 
and the supplementary statement of objections will also be provided.41
The statement of objections should inform the addressee not only about 
the Commission’s conclusions and the evidence gathered during the investi-
gation, but also about the consequences of being identified as a party to the 
proceedings.
First, if the Commission intends to impose remedies on the parties, in accor-
dance with Article 7(1) of Regulation 1/ 2003, the statement of objections will 
indicate the remedies envisaged that may be necessary to bring the suspected 
infringement to an end. The information provided to the parties should be suf-
ficiently detailed to allow them to defend themselves as to the necessity and 
proportionality of the remedies envisaged. When the Commission intends to 
impose structural remedies, the statement of objections will explain the rea-
sons for which structural remedies are preferred over behavioural remedies.42
Second, the statement of objections should clearly indicate whether the 
Commission intends to impose fines on the undertakings, should the objections 
be upheld, in accordance with Article 23 of Regulation 1/ 2003. In such cases, 
the statement of objections will refer to the relevant principles laid down in 
the guidelines on setting fines. In the statement of objections, the Commission 
should indicate the essential facts and matters of law which may result in the 
imposition of a fine, such as the duration and gravity of the infringement and 
whether the infringement was committed intentionally or by negligence. The 
statement of objections should also mention, in a sufficiently precise manner 
and to the extent possible, the aggravating and attenuating circumstances.43
The Commission has the discretion to include in the statement of objections 
further matters relevant to the subsequent calculation of fines, such as the rel-
evant sales figures to be taken into account and the year(s) that will be con-
sidered for the value of such sales. Such information may also be provided to 
the parties following the issuing of the statement of objections. In both cases, 
if the Commission chooses to provide such information, the parties will be 
provided with an opportunity to comment.
As shown above, the Commission is not bound in any way by the conclu-
sions spelled out in the statement of objections. However, if the Commission 
 41 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu, quoted above, p. 26.
 42 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu, quoted above, p. 26.
 43 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
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intends to depart from them in its final decision or to disadvantage the under-
takings by the remedies or the fines imposed, it has the duty to inform the 
undertakings of the changed course of action in order to offer the undertak-
ings the possibility to defend themselves.
The Commission might also inform the parties that, in exceptional cases, 
it may, upon request, take account of the undertaking’s inability to pay and 
reduce or cancel the fine that might otherwise be imposed if that fine would 
irretrievably jeopardise the economic viability of the undertaking. This is an 
important safeguard for undertakings that can be triggered by lodging an 
inability to pay request and providing detailed and up- to- date financial infor-
mation to support their request. The inability to pay request offers a new 
opportunity to the parties to bring further relevant information to the atten-
tion of the Commission, but also offers the Commission the opportunity to 
have access to new information about the undertakings that are investigated.
The decision to open proceedings has been delegated to the Competition 
Commissioner.44 As explained above, this decision cannot be challenged in 
the European Courts because this might result in the judicial branch reaching 
a decision before the Commission.
10.2.2 Language Requirements
Language is an important aspect of every legal procedure. Although not rec-
ognised as limit on the Commission’s investigative powers, or as a defence 
right, EU competition law legislation contains extensive provisions concerning 
the language of the proceedings. First, the documents which the Commission 
sends to an undertaking based in the European Union should be drafted in the 
language of the member state in which the undertaking is based. Second, the 
documents which an undertaking sends to the Commission may be drafted in 
any one of the official languages of the European Union selected by the sender. 
The reply and subsequent correspondence should be drafted in the same lan-
guage. However, in order to avoid delays due to translation, the addressees may 
waive their right to receive the text in the language of the member state in 
which the undertaking is based and opt for another language. Duly authorised 
language waivers can be given for some specific documents or for the whole 
procedure.45
 44 Rules of Procedure of the Commission [C(2000) 3614], oj L 308, 8.12.2000, pp. 26– 34, 
Article 13.
 45 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 







During the investigation phase, the language requirements are less strict 
and the Commission may send simple requests for information in the lan-
guage of the addressee’s location or in English and attach the questionnaire 
in English. The addressee must also be clearly informed – in the language of 
the addressee’s location – of its right to obtain a translation of the cover letter 
and/ or questionnaire into the language of the addressee’s location, as well as 
the right to reply in that language. This practice allows for more expeditious 
treatment of information requests, while preserving the rights of addressees.46
In the later stages of the procedure, though, the Commission has the duty to 
communicate in the authentic language of the addressee. Thus, the statement 
of objections, the preliminary assessment and the decisions adopted pursu-
ant to Articles 7, 9 and 23(2) of Regulation 1/ 2003 should be notified in the 
authentic language of the addressee unless it has signed the above- mentioned 
language waiver. The reply and all subsequent correspondence addressed to 
the complainant should be in the language of their complaint.47
Finally, participants in the oral hearing may request to be heard in an EU 
official language other than the language of proceedings. In that case, interpre-
tation should be provided during the oral hearing, as long as sufficient advance 
notice of this requirement is given to the hearing officer.48
10.2.3 In- depth Analysis Prior to the Adoption of a Prohibition Decision
When the Commission acquires new evidence that will be used in a decision, it 
must bring this to the attention of the parties concerned by a letter of facts. The 
letter of facts gives undertakings the opportunity to provide written comments 
on the new evidence within a fixed time limit. A request for an extension of 
this time limit may be made by way of a reasoned request to the Commission. 
If the Directorate- General for Competition and the addressee disagree about a 
requested extension, the addressee may refer the matter to the hearing officer 
by means of a reasoned request.49 If a letter of facts is issued, access would in 
general be granted to evidence gathered after the statement of objections up 
to the date of the said letter of facts. However, in cases where the Commission 
 46 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu, quoted above, p. 12.
 47 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu, quoted above, p. 12.
 48 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu, quoted above, p. 12.
 49 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 










Procedure for Enforcement of Article 101 and 102 tfeu 225
intends to rely only upon specific evidence that concerns one or a limited 
number of parties and/ or isolated issues (in particular those regarding the 
determination of the amount of the fine or issues of parental liability), access 
would be provided only to the parties directly concerned and to the evidence 
relating to the issue(s) in question.50
Only the documents mentioned in the statement of objections may be 
treated as admissible evidence against an undertaking. This point was raised in 
ici in which the applicant company complained that, when the Commission 
sent it the statement of objections, it did not send it all the documents on 
which it based the decision and that the Commission thus made it impossible 
for them to explain their contents. The Court highlighted that according to its 
case- law,
the important point is not the documents as such but the conclusions 
which the Commission has drawn from them, and if those documents 
were not mentioned in the statement of objections, the undertaking con-
cerned was entitled to take the view that they were of no importance for 
the purposes of the case. By not informing an undertaking that certain 
documents would be used in the Decision, the Commission prevented 
it from putting forward at the appropriate time its view of the probative 
value of such documents. It follows that those documents cannot be 
regarded as admissible evidence.51
The translation of the facts discovered into legal reasoning is an important step 
in every procedure. The intermediate legal interpretation of facts offered by the 
Commission to the undertakings in its statement of objections can, however, 
be transformed, adapted or given up in the final legal reasoning put forward 
in the decision. This issue was raised in the case of Mannesmannrohren- Werke 
where the applicant undertaking complained that the discrepancy in legal rea-
soning between the statement of objections and the Commission’s Decision 
breached its rights of defence. In that regard, the Court noted that
the legal classification of the facts made in the statement of objections 
can, by definition, be only provisional, and a subsequent Commission 
decision cannot be annulled on the sole ground that the definitive 
conclusions drawn from those facts do not correspond precisely with 
 50 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu, quoted above, p. 26.






that intermediate classification. The Commission is required to hear 
the addressees of a statement of objections and, where necessary, to 
take account of any observations made in response to the objections 
by amending its analysis specifically in order to respect their rights of 
defence.52
The Notice on Best Practices explains that throughout the procedure, the 
Directorate- General for Competition endeavours to offer the parties, on its 
own motion or upon request, “ample opportunity for open and frank dis-
cussions – taking into account the stage of the investigation – and to make 
their points of view known”.53 This is achieved by organizing state of play 
meetings, triangular meetings and meetings with the Commissioner or the 
Director- General.
State of play meetings can be offered to the parties being investigated for 
the purpose of contributing to the “quality and efficiency of the decision- mak-
ing process and to ensure transparency and communication”.54 In the context 
of cartel proceedings, one state of play meeting will be offered after the oral 
hearing. Furthermore, two specific state of play meetings will be offered in 
the context of procedures leading to commitment decisions and to complain-
ants where the Commission has opened proceedings under Article 11(6) of 
Regulation 1/ 2003 and intends to inform the complainant that it will reject its 
complaint by formal letter.55
State of play meetings can be conducted at the Commission’s premises or 
held by telephone or videoconference. They are chaired by the Director- General, 
Deputy Director- General or by the responsible head of unit.
Triangular meetings are meetings held between the Directorate- General for 
Competition, the undertakings being investigated and the complainant and/ or 
third parties. The purpose of triangular meetings is “to verify the accuracy of fac-
tual issues of all the parties in a single meeting (…) for example, where two or more 
opposing views or information have been put forward as to key data or evidence”.56 
 52 T- 44/ 00, Mannesmannrohren- Werke v Commission, quoted above, paragraph 100.
 53 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu, quoted above, p. 17.
 54 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu, quoted above, p. 18.
 55 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu, quoted above, p. 18.
 56 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
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Triangular meetings are chaired by the Director- General or Deputy Director-  
General.57
Lastly, the Notice on Best Practices states that
it is normal practice to offer senior officers of the parties subject to the 
proceedings and the complainant an opportunity to discuss the case 
either with the Director- General for competition, the Deputy Director- 
General for antitrust, or if appropriate, with the Commissioner responsible 
for Competition. The senior officers may be accompanied by their legal 
and/ or economic advisors.58 (emphasis added)
Once the Commission has finished collecting and assessing the facts, and once 
the parties concerned have had an opportunity to challenge them orally or in 
writing, the Commission may adopt a prohibition decision. The Commission 
established a few checks and balances in order to ensure that all relevant views 
and evidence are properly taken into account before a final decision is adopted, 
and that the assessment proposed by the case team is sound and takes account 
of parties’ arguments.59 At the same time, these checks and balances are part 
of the Commission’s internal deliberation process and the documents pro-
duced during these deliberations are generally not part of the accessible file.
The internal checks and balances to the dg comp put in place are (1) the 
chief economist, (2) peer review, (3) the hearing officer, (4) the legal service 
and other associated Commission services and (5) the advisory committee.
The chief economist’s task is to assist in evaluating the economic impact of 
the Commission’s actions in the field of competition, and to provide guidance 
on issues of economics and econometrics in the application of EU competi-
tion rules. The chief economist contributes to individual competition cases, in 
particular in cases involving complex economic issues and quantitative anal-
ysis. At the request of the legal service, the chief economist assists with cases 
pending before the Court of Justice of the European Union.60
 57 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu, quoted above, p. 19.
 58 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu, quoted above, p. 19.
 59 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. Proceedings for the appli-
cation of Articles 101 and 102 tfeu: Key Actors and Checks and Balances. Page 2. Available 
at http:// ec.europa.eu/ competition/ antitrust/ key_ actors_ en.pdf accessed on 23 February 
2021.
 60 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. Proceedings for the applica-










Peer review was initially used in complex merger cases, but was later 
extended to other types of in- depth investigation.61
The Commission explains that peer review is an instrument intended to 
provide a “fresh pair of eyes” to look at all or certain aspects of the assess-
ment performed by the case team. It is the Director- General, together with the 
Commissioner, who decide which cases will be reviewed by peer review panel. 
A peer review team is appointed for this purpose.
The organisation of the panel and the members of the peer review team are 
not made public and the peer review of a case does not involve the parties. The 
peer review team is granted full access to the file and the case team.
The aim of the Peer Review Panel is to have an open discussion on the line 
proposed by the case team. The Panel will “either identify areas where further 
work is necessary; identify objections that should be dropped; recommend 
that the case is not pursued further; or recommend that the case team con-
tinue with the case on an unchanged basis. The Panel’s recommendations are 
purely internal and are not disclosed to the parties to the proceedings, com-
plainants or any other third party”.62
The findings and recommendations of the Panel are reported to the Director- 
General, who is then responsible for making a proposal to the Commissioner 
that reflects all available evidence and analysis.
The Hearing Officers are appointed by the President of the Commission 
for the purpose of ensuring that procedural rights are safeguarded during 
the proceedings. The hearing officer organises and conducts the oral hear-
ing and reports to the Competition Commissioner on it. Generally, the 
hearing officer may present to the Competition Commissioner observa-
tions on any matter arising out of the proceedings. He/ she also prepares 
a final report to the College of Commissioners before the final decision is 
taken.63
dg comp must also consult the Commission’s legal service and other dg  s 
responsible for the products, services or policy areas concerned in a particular 
case.64
 61 Van Bael, Ivo and Jean- François Bellis. Competition Law of the European Community. 
Bruxelles: Kluwer Law International, 2005, p. 11.
 62 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. Proceedings for the applica-
tion of Articles 101 and 102 tfeu: Key Actors and Checks and Balances, quoted above.
 63 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. Proceedings for the applica-
tion of Articles 101 and 102 tfeu: Key Actors and Checks and Balances, quoted above, p. 3.
 64 European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. Proceedings for the applica-









Procedure for Enforcement of Article 101 and 102 tfeu 229
Finally, Article 14(1) of Regulation 1/ 2003 indicates that the Commission 
shall consult an Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant 
Positions prior to the taking of any decision concerning:
 – A finding and termination of infringement;
 – Interim measures;
 – Commitment decisions;
 – A finding of inapplicability of Article 101 or 102;
 – Imposition of fines;
 – Final imposition of a periodic penalty; or
 – The withdrawal of the benefit of a block exemption in individual cases.
The Advisory Committee is composed of representatives of the competition 
authorities of the member states. For meetings in which issues other than indi-
vidual cases are being discussed, an additional member state representative 
competent in competition matters may be appointed.65
Although the Commission shall take the utmost account of the opin-
ion delivered by the advisory committee, it is not bound by it. However, the 
Commission shall inform the committee of the manner in which its opinion 
has been taken into account.66 In addition, where the advisory committee 
delivers a written opinion, this opinion shall be appended to the draft decision.
10.2.4 Formal Adoption of a Prohibition Decision
The final step towards the adoption of a prohibition decision – after the inves-
tigation and decision- making phases – is the formal adoption of the decision. 
Article 4 of the Rules of Procedure provides that the Commission’s decisions 
can be taken at meetings, or, alternatively, by written procedure, by empower-
ment or by delegation.
The written procedure is provided for in Article 12 of the Rules of Procedure 
of the Commission. This procedure implies that the text of the proposal be 
circulated in writing to all Members of the Commission with a time limit 
within which members must make known any reservations or amendments 
they wish to make. Proposals on which no Member of the Commission has 
made reservations, with which the Directorates- General directly involved are 
 65 Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, quoted above, arti-
cle 14(2).
 66 Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 








in agreement and which are endorsed by the legal service, shall stand adopted 
by the Commission.
Van Bael notes that due to the heavy workload of the Commission, most 
competition decisions are adopted by the Commission without any debate, by 
the written procedure.67 Schwarze has noted that the written procedure “raises 
no doubts of a legal nature, since it preserves the basic responsibility of all com-
missioners and merely alters the voting procedure in a way that is not crucial”.68
An illustration of written procedure can be found in Buchler, wherein the 
applicants complained that the Commission’s decision should be declared 
invalid due to the fact that the Commissioners had not received a complete file 
of the case. The Court replied that the Members of the Commission received 
complete and detailed information regarding the essential points of the case 
and had access to the entire file.69
Alternatively, Article 13 of the Rules of Procedure provides that the 
Commission might – provided that the principle of collective responsibility is 
fully respected – empower one or more of its Members (1) to take management 
or administrative measures on its behalf; (2) to adopt the definitive text of any 
instrument or proposal to be presented to other institutions the substance of 
which has already been determined in discussion; or (3) to subdelegate the 
above- mentioned powers to the Directors- General and Heads of Service.
The empowerment and delegation procedures appear to be more prob-
lematic. Except for the brevity and expediency of their formulation, Schwarze 
highlighted that the legitimacy of the transfers of power is problematic because 
they diminish “the responsibility of the collegiate body as a whole”.70
After the formal adoption of a decision by the College of Commissioners, 
the Commission will notify the decision to the parties and will publish it in the 
Official Journal of the European Union.
10.3 Commitments Procedure
Article 9(1) of Regulation 1/ 2003 stipulates that
where the Commission intends to adopt a decision requiring that an 
infringement be brought to an end and the undertakings concerned 
 67 Van Bael, op. cit., p. 210.
 68 Schwarze, op. cit., p. 1209.
 69 C- 44/ 69, Buchler & Co. v Commission, ecli:eu:C:1970:72, paragraph 22.
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offer commitments to meet the concerns expressed to them by the 
Commission in its preliminary assessment, the Commission may by deci-
sion make those commitments binding on the undertakings. Such a deci-
sion may be adopted for a specified period and shall conclude that there 
are no longer grounds for action by the Commission.
The main difference between a prohibition decision pursuant to Article 7 and 
a commitment decision pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation 1/ 2003 is that the 
former contains a finding of an infringement while the latter makes the com-
mitments binding without a statement of infringement. A commitment deci-
sion will conclude, however, that, in light of the commitments offered, there 
are no longer grounds for action by the Commission. Moreover, unlike Article 
7 decisions, commitments are offered by undertakings on a voluntary basis.71 
Former Commissioner Almunia stated that “commitments invite a coopera-
tive attitude on the part of the companies, which I always regard as a good 
thing”.72
Commissioner Almunia noted that both the undertakings and the 
Commission benefit from pursuing this procedure. On the one hand, most 
companies involved in anti- competitive practices accept the commitment pro-
cedure and go for the solution that can best protect their interests and reputa-
tion, allowing for a faster closing of the case and without a formal acceptance 
of wrongdoing. The Commission on the other hand, appreciates the swiftness 
and flexibility that the commitment procedure brings.73
It is for the undertakings to approach dg comp to explore the Commission’s 
readiness to pursue the case with the aim of reaching a commitment deci-
sion. The commitments may be offered from the moment of the initiation of 
the proceedings until the moment when the Commission adopts a decision, 
although undertakings will be encouraged to open the floor for discussing 
commitments as early as possible.
Once the undertakings have expressed an interest in discussing com-
mitments, dg comp will indicate the timeframe within which the discus-
sions on potential commitments should be concluded and will present to 
them the preliminary competition concerns arising from the investigation. 
 71 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu, quoted above, p. 26.
 72 European Commission. Joaquin Almunia. Remedies, Commitments and Settlements in 
Antitrust. Speech, 8 Mar 2013. Available at http:// europa.eu/ rapid/ press- release_ SPEECH- 
13- 210_ en.htm accessed on 23 February 2021.








Although neither Regulation 1/ 2003, nor the Implementing Regulation 
define what the elements of a preliminary assessment should be, in prac-
tice it is a written letter addressed to the undertaking(s) concerned in which 
the Commission describes the facts, the behaviour under scrutiny, the legal 
basis of the decision and the competition law concerns that justify the adop-
tion of a decision.
The Commission must conduct a market test of the proposed commitments 
before making them binding by decision. The Commission will only conduct 
a market test if it considers that the commitments offered prima facie address 
the competition concerns identified. The Commission must publish in the 
Official Journal of the European Union a market test notice containing a con-
cise summary of the case and the main content of the commitments, whilst 
respecting the obligations of professional secrecy. It will also publish on the dg 
comp’s website the full text of the commitments in the authentic language. In 
order to enhance the transparency of the process, the Commission will also 
publish a press release setting out the key issues of the case and the proposed 
commitments.74
There is no time limit to these negotiations; in difficult cases the negotia-
tions can continue until the very last minute.
If the undertakings are unwilling to submit an amended version of the com-
mitments, the Commission can revert to the Article 7 procedure.
If an agreement is reached, the Commission will adopt a decision pursuant 
to Article 9(1) of Regulation 1/ 2003 making the commitments binding and thus 
enforceable.
10.4 Procedure for Rejection of Complaints
The Commission may, after appropriate assessment of the factual and legal 
circumstances of an individual case, reject a complaint. The rejection of com-
plaints can be justified by (1) insufficient grounds for acting; (2) lack of compe-
tence or (3) lack of evidence.
If the Commission, after careful examination of a case, comes to the pre-
liminary conclusion that it should not pursue the case, it will inform the com-
plainant in a meeting or by phone that it has come to the preliminary view 
that the case should be rejected. This gives the opportunity to the complainant 
 74 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
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to withdraw its complaint. Otherwise, the Commission will inform the com-
plainant by a formal letter of its preliminary findings and set a time limit for its 
written observations. In this context, the complainant has the right to request 
access to the documents on which the Commission bases its provisional 
assessment.75
If the complainant does not answer the Commission’s letter, the com-
plaint will be considered to be withdrawn on the basis of Article 7(3) of the 
Implementing Regulation. If the complainant replies by providing information 
that does not change its preliminary assessment, the Commission will reject 
the complaint by a decision on the basis of Article 7(2) of the Implementing 
Regulation.
10.5 Settlement Procedures
There are currently two settlement procedures used by the Commission: the 
informal settlement procedure and the formal settlement procedure.
Very little is known about the procedure by which the Commission infor-
mally settles competition law cases. Van Bael has estimated that more than 
90% of infringement cases are closed using the informal settlement proce-
dure.76 He argues that informal settlements take place “in a purely negotiated 
and informal way, without any clear procedural steps and usually with very 
limited publicity”.77 He concludes that “the core weakness of informal settle-
ments is that they do not lead to any formal decision”.78
Another author has highlighted that despite the introduction of the com-
mitment procedure, the Commission still continues, as before the entry into 
force of Regulation 1/ 2003, to settle cases informally, provided it considers 
such a solution appropriate in its antitrust enforcement action.79 The author 
puts forward the example of the case where the Commission welcomed the 
new iPhone policies announced by Apple. Formal antitrust proceedings were 
commenced against Apple in 2007 in cases comp/ 39154 po/ iTunes and comp/ 
 75 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu, quoted above, p. 29.
 76 Van Bael, op. cit., p. 290.
 77 Van Bael, op. cit.
 78 Van Bael, op. cit., p. 292.
 79 Cavicchi, Piero. “The European Commission’s Discretion as to the Adoption of Article 
9 Commitment Decisions: Lessons from Alrosa.” Discussion paper// Europa- Kolleg 
Hamburg, Institute for European Integration 3 (2011), p.5. Available at http:// hdl.handle.













39174 Which/ iTunes, before the Commission decided to close them in light of 
Apple’s announcement that it would equalise prices for downloading songs 
from its iTunes online store in Europe.80
The European Commission introduced the formal settlement procedure in 
2008 as a package comprising:
 – Commission Regulation (ec) No 622/ 2008 of 30 June 2008 amending 
Regulation (ec) No 733/ 2004, as regards the conduct of settlement proce-
dures in cartel cases; and
 – Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of 
the adoption of Decisions pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council 
Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 in cartel cases which describes the new proce-
dure in detail.
The rationale for these legislative changes, as explained in their preambles, 
is three- fold and includes: (1) the need for a simplified procedure; (2) the 
need to acknowledge and reward the parties voluntarily cooperating with the 
Commission and thus promote a culture of cooperation; and (3) the need to 
reduce litigation before the European Courts in cartel cases.
The Competition Commissioner commented at the time of the adoption of 
the package that
this new settlement procedure will reinforce deterrence by helping the 
Commission deal more quickly with cartel cases, freeing up resources 
to open new investigations. Companies which are convinced that the 
Commission can prove their involvement in a cartel, will also benefit 
from quicker decisions and a fine reduction.81
The settlement procedure applies only to cartel cases. As pointed out “since 
cartels are deliberate, flagrant infringements, in such cases the debate between 
the suspect companies and the Commission focuses on the scope and accu-
racy of the facts and on the value and extent of evidence in the file”.82 Indeed, 
due to the fact that discussions about intent, market definition, pro and 
 80 European Commission. “Antitrust: European Commission Welcomes Apple’s 
Announcement to Equalise Prices for Music Downloads from iTunes in Europe.” Press 
Release Database ip/ 08/ 22. 9 Jan 2008. Available at http:// europa.eu/ rapid/ press- release_ 
IP- 08- 22_ en.htm accessed on 23 February 2021.
 81 European Commission. “Antitrust: Commission Introduces Settlement Procedure for 
Cartels.” Press Release Database ip/ 08/ 1056. 30 Jun 2008. Available at http:// europa.eu/ 
rapid/ press- release_ IP- 08- 1056_ en.htm accessed on 23 February 2021.







Procedure for Enforcement of Article 101 and 102 tfeu 235
anti- competitive effects are missing, the settlement discussions “are not meant 
to extract more evidence but to debate the preliminary findings and the evi-
dence already gathered by the Commission”.83
The Commission Notice on Settlement describes the six stages of the formal 
settlement procedure in cartel cases: (1) investigation as usual; (2) exploratory 
steps regarding settlement; (3) bilateral rounds of settlement discussions; (4) set-
tlement; (5) ‘settled’ statement of objections; and (6) ‘settlement’ decision.84
As a normal investigation takes place before the settlement phase, settle-
ments do not mean “investigative shortcut”. On the contrary, “the Commission 
enters into this phase only when it has sufficient elements to proceed with the 
case in standard procedure”.85
There is no monopoly on the right to propose the settlement of the case; 
either of the parties or the Commission may express interest in this proce-
dure. The Commission, however, has a broad margin of discretion to choose 
the cases which are suitable for settlement, to decide to engage in settlement 
discussion, to discontinue them or to pursue the settlement procedure until 
the end.86 A general principle, though, is that the settlement procedure can-
not be imposed on the parties.87 The Commission’s broad margin of discretion 
in the settlement procedure extends to the reasons for choosing to take the 
path of settlement. In this regard, account may be taken of the probability of 
reaching a common understanding regarding the scope of the potential objec-
tions in light of the provisional calendar, the number of parties involved and 
the foreseeable conflicting positions. The Commission’s decision may also be 
informed by the prospect of achieving efficiencies and the possibility of creat-
ing a precedent.88
 83 Tierno Centella, op. cit., p. 31.
 84 Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of the adoption of 
Decisions pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 in 
cartel cases, oj C 167, 2.7.2008, pp. 1– 6.
 85 Laina, Flavio, and Elina Laurinen. “The EU Cartel Settlement Procedure: Current Status 
and Challenges.” Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 4.4 (2013): pp. 302– 
311, p. 2.
 86 Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, quoted above, pream-
ble 4.
 87 Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of the adoption of 
Decisions pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 in 
cartel cases, quoted above, p. 1.
 88 Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 















When the Commission decides to explore the parties’ interest to engage 
in settlement discussions, it will set a time limit of a minimum of two weeks 
within which the parties may express in writing their interest in pursuing this 
procedural option.
The next stage of the settlement procedure comprises bilateral rounds of 
settlement discussions that start when one or a few parties make a request 
to settle. The bilateral rounds of discussions move gradually toward a more 
intense exchange of information between the Commission and the parties. 
The Commission retains the discretion to determine the appropriateness of 
the pace, the timing of disclosing evidence and the potential fine.89 No formal 
records of the settlement discussions are kept at this stage because this “allows 
the parties to have frank exchanges and helps protect confidentiality of settle-
ment discussions”.90
Laina and Laurinen acknowledged that this is “a challenging process, as 
intensive and confidential bilateral discussions are carried out in parallel with 
all parties and consensus must be reached with all of them”.91 They emphasise 
that by no means is participation in settlement discussions synonymous with 
an admission of an infringement, a conclusion that can only be reached at the 
end of the bilateral discussions.92
During the discussions, parties may submit technical papers or ‘non- papers’ 
which address various technical aspects of the case in order to facilitate the 
discussions, but which cannot be used as evidence.93
After the bilateral discussions, parties may introduce a formal request to set-
tle in the form of a settlement submission. The settlement submissions should 
contain the following elements: (1) a clear and unequivocal acknowledgement 
of the of the parties’ liability for the infringement, including the main facts, 
their legal qualification, the role played by the party in the infringement, and 
the duration of their participation; (2) the maximum amount of the fine that 
the party foresees and that they would accept; (3) a statement that they have 
been sufficiently informed and that they had sufficient opportunity to make 
their views known; (4) a statement that they do not envisage requesting access 
to the file or to be heard in the oral hearing; and (5) the parties’ agreement to 
 89 Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of the adoption of 
Decisions pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 in 
cartel cases, quoted above, p. 3.
 90 Tierno Centella, op. cit., p. 33.
 91 Laina and Laurinen, op. cit., p. 3.
 92 Laina and Laurinen, op. cit.
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receive the statement of objections and the final decision in an agreed lan-
guage of the European Union.94 The settlement request is an important step 
and, once the party makes it, it cannot be withdrawn.
The Commission retains the right, after the receipt of the settlement request, 
to adopt a statement of objections that reflects the parties’ settlement request 
and thus continue the settlement procedure or to disregard the request and 
adopt a prohibition decision.
However, after the parties’ replies to the statement of objections confirming 
their commitment to settle, the Commission may proceed to the adoption of 
the final decision pursuant to Articles 7 and/ or 23 of Regulation 1/ 2003.95 The 
cooperation towards settlement will be mentioned by the Commission in its 
final decision. When the Commission decides to reward the party for settle-
ment, it will reduce the fine by 10%.96
Settlement decisions are adopted in the same way as prohibition decisions. 
They will include a finding of an infringement and a fine.
One author concluded that the Settlement Package shows that the 
Commission “does not rest on its laurels, but actively searches for ways to 
maintain and improve its performance and record against a moving target, so 
that its enforcement efforts increase deterrence against cartel behaviour”.97
 94 Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of the adoption of 
Decisions pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 in 
cartel cases, quoted above, p. 3.
 95 Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of the adoption of 
Decisions pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 in 
cartel cases, quoted above, p. 4.
 96 Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of the adoption of 
Decisions pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 in 
cartel cases, quoted above, p. 5.
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 chapter 11
The Commission’s Powers of Investigation
11.1 Sanctions
One of the most important powers of the European Commission is the power 
to sanction the undertakings that breach Articles 101 or 102 tfeu. A retrospec-
tive view on the Commission’s fining practice indicates that in the early years 
of European competition law, the fines for breaches of cartel legislation or for 
abuses of dominant position were low. Legal certainty was a concept foreign to 
the European Commission as shown by the Commission’s change of heart start-
ing with the well- known decision in Pioneer adopted by the Commission in 1980.1 
By 1991 however, the Commission was ready to make full use of Regulation 17 and 
impose fines of up to 10% of the annual turnover of the companies involved. In the 
recent years, the fines imposed by the Commission have raised many eyebrows, 
until it became clear that a fine of 1 billion Euros would no longer be an exception.
The cjeu has consistently held that the Commission benefits from a large 
margin of discretion when it comes to calculating and imposing fines for breach 
of Articles 101 and 102 tfeu. The reproach, however, was that the method of 
setting the fine should be a transparent one, so as to enable the addressee to 
understand how the Commission reached that amount and to grasp the con-
nection between the behaviour that is reproached and the fine that is imposed. 
In one of those critiques, the Court held that
the Commission must, if it systematically took into account certain basic 
factors in order to fix the amount of fines, set out those factors in the 
body of the decision in order to enable the addressees of the decision to 
verify that the level of the fine is correct and to assess whether there has 
been any discrimination.2
In response to these critiques, the Commission issued in 1998 its first fining 
guidelines.3 These guidelines were intended to
 1 C- 100/ 80, Musique Diffusion française v Commission, quoted above.
 2 T- 347/ 94, Mayr- Melnhof Kartongesellschaft v Commission, paragraph 285.
 3 Information from the Commission – Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed 
pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ecsc Treaty, oj C 9, 
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ensure the transparency and impartiality of the Commission’s decisions, 
in the eyes of the undertakings and of the Court of Justice alike, whilst 
upholding the discretion which the Commission is granted under the rel-
evant legislation to set fines within the limit of 10% of overall turnover. 
This discretion must however follow a coherent and non- discriminatory 
policy which is consistent with the objectives pursued in penalizing 
infringements of the competition rules.4
In 2006, the Commission issued a revised version of the fining guidelines to 
further develop and refine its policy on fines.5 The Commission stressed in the 
introduction that the power to impose fines on undertakings or associations of 
undertakings which, intentionally or negligently, infringe on Article 101 or 102 
of the tfeu
is one of the means conferred on it in order for it to carry out the task of 
supervision entrusted to it by the Treaty. That task not only includes the 
duty to investigate and sanction individual infringements, but it also 
encompasses the duty to pursue a general policy designed to apply, in com-
petition matters, the principles laid down by the Treaty and to steer the con-
duct of undertakings in the light of those principles. For this purpose, the 
Commission must ensure that its action has the necessary deterrent effect. 
(…) Fines should have a sufficiently deterrent effect, not only in order to 
sanction the undertakings concerned (specific deterrence) but also in order 
to deter other undertakings from engaging in, or continuing, behaviour that 
is contrary to Articles 81 and 82 of the ec Treaty (general deterrence).6
The European courts have also considered the question of the legal value of 
the fining guidelines in view of their soft law nature. The cjeu found in Dansk 
Rorindustry and Others that
in adopting such rules of conduct and announcing by publishing them that 
they will henceforth apply to the cases to which they relate, the institution 
in question imposes a limit on the exercise of its discretion and cannot 
 4 Information from the Commission – Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pur-
suant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ecsc Treaty, quoted above, 
introductory paragraph.
 5 Guidelines of method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 
1/ 2003, quoted above.
 6 Guidelines of method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 








depart from those rules under the pain of being found, where appropriate, 
to be in breach of the general principles of law, such as equal treatment or 
the protection of legitimate expectations. It cannot therefore be excluded 
that, on certain conditions and depending on their conduct, such rules 
of conduct, which are for general application, may produce legal effects.7
Article 23 of Regulation 1/ 2003 holds that fines can be imposed for two types 
of breaches: (1) fines for procedural infringements and (2) fines for substantive 
breaches of European competition law.
Articles 23(1) of the Regulation on Procedure indicates that the Commission 
may impose by decision a fine for the following behaviours: supply of incorrect 
or misleading information in response to a request made by the Commission, 
or disrespect of the time limit to provide the information; production of the 
required books or other records related to the business in incomplete form 
during an inspection or refusal to submit to an inspection; refusal to answer 
questions during an inspection; or breaking of seals.
Despite the Commission’s large use of its fining powers, the instances where 
Article 23(1) is applied are rare. It is more likely that the Commission will con-
sider the behaviours described above as aggravating circumstances under 
Article 23(2).
Article 23(2) enumerates the situations in which the Commission may 
impose fines for breach of substantive competition rules: infringement of 
Article 101 or Article 102 tfeu; contravention of a decision ordering interim 
measures under Article 8 of Regulation 1/ 2003; and failure to comply with a 
commitment made binding by a decision pursuant to Article 9.
Turning now to the method of calculating the fines, the Commission will first 
establish the basic amount that will then be adjusted to take into consideration 
all the aggravating or mitigating factors. The Commission may also add a specific 
increase for deterrence, making sure, however, that the fine does not exceed the 
10% ceiling. On rare occasions, the Commission will also take into account the 
undertaking’s inability to pay the fine due to economic or social hardship.
11.2 Leniency
The Commission’s practice in the field of leniency was launched in 1996 by 
the introduction of the Leniency Notice.8 This was subsequently updated in 
 7 C- 189/ 02 P, Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, ecli:eu:C:2005:408, paragraph 212.
 8 Commission Notice on the non- imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases, oj C 207, 
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2002.9 A second update followed shortly after in 2006.10 The three leniency 
programmes in force so far have been successful. From 1996 until 2002, more 
than eighty leniency applications were lodged under the 1996 Leniency Notice 
and sixteen out of eighteen cartel decisions adopted by the Commission during 
this time were triggered by leniency applications.11 Under the 2002 Leniency 
Notice, the Commission received 104 applications for full immunity and 99 
applications for reductions of fines.12
The 2006 Leniency Notice provides for two procedures: full immunity from 
fines and reduction of fines.
The Commission can grant immunity from any fine which would otherwise 
have been imposed on an undertaking disclosing its participation in an alleged 
cartel affecting the internal market, provided that it is the first to submit infor-
mation and evidence which can enable the Commission to carry out a targeted 
inspection or find an infringement in connection with the alleged cartel.1314
Immunity can be granted pursuant to Article 8(a) of the Leniency Notice if, 
at the time of the submission, the Commission had not already had sufficient 
evidence to adopt a decision to carry out an inspection in connection with the 
alleged cartel or had already carried out such an inspection.15
The leniency applicant must provide, first of all, a corporate statement which 
must include a detailed description of the alleged cartel arrangement, includ-
ing its aims, activities and functioning; the product or service concerned, the 
geographic scope, the duration of and the estimated market volumes affected 
by the alleged cartel; the specific dates, locations, content of and participants 
in alleged cartel contacts; and all relevant explanations in connection with 
the pieces of evidence provided in support of the application. Second, the 
application must include the name and address of the undertaking submit-
ting the immunity application as well as the names and addresses of all the 
 9 Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, oj C 45, 
19.2.2002, p. 3– 5.
 10 Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, 
quoted above.
 11 Arbault, François and Francisco Peiro. “The Commission’s New Notice on Immunity and 
Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases: Building on Success.” Competition Policy Newsletter 2 
(June 2002): pp. 15– 22.
 12 European Commission. Report on Competition Policy 2006. Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 2007, p. 12.
 13 Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, quoted 
above, p. 18.
 14 Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, quoted 
above, p. 18.















other undertakings that are involved with the alleged cartel. Third, the appli-
cant must provide the names, positions, office locations and home addresses 
of all individuals who are currently or have been involved in the past with the 
alleged cartel. Fourth, the leniency applicant must inform the Commission 
about other competition authorities, inside or outside the EU, which have been 
approached or would be approached in relation to the alleged cartel. Lastly the 
leniency applicant must provide other evidence in its possession or available 
to it at the time of the submission, including in particular any evidence con-
temporaneous to the alleged infringement.16
The corporate statement is the central piece of any immunity or reduction 
of fines application. The Commission defines it as “a voluntary presentation by 
or on behalf of an undertaking to the Commission of the undertaking’s knowl-
edge of a cartel and its role therein prepared specially to be submitted under 
this Notice”.17 The corporate statement cannot be retracted once submitted 
and it forms part of the Commission’s file. It can be presented either in written 
form or orally.
Immunity can be granted pursuant to Article 8(b) if the Commission does 
not already have enough evidence to find an infringement and that no under-
taking had already been granted immunity under Article (8)(a) in connection 
with the alleged cartel. Thus, in order to qualify for immunity, the undertak-
ing lodging a leniency application must be the first to lodge such a request or 
would otherwise not qualify for immunity.
The undertakings have a duty to cooperate with the Commission genu-
inely, fully, on a continuous basis and expeditiously from the time they submit 
the application throughout the Commission’s administrative procedure. The 
undertaking must also end their involvement in the alleged cartel immediately, 
except for what involvement would, in the Commission’s view, be reasonably 
necessary to preserve the integrity of the inspections.18
The Commission can grant immunity status to only one undertaking 
involved in an alleged cartel, however it can also grant a few reductions of 
fines to the undertakings that do not qualify for immunity. Thus, undertakings 
disclosing their participation in an alleged cartel affecting the internal market 
 16 Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, quoted 
above, p. 18.
 17 Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, quoted 
above, p. 21.
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that do not meet the conditions for immunity may otherwise be eligible to 
benefit from a reduction of fine.19
In order to qualify for a reduction of fine, the undertaking making the request 
must provide the Commission with evidence of the alleged infringement which 
represents significant added value with respect to the evidence already in the 
Commission’s possession and must meet the cumulative conditions set out 
above. The Leniency Notice defines the concept of “added value” as referring “to 
the extent to which the evidence provided strengthens, by its very nature and/ 
or its level of detail, the Commission’s ability to prove the alleged cartel”.20 To 
perform this assessment, the Leniency Notice indicates that the Commission
will generally consider written evidence originating from the period of 
time to which the facts pertain to have a greater value than evidence subse-
quently established. Incriminating evidence directly relevant to the facts in 
question will generally be considered to have a greater value than that with 
only indirect relevance. Similarly, the degree of corroboration from other 
sources required for the evidence submitted to be relied upon against other 
undertakings involved in the case will have an impact on the value of that 
evidence, so that compelling evidence will be attributed a greater value than 
evidence such as statements which require corroboration if contested.21
The first undertaking to provide significant added value will receive a fine 
reduction ranging from 30– 50% of the fine which would otherwise be 
imposed. The second undertaking will receive a reduction of 20– 30%, and the 
subsequent undertakings will receive reductions of up to 20%.22
11.3 Sector Inquiries
The Commission has the power to investigate sectors of the economy and 
types of agreements. Article 17 of the Regulation 1/ 2003 provides that
 19 Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, quoted 
above, p. 20.
 20 Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, quoted 
above, p. 20.
 21 Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, quoted 
above, p. 20.












where the trend of trade between Member States, the rigidity of prices 
or other circumstances suggest that competition may be restricted or 
distorted within the common market, the Commission may conduct its 
inquiry into a particular sector of the economy or into a particular type 
of agreements across various sectors. In the course of that inquiry, the 
Commission may request the undertakings or associations of undertak-
ings concerned to supply the information necessary for giving effect to 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and may carry out any inspections neces-
sary for that purpose.23
The Commission can request the disclosure of any agreement, decision or con-
certed practice that it considers necessary.
Former Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes explained that sector 
inquiries are to be launched in areas where there appear to be sustained com-
petition problems, possibly due to competition infringements, with the possi-
bility for introducing better regulation in a sector which is key for consumers 
and for competitiveness.24
The Commission publishes a preliminary report on the results of its inquiry 
and invites comments from interested parties.25 A final report is then released, 
taking stock of the findings and the views expressed by the third parties in 
writing or during an oral hearing.
The Commission has increasingly relied on sector inquiries in recent years, 
with inquiries authorised in the media sector, the energy sector, the financial 
services sector and the pharmaceutical sector.
Van Bael points out that “sector inquiries are first of all an information- 
gathering exercise that provides the Commission with in- depth knowledge 
about markets and is therefore ‘upstream’ of proceedings in specific cases. The 
knowledge gained about the market can form the basis of specific enforce-
ment initiatives at a later stage”.26
 23 Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, quoted above, arti-
cle 17(1).
 24 European Commission. Neelie Kroes. Fact- based Competition Policy – the Contribution of 
Sector Inquiries to Better Regulation, Priority Setting and Detection. Speech, 26 Mar 2007. 
Available at http:// europa.eu/ rapid/ press- release_ SPEECH- 07- 186_ en.pdf accessed on 23 
February 2021.
 25 Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, quoted above, arti-
cle 17(1).
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The decision to authorise a sector inquiry can be challenged before 
the cjeu.
11.4 Requests for Information
The Commission can, by simple request or by decision, require undertakings 
and associations of undertakings to provide all information necessary for the 
performance of its investigative duties.27
When the Commission sends a simple request for information to an under-
taking or association of undertakings, it states the legal basis and the purpose 
of the request, specifies what information is required and fixes the time limit 
within which the information is to be provided. The Commission also informs 
the undertakings about the penalties provided for in Article 23 in cases of sup-
plying incorrect or misleading information.28 The Commission also indicates the 
right of the undertaking to have the decision reviewed by the Court of Justice.29
The Commission forwards a copy of the request for information to the govern-
ment and national competition authorities concerned, which in turn provide 
the Commission with all the necessary information for the performance of its 
duties.30
The Commission invites the addressees of the request for information to 
identify in their replies any information that contains business secrets or other 
confidential information.
11.5 The Power to Take Statements
Article 19 of Regulation 1/ 2003 provides that the Commission may interview 
any natural or legal person who consents to be interviewed for the purpose of 
 27 Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, quoted above, arti-
cle 18(1).
 28 Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, quoted above, arti-
cle 18(2).
 29 Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, quoted above, arti-
cle 18(3).
 30 Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 













collecting information relating to the subject- matter of an investigation.31 The 
Commission has to inform the person of the voluntary nature of the interview 
and of its intention to record it.32 The interview may be conducted face- to- 
face, by telephone or by electronic means.33
When the interview is granted at the premises of an undertaking, the 
Commission must inform the competition authority of the member state in 
whose territory the interview takes place. If so requested by the competition 
authority of that member state, its officials must assist the Commission in con-
ducting the interview.34
11.6 Powers of Inspection
Article 20 of Regulation 1/ 2003 contains extensive provisions concerning the 
Commission’s powers of inspection. The regulation strengthened these pow-
ers, confirming that the Commission’s right to inspection includes the powers:
 – to enter any premises, land and means of transport of undertakings and 
associations of undertakings;
 – to examine the books and other records related to the business, irrespective 
of the medium on which they are stored;
 – to take or obtain in any form copies of or extracts from such books or 
records;
 – to seal any business premises and books or records for the period and to the 
extent necessary for the inspection; and
 – to ask any representative or member of staff of the undertaking or associa-
tion of undertakings for explanations on facts or documents relating to the 
subject- matter and purpose of the inspection and to record the answers.35
 31 Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, quoted above, arti-
cle 19(1).
 32 Regulation No 17 First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, quoted 
above, article 3(1).
 33 Regulation No 17 First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, quoted 
above, article 3(2).
 34 Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, quoted above, arti-
cle 19(2).
 35 Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
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There is no limit as to the number of officials and other accompanying persons 
who are authorised to perform the inspection. They will, however, exercise 
their powers upon production of a written authorisation specifying the subject 
matter and purpose of the inspection and the penalties provided for in Article 
23 in case the production of the required books or other records related to the 
business is incomplete or where the answers to questions asked under para-
graph 2 of the present Article are incorrect or misleading.36 The decision must 
specify (a) the subject matter and purpose of the inspection, (b) the date of the 
inspection, (c) the penalties provided for in Articles 23 and 24 and (d) the right 
to have the decision reviewed by the cjeu. The Commission shall take such 
decisions after consulting the competition authority of the member state in 
whose territory the inspection is to be conducted.37
The undertakings and associations of undertakings must submit to inspec-
tions ordered by decisions of the Commission.
 36 Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, quoted above, arti-
cle 20(3).
 37 Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
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 chapter 12
Limits on the Commission’s Powers of Investigation
Two general rules limit or interrupt the Commission’s powers of investiga-
tion: (1) general EU law principles and (2) the duty to respect the rights of the 
defence.
12.1 General Principles of Limitation
The powers of investigation of the European Commission have been increas-
ing over the years. The European courts have developed or adapted general 
principles of European law to limit, frame or render more predictable the use 
of the Commission’s powers. However, these principles appear to be moral 
statements and desiderates rather than rules that can tame the Commission’s 
powers, and indeed the European courts have rarely relied on them to annul 
the Commission’s decisions. Despite this, the importance of the general princi-
ples of limitation cannot be denied. First of all, they form the context in which 
the Commission operates and interacts with other EU institutions and with 
the undertakings. Second, they are common signposts that identify the not 
always obvious limits of power of the European Commission. Lastly and most 
importantly they are applicable to all EU competition law enforcement proce-
dures in the EU. Even when due process is weak, as in the case of commitment 
procedures and settlements, the Commission is still bound by these general 
principles of EU law.
12.1.1 The Principle of Proportionality
The principle of proportionality is a general principle of EU law, expressly 
worded in Article 49(3) of the Charter which requires that the measures 
adopted by European Union institutions must not exceed what is appro-
priate and necessary for attaining the objective pursued. When there is a 
choice between several appropriate measures, the least onerous must be 
chosen. The disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims 
pursued.1
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Applying the principle of proportionality, the ecj stated in Dow Chemicals 
Iberica and Others that every investigation by the Commission must be 
“necessary”.
The Court noted that
in all the legal systems of the Member States, any intervention by the pub-
lic authorities in the sphere of private activities of any person, whether 
natural or legal, must have a legal basis and be justified on the grounds 
laid down by law, and, consequently, those systems provide, although in 
different forms, protection against arbitrary or disproportionate inter-
vention. The need for such protection must be recognized as a general 
principle of Community law. In that regard, it should be pointed out that 
the Court has held that it has the power to determine whether measures 
of investigation taken by the Commission under the ecsc Treaty are 
excessive.2
The Court later explained that both the investigation as such and the 
Commission’s specific discovery principles can be assessed against the propor-
tionality principle, in order to ensure that they “do not constitute, in relation 
to the aim pursued by the investigation in question, a disproportionate and 
intolerable interference”.3
12.1.2 The Principle of Territoriality
The European Commission is competent to investigate breaches of competi-
tion law that have occurred within the territory of the EU. However, due to 
the way in which businesses are currently located and working, this issue 
is far from being settled. In particular, the question arose as to whether the 
Commission can request information and documents from a company that is 
situated outside the territory of the EU. The Commission explained it has
only limited powers to obtain information from firms situated outside 
the EU. Under international law, the Commission is not empowered to 
conduct investigations outside the bounds of its territorial competence 
if they would infringe upon the national sovereignty of the non- mem-
ber country in whose territory it was purporting to act. In such cases, the 
 2 C- 97/ 87, Dow Chemical Ibérica and Others v Commission, ecli:eu:C:1989:380, paragraph 16.
 3 C- 94/ 00, Roquette Frères v Directeur général de la concurrence, de la consommation et de la 








Community can send out requests for information, but it cannot impose 
sanctions if a firm fails to comply. One option open to the Commission is 
to direct a request for information to a subsidiary of a non- EU firm which 
is based in the EU.4
12.1.3 The Duty to Act within a Reasonable Time
The Commission’s investigations cannot last indefinitely; a decision must be 
reached within a reasonable time. The European Court of Justice has rec-
ognised the duty to act within a reasonable time as a general principle of com-
munity law and a corollary of the principle of sound administration.5
This principle is also now expressly mentioned in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights which states in its Article 41(1) that “every person has the right to have 
his or her affairs handled within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies of the Union”. The Charter does not distinguish between 
a general duty of the European institutions to act within reasonable deadlines 
and a special, more severe duty of the European Commission when it investi-
gates market breaches under Articles 101 and 102 tfeu. Neither do the Charter, 
the Treaty or the European courts impose any deadlines on the Commission 
for investigating or closing cases. The European courts, however, will perform a 
case- by- case analysis in light of certain criteria such as the context of the case 
and its complexity, the conduct of the parties and of the Commission, and the 
interest of the undertakings concerned.
12.1.4 Duty to State Reasons
The duty to state reasons is an important principle of EU law that is now 
enshrined in Article 296 tfeu and Article 41(2) of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, which provides for the obligation of the administration to give reasons 
for its decisions.
In investigations covering Articles 101 and 102 tfeu, the Commission has 
a duty to give reasons both for its findings and for the penalties imposed. 
The European Court of Justice held, in a case concerning state aid, that the 
Commission is required to deliver its reasons in a clear and unequivocal fash-
ion so as to
enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure 
and to enable the competent court to exercise its power of review. The 
 4 European Commission. Dealing with the Commission Notifications: complaints, inspections 
and fact- finding powers under Articles 85 and 86 of the eec Treaty, quoted above, p. 22.
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requirement to state reasons must be appraised by reference to the cir-
cumstances of each case. The question whether the statement of reasons 
meets the requirement of Article 253 ec must be assessed with regard not 
only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules govern-
ing the matter in question.6
12.2 The Rights of the Defence
 12.2.1. The Right to Be Heard
The notification of the statement of objections to the undertakings concerned 
triggers the right to be heard, which is one of the pillars of the rights of the 
defence in European competition law. The right to be heard in European com-
petition law has two aspects that complement each other: (a) the written com-
ments and (b) the oral hearing.
Regulation 1/ 2003 ensures that before taking decisions as provided for in 
Articles 7, 8, 23 and 24(2), the Commission must give the undertakings or 
associations of undertakings which are the subject of the proceedings the 
opportunity to be heard on the matters to which the Commission has taken 
objection. This is of crucial importance as the Commission can base its deci-
sions only on objections on which the parties concerned have been able to 
comment.7
The right to be heard is not guaranteed by Regulation 1/ 2003 in commit-
ment proceedings. In settlement proceedings, the right to be heard is guaran-
teed by Regulation 622/ 2008.
The parties concerned must be informed about all the objections raised 
against them in the statement of objections that must be sent to each party. 
The Commission must also set a time limit within which they can react to 
these objections. The concerned parties should prepare and send their reply, 
which can describe the facts that support or go against the Commission’s asser-
tions. They can also attach evidence in support of their allegations. Finally, 
 6 T- 95/ 03, Asociación de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio de la Comunidad Autónoma 
de Madrid and Federación Catalana de Estaciones de Servicio v Commission of the European 
Communities, ecli:eu:T:2006:385, paragraph 108.
 7 Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules 
on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, quoted above, article 27.
Commission Regulation (ec) No 773/ 2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of pro-
ceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty Implementing 








they can propose that the Commission hears persons who may corroborate the 
facts set out in their submission.8
Aside from the parties concerned, the Commission can also hear in writing 
the complainants and other third parties. Complainants should be associated 
closely with the proceedings.9 When the Commission has issued a statement 
of objections relating to a matter in respect of which it has received a com-
plaint, it must provide the complainant with a copy of the non- confidential 
version of the statement of objections and set a time limit within which the 
complainant may make known its views in writing.10
The Commission may also decide to hear third parties that have either been 
identified by the parties concerned or by the member states, or are deemed 
by the Commission to have an interest in the proceedings. Third parties may 
themselves request to be heard when they have an interest in the proceedings. 
Such applications to be heard shall, where they show a sufficient interest, be 
granted.11
As to the right to be heard orally, the interested parties can request an oral 
hearing before or, at the latest, when submitting their reply to the statement 
of objections.12
The Commission sets up the date of the oral hearing and invites the parties 
concerned or other interested third parties that the Commission will admit to 
the hearing. The Commission also invites the competition authorities of the 
member states to take part in the oral hearing. It may likewise invite officials 
and civil servants of other authorities of the member states.13
 8 Commission Regulation (ec) No 773/ 2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of pro-
ceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the ec Treaty Implementing 
Regulation, quoted above, article 10.
 9 Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, quoted above, article 27.
 10 Commission Regulation (ec) No 773/ 2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of pro-
ceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the ec Treaty Implementing 
Regulation, quoted above, article 6(1).
 11 Council Regulation (ec) No 1/ 2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, quoted above, arti-
cle 27(3).
 12 Commission Regulation (ec) No 773/ 2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of pro-
ceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the ec Treaty Implementing 
Regulation, quoted above, article 12.
 13 Commission Regulation (ec) No 773/ 2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of pro-
ceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the ec Treaty Implementing 
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The hearing officer organizes and conducts the hearing. He fixes the date, 
the duration and the place of the hearing. He ensures that the oral hearing pro-
vides addressees of the statement of objections, other involved parties, as well 
as complainants and interested third persons which have been admitted to the 
oral hearing, with sufficient opportunity to express and develop their views.14 
In order to ensure the proper preparation of the oral hearing, the hearing offi-
cer can, after consulting the director responsible, supply in advance to the per-
sons invited to the hearing a list of questions which might be raised during the 
hearings. He can also indicate to the persons invited to the hearing the focal 
areas for debate, having regard, in particular, to the facts and issues that the 
parties want to raise.15 The hearing officer may also ask for the prior written 
notification of the essential contents of the intended statements of persons 
invited to the hearing.16 He has the competence to decide whether new doc-
uments should be admitted during the hearing and which persons should be 
heard on behalf of a party.17
After the hearing, the hearing officer submits an interim report and later a 
final report to the competent member of the Commission on the hearing and 
the conclusions he or she draws with regard to the respect for the effective 
exercise of procedural rights.18
The persons heard by the Commission may be assisted by their lawyers or 
other qualified persons.19 Oral hearings are not public.20 Each person may be 
 14 Decision of the President of the European Commission of 13 October 2011 on the function 
and terms of reference of the hearing officer in certain competition proceedings, oj L 275, 
20.10.2011, pp. 29– 37, article 10.
 15 Decision of the President of the European Commission of 13 October 2011 on the function 
and terms of reference of the hearing officer in certain competition proceedings, quoted 
above, article 11(1).
 16 Decision of the President of the European Commission of 13 October 2011 on the function 
and terms of reference of the hearing officer in certain competition proceedings, quoted 
above, article 11(3).
 17 Decision of the President of the European Commission of 13 October 2011 on the function 
and terms of reference of the hearing officer in certain competition proceedings, quoted 
above, article 12(2).
 18 Decision of the President of the European Commission of 13 October 2011 on the function 
and terms of reference of the hearing officer in certain competition proceedings, quoted 
above, articles 14 and 16.
 19 Commission Regulation (ec) No 773/ 2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of pro-
ceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the ec Treaty Implementing 
Regulation, quoted above, article 14(4).
 20 Commission Regulation (ec) No 773/ 2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of pro-
ceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the ec Treaty Implementing 















heard separately or in the presence of other persons invited to attend, having 
regard to the legitimate interest of the undertakings in the protection of their 
business secrets and other confidential information.
With regard to the right to ask questions during the hearing, the hearing 
officer may grant the parties this right, however the existing legislation pro-
vides no guidance as to the circumstances in which this right may be granted. 
The statements made by each person heard have to be recorded, they can be 
disclosed upon request to the persons who attended the hearing.21
12.2.2 Access to File
Access to file is one of the most important procedural guarantees in European 
competition law proceedings and constitutes “a major breakthrough in the 
field of due process and an essential prerequisite for the exercise of the right 
to be heard”.22 It is also an example of how fundamental rights have developed 
in the field of competition law through the common work of the European 
courts’ case- law and the practice of the European Commission.
Access to file was initially construed to encompass only access to inculpa-
tory evidence. However, from 1982 the Commission changed its practice, grant-
ing access to the entire file when investigating Articles 101 and 102. This prac-
tice was translated into a legal principle in 1991, when the cfi ruled that
in establishing a procedure for providing access to file in competition 
cases, the Commission imposed on itself rules exceeding the require-
ments laid down by the Court of Justice. (…) The Commission may not 
depart from rules which it has thus imposed on itself. (…) It follows that 
the Commission has an obligation to make available to the undertakings 
involved in Articles 81(1) proceedings all documents, whether in their 
favour or otherwise, which it has obtained during the course of the inves-
tigation, save where the business secrets of other undertakings, the inter-
nal documents of the Commission and other confidential information 
are involved.23
In ici, the cfi relied on the equality of arms principle to explain that “in a com-
petition case the knowledge which the undertaking concerned has of the file 
 21 Commission Regulation (ec) No 773/ 2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of pro-
ceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the ec Treaty Implementing 
Regulation, quoted above, article 14(8).
 22 Van Bael, op. cit., p. 176.
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used in the proceedings is the same as that of the Commission”.24 In Solvay, the 
cfi held that the Commission should give the defendants access to the entire 
file: “it cannot be for the Commission alone to decide which documents are of 
use for the defence. The Commission must give the advisers of the undertaking 
concerned the opportunity to examine documents which may be relevant so 
that their probative value for the defence can be assessed”.25
In 1997, the Commission published guidelines on the right of access to 
file, aiming to bring its practice in line with the jurisprudence of the cjeu. In 
200,5 the Commission issued a Notice on Access to File, replacing the guide-
lines adopted in 1997. In addition, Regulation on Procedure, the Implementing 
Regulation and the Charter provide for the right to have access to the 
Commission’s file. However, access to the Commission’s files under Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu can only be granted to the addressees of the statement of 
objections.
The Commission’s file consists of all documents which have been obtained, 
produced and/ or assembled by dg comp during the investigation. Documents 
collected during an investigation which, following a more detailed examina-
tion, prove to be unrelated to the subject matter of the case in question, may 
be returned to the undertaking from which they have been obtained. Upon 
return, these documents will no longer constitute part of the file.26
Accessible documents are all documents that compose the Commission’s 
file, with the exception of internal documents, business secrets of other under-
takings, or other confidential information.27
Access to file is granted upon request and, normally, on a single occasion, 
following the communication of the statement of objections to the parties 
concerned. As a general rule, therefore, no access can be granted to other par-
ties’ replies to the Commission’s objections unless such documents constitute 
new evidence – whether of an incriminating or of an exculpatory nature – and 
the Commission intends to rely on it.28
 24 T- 37/ 91, ici v Commission, ecli:eu:T:1995:119, paragraph 64.
 25 T- 30/ 91, Solvay v Commission, ecli:eu:T:1995:115, paragraph 81.
 26 Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant 
to Articles 81 and 82 of the ec Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the eea Agreement and 
Council Regulation (ec) No 139/ 2004, oj C 325, 22.12.2005, pp. 7– 15, p. 8.
 27 Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant 
to Articles 81 and 82 of the ec Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the eea Agreement and 
Council Regulation (ec) No 139/ 2004, quoted above, p. 8.
 28 Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant 
to Articles 81 and 82 of the ec Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the eea Agreement and 












Access to file may be granted in one of the following ways, taking due 
account of the technical capabilities of the parties:
 – by means of cd- rom(s) or any other electronic data storage device as may 
become available in future;
 – through copies of the accessible file in paper form sent to them by mail; or
 – by inviting them to examine the accessible file on the Commission’s 
premises.
The Commission may choose any combination of these methods. In order 
to facilitate access to the file, the parties receive an enumerative list of docu-
ments setting out the content of the Commission file.29
The Notice on Access to File describes two main types of non- accessible 
documents: the Commission’s internal documents and documents containing 
business secrets and other confidential information.
Article 15(2) stipulates that the right of access to the file does not extend to 
internal documents of the Commission or of the competition authorities of 
the member states. The right of access to the file does not cover the corre-
spondence between the Commission and the competition authorities of the 
member states or between the latter where such correspondence is contained 
in the file of the Commission.
The Commission’s internal documents can be neither incriminating nor 
exculpatory and they do not constitute, therefore, part of the evidence on 
which the Commission can rely in its assessment of a case. Thus, the parties 
will not be granted access to internal documents in the Commission file.
An important part of the Commission’s internal documents are the minutes 
of meetings. There is however no obligation for the Commission to draft any 
minutes of meetings with any person or undertaking. More importantly, if the 
Commission chooses to make notes of such meetings, such documents consti-
tute the Commission’s own interpretation of what was said at the meetings, for 
which reason they are classified as internal documents. In exceptional cases, 
however, the Commission can disclose the content of its minutes. Thus, for 
example, where the undertaking has agreed, the minutes will be made acces-
sible after deletion of any business secrets or other confidential information. 
Such agreed minutes constitute part of the evidence on which the Commission 
can rely in its assessment of a case.30
 29 Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant 
to Articles 81 and 82 of the ec Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the eea Agreement and 
Council Regulation (ec) No 139/ 2004, quoted above, p. 15.
 30 Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant 
to Articles 81 and 82 of the ec Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the eea Agreement and 
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Article 15(2) of the Implementing Regulation provides that business secrets 
and other confidential information are not required to be disclosed under the 
right of access to file.
Business secrets are defined broadly as including technical and/ or finan-
cial information relating to an undertaking’s know- how, methods of assessing 
costs, production secrets and processes, supply sources, quantities produced 
and sold, market shares, customer and distributor lists, marketing plans, cost 
and price structures and sales strategies.31
Other confidential information may include “information other than busi-
ness secrets, which may be considered as confidential, insofar as its disclosure 
would significantly harm a person or undertaking”.32 Confidential informa-
tion is case- specific and it may include, for example, information provided 
by third parties about undertakings which are able to place very considerable 
economic or commercial pressure on their competitors or on their trading 
partners, customers or suppliers, including retaliatory measures. The notion of 
other confidential information may include, therefore, information that would 
enable the parties to identify complainants or other third parties where those 
have a justified wish to remain anonymous.33
The Commission can either accept the confidentiality claims when they are 
justified or reject them, in which case, if the party insists on confidentiality, it 
will be for the hearing officer to settle the matter.
The Commission explains that the confidential nature of a document is not 
a bar to its disclosure if such information is an inculpatory or an exculpatory 
document. In this case, the need to safeguard the rights of the defence of the 
parties through the provision of the widest possible access to the Commission 
file may outweigh the concern to protect confidential information of other 
parties. It is for the Commission to assess whether those circumstances apply 
to any specific situation. This calls for an assessment of all relevant elements, 
including the relevance of the information in determining whether or not 
an infringement has been committed, and its probative value; whether the 
 31 Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant 
to Articles 81 and 82 of the ec Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the eea Agreement and 
Council Regulation (ec) No 139/ 2004, quoted above, p. 10.
 32 Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant 
to Articles 81 and 82 of the ec Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the eea Agreement and 
Council Regulation (ec) No 139/ 2004, quoted above, p. 10.
 33 Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant 
to Articles 81 and 82 of the ec Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the eea Agreement and 








information is indispensable; the degree of sensitivity involved; and the pre-
liminary view of the seriousness of the alleged infringement.34
12.2.3 The Right to Remain Silent
The right to remain silent is a principle which argues that no one can be com-
pelled to incriminate oneself. This principle prevents extortion of information 
or the use of investigative measures that force the accused person to acknowl-
edge his guilt.
There is no express provision concerning the right to remain silent in 
European competition law. On the contrary, the legislation places an obliga-
tion of cooperation on the undertakings, an obligation that encompasses the 
duty to answer requests for information, the duty to provide requested docu-
ments and the duty to collaborate during inspections.
However, in Orkem, the Court of Justice developed an exception to the 
undertakings’ obligation of cooperation with the Commission. The Court 
argued that an undertaking has the right to remain silent when faced with 
questions that can be viewed as possibly requiring the company to admit the 
existence of an infringement.35
The EU Courts held in a later case that “a right to silence can be recognized 
only to the extent that the undertaking concerned would be compelled to pro-
vide answers which might involve an admission on its part of the existence of 
an infringement”.36 The cfi explained that this approach was motivated by 
the need to preserve the efficiency of the Commission’s enforcement powers.37
This exception is now codified in Recital 23 of the preamble to the 
Regulation 1/ 2003 which highlights that “when complying with a decision 
of the Commission, undertakings cannot be forced to admit that they have 
committed an infringement, but they are in any event obliged to answer fac-
tual questions and to provide documents, even if this information may be 
used to establish against them or another undertaking the existence of an 
infringement”.
Thus, undertakings must produce all the documents that the Commission 
requests, but should answer only those questions which are not directly 
incriminatory. The Commission itself explained that
 34 Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant 
to Articles 81 and 82 of the ec Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the eea Agreement and 
Council Regulation (ec) No 139/ 2004, quoted above, p. 11.
 35 C- 374/ 87, Orkem v Commission, ecli:eu:C:1989:387, paragraph 35.
 36 T- 236/ 01, Tokai Carbon v Commission, ecli:eu:T:2004:118, paragraph 402.
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it is not permitted to ask leading questions, where giving a truthful answer 
would lead the firm to confess to an infringement. (…) It remains the task 
of the Commission to prove the facts, as it has found them, in support of 
the conclusion that there has been an infringement of the competition 
rules. Requiring firms to answer oppressive questions would effectively 
deprive them of their right to a hearing in the subsequent adjudicatory 
stage of proceedings.38
 38 European Commission. Dealing with the Commission Notifications: complaints, inspections 
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 chapter 13
A Risk- Based Framework for Safeguarding 
the European Commission’s Independence
I have started this part of the book with the description of academic and polit-
ical discourse surrounding the notion of judicial independence and outlined 
the principles formulated by the ECtHR on this subject. Chapter 9 described 
the objective environment in which EU competition law decisions are adopted 
and highlighted the political- bureaucratic interface that is engaged when 
the European Commission acts as an investigator, prosecutor and adjudica-
tor during competition law enforcement proceedings. Chapters 10, 11 and 12 
described the anatomy of the procedure leading to a competition law decision.
In the current chapter I will attempt to juxtapose the fair trial standards of 
independence developed by the ECtHR with the political- bureaucratic inter-
face of the Commission. The purpose of this exercise is to test whether the 
European Commission can be deemed an independent and impartial adjudi-
cator for the purpose of Article 6(1) echr.
13.1 Identifying the Risks to Independence in EU Competition Law 
Proceedings
I will follow a three- columned analysis in the current section, as Table 2 below 
indicates. This analysis will juxtapose procedural moments with the existing 
risks to the independent exercise of the adjudicative power and the existing 
safeguards.
The following procedural moments will be analysed:
 – Steps taken by the EU Commission outside the framework of an official 
investigation;
 – Official receipt of a formal complaint or a leniency application;
 – Opening of an investigation or issuing of a statement of objections;
 – Initial assessment and in- depth investigation of a complaint; and
 – Formal adoption of a decision.
The following risks to independence will be interpreted:
 – Interference – Describing potential involvement or influence over dg comp 
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 – External influence – Describing the potential involvement with or influence 
that lobbying groups or private interests may exercise over the Commission’s 
employees;
 – Anonymity – Describing the fact that the members of the dg comp case 
team handling a competition law complaint are unknown to the public;
 – Collegiality – Describing the collegiate nature of decision- making employed 
by the College of Commissioners;
 – Appearances – Describing potential doubts that complainants or defen-
dants may entertain about the Commission’s independence;
 – Cumulation of functions – Describing the concomitant exercise of investi-
gative, prosecutorial and adjudicative functions by the EU Commission;
 – Bias – Describing the preconceived ideas that staff involved in EU compe-
tition law proceedings might entertain due to their prior involvement with 
the case, the claimants or the defendants; and
 – Momentum bias – Describing the risk that a lengthy investigation will 
lead to the adoption of a decision due to the time and resources spent 
investigating.
The last column of the analysis is dedicated to the existing safeguards that 
might counter the identified risks. These safeguards are the following:
 – General behavioural safeguards – Describing EU law provisions con-
cerning the independence of the EU Commission. General behavioural 
safeguards include the tfeu provisions concerning the independence 
of Commissioners, the Code of Conduct for Commissioners, the Staff 
Regulations, Rules of Procedure of the EU Commission and the Code of 
Good Administrative Behaviour. They were described in sections 9.1.2. and 
9.2.2. above;
 – Language requirements – Describing the obligation that the EU Commission 
has to communicate both with the complainants and the defendants in a 
language they can understand;
 – Rights of defence – Describing the right to be heard that the defendants 
have and the involvement of the hearing officer with the proceedings;
 – Meetings with the EU Commission – Describing state of play meetings, 
triangular meetings or bilateral meetings with the EU Commissioner for 
Competition or the Director- General of the dg comp;
 – Internal peer review – Describing the mechanisms put in place with the 
EU Commission for the purpose of ensuring checks and balances. These 
mechanisms describe the involvement of the Chief Economist, the EU 
Commission’s Legal Service, the other dg s and the Advisory Committee;
262 Chapter 13
 – Public scrutiny – Describing the accountability that derives from the pub-
lic’s knowledge about the competition law proceedings opened by the EU 
Commission; and
 – Judicial review – Describing the judicial review performed by the cjeu.
table 2 Risks to independent adjudication and existing safeguards in EU competition law
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13.1.1 Risks to Independence Outside Official Proceedings
It is important to notice that the EU Commission shapes EU competition pol-
icy and investigates breaches of competition law outside official proceedings 
as well. The political priorities set by the President of the Commission guide 
dg comp’s work during the whole mandate. At the same time, the dg comp 
should monitor and gather information about the priority policy areas. Finally, 
as some authors have highlighted, dg comp receives and settles informally 
competition law complaints. Allegedly, 90% of the competition cases that the 
Commission receives are settled informally.1
This situation raises serious concerns in relation to the independence of the 
EU Commission. First, since this off- procedure activity takes place outside the 
legal framework provided for by the existing hard law and soft law instruments 
in competition law, the risks of external influence, interference and bias are high. 
The only safeguards that apply to this type of competition law enforcement are 
the ones provided for by the Staff Regulations, the Rules of Procedure and by the 
Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, all of which are soft- law instruments. 
These general behavioural safeguards are sufficient for an administrative author-
ity that has adjudicative powers. First, these standards do not clarify the involve-
ment of the political branch of the Commission with the case. Since the enforce-
ment of EU competition law requires the involvement of both the College of 
Commissioners and the dg comp, the question arises as to how the College of 
Commissioners participates in the cases that are settled informally.
Second, questions about the practical aspects of handling informal com-
plaints, such as the staff in charge of receiving the complaints or the procedure 
for negotiating an informal settlement, also raise serious questions about the 
independence of the EU Commission.
Lastly, it might be argued that this type of competition law- making yields 
large efficiency benefits in terms of competition policy making. However, 
this procedure rests on anonymity and gives the appearance that the EU 
Commission acts more like a secret service than a competition enforcement 
agency.
13.1.2 Risks to Independence upon Receipt of Formal Complaints
The receipt of a formal complaint or of a leniency application marks the 
beginning of formal competition law enforcement proceedings. This pro-
cedural moment activates the known legal framework for the enforcement 






of competition policy in the EU and the rights of the defendants. A formal 
complaint or a leniency application also triggers the complainants` legitimate 
expectations that the Commission will reach a decision within a reasonable 
time and will correct the relevant market failure. In other words, this step 
marks the beginning of competition law proceedings whose course can be 
predicted by the parties involved and in which the Commission’s powers will 
be exercised in a foreseeable way.
The risks to independence at this stage of the procedure are minimal. 
However, it is possible that external or internal pressure could be exercised on 
the staff receiving the complaints or involved with their preliminary handling. 
This pressure could be directed towards assigning lesser priority to cases or, on 
the contrary, assigning higher priority to cases.
13.1.3 Risks to Independence during Opening of Proceedings
The opening of proceedings, which in the case of cartel cases, coincides with 
the issuing of the statement of objections, marks the moment when defen-
dants formally learn about the Commission’s investigation and the evidence 
gathered against them. If the Commission issues a press release, the general 
public is also informed about the opening of the proceedings.
The risks to independence at this stage are important. First, there is the 
risk that staff involved in the off- procedure investigation of the case would be 
assigned to work as a case team. This means that staff members who might 
have spent years gathering information about the anti- competitive practices 
of the defendants would then be requested to act as prosecutors. Taking into 
account the organigram of dg comp and its sectoral teams mentioned in 
Section 9.2.3. above, the probability that the same members of staff involved in 
investigation would be involved in the prosecution is very high. The alternative 
scenario would mean, for example, that staff from the division dealing with 
mergers in the energy sector might be required to be a part of the team pros-
ecuting cartels in the big data sector. This scenario, although it might contrib-
ute to the Commission’s independence, is very unlikely. dg comp was praised 
during the two Eurobarometer exercises described in section 9.2.3. above as 
an administration with highly specialized teams. The reasoning that the EU 
courts use to defer to the discretion of the EU Commission on the grounds that 
the EU Commission is better- placed to acquire specialized knowledge on com-
petition law matters might apply to the Commission’s internal mechanisms as 
well. In fact, there might be an internal, sectoral deference within dg comp 
that could affect the independent handling of complaints.
Second, the anonymity of the case- handlers can affect the independence 
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the opportunity to meet the members of the case team assigned by dg comp 
to handle a case, the rest of the public does not know the names of the staff 
members involved with the case. This means that the public or the competi-
tion community is deprived of the possibility to identify dg comp staff mem-
bers who might have personal or economic links – such as owning shares – 
with the defendants or the complainants. In this context, one can argue that 
European consumers – on whose behalf competition proceedings are initi-
ated – should have the right to know the identity of the persons using pub-
lic funds to prosecute breaches of competition law and to impose fines in the 
name of the public interest. Also, the anonymity of the prosecutorial function 
in this scenario diminishes the level of personal responsibility and account-
ability of each member of staff. Lastly, in light of the concerns raised during 
the Eurobarometer polls concerning the frequent changes of dg comp’s case 
team during proceedings, it seems fair to inquire into the reasons for these 
staff movements. Changes in the composition of case teams can strengthen 
independence by removing members who appear to be biased or linked to the 
complainants or the defendants. However, such changes might also weaken 
independent decision- making by removing case handlers who refuse to follow 
political instructions.
The existing safeguards at this stage are more meaningful than during other 
stages of competition law enforcement proceedings. The general behavioural 
safeguards are accompanied by safeguards stemming from publicity- driven 
accountability. Once the general public is informed about the proceedings, it 
can contribute to them by sharing information in support or against the EU 
Commission’s proposed line of argument. In addition, the existing legal frame-
work indicates that the statement of objections is issued in order to ensure 
the rights of defence of the defendants. However, rights of the defence in this 
context only refer to the right to be heard.
13.1.4 Risks to Independence during Initial Assessment and In- Depth 
Investigation
The initial assessment and the in- depth investigation performed by dg comp 
are the stages of EU competition law proceedings during which the defendants 
have most rights and obligations. Defendants have the right to request state of 
play meetings, triangular meetings and meetings with the EU Commissioner 
for Competition or with the Director General for Competition. However, the 
Commission has full discretion when it comes to granting such meetings. 
What is more, when these meetings take place, the exchanges taking place 
during them are not public and do not thus form part of the case file. Hence, 
as the table above proposes, these meetings can be both a risk to independent 
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decision- making and a safeguard. Since not enough is known publicly about 
them, it is difficult to propose a definite argument in favour of their assessment.
Unlike the meetings described above, for which the Commission retains 
full discretion concerning their approval, the Commission must organise one 
meeting to allow the defendant to be heard. The hearing is organised by the 
hearing officer, who reports directly to the EU Commissioner for Competition. 
The purpose of the hearing is to allow the defendant company to present its 
case to the Commission. However, in light of the whole enforcement proce-
dure, it appears that such hearings are mere formalities. First, in light of the 
other meetings that can take place between the EU Commission and the 
defendants and which are off- record, it is important to understand what the 
added value of a hearing is other than ticking a box. This is particularly import-
ant both from the point of view of the length of proceedings and of the fact 
that these meetings are organized using public funds. Second, the hearing offi-
cer is, as the name suggests, only in charge of hearing the defendants. He is not 
a member of the case team and definitely not a specialist in the substantive 
issues raised during proceedings. The input of the hearing officer is thus more 
formal than substantive.
13.1.5 Risks to Independence during Formal Adoption of Decisions
The final step of EU competition law proceedings is the formal adoption of a 
decision. Independence at this stage of the proceedings faces serious risks. The 
case team that has so far cumulated investigative and prosecutorial powers is 
now also called to exercise adjudicative powers. In addition to the bias origi-
nating from the cumulation of functions, this step of the proceedings can also 
be influenced by a momentum bias. In fact, prior to the official initiation of 
proceedings, staff members of dg comp might have spent a few years inves-
tigating the concerned market, handling complaints and choosing the com-
plaint that has the highest probability of success. The opening of proceedings 
and the official investigation involve both the Commission’s human resources 
and reputation capital. Thus, before the formal adoption of a decision, a vari-
ety of services from the Commission would have been involved with reading 
and reviewing the decision prepared and drafted by the dg comp. Thus, the 
expectation of adopting the proposed decision might create a bias favouring 
the adoption of the decision.
The procedure for the adoption of EU competition law decisions can be 
either written or oral. It is well known that these decisions are long and incor-
porate complex economic analysis. It is also known that in the case of a written 
procedure, the Commissioners receive a proposed decision one week before 
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its adoption. It is not clear how much in advance the Commissioners receive 
the proposed decision in case of oral procedure. It is also not clear if mem-
bers of the Commissioners’ cabinets have access to the proposed decision or 
if they can influence the Commissioner’s opinion on it. Finally, it is unclear if 
the formal adoption of a decision is another instance of internal deferral to dg 
comp’s judgement or if the Commissioners truly take the time to consider the 
proposed decision. In view of the fact that the cjeu spends a few years on each 
competition law appeal, it might be argued that the College of Commissioners 
adopts the decision without examining the details of the case.
In any case, the decisions proposed by dg comp are adopted by the College 
of Commissioners, a collegial institution. Dissenting votes may be voiced 
during the adoption procedure but are not made public. Whereas collegial-
ity has its place in policy- making and institution- building, it sits oddly with 
the requirement that adjudicators be independent. It amounts to saying, “our 
institution thinks that you are guilty,” and this, in turn, is a rather Orwellian 
approach to justice.
13.2 Mitigating the Identified Risks
The analysis that I have provided in the section 13.1. above described the risks 
to independence that may arise during EU competition law enforcement pro-
ceedings. For the purpose of identifying mitigating measures, I have identified 
four main types of risks:
 – Off- record procedural risks arising from competition law enforcement that 
takes place outside the regular legal framework or from a lack of procedural 
rules;
 – Structural risks resulting from the design of EU competition policy 
enforcement;
 – Anonymity risks arising from the anonymity of dg comp case handlers; and
 – Collegiality risks arising from the collegiate nature of decision- making 
employed by the EU Commission.
Table 3 below categorises the risks identified in the enforcement of EU compe-
tition law proceedings by focusing on the procedural moments that raise most 
concerns in relation to independent decision- making.
13.2.1 Off- Record Procedural Risks to Independence
The off- record procedural risks to independent decision- making refer to inves-






competition law proceedings or during the proceedings. These risks create the 
appearance that the EU Commission acts like a secret service agency collect-
ing information about markets and undertakings outside the scope of formal 
investigations.
These risks could be mitigated by clarifying the applicable rules of proce-
dure. First, dg comp could publish the total number of complaints received 
yearly and the number of complaints per sectors. This would allow the gen-
eral public to judge if the EU Commission is responding to complaints raised 
by the market or to its own political agenda. Second, dg comp could publish 
the yearly number of informal settlements and the remedies imposed in these 
cases. Third, the applicable procedural framework could clarify the investiga-
tive measures the dg comp can perform before the opening of proceedings. 
Last, the minutes of the meetings between the EU Commission and the defen-
dants could be made part of the case file.
table 3 Types of risks to independence in EU competition law
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13.2.2 Structural Risks to Independence
The structural risks to independent decision- making arise from the design of 
the EU competition enforcement system itself. These are, therefore, inevitable 
risks in the sense that any system designed in the same way would produce the 
same results. These risks concern the interference of the political branch of the 
EU Commission with the enforcement of EU competition law. They also con-
cern the concomitant exercise by the EU Commission of investigative, prose-
cutorial and adjudicative powers.
Structural risks to independent decision- making stem from the fact that 
EU competition law enforcement has historically not been concerned with 
independence. Neither Regulation 1/ 2003, nor the implementing regulation 
mention independent decision- making. However, the constitutional design 
of the EU has dramatically changed with the adoption of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the tfeu- imposed duty to accede to the echr. The 
new constitutional design of the EU requires the safeguarding of independent 
decision- making.
Despite their importance, structural risks are hard to address because they 
require changes to EU Treaties. At the same time, it would be possible to dimin-
ish the impact of the structural risks by creating a culture of independence 
within the EU Commission. As it has been shown above, the EU Commission 
has an autonomous bureaucracy. Autonomy, however, only complicates the 
efforts to create independent decision- makers. Whereas autonomy expresses 
the relationship between the political and the bureaucratic branches of an 
institution, independence qualifies first and foremost the relationship towards 
adjudicators and the act of adjudication. Both autonomy and independence 
are acts of self- centring, but autonomy seeks to ensure bureaucratic freedom 
of action from political interests in the institution, whereas independence pro-
tects the persons and the decision- making processes from influence, even by 
members of the bureaucracy itself.
Aside from constitutional remedies to mitigate structural risks to inde-
pendence, a few measures could be implemented using soft- law instruments. 
First, the EU Commission could adopt a standard of independent decision- 
making when dealing with EU competition law. Unlike now, independence 
could become a guiding principle of decision- making. Second, dg comp could 
assign separate teams of staff to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate cases. 
It would also be important to physically separate the team performing adju-
dicative functions in separate buildings in order to decrease the influence or 
pressure exercised on it.
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13.2.3 Risks to Independence Posed by Collegiality
Collegiality can be a risk because it diminishes the personal accountability 
of the Commissioners for the adopted decision. Collegiality, a typical feature 
of judicial decision- making, is not provided for by the EU treaties. It was the 
Commission itself, while adopting its own Rules of Procedure, that declared 
the collegiate nature of its decision- making.
Whereas collegiality can appear as a safeguard for independent adjudica-
tion, the contrary is achieved within the EU Commission. The Commissioners 
are politicians who, in the same day, must take decisions on numerous matters 
on their agenda. The Rules of Procedure provide for the same two procedures – 
written or oral – to be employed for the adoption of all the items on the agenda. 
The fact that adjudication is treated by the EU Commissioners in the same way 
as the adoption of political matters raises separate issues of fairness. However, 
what appears of concern in the context of this analysis is the fact that colle-
giality prevents the defendants and other interested parties from contesting 
the independence of decision- making. Only if the adopted decision provided 
for a breakdown of the Commissioners’ individual votes could the defendants 
show that certain Commissioners are linked to the complainants, that they 
consistently defend national politics or that they have endorsed opposing legal 
reasoning in the past.
Thus, changing the collegiality rules employed for the enforcement of EU 
competition law would not only strengthen the independence of the decision- 
making process, it would render the College of Commissioners more account-
able and more diligent.
13.2.4 Anonymity Risks to Independence
The last type of risk to independent decision- making is posed by the anonym-
ity of the case handlers. The risks presented by anonymity are similar to those 
presented by collegiality. Except for the lack of accountability, anonymity also 
increases the risk of interference by providing for the possibility of arbitrary 
removal of case handlers who might entertain minority views. In addition, 
anonymity also increases the risk of disclosure of information to defendants, 
complainants or third parties in a way that may pose serious concern to inde-
pendent decision- making. dg comp is aware of this risk as it highlights in 
its Annual Activity Reports the number of cases of inadvertent disclosure of 
information and the measures taken to correct the situation.2
 2 See for example European Commission. Directorate- General for Competition. 2017 Annual 
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This type of risk is easy to address; the names of the case handlers could be 
disclosed starting with the opening of the proceedings and changes in team 
formation could be explained at least to the parties.
…
I have undertaken a difficult task in Part 3 of the current book: to test whether 
the European Commission fulfils the independence requirement imposed by 
Article 6(1) echr when enforcing EU competition law. In the course of the 
analysis, Chapter 7 described the growing importance of the administra-
tive state and the issues raised by the required independence of the newly- 
created regulators and of national competition authorities. At the same time, 
the administrative state brought about administrative institutions/ agencies 
mandated to perform adjudicative tasks. Since judicial independence is a con-
stitutional requirement imposed on the courts, the question of how judicial 
independence is to be understood in the context of administrative agencies 
performing adjudicatory functions is far from settled. This question is, how-
ever, of prime importance for the European Commission in light of the Union’s 
commitment to democracy and to accede to the echr. The wider perspective 
offered in Chapter 7 stressed that the notion of independence is of concern 
both for national and international institution- building.
Chapter 8 was dedicated to the analysis of the ECtHR’s case- law on the inde-
pendence and impartiality of tribunals. The ECtHR’s case- law indicates that 
member states can delegate adjudicatory tasks to administrative tribunals or 
agencies. At the same time, the ECtHR requires states to ensure independence 
of adjudication irrespective of the nature of the dispute. In other words, accord-
ing to the case- law of the ECtHR, judicial independence should not be affected 
by the constitutional setup chosen by the state to provide adjudication.
What is more, as Section 8.4. suggested, the case- law of the ECtHR high-
lights a relationship between the seriousness of the dispute and the avail-
ability of safeguards protecting the independence of adjudication or judicial 
review. This conceptual framework was applied to test the EU Commission’s 
independence.
Chapter 9 focused on the objective environment in which EU competition 
decisions are adopted and showed that they are prepared by the Directorate 
General for Competition – that is, by the bureaucratic side of the EU 
Commission – and are adopted by the College of Commissioners – that is, 
the political side of the EU Commission. In addition, the dg comp cumu-
lates investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative powers when it enforces EU 








be presumed in EU competition law despite the fact that the EU has adopted 
a series of soft law instruments requiring both the Commissioners and the 
Commission’s civil service to act independently.
Chapters 10, 11 and 12 focused on the anatomy of EU competition law decisions 
and described the procedures used by the EU Commission to enforce Articles 
101 and 102 tfeu, the Commission’s powers of investigation and the existing 
limits on its powers. This in- depth account showed that the EU Commission 
benefits from a wide discretion of action at all points during the procedure. This 
discretion allows the dg comp to act off- record, by informally settling cases, 
to select the cases it wishes to pursue, to accept or reject meetings with the 
defendants and to impose large fines.
Based on the principle derived from the ECtHR’s case- law – that disputes 
with serious consequences should provide for safeguards to preserve indepen-
dent adjudication – Chapter 13 mapped the potential risks to the independence 
of the EU Commission when acting as an enforcer of EU competition law. Four 
types of risks were thus identified: off- record procedural risks, structural risks, 
anonymity risks and collegiality risks. Most of these risks are the result of the 
design of competition law system and mitigating them would require a change 
in the EU Treaties. Other risks to independent decision- making arise from the 
way in which the EU Commission has framed its own decision- making powers. 
These risks to independent decision- making could be mitigated by changes in 
practice.
Before closing this chapter, a clarification should be offered about the rela-
tionship between the right to be heard and independent adjudication during EU 
competition law proceedings. The right to be heard, together with other guar-
antees such as proportionality, do strengthen the appearance of fairness of 
the whole process. At the same time, these guarantees provide the defendants 
with actionable rights that also shape the Commission’s actions. However, the 
relationship between the right to be heard and the right to an independent and 
impartial tribunal is not a direct one. An administrative tribunal can be fully 
independent and still disrespect the defendants’ right to be heard. Also, a tri-
bunal that is not independent can hear a defendant in a way that is compatible 
with the right to a fair trial. The two, however, are distinct classes of rights; they 
are not interchangeable and they should be satisfied concomitantly.
The relationship between the right to an independent and impartial tribunal 
and the right to an effective judicial review can be a direct one if – as the ECtHR 
has indicated – a lack of independence can be corrected during judicial review. 
If, on contrary, the lack of independence is due to a structural issue, it cannot 
be cured during judicial review.
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It can thus be concluded that, due to the objective environment in which 
EU competition law decisions are adopted and to the anatomy of the deci-
sions, serious risks to independence exists in EU competition law. The large 
fines imposed by the EU Commission in competition law cases and the rep-
utational cost of Article 101 or 102 tfeu proceedings represent serious con-
sequences that should be accompanied by deep due process guarantees and 
in- depth judicial review. I will discuss at length the issue of correcting lack of 
independence through judicial review in Part 4. 

∵
pa rt  4




This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
Introduction to Part 4
This book embarked on analysing how the EU Commission engages with cor-
porate bigness in the EU using competition law. For this purpose, I have pro-
posed that the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6(1) echr can play a 
central role in this process by ensuing that the fight against corporate bigness 
does not create the sort of “administrative bigness” Louis Brandeis warned 
against. I have analysed in Part 3 the interaction between Article 6(1) echr 
and the EU Commission as competition enforcement agency. Working with 
the ECtHR’s autonomous concept of “independent and impartial tribunal”, 
I have suggested in Part 3 that the EU Commission cannot be deemed to be 
an independent adjudicator for the purpose of Article 6(1) echr. The next 
step of the analysis will be dedicated to examining whether the judicial review 
performed by the EU Courts can cure this lack of independence as required by 
Article 6(1) echr. Figure 10 below offers a visual representation of the current 
endeavour.
The method I follow in Part 4 is similar to the method I have applied pre-
viously. Chapter 14 will describe the case- law of the ECtHR concerning the 
right to an effective judicial remedy. Chapter 15 will be devoted to analysing 










the relevance of this case- law to EU competition law. Chapter 16 will describe 
the case- law of the EU courts concerning the right to judicial review. Finally, 
Chapter 17 will be dedicated to examining the reasons for the deferential judi-
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 chapter 14
Case- law of the ECtHR on the Right to an Effective 
Judicial Review
The echr does not provide for the right to judicial review as such. However, it 
is indirectly established by Article 6(1) and Article 13 echr which provide for 
the right to a fair trial and the right to an effective remedy respectively. Unlike 
Article 6(1) echr, Article 13 applies equally to all types of disputes adjudicated 
by courts and administrative tribunals.
Article 13 echr stipulates that “everyone whose rights and freedoms as set 
forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a 
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by 
persons acting in an official capacity”.
Two judges have called Article 13 echr “the most obscure” provision of the 
Convention.1 In the same vein, it has been noted that the approaches to the 
interpretation of Article 13 echr by the ECtHR “have oscillated, now demand-
ing more of states, now less, as they have sought an understanding of Article 13 
which fits into the whole structure of the Convention”.2
The ECtHR explained that Article 13 echr is an auxiliary provision, which 
can only be invoked in relation to another Convention right. In this sense, 
Article 13 guarantees “the availability of a remedy at national level to enforce 
the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they 
may happen to be secured in the domestic legal order”.3
The effectiveness of the remedy provided for by Article 13 echr has four 
elements:
 1) institutional, requiring that the decision- maker fulfils a minimum stan-
dard of independence from the authority allegedly responsible for the 
breach of the Convention;
 2) substantive, establishing that where a member state incorporates the 
Convention into the domestic law, Convention rights can be directly 
invoked before the domestic courts;
 1 Judges Matscher and Pinheiro Farinha, partly dissenting opinion in ECtHR. Malone v. the 
United Kingdom, application no. 8691/ 79, judgement of 2 Aug 1984.
 2 Harris, D., M. O’Boyle, Ed Bates and C.M. Buckley, op. cit., p. 445.










 3) remedial, granting remedies for applicants whose claims are accepted by 
the domestic courts;
 4) material, implying that the applicant must be able to take advantage of 
the remedy at her disposal.4
Article 13 echr partially covers the subject- matter of Article 6(1) echr. When 
there is substantive overlap, the Court considers only the complaints raised 
under Article 6(1) echr because the requirements of Article 13 echr are less 
strict than the requirements of Article 6(1) echr which absorbs them for this 
matter.
14.1 Judicial Review in Administrative Law Disputes
In Obermeier, following unsuccessful domestic proceedings to challenge the 
applicant’s dismissal, he lodged an application at the ECtHR complaining that 
the domestic labour courts had considered themselves bound by the adminis-
trative decisions authorising his dismissal and that they had thereby deprived 
him of the right to judicial review.5
The ECtHR noted that the domestic Austrian courts have inferred from the 
existing legislation that they were precluded from inquiring into the validity of 
a dismissal which had received the authorisation of the administration’s board. 
The domestic courts could only determine “whether the discretion enjoyed by 
the administrative authorities has been used in a manner compatible with the 
object and purpose of the law”.6 In practice, the test applied by the domestic 
administrative courts meant that they could not re- examine decisions taken 
by the administrative authorities. As a result, individuals challenging their dis-
missal remained in the majority of cases, including the present one, did not 
benefit from judicial review.
A few years later, another case against Austria raising the issue of effective 
judicial review reached the ECtHR. In that case, a plot of land belonging to the 
applicant and cutting in two his estate had been expropriated in order to build 
a provincial highway.7 The applicant contested this measure, complaining in 
particular about the lack of a public hearing and about the refuse to appoint 
an independent expert to assess the consequences of the proposed expropria-
tion. The relevant administrative authorities, the Constitutional Court and the 
 4 Harris, D., M. O’Boyle, Ed Bates and C.M. Buckley, op. cit., p. 450.
 5 ECtHR. Obermeier v. Austria, application no. 11761/ 85, judgement of 28 Jun 1990.
 6 Obermeier v. Austria, quoted above, paragraph 70.
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Administrative Court all dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The Constitutional 
Court of Austria decided “not to entertain the application since, in view of (…) 
the authorities’ discretion in determining the routes of highways, the applica-
tion did not have sufficient prospects of success”.8
The Administrative Court of Austria defined its jurisdiction in the follow-
ing way. First, it was not allowed to put itself in the place of the administra-
tive authority in order to take evidence, which the latter may have omitted 
to take, and was not allowed to supplement the investigation by itself taking 
investigative measures to establish the facts. Second, the Administrative Court 
could take evidence in order to determine whether an essential procedural 
requirement has been breached and to establish whether a procedural defect 
was essential or whether the administrative authority could have reached a 
different decision if that procedural defect had been avoided.
The ECtHR centred its analysis on the fact that, under Austrian Law, expro-
priation was not a matter exclusively within the discretion of the administra-
tive authorities. The ECtHR noted, that despite its deference to the admin-
istrative authority, there was no violation of Article 6 because the Austrian 
Administrative Court “in fact considered these submissions on their merits, 
point by point, without ever having to decline jurisdiction in replying to them 
or in ascertaining various facts”.9
In Bryan, an enforcement notice was served on the applicant to demolish 
two buildings that he had allegedly erected in breach of the planning legisla-
tion. The applicant complained that the High Court had no power to disturb 
the findings of fact made by the administrative authority unless there was a 
defect which was so great as to go to jurisdiction.10
The ECtHR started its analysis by noting that the High Court’s appeal could 
not embrace all the aspects raised by the applicant against the administrative 
authority’s decision. The ECtHR noted that, as it was frequent in the Council of 
Europe Member States, administrative law appeals did not embrace (1) rehear-
ing of original complains, (2) substitution of the domestic courts’ reasoning for 
that of the administration or (3) unlimited jurisdiction over the facts. However, 
in the case brought by Mr Bryan, the administrative decision at issue could 
have been quashed by the High Court if “it had been made by reference to 
irrelevant factors or without regard to relevant factors; or if the evidence relied 
on by the inspector was not capable of supporting a finding of fact; or if the 
decision was based on an inference from facts which was perverse or irrational 
 8 Zumtobel v. Austria, quoted above, paragraph 12.
 9 Zumtobel v. Austria, quoted above, paragraph 32.








in the sense that no inspector properly directing himself would have drawn 
such an inference”.11
Furthermore, the ECtHR stressed that the sufficiency of review should be 
tested in relation to matters such as the (1) subject- matter of the decision 
appealed against, (2) the manner in which that decision was arrived at, (3) the 
content of the dispute, including the desired and actual grounds of appeal, 
(4) the possibility to review shortcomings in the procedure.12
Focusing on the subject- matter of the dispute, the ECtHR highlighted 
that there was no conflict over the facts of the case or the inferences that the 
inspector drew from the facts. Rather, the case revolved around “a panoply of 
policy matters” such as development plans, and the fact that the property was 
situated in a green belt and a conservation area. The ECtHR noted that such 
set- ups can “reasonably be expected in specialised areas of the law such as 
the one at issue, particularly where the facts have already been established in 
the course of a quasi- judicial procedure governed by many of the safeguards 
required by Article 6 § 1”.13 Highlighting that the case at hand was a typical 
example of the exercise of discretionary judgement in the regulation of cit-
izens’ conduct in the sphere of town and country planning, the ECtHR con-
cluded that there was no violation of Article 6(1) echr.
Some 10 years later, the ECtHR reassessed the test proposed in Bryan. In 
Tsfayo the applicant, who was a political refugee, benefitted from social hous-
ing provided by the social services department of Hammersmith and Fulham 
Council (the Council). Due to the applicant’s lack of familiarity with the ben-
efits system and her poor English, she was late to re- apply for social housing. 
As a result, the housing association started eviction proceedings against the 
applicant. At the same time, a court order allowed the Council to deduct gbp 
2.60 per week from the applicant’s income support of gbp 35.87.14
The applicant’s appeal to the Housing Benefit Review Board (hbrb) was 
rejected. The High Court dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to 
apply for judicial review because, first, the echr had not yet been incorpo-
rated into English law and, second, because the hbrb’s decision was neither 
unreasonable not irrational. The applicant complained to the ECtHR that her 
right to a fair trial had been breached in the domestic proceedings due to the 
fact that the hbrb was not independent and impartial and, unlike Bryan, the 
 11 Bryan v. the United Kingdom, quoted above, paragraph 44.
 12 Bryan v. the United Kingdom, quoted above, paragraphs 45– 46.
 13 Bryan v. the United Kingdom, quoted above, paragraph 47.
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judicial review performed by the High Court was not such as to remedy a lack 
of independence at first instance.
The ECtHR first distinguished the present case from Bryan and the ensuing 
case- law against the United Kingdom in which the issues to be determined 
required a measure of professional knowledge or experience and the exercise 
of administrative discretion pursuant to wider policy aims.15 In contrast, the 
case at hand posed a simple question of fact, by trying to clarify whether there 
was “good cause” for the applicant’s delay in reapplying for social housing. In 
addition, the hbrb rejected the applicant’s claim on the basis of their assess-
ment of her credibility.
Second, the ECtHR noted that, in contrast to domestic and Strasbourg cases 
referred to above, the hbrb was not merely lacking in independence from the 
executive, but was directly connected to one of the parties to the dispute. In 
fact, the hbrb included five councillors from the local authority which would 
be required to pay the benefit if awarded. The ECtHR unanimously found a 
violation of Article 6 and highlighted that such a connection might “infect the 
independence of judgment in relation to the finding of primary fact in a man-
ner which could not be adequately scrutinised or rectified by judicial review. 
The safeguards built into the hbrb procedure were not adequate to overcome 
this fundamental lack of objective impartiality”.16
In Terra Woningen b.v., the applicant company alleged a violation of Article 
6(1) echr in that they had not had the benefit of effective judicial review 
because the District Court had considered itself bound by the Provincial 
Executive’s finding in respect of the soil pollution and its effects on public 
health and the environment.17
The ECtHR noted that it was indeed unclear whether the soil pollution 
reached the threshold of serious danger to public health or the environment 
 15 See, for example, ECtHr. X. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), application no. 28530/ 95, judge-
ment of 19 Jan 1998, concerning a determination by the Secretary of State that the appli-
cant was not a fit and proper person to be chief executive of an insurance company.
ECtHR. Stefan v. the United Kingdom (dec.), application no. 29419/ 95, judgement of 9 
Dec 1997, concerning proceedings before the General Medical Council (“gmc”) to estab-
lish whether or not the applicant was mentally ill and thus unfit to practise as a doctor.
ECtHR. Wickramsinghe v. the United Kingdom (dec.), application no. 31503/ 96, judge-
ment of 9 Dec 1997, concerning disciplinary proceedings before the gmc.
And see also ECtHR. Kingsley v. the United Kingdom [gc], application no. 35605/ 97, 
judgement of 28 May 2002, paragraph 32.
 16 Tsfayo v. the United Kingdom, quoted above, paragraphs 47– 49.









such as to justify a reduction of the rent applied by the applicant company. 
However, what went against the spirit of the right to a fair trial was the domes-
tic courts’ assumption that the serious danger to public health and to the envi-
ronment was necessarily implied by the decision of the administrative author-
ity. By drawing a relationship of necessary implication between the contested 
facts and the administrative authority’s qualification of them, domestic courts 
deprived themselves of jurisdiction to examine crucial facts concerning the 
dispute at hand. The Court concluded that for these reasons, the applicant 
company did not have access to a tribunal having sufficient jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the case before it.18
In a similar case, the applicant was employed by the Bulgarian Railroad 
Office.19 Her contract of employment stated that she worked as a dormitory 
supervisor and social activities coordinator, but, in fact, the applicant worked 
as a typist at the local section of the Bulgarian Communist Party. The appli-
cant was examined by the Diagnostic Expert Commission (dec) that found 
that she was suffering from vegetative polyoneuropathy of the upper limbs, 
a disease featured on the Table of Occupational Diseases. The dec, relying 
solely on the applicant’s job description, found that the position occupied by 
her officially – dormitory supervisor and social activities coordinator – did 
not entail increased strain on her upper limbs. The dec concluded therefore 
that the applicant suffered from a non- occupational disease as no causal link 
could be established between her work conditions and the disease. This find-
ing was upheld by the Central Diagnostic Expert Commission (cdec) and by 
the domestic courts. The Bulgarian Supreme Court deferred to the reasoning 
of dec and concluded that the applicant has not established before them the 
existence of a causal link between her disease and the conditions of work as a 
typist.20
The ECtHR started its assessment by noting that the domestic courts have 
deferred the assessment of a crucial fact to the domestic administrative 
authorities and have thus deprived themselves of jurisdiction to sit on the 
applicant’s case. Such a set- up is compatible with the right to a fair trial only 
when the decisions of the administrative authorities were delivered following 
a procedure that is itself in line with Article 6. In the case at hand, the disputed 
administrative authority was under the authority of the Ministry of Health, 
their members were remunerated under service contracts with the Ministry 
of Health and did not have tenure. Furthermore, the dec did not have rules 
 18 Terra Woningen b.v. v. the Netherlands, quoted above, paragraphs 50– 55.
 19 ECtHR. i.d. v. Bulgaria, application no. 43578/ 98, judgement of 28 Apr 2005.
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of procedure, did not hold public hearings and took decisions about medical 
examinations that they themselves held. As to the judicial review performed 
by the domestic courts, the ECtHR noted that the Government have not fur-
nished any example of a judicial decision confirming that a person was able to 
appeal against a decision of the cdec during the period at issue. The ECtHR 
found unanimously a violation of Article 6.21
In Kingsley, the applicant applied for judicial review of the decision of the 
Gaming Board by which he has been deprived of the right to hold a managerial 
position in the gaming industry. Both Justice Jowitt and the Court of Appeal 
dismissed the applicant’s request for judicial review.22
Justice Jowitt noted that counsel from the Gaming Board accepted the exis-
tence of an appearance of bias in the proceedings involving the applicant. 
However, he noted that the existing appearance of bias did not give rise to a 
real gander of injustice due to the following elements: (1) the applicant bene-
fitted from an extended hearing, (2) he had ample opportunity to present evi-
dence in his favour, (3) there a few findings in favor of the applicant and 4) the 
calibre and experience of the Panel Members. Justice Jowitt found that even if 
there was bias on the part of the Gaming Board, it was justified by the doctrine 
of necessity:
When a body is charged by statute with the power or duty, which cannot 
be delegated, to make a decision in circumstances in which a question of 
bias arises because:
 (i) in pursuance of that statutory power or duty an initial view has been 
formed upon a matter affecting the interests of someone in respect 
of whom the body in the exercise of its statutory power or duty has 
thereafter to make a decision, or final decision, after receiving and 
considering representations which he is entitled to make or
 (ii) in the exercise of a statutory power or duty to make a decision a 
conflict arises between the interests of another or others which 
have to be taken into account and the body's own interests.
The decision will not be liable to be impugned on account of bias pro-
vided that:
 21 i.d. v. Bulgaria, quoted above, paragraphs 50– 55.







 (i) if only some of those charged with the power or duty to decide are 
potentially affected by bias such of them as can lawfully withdraw 
from the decision making do so and
 (ii) those of the decision makers who are potentially affected by bias 
but cannot lawfully withdraw use their best endeavours to avoid the 
effect of bias and, consistently with the purpose for which its deci-
sion has to be made the body takes what reasonable steps are open 
to it to minimise the risk of bias affecting them.23
The Court disagreed with the UK domestic authorities and found a violation of 
Article 6(1) echr, arguing that
it is generally inherent in the notion of judicial review that, if a ground 
of challenge is upheld, the reviewing court has power to quash the 
impugned decision, and that either the decision will then be taken by the 
review court or the case will be remitted for a fresh decision by the same 
or a different body. Thus where, as here, complaint is made of a lack of 
impartiality on the part of the decision- making body, the concept of full 
jurisdiction involves that the reviewing court not only considers the com-
plaint but has the ability to quash the impugned decision and to remit 
the case for a new decision by an impartial body.24
In another case involving deference to administrative bodies justified by the 
technical knowledge they held, the applicant was dismissed from a high- 
ranking position in the Ministry of Internal Affairs as a result of a psycholog-
ical assessment performed on him.25 The applicant unsuccessfully contested 
his dismissal before the national courts.
The ECtHR highlighted that the reliance of the domestic courts on the 
expert opinions of specialized agencies was not contrary to Article 6(1) echr. 
However, when the domestic courts consider themselves bound by the assess-
ment of such agencies and refuse to analyse the facts of the case for that mat-
ter, they may breach the right of access to a court as guaranteed by Article 6(1) 
echr. In the case at issue, the domestic courts refused to scrutinize the most 
important issue of the applicant’s case, that is his mental fitness to carry duties 
in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In addition, none of the authorities involved 
with the case put forward a justification for such an approach, except for the 
 23 Kingsley v. the United Kingdom, quoted above, paragraph 24.
 24 Kingsley v. the United Kingdom, quoted above, paragraph 58.
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existing statutory bar.26 For these reasons, the Court concluded that Article 
6(1) echr has been violated in the case at issue.
14.2 Judicial Review in Disputes Involving “Criminal Charges”
The general applicability of Article 6(1) echr to disputes concerning a “crimi-
nal charge” has been discussed in Section 5.3. above.
In the early case Schmautzer the applicant was fined by the federal police 
300 Austrian schillings with twenty- four hours’ imprisonment in default of 
payment for not wearing a seat- belt. The latter was considered an adminis-
trative criminal offence under Austrian Law. The applicant complained at the 
ECtHR that the domestic authorities that were involved in his case were not 
“tribunals” as required by Article 6(1) echr.27
The ECtHR highlighted that the powers of the Administrative Court in the 
present case must be assessed in the light of the fact that the court was sitting in 
proceedings that were of a criminal nature for the purposes of the Convention. 
This meant therefore that a judicial body with full jurisdiction should have the 
“power to quash in all respects, on questions of fact and law, the decision of the 
body below”.28 The ECtHR also took into account a judgement of the Austrian 
Constitutional Court which held that limited review of criminal penalties was 
unconstitutional.
In Menarini, the applicant received a fine of 6 million euro from the Italian 
Competition Authority (agcm) for breach of competition law.29 The applicant 
complained that the review of legality performed by the Italian administra-
tive courts was incompatible with Article 6(1) echr. The applicant company 
further complained that the Italian administrative courts could not substitute 
their own assessments to those of agcm, could only apply the legal norms 
identified by agcm and had no means to modify agcm’s decision. The appli-
cant company contested the practice of the Italian Court of Cassation to con-
sider that, when the administrative authority was endowed with discretion-
ary powers, the domestic courts could not substitute their arguments to those 
of the independent administrative authority, but merely verify the logic and 
coherence of the power exercised by the administrative body.
 26 Fazliyski v. Bulgaria, quoted above, paragraphs 56– 62.
 27 ECtHR. Schmautzer v. Austria, application no. 15523/ 89, judgement of 23 Oct 1995.
 28 Schmautzer v. Austria, quoted above, paragraph 36.












The ECtHR highlighted that Article 6(1) echr required a full review of deci-
sions reached by administrative authorities that did not meet independence 
requirements. The Court further noted that the characteristics of an admin-
istrative procedure may differ from those of a purely criminal procedure. 
However, the Court insisted that, while these characteristics cannot relief a 
Member State from their obligation to respect all the guarantees enshrined in 
Article 6(1) echr, they can, however, influence means of implementation.30
On the facts of the case, the Court found – with five votes to one – that the 
Italian system of judicial review of competition decisions was compatible with 
Article 6(1) echr. The Italian courts went beyond a review of legality, they ver-
ified if agcm has used its powers appropriately, they assessed the soundness 
and proportionality of the choices made by agcm and they even checked the 
soundness and proportionality of the agcm’s technical evaluations. Lastly, the 
Italian courts performed a full review of the fine imposed by agcm.31
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque disagreed with the 
majority’s conclusion. He drew the attention to the long- standing and constant 
jurisprudence of the Italian courts to exercise restraint when reviewing the 
decisions of agcm. According to this jurisprudence, the administrative courts 
cannot exercise a substitutive power to replace the reasoning of the adminis-
trative authority concerning the technical assessment of facts with their own. 
Judge Albuquerque argued that this jurisprudence leads to the extraction of 
the essence of the case from the Italian courts’ jurisdiction.
He further argued that in the case at hand, the Italian administrative judges 
have merely given a formal beneplacitus while performing an internal control 
that does not offer any guarantees for the already convicted. He draws the 
attention to the fact that the text of the Administrative Tribunals referred 60 
times to the text of the administrative decision and the judgement delivered 
by the Conseil d’Etat referred to it 40 times. The courts called to review the 
decision of the agcm merely repeated the arguments already presented by the 
latter. Lastly, they presented no autonomous, concrete and detailed analysis of 
the illegality and culpability of the applicant’s behaviour.
Judge Albuquerque intimates that a full review performed by an adminis-
trative tribunal is not a mere reformatio (reform) of the administrative deci-
sion, but a revisio (re- examination) of it. He also highlights that full review is 
necessarily an exhaustive review as well. He further contends that acceptance 
of pseudo- criminal law or of a criminal law with two speeds as in the case at 
 30 Menarini Diagnostics s.r.l. v Italy, quoted above, paragraph 60.
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hand will have two inevitable consequences: the usurpation by the adminis-
trative authorities of the judicial power to punish and the capitulation of indi-
vidual freedom before a powerful administration. Judge Albuquerque insists 
that whereas imperatives such as the efficiency of the justice system and the 
technical complexity of the modern administrative organization can justify 
endowing the latter with a punitive power, this does not justify the fact that 
the administrative authorities have the last word concerning the exercise of 
repressive power.32
In Steininger, the applicant company complained about a breach of their 
right to a fair trial in a case concerning the payment of state aid parafiscal sur-
charges.33 The administrative authorities that adopted decisions in the appli-
cant’s case were Agrarmarkt Austria (ama), the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry, Environment and Water, the Constitutional Court and the Supreme 
Administrative Court. The Court noted that neither ama, nor the Ministry that 
acted as appeal authorities, could be deemed “tribunals” for the purpose of 
Article 6(1) echr because ama was a public law body in which some admin-
istrative powers were vested and the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, 
Environment and Water was a government authority.
Relying on Schmautzer, the Court highlighted that Article 6(1) echr was 
applicable under its criminal head in the present case and found that the 
review provided by the Administrative Court was insufficient in that it merely 
related to questions of law, contained no answer to the complaints raised in 
relation to the facts and consisted merely of a simple reference to a previous 
decision on a similar matter.34
14.3 Judicial Review in Banking Law Disputes
In the case Credit and Industrial Bank, compulsory administration was imposed 
and extended by the Central National Bank (cnb) on the applicant company 
without its knowledge. The applicant bank complained that it had no effective 
access to a tribunal.35
 32 Dissenting opinion Judge Pinto de Albuquerque in ECtHR, Menarini Diagnostics s.r.l. v 
Italy, quoted above, p. 20.
 33 ECtHR. Steininger v. Austria, application no. 21539/ 07, judgement of 17 Jul 2012.
 34 Steininger v. Austria, quoted above, paragraph 57.
 35 ECtHR. Credit and Industrial Bank v. the Czech Republic, application no. 29010/ 95, judge-











The ECtHR noted that domestic legislation provided for limited review of 
the cnb’s decisions. This review was considered incompatible with Article 6(1) 
echr for the following reasons. First, the domestic courts were precluded in 
their exercise of judicial review from any substantive analysis of the cnb’s deci-
sion to impose and extend the compulsory administration. Their only function 
was to verify if the formal conditions for making an entry in the Companies 
Register concerning the compulsory administration were met. Second, domes-
tic legislation provided only for a written and private procedure for this type of 
disputes, without a hearing and without the possibility of opposition from the 
management of the bank.36
In another dispute concerning banking activities, the applicant bank com-
plained about the lack of judicial review in its dispute with the Bulgarian 
National Bank (bnb) concerning a withdrawal of banking licence and a wind- 
up order.37
The ECtHR noted that the domestic courts thought they were precluded 
from performing their own examination of a bank’s insolvency in those 
instances when the bnb found the bank to be insolvent. Thus, Sofia City Court 
and the Supreme Court of Cassation have expressly rejected the applicant’s 
bank requests to present evidence as to its solvability. The Court held that 
the deferral to the findings of the bnb for an issue which was crucial to the 
determination of a case was incompatible with Article 6(1) echr. The Court 
accepted that the bnb had significant knowledge in the field of banking and 
that the measures complained of were imposed during a serious financial cri-
sis that called for immediate response from the authorities. However, no alter-
native, less radical solution has been considered by the domestic authorities 
and, what is more, the provision of the Bulgarian Banks Act laying down the 
prohibition to review the bnb’s decisions remained in force despite the end of 
the crisis.
Interestingly, the Bulgarian Government argued in this case that the limited 
review of the bnb’s decisions was introduced at the demand of imf during 
the negotiation concerning the establishment of a currency board. The Court 
noted however that, on the one hand, the Government had not produced any 
evidence as to the existence of the alleged agreement and that, on the other 
hand, even assuming that the agreement existed, its existence did not justify 
a limitation of the right to a fair trial. The Court stressed in this sense that it 
was not indifferent to the need to interpret the Convention in such a way as 
 36 Credit and Industrial Bank v. the Czech Republic, quoted above, paragraphs 60– 62.
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to allow the member states to comply with their international obligations. 
Despite this, the ECtHR highlighted that the member states’ responsibility 
arising from the echr continues after they assume new international obliga-
tions. The opposite view would mean that when assuming new international 
obligations, member states are absolved from their responsibility under the 
Convention.38
14.4 Non- Pecuniary Damage for Breach of the Right to Judicial Review
Article 41 echr provides that “if the Court finds that there has been a vio-
lation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of 
the High Contracting Party concerned allows only a partial reparation to 
be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured 
party”.
The Court can award two types of damage under Article 41 echr: pecuniary 
and non- pecuniary damage. However, the Court has been less generous in the 
cases where it found a violation of Article 6(1) echr on account of lack of judi-
cial review. In the majority of cases in which the ECtHR has found a breach of 
the right to a fair trial for lack of access to judicial review, it did not award non- 
pecuniary damage. The ECtHR reasons that no causal link can be established 
between the violation and the damage allegedly suffered because of it and that 
it is highly unclear what the decision of the domestic authorities would have 
been provided that judicial review had been effective.
This question has been raised in Kingsley.39 The Grand Chamber high-
lighted that the principle underlying the provision of just satisfaction for a 
breach of Article 6(1) echr was that the applicant should as far as possible be 
put in the position he would have enjoyed had the proceedings complied with 
the Convention. The Court however will award financial compensation under 
Article 41 only where it is satisfied that the loss or damage complained of was 
actually caused by the violation that the Court has found. This is a corollary of 
the principle that the State cannot be held liable to pay damages in respect of 
losses for which it is not responsible.40
The ECtHR rejected thus by ten votes to seven the applicant’s request to 
award financial compensation in respect of loss of procedural opportunity or 
any distress, loss or damage allegedly flowing from the outcome of the domestic 
 38 Capital Bank ad v. Bulgaria, quoted above, paragraph 111.
 39 Kingsley v. the United Kingdom [gc], quoted above.









proceedings. The Court highlighted that a finding of a violation of Article 6 
does not entail that the contested domestic decision was not well- founded or 
that a differently constituted tribunal would have found for the applicant.41
 41 Kingsley v. the United Kingdom [gc], quoted above, paragraph 42. 
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 chapter 15
Relevance of the ECtHR’s Case- law on the Right 
to Judicial Review – A Story of Three Models
A few matters need to be highlighted about the case- law of the ECtHR anal-
ysed above. This case- law brings to light a problem common to many European 
states and the difficulty that the ECtHR had to provide a harmonious interpre-
tation for the right to an effective judicial remedy.
First, even if Article 13 echr provides expressly for the right to an effective 
remedy and for what can be deemed as a wider framework for interpretation, 
most cases considered by the ECtHR raising concerns about intensity of judi-
cial review are decided under Article 6(1) echr. The ECtHR analyses these 
cases as a breach of the right of access to a court or as a breach of the right 
to a fair trial. This approach renders the ECtHR’s analysis more harmonious 
because it allows the Court to link judicial review to other safeguards guar-
anteed by Article 6(1) echr, such as independence and the right to be heard. 
More importantly, it grounds the analysis on judicial review within the terrain 
of the fairness of justice.
Second, as ECtHR noted in Bryan, administrative law appeals that encom-
passed only a review of legality are common practice in the member states 
parties to the echr.1 Despite what appears to be a consensus of practice, 
the ECtHR does not consider the deference to administrative agency and 
the review of legality to be compatible with the echr. At the same time, the 
ECtHR does not provide for a blanket rejection of this type of administrative 
law appeals, but follows a case- by- case reasoning.
Third, applicants who complain at the ECtHR about the insufficiency of 
judicial review performed by the domestic courts in administrative law appeals 
also tend to complain about the lack of independence of the administrative 
agency whose decision the applicant is trying to set aside or about a breach 
of the right to be heard. This fact indicates that applicants expect administra-
tive agencies performing adjudicative functions to behave in the same way as 
courts. This also indicates that applicants consider that courts should control 
the excessive exercise of administrative discretion.





Lastly, I have distilled three models of judicial review from the case- law of 
the ECtHR. These models are based on a causal relation between the quality 
of the administrative discretion exercised, the impact of the discretion on the 
individual interests concerned and, lastly, the depth of judicial review. The 
first model is concerned with the exercise of administrative discretion within 
polycentric issues. The second model describes the exercise of administrative 
discretion in monocentric issues. The third model deals with the exercise of 
administrative discretion as police power.
I describe the proposed models in the following sections.
15.1 Exercise of Administrative Discretion within Polycentric Issues
Modern democracies witnessed an increase in the exercise of administrative 
discretion for the purpose of achieving wider policy aims. Such discretion is 
closely associated with political agendas of elected officials. It can be argued 
that the exercise of administrative discretion for wider policy- making pur-
poses is mandated by the electorate and, thus, part of democratic processes.
An example of this type of administrative discretion would be when individ-
ual expropriations are performed in order to construct a highway or a nuclear 
power plant. In these cases, the professional knowledge of the administrative 
agency plays an important role. So does the undisturbed exercise of the dis-
cretionary powers by the administrative agency. Also, such situations might be 
the result of both lengthy and costly political processes.
This situation falls under what Fuller and Winston have famously coined as 
a polycentric issue: “we might visualize this kind of situation by thinking of a 
spider web. A pull on one strand will distribute tensions after a complicated 
patter throughout the web as a whole”.2
Individual interests will often be affected by the exercise of this kind of 
administrative discretion. However, judicial review might not be the best tool 
to comprehensively address the affected individual interests. An in- depth 
judicial review of such cases can block the contested policy. In the example 
above, if the domestic courts choose to perform an in- depth judicial review 
and to annul the administrative decision, this might delay the construction 
of the highway or of the nuclear power plant. At the same time, since a policy 
decision like the decision to build a highway or a nuclear power plant involves 
 2 Fuller, L. L., and K.I. Winston. “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication.” Harvard Law Review 
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hundreds of experts and thousands of working hours, re- hearing such a case 
during judicial review by only a handful of judges might not appear to be in 
line with fairness either.
The ECtHR provides that in such cases judicial review should start by clar-
ifying whether the subject- matter of the individual case – that is the factual 
basis of the case – is disputed. In the example above, this would involve ana-
lysing whether the fact of expropriation is disputed. Furthermore, as Bryan 
provides, the sufficiency of judicial review should be assessed depending 
on the manner in which the decision was reached, the content of the dis-
pute and the possibility to review the shortcomings in the administrative 
procedure.3
What is important in this case is that the individual directly affected by the 
wider policy aims is heard during all stages of the procedure and is compen-
sated for the loss he/ she incurs. In other words, the purpose of this type of 
judicial review is to ensure that administrative discretion is exercised fairly 
and that those affected by this exercise are not simply dismissed as nuisances.
Two features would greatly increase the fairness of proceedings involving 
this type of administrative discretion. First, the early stages of the policy- 
making process must include an assessment of the individual interests that 
might be affected by it. Citizens and their interests should be seriously con-
sidered and mediators should be involved in reaching agreement about con-
tentious issues. This communitarian aspect of the exercise of administrative 
discretion could diminish the risk of court proceedings because, unless seri-
ous evidence of arbitrariness, courts would not satisfy the individual interest 
due to the limited judicial review that they would perform. Avoiding court 
proceedings by having properly considered the individual interests involved 
would thus be a win solution for all parties involved.
Second, having an independent adjudicative branch within the administra-
tive agency enjoying wide discretionary powers would answer all the compet-
ing needs that arise in such a context: the administrative agency would have 
its policy enforced without unnecessary delays, the individuals affected would 
have their interest considered and loss compensated and the courts would be 
relieved of a case.
The exercise of administrative discretion within polycentric issues that 
satisfy the requirements described above would be compatible with even the 
broadest notion of fairness.
 3 Bryan v. the United Kingdom, quoted above. 
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15.2 Exercise of Administrative Discretion for Monocentric Issues
The opposite of polycentric issues are monocentric issues, that is cases in 
which administrative discretion in exercised and affects only one individual 
case. This could concern the dismissal of a staff member, the allocation of 
social benefits or the insolvency of a bank. Monocentric issues are classical, 
textbook examples of exercise of administrative discretion.
In these instances, there should be no political capital involved. Less people 
and resources are involved in the decision- making process and the disputed 
administrative process is normally regulated by employment law, social bene-
fits laws or insolvency law. An example could be when a citizen is deprived of 
social benefits by an administrative agency.
Such cases may result in court proceedings either because the adminis-
trative authority has made a mistake, or because there is a gap in the rele-
vant normative framework. It might be that the exercise of administrative 
discretion in this type of individual cases involves specialized knowledge, 
such as during insolvency proceedings. This fact however does not justify 
a self- restrained judicial review. On the contrary, the domestic courts can 
in this case correct mistakes, assess the exercise of the discretionary power 
in relation to the individual concerned or fill the gap in the normative 
framework.
Cases of exercise of administrative discretion in monocentric issues – as 
shown in Tsfayo – require a judicial review both of the process of administra-
tive decision making and of the reached decision.4 Such judicial review should 
also be able to either re- consider the case or send the case for reconsideration 
by the administrative authority.
Full judicial review of cases involving monocentric issues performs the 
important role of quality control of the administrative decisions. When 
administrative authorities know that their decisions may be reversed or 
resent for reconsideration, they will be more diligent in the performance of 
their tasks.
According to the ECtHR, the limited judicial review of the exercise of 
administrative discretion in monocentric issues is not be compatible with the 
right to a fair trial.
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15.3 Exercise of Administrative Discretion as Policing Power
Modern democracies have decriminalized certain fields of law, such as petty 
offences. Also, partially, economic law offences stopped being considered 
criminal offences and became instead administrative law offences.
A paradox, however, came to occupy these areas of law. On the one hand, 
despite removing the “criminal law” tag, the administrative agencies entrusted 
with enforcing economic law have been empowered with important policing 
powers. Thus, they can launch investigations, they can search premises, cars 
and houses, they can seize documents, they can collect and corroborate evi-
dence, they can accuse and fine the offender. On the other hand, the removal 
of the “criminal law” tag from the economic law offences did not change the 
extent to which individuals’ rights are affected during such proceedings. The 
paradox has been, both in the policy- making circles and in the academic cir-
cles, to treat such proceedings as administrative law despite the bold polic-
ing powers exercised by administrative agencies and the effect on individu-
als’ rights. This paradox extended to the exercise of judicial review over such 
matters. It was expected that courts perform a limited, self- restrained judicial 
review of administrative action by deferring to the discretion of the admin-
istrative agency. In fact, judicial review of economic offences is expected to 
treat the exercise of administrative discretion as if it concerned polycentric 
issues.
Another issue which is ignored under this paradox is the fact that the 
administrative discretion exercised under this model is the most dangerous. 
Competition law offers a good way to exemplify this assertion. A competition 
agency typically has the discretion to decide which cartels or abuses of dom-
inant position to pursue and when to pursue them. It is, for example, diffi-
cult to imagine a prosecutor who would selectively pursue cases of homicide. 
Such prosecution is, unfortunately, practiced in countries considered not dem-
ocratic. However, when competition agencies select which competition law 
offences to pursue and which not to pursue, they are acting like the prosecutor 
described above.
This type of exercise of administrative discretion may be the expression 
of political goals or personal preferences. In addition, the individuals whose 
rights have been violated during the administrative proceedings should have a 
forum to complain about the violation of those rights or about the exercise of 
administrative discretion. For these reasons, the judicial review performed in 
these cases should be bold and deep in order to assess the exercise of adminis-
trative discretion and the respect of the individuals’ rights.
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The case- law of the ECtHR is clear in this respect. The ECtHR provides that 
when administrative discretion is exercised in areas that fall under the crim-
inal head of Article 6(1) echr, domestic courts should perform a full judicial 
review. A full review includes the power to hear evidence, the power to quash 
in all respects and the power to substitute the reasoning of the administra-
tive agency with its own reasoning. These powers should be provided by the 
domestic legislation and, more importantly, should be exercised in practice.
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 chapter 16
Case- law of EU Courts on the Right to an Effective 
Judicial Review
Haltern has remarked that, since there was no Treaty basis for the cjeu’s initial 
human rights jurisprudence, the cjeu had “invented, out of thin air, unwritten 
European human rights”.1 Rosas describes five stages in the development of 
human rights protection in the EU: (1) outside the competence of the cjeu; 
(2) as part of general principles of Community law since 1969; (3) explicit ref-
erence to the echr since 1974– 1979; (4) characterization of the echr as having 
“special significance” since 1989; and (5) reference to individual judgements of 
the ECtHR since the mid 1990s.2 The activism that the EU Courts are accused of 
originates very often from cases concerning human rights.3 As Muir has noted, 
“if one defines judicial activism as judicial decisions going beyond the legal 
framework created by political institutions, the Court’s traditional case- law on 
fundamental rights is a prime of judicial activism. It is indeed largely accepted 
that the Court asserted the constitutional importance of fundamental rights in 
the EU legal order despite the original will of the Treaty makers”.4 Interestingly, 
despite the activism shown by EU courts in cases concerning human rights 
protection, they have pursued judicial restraint in EU competition law cases, 
including in relation to fair trial issues raised in competition law disputes. This 
contradiction is analysed in this chapter.
The entry into force of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights has marked 
a new stage in the development of fundamental rights in the EU because, 
pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) teu, the Charter has the 
same legal value as the Treaties. In addition, the right to a fair trial has been 
 1 Haltern, U. “Integration Through Law.” European Integration Theory. Eds. A. Weiner and 
T. Diez. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 183.
 2 Rosas, Allan. “With a Little Help from My Friends: International Case- Law as a Source of 
Reference for the EU Courts.” The Global Community Yearbook of International Law and 
Jurisprudence (2005), pp. 203– 230, p. 214.
 3 De Búrca, Gráinne. “The Evolution of EU Human Rights Law.” The Evolution of EU Law. Eds. 
Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
 4 Muir, Elise. “The Court of Justice: a Fundamental Rights Institution Among Others.” Judicial 
Activism at the European Court of Justice. Eds. Mark Dawson, Bruno De Witte and Elise Muir. 











formalised for the first time. Thus, Article 47(1) of the Charter provides that 
everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law are violated has 
the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the 
conditions laid down in this article. Article 47(2) stipulates that everyone 
is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone is 
to have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented. Lastly, 
Article 47(3) provides that legal aid is to be made available to those who lack 
sufficient resources insofar as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access 
to justice.
According to the explanations relating to Article 47, which, in accordance 
with the third subparagraph of Article 6(1) teu and Article 52(7) of the Charter, 
have to be taken into consideration for the interpretation of the Charter, the 
second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter corresponds to Article 6(1) of 
the echr.5
The first sentence of Article 52(3) teu states that, insofar as the Charter con-
tains rights which correspond to those guaranteed by the echr, their meaning 
and scope are to be the same as those laid down by the echr. According to the 
explanation of that provision, the meaning and the scope of the guaranteed 
rights are to be determined not only by reference to the text of the echr, but 
also, inter alia, by reference to the case- law of the echr. The second sentence 
of Article 52(3) of the Charter provides that the first sentence is not to preclude 
the grant of wider protection by EU law.
These provisions of the Charter and of the teu suggest that fundamental 
rights in the EU should be interpreted at least as widely as the interpreta-
tion offered by the ECtHR.6 In order to analyse if these Treaty provisions are 
respected in relation to the review of EU Commission’s decisions in compe-
tition law cases, the following section will describe the case- law of the EU 
Courts on the right to effective judicial protection and the right to effective 
judicial review. As it will be shown, the existing system of judicial review com-
bines limited review of the substance of the case with the unlimited review of 
fines. The EU Commission’s discretion is wide and exercised during all stages 
of enforcement proceedings. Lastly, this section highlights the connection 
that the EU Courts have developed between the right to a fair trial and judicial 
review.
 5 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, quoted above, p. 29.
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16.1 Right to Effective Judicial Protection
The ecj recognized relatively early that the principle of effective judicial 
protection is a general principle of EU law stemming from the constitu-
tional traditions common to the Member States, which has been enshrined 
in Articles 6 and 13 echr.7 In Marguerite Johnston, a case which concerned 
the principle of equal treatment between men and women, the ecj found 
that “as the European Parliament, Council and Commission recognized (…) 
and as the Court has recognized in its decisions, the principles on which 
that Convention is based must be taken into consideration in Community 
law”.8 The ecj also found that “all persons have the right to obtain an effec-
tive remedy in a competent court against measures which they consider to 
be contrary to the principle of equal treatment for men and women” and 
that it was “for the Member States to ensure effective judicial control as 
regards compliance with the applicable provisions of Community law and of 
national legislation intended to give effect to the rights for which the direc-
tive provides”.9
In Heylens, the ecj was faced with a preliminary question seeking to estab-
lish whether the principle of the free movement of workers required that it 
must be possible for a decision refusing to recognize the equivalence of a 
diploma be made the subject of judicial proceedings.10
The ecj answered affirmatively and found that
effective judicial review, which must be able to cover the legality of the 
reasons for the contested decision, presupposes in general that the court 
to which the matter is referred may require the competent authority 
to notify its reasons. But where, as in this case, it is more particularly a 
question of securing the effective protection of a fundamental right 
 7 C- 222/ 84, Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, ecli:eu:C:1986:206, 
paragraphs 18 and 19.
C- 222/ 86, Unectef v Heylens, ecli:eu:C:1987:442, paragraph 14.
C- 424/ 99, Commission v Austria, ecli:eu:C:2001:642, paragraph 45.
C- 50/ 00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council, ecli:eu:C:2002:462, paragraph 39.
C- 467/ 01, Eribrand, ecli:eu:C:2003:364, paragraph 61.
 8 C- 222/ 84, Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, quoted above, para-
graphs 18– 19.
 9 C- 222/ 84, Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, quoted above, para-
graph 19.











conferred by the Treaty on Community workers, the latter must also be 
able to defend that right under the best possible conditions and have 
the possibility of deciding, with a full knowledge of the relevant facts, 
whether there is any point in their applying to the courts. Consequently, 
in such circumstances the competent national authority is under a duty 
to inform them of the reasons on which its refusal is based, either in the 
decision itself or in a subsequent communication made at their request.11
Thus, similar to the case- law of the ECtHR, effective judicial protection was not 
construed by the ecj as an abstract concept. Rather, the effectiveness required 
of judicial protection stems from the need to secure the rights conferred by the 
EU Treaties. Also, effective judicial protection in the EU implies duties both for 
the domestic competent administrative and judicial authorities.
Starting with Oleificio Borelli, the EU Courts have used a linear analysis for 
the interpretation of the principle of judicial protection. There, the ecj has 
found that judicial control reflects a general principle of Community law stem-
ming from the constitutional traditions common to the member states and 
enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 echr.12
In the recent years, the cjeu has developed its jurisprudence on the right to 
effective judicial protection. However, although the right to an effective legal 
remedy constitutes a general principle of EU law and was reaffirmed by the 
Charter, it can only be enforced when the subject- matter of the dispute in the 
main proceedings is connected with the EU law. In Chartry, the Court noted 
that a dispute between a Belgian national and the Belgian State concerning 
taxation of activities carried out within the territory of that Member State, 
was not connected in any way with the provisions of the ec Treaty on the free 
movement of persons, of services, or of capital.13 Moreover, that dispute did 
not concern the application of national measures by which that Member State 
implement EU law.14
In the case deb, the cjeu was asked whether the right to effective judicial 
protection entails legal aid for legal persons in the form of dispensation from 
payment of the costs of proceedings or from provision of security for costs 
before an action is brought.15 The cjeu highlighted that “the assessment of the 
 11 C- 222/ 86, Unectef v Heylens, quoted above.
 12 C- 97/ 91, Oleificio Borelli v Commission, ecli:eu:C:1992:491.
 13 C- 457/ 09, Claude Chartry v Belgian State, ecli:eu:C:2011:101.
 14 C- 457/ 09, Claude Chartry v Belgian State, quoted above, paragraphs 22– 26.
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need to grant that aid must be made on the basis of the right of the actual per-
son whose rights and freedoms as guaranteed by EU law have been violated, 
rather than on the basis of the public interest of society, even if that inter-
est may be one of the criteria for assessing the need for the aid”.16 The Court 
showed that the principle of effective judicial protection may cover, inter alia, 
dispensation from advance payment of the costs of proceedings and/ or the 
assistance of a lawyer.17
In Brahim Samba Diouf, the cjeu received a preliminary question asking 
whether the right to an effective remedy against decisions taken on applica-
tions for asylum, and, more generally, the general principle of the right to an 
effective remedy, must be interpreted as meaning that they preclude rules as 
a result of which no separate judicial remedy exists against the decision of the 
competent national authority to examine an application for asylum under an 
accelerated procedure.18
The Court recalled that the effectiveness of a remedy depends on the admin-
istrative and judicial system of each Member State seen as a whole and that the 
principle of judicial protection affords an individual a right of access to a court 
or tribunal, but not to a number of levels of jurisdiction.19
On the facts of the case, the cjeu noted that the procedure to be applied 
for the examination of the application for asylum, viewed separately and inde-
pendently from the final decision which grants or rejects the application for 
asylum, is a measure preparatory to the final decision. As such, an absence of 
a remedy does not constitute a breach of the right to an effective remedy, “pro-
vided, however, that the legality of the final decision adopted in an accelerated 
procedure – and, in particular, the reasons which led the competent author-
ity to reject the application for asylum as unfounded – may be the subject of 
a thorough review by the national court, within the framework of an action 
against the decision rejecting the application”.20
 16 C- 279/ 09, deb, quoted above, paragraph 42.
 17 C- 279/ 09, deb, quoted above, paragraphs 59– 62.
 18 C- 69/ 10, Brahim Samba Diouf v Ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration, 
ecli:eu:C:2011:524.
 19 C- 69/ 10, Brahim Samba Diouf v Ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration, quoted 
above, paragraphs 46 and 69.













16.2 Right to Judicial Review in Competition Law Cases – A Matter of 
Constitutional Design
Judicial review in EU competition law cases is first of all a matter of consti-
tutional design because its tenets are laid down in the tfeu and Regulation 
1/ 2003. Thus, Article 263 tfeu provides that the cjeu has jurisdiction over 
actions brought against the Commission’s decisions.
More precisely, Article 263 tfeu states that
The Court of Justice of the European Union shall review the legality of 
legislative acts, of acts of the Council, of the Commission and of the 
European Central Bank, other than recommendations and opinions, 
and of acts of the European Parliament and of the European Council 
intended to produce legal effects vis- à- vis third parties.
It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought (…) on 
grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural 
requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to 
their application, or misuse of powers.
This provision is considered to embody a limited jurisdiction that allows the 
EU Courts to review the legality of the Commission’s decisions. Many scholars 
have argued that the review of legality does not allow the cjeu to re- examine 
a case on its merits.21
The limited review of legality is accompanied by an unlimited review of 
fines provided for in Article 261 tfeu which states that regulations adopted 
by the European Parliament and the Council “may give the Court of Justice of 
the European Union unlimited jurisdiction with regard to the penalties pro-
vided for in such regulations”. Article 31 of Council Regulation 1/ 2003 provides 
that “the Court of Justice shall have unlimited jurisdiction to review decisions 
whereby the Commission has fixed a fine or periodic penalty payment. It may 
cancel, reduce or increase the fine or periodic penalty payment imposed”.
It is important to observe that Article 263 tfeu places the decisions that 
the EU Commission adopts in competition law matters in the same class of 
acts with the legislative acts of the EU, the acts of the Council or the acts of 
 21 See Vesterdorf, Bo. “Judicial Review in EU Competition Law: Reflections on the Role 
of the Community Courts in the ec system of Competition Law Enforcement.” Global 
Competition Policy 1 (2005), pp. 3– 27, pp. 9 et seq.
Bailey, David. “Scope of Judicial Review under Article 81 ec.” Common Market Law 
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the Central Bank. Figure 11 below offers a visual representation of this consti-
tutional requirement.
The general EU judicial system of a posteriori control was directly inspired 
by the control of administrative bodies exercised by the French Conseil d’Etat 
since 1799, when Napoléon established it.22 He further noted that, even if the 
concept of unlimited jurisdiction is not defined in the Treaties, it appears to 
be derived from the French administrative law concept of recours de pleine 
jurisdiction. This conception of judicial jurisdiction is thought to mandate a 
court to “deal fully with a dispute and exercise its fullest powers. For example, 
a court may award damages against the administrative body or revise (as dis-
tinct from merely annulling) the administrative act in question”.23 Etoa noted 
that an increase in the level of judicial review has occurred in relation to the 
administrative sanctions imposed by the French domestic agencies.24
16.3 Limited Review of Legality – Design by Self- Interpretation
According to the case- law of the cjeu, judicial review of the decisions of the 





















 figure 11  Review of legality as construed by art. 263 tfeu
 22 Derenne, op. cit., p. 74.
 23 Derenne, op. cit., p. 77.
 24 Etoa, Samuel. “L’évolution du contrôle du juge administratif sur la gravité des sanctions 











started its analysis concerning judicial review in a competition law dispute 
by highlighting that, in addition to the review of legality, provided for under 
Article 263 tfeu, a review with unlimited jurisdiction was envisaged in regard 
to the penalties laid down by regulations.25 In light of this, the failure to review 
the whole of the contested decision of the Court’s own motion does not con-
travene the principle of effective judicial protection. Compliance with that 
principle does not require that the EU Courts – which are indeed obliged to 
respond to the pleas in law raised and to carry out a review of both the law and 
the facts – should be obliged to undertake of its own motion a new and com-
prehensive investigation of the file.
The EU Courts have traditionally used two notions to justify maintain-
ing limited powers of review of the EU Commission’s competition law deci-
sions: complex economic analysis and the Commission’s margin of discretion.
Already in Consten and Grundig, the ecj found that
judicial review of complex economic evaluations by the Commission (…) 
must take account of their nature by confining itself to an examination of 
the relevance of the facts and legal circumstances which the Commission 
deduces therefrom. This review must in the first place be carried in 
respect of the reasons given for the decisions which must set out the facts 
and considerations on which the said evaluations are based.26
Whereas initially formulated in relation to Article 101 tfeu, this reasoning was 
later extended to cover cases involving Article 102 tfeu and merger reviews. 
Thus, in Remia, the ecj noted that, when confronted with complex economic 
matters, the Court must “limit its review of such an appraisal to verifying 
whether the relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether 
the statement of the reasons for the decision is adequate, whether the facts 
have been accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest error of 
appraisal or misuse of powers”.27
The EU Courts’ self- restraint in cases involving complex economic/ tech-
nical matters is often accompanied by its corollary principle describing the 
Commission’s margin of discretion. Interestingly, this concept is used by 
the EU Courts both to justify deference to the Commission’s appraisals and 
 25 C- 386/ 10 P, Chalkor v Commission, ecli:eu:C:2011:815, paragraph 53.
 26 C- 56/ 64, Consten and Grundig v Commission of the eec, ecli:eu:C:1966:41.
C- 58/ 64, Grundig v Commission of the EEC, ecli:eu:C:1965:60.
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to deploy a comprehensive judicial review that can lead to setting aside the 
Commission’s decision.
In Tetra Laval, the Court of Justice found that while the EU Courts
recognize that the Commission has a margin of appreciation in eco-
nomic and technical matters, that does not mean that they must decline 
to review the Commission’s interpretation of economic and technical 
data. The EU Courts must not only establish whether the evidence put 
forward is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but must also deter-
mine whether that evidence contains all the relevant data that must be 
taken into consideration in appraising a complex situation and whether 
it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it.28
This analysis has been extended by the EU Courts to other areas except com-
petition law.29
The EU Courts justify their deferential, limited judicial review – which is 
employed in most competition law cases – by the need to respect the rule of 
law and the principle of institutional balance. In relation to the principle of 
rule of law, the Court established in Les Verts, in 1986, that
the European Economic Community is a Community based on the rule 
of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States not its institutions can 
avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted by them 
are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty. (…) 
The Treaty established a complete system of remedies and procedures 
designed to permit the Court of Justice to review the legality of measures 
adopted by the institutions.30
This principle of rule of law is now consecrated in Article 13(2) tfeu which 
states that “each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred 
on it in the Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and 
objectives set out in them”.
The principle of institutional balance, has been established in Meroni, 
where the Court argued that a balance of powers was “characteristic of the 
 28 C- 12/ 03 P, Commission v Tetra Laval, ecli:eu:C:2005:87, paragraph 39.
 29 C- 405/ 07 P, Netherlands v Commission, ecli:eu:C:2008:613, paragraph 55; T- 475/ 07, Dow 
AgroScience and Others v Commission, ecli:eu:T:2011:455, paragraph 153; T- 257/ 07, France 
v Commission, ecli:eu:T:2011:444, paragraph 87.








institutional structure of the Community”.31 The principle of institutional bal-
ance is not provided as such in the tfeu, although it can be deduced from the 
overall structure of the Treaty.
In addition to the reasons offered by the EU Courts themselves concerning 
their preference for limited judicial review, scholars argue that Article 33(1) 
of the Treaty establishing the ecsc was the legislative precursor of the judi-
cial self- restraint currently practiced. David Bailey showed that “as regards 
the evaluation of economic facts or circumstances relevant to a decision, 
Article 33 ecsc required the Court of Justice to ascertain only whether the 
Commission misused its powers or manifestly failed to observe the provisions 
of the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application”.32 Bailey highlights 
that there is no equivalent provision in the tfeu. He adds however that judi-
cial self- restraint is well- established not only in relation to competition mat-
ters, but also in the common agricultural policy, anti- dumping duties and the 
medico- pharmacological sphere.33
16.4 Unlimited Review of Fines
The normative framework defining competition law has not suffered many 
changes since its inception. At the same time, the fining policy applied by the 
European Commission in competition law cases has changed profoundly. The 
Commission imposed no fines between 1962 and 1969, when the first cartel 
decision has been adopted.34 From that point until the 1980s, the fines imposed 
by the Commission remained very modest. This trend was replaced in the 1980s 
by an increasingly aggressive fining policy. In Pioneer, a decision that targeted 
five European subsidiaries and independent distributors of the Japanese man-
ufacturer Pioneer, the Commission imposed the first fine exceeding 10 million 
US Dollars.35 When Pioneer challenged this change of fining practice, the ecj 
argued that
 31 C- 9/ 56, Meroni v High Authority, quoted above, paragraph 133.
 32 Bailey, David. “Standard of Judicial Review under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.” The Role of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases. Eds. Massimo Merola 
and Jacques Derennes. Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2012, pp. 103– 128, p. 106.
 33 Bailey (2012), op. cit., p. 106.
 34 European Commission. Case iv/ 26.045, Quinine [1969], oj L 192, p. 5.
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the fact that the Commission, in the past, imposed fines of a certain level 
for certain types of infringement does not mean that it is estopped from 
raising that level within the limits indicated in Regulation 17 if that is 
necessary to ensure the implementation of community competition pol-
icy. On the contrary, the proper application of competition rules requires 
that the Commission may at any time adjust the level of the fines to the 
needs of that policy.36
Forrester noted that prior to the 1980s, the “Commission’s priority regarding 
cartels had hitherto been rather equivocal: cartels were a known and undesir-
able feature of economic life, but attacking a national champion was likely to 
be controversial, and getting good evidence was not easy”.37 However, due to 
a change of policy in the US targeting international cartels, “the Commission 
wholeheartedly joined the quest against cartels, as being a primary task of a 
competition law enforcer”.38
The modernization program undertaken by dg comp involved the replace-
ment of Regulation 17/ 62 with Regulation 1/ 2003. The Fining Guidelines of 
1998 have been replaced by the Fining Guidelines of 2006 and the Leniency 
Notice. As Tables 4 and 5 below indicate, this process of modernization has 
been accompanied by a concomitant increase of the fines imposed by the 
Commission for breaches of EU competition law. Thus, the fines imposed by 
the Commission between 2015– 2020 represent 25% of all the fines imposed 
since 1990.
The more aggressive fining policy of the Commission has led to the increase 
in the appeals against the Commission’s decisions.
The ecj construed its own powers of review of the fines imposed in com-
petition law cases in a broader way than the review of legality. In this sense, 
the ecj has stated that the unlimited jurisdiction conferred by Article 31 of 
Regulation 1/ 2003 authorizes the EU courts “to vary the contested measure, 
even without annulling it, by taking into account all of the factual circum-
stances, so as to amend, for example, the amount of the fine”.39
 36 C- 100/ 80, Musique Diffusion française v Commission, quoted above, paragraph 100.
 37 Forrester, Ian S. “A Challenge for Europe’s Judges: The Review of Fines in Competition 
Cases.” The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases. Eds. 
Massimo Merola and Jacques Derennes. Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2012, pp. 147– 192, p. 150.
 38 Forrester (2012), op. cit.











A few years later, in Chalkor, the Court maintained that the review of legal-
ity is supplemented by the unlimited jurisdiction which empowers the Courts, 
in addition to carrying out a mere review of the lawfulness of the penalty, to 
substitute their own appraisal for the appraisal provided by the Commission 
and, consequently, to cancel, reduce or increase the fine or penalty payment 
imposed.40
However, despite both the Treaty- encapsulated and self- declared unlim-
ited review of fines, the EU Courts tend to defer to the Commission’s margin 
of appreciation when reviewing the fines. A comparison between Table 5 
above describing the fines imposed by the EU Commission and Table 6 below 
describing the fines adjusted by the EU Courts support this view.
As Table 7 concludes, if at the beginning of the 1990s the EU Courts’ review 
of the fines imposed by the EU Commission resulted in the fines being dimin-
ished by 35,9%, starting with 1995 this number rarely went over 10%.
table 4 Total of fines imposed by the Commission in EU competition law 
Cases – 1990– 2020a
Period Amount in €
1990– 1994 537 491 550
1995– 1999 292 838 000
2000– 2004 3 458 421 100
2005– 2009 9 355 867 500
2010– 2014 7 917 218 674
2015– 2019 8 307 828 000
2020* 278 639 000
Total 30 148 303 824
* Last update: 29 September 2020
a   European Commission. Cartel Statistics. Available at http:// ec.europa.eu/ competition/ cartels/ 
statistics/ statistics.pdf accessed on 23 February 2021. Amounts as imposed by the Commission 
(incl. corrections following amendment decisions) and not corrected for changes following 
judgments of the Courts (General Court and European Court of Justice) and only considering 
cartel infringements under Article 101 tfeu (previously Articles 81 resp. 85 and Article 82 resp. 
Article 86 of the Treaty), only those amounts, which concern the Article 101 tfeu, have been 
considered.
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16.5 Margin of Appreciation of the EU Commission and Unlimited 
Review of Fines
As shown in section 16.4., the cjeu has the constitutional right to perform 
unlimited judicial review of the fines imposed by the Commission in com-
petition law cases. At the same time, the analysis performed in the section 
above indicated that the cjeu’s judicial review of fines became more deferen-
tial since the 1990s. In fact, the Commission’s margin of discretion is invoked 
by the cjeu to justify everything from the Commission’s use of the Fining 
Guidelines, to the analysis of mitigating circumstances and impact on the mar-
ket. Consistently, the Commission’s margin of appreciation in fining matters is 
justified by the need to ensure the deterrent effect of fines.41
The present section highlights landmark cases that define the scope of the 
Commission’s margin of discretion in fining matters.
In Archer Daniels Midland the cfi was faced with the question whether 
the Fining Guidelines are compatible with the principle of non- retroactivity 
of criminal laws. The cfi noted that that the principle of non- retroactivity of 
table 5 Total of fines imposed by the Commission in EU Competition law 
cases – 2016– 2020a
Year Amount in €
2016 3 726 976 000
2017 1 945 656 000
2018 800 748 000
2019 1 484 877 000
2020* 278 639 000
Total 8 236 896 000
* Last update: 29 September 2020
a   European Commission. Cartel Statistics, quoted above.
Amounts as imposed by the Commission (incl. corrections following amendment decisions) 
and not corrected for changes following judgments of the Courts (General Court and European 
Court of Justice) and only considering cartel infringements under Article 101 tfeu (previously 
Articles 81 resp. 85 and Article 82 resp. Article 86 of the Treaty), only those amounts, which con-
cern the Article 101 tfeu, have been considered.










criminal laws, enshrined in Article 7 echr constitutes a general principle of 
Community law which must be observed when fines are imposed for infringe-
ment of the competition rules. The principle of non- retroactivity of criminal 
laws requires that the penalties imposed correspond with those fixed at the 
time when the infringement was committed. At the same time, the adop-
tion of guidelines capable of modifying the general competition policy of 
the Commission as regards fines may fall within the scope of the principle of 
non- retroactivity.42
The cfi also highlighted that by adopting and publishing the Fining 
Guidelines, the Commission imposes a limit on its own discretion: “it cannot 
depart from those rules under pain of being found, where appropriate, to be 
in breach of the general principles of law, such as equal treatment or the pro-
tection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty”.43 The cfi concluded 
table 6 Total of fines imposed by the Commission, adjusted for court 
judgements – 1990– 2020a
Period Amount in €
1990– 1994 344 282 550,00
1995– 1999 270 963 500,00
2000– 2004 3 157 348 710,00
2005– 2009 7 863 307 786,50
2010– 2014 7 598 728 479,00
2015– 2019 8 234 322 023,00
2020* 278 639 000,00
Total 27 747 592 048,50
* Last update: 29 September 2020
a   European Commission. Cartel Statistics, quoted above.
Amounts corrected for changes (incl. corrections following amendment decisions) and judg-
ments of the Courts (General Court and European Court of Justice) and only considering car-
tel infringements under Article 101 tfeu (previously Article 81 resp. Article 85 of the Treaty). 
Wherever prohibitions and fines concern infringements of Article 101 tfeu (previously Articles 
81 resp. Article 85 and of Article 102 tfeu previously Article 82 resp. Article 86 of the Treaty), 
only those amounts, which concern the Article 101 tfeu infringements, have been considered.
 42 T- 59/ 02, Archer Daniels Midland v Commission, ecli:eu:T:2006:272, paragraph 42.
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however that “undertakings involved in an administrative procedure in 
which fines may be imposed cannot acquire a legitimate expectation that 
the Commission will not exceed the level of fines previously imposed or the 
method of calculating the fines”.44
In kme Germany, the Commission has fined the applicants for having orga-
nized a cartel in the air conditioning and refrigeration business. The applicants 
lodged an action for annulment, contesting the amount of the fine imposed on 
them and the fact that the Fining Guidelines used by the Commission for the 
calculation of the fines was a soft law instrument.45
The cfi has, first of all, highlighted that whilst the Fining Guidelines “may 
not be regarded as rules of law, they nevertheless form rules of practice from 
which the Commission may not depart in an individual case without giving 
reasons which are compatible with the principle of equal treatment”.46 The 
cfi stressed that its role when reviewing the legality of the fines imposed by 
the Commission was twofold: (1) to assess whether the discretion exercised by 
the Commission is in line with the method for calculating the fines established 
in the Guidelines, and in the contrary (2) to verify whether the departure is 
justified and supported by sufficient legal reasoning. The cfi also added that 
“the self- limitation on the Commission’s discretion arising from the adoption 
table 7 Percentage of fine reduction by EU courts in cartel cases
Period Imposed Adjusted Difference
1990– 1994 537 491 550 344 282 550,00 - 35,9%
1995- 1999 292 838 000 270 963 500,00 - 7,5%
2000– 2004 3 458 421 100 3 157 348 710,00 - 8,7%
2005– 2009 9 355 867 500 7 863 307 786,50 - 16,0%
2010– 2014 7 917 218 674 7 598 728 479,00 - 4,0%
2015– 2019 8 307 828 000 8 234 322 023,00 - 0,9%
2020* 278 639 000 278 639 000,00 0,0%
Total 30 148 303 824 27 747 592 048,50 - 8,0%
* Last update: 29 September 2020
 44 T- 59/ 02, Archer Daniels Midland v Commission, quoted above, paragraph 48.
 45 T- 127/ 04, kme Germany and Others v Commission, ecli:eu:T:2009:142.










of the Guidelines is not incompatible with the Commission’s maintaining a 
substantial margin of discretion”.47
Furthermore, the cfi noted that the Commission’s duty was not to scientif-
ically prove the impact of a cartel on a market, but rather “to provide specific 
and credible evidence indicating with reasonable probability that the cartel 
had an impact on the market”.48
According to settled case- law, the gravity of an infringement has to be deter-
mined by reference to numerous factors, such as the particular circumstances 
of the case and its context; moreover, there is no binding or exhaustive list of 
the criteria which must be applied.49 The criteria for assessing the gravity of 
an infringement may include the volume and value of the goods in respect of 
which the infringement was committed and the size and economic power of 
the undertaking and, consequently, the influence which it is able to exert on 
the relevant market. Thus, on the one hand, the Commission can have regard 
both of the total turnover of the undertaking, which gives an indication, albeit 
approximate and imperfect, of the size of the undertaking and of its economic 
power, and of the market share of the undertakings concerned on the rele-
vant market, which gives an indication of the scale of the infringement. On 
the other hand, it is important not to attach on one or other of those figures an 
importance which is disproportionate in relation to other factors and the fix-
ing of an appropriate fine cannot therefore be the result of a simple calculation 
based on total turnover.50
In addition, when determining the gravity of an infringement, particular 
account should be taken of the legislative background and economic context 
of the conduct complained of.51 Also, in order to assess the actual effect of an 
infringement on the market the Commission must take as a reference the com-
petition that would exist if there was no infringement.52
 47 T- 127/ 04, kme Germany and Others v Commission, quoted above, paragraphs 34– 35.
 48 T- 241/ 01, Scandinavian Airlines System v Commission, ecli:eu:T:2005:296, paragraph 122.
 49 Order in C- 137/ 95 P, spo and Others v Commission, ecli:eu:C:1996:130, paragraph 54.
C- 219/ 95 P, Ferriere Nord v Commission, ecli:eu:C:1997:375, paragraph 33.
And T- 9/ 99, hfb and Others v Commission, ecli:eu:T:2002:70, paragraph 443.
 50 C- 100/ 80, Musique Diffusion française v Commission, quoted above, paragraphs 120 and 
121.
T- 77/ 92, Parker Pen v Commission, ecli:eu:T:1994:85, paragraph 94.
 51 C- 40/ 73 (joined cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114– 73), Suiker Unie and Others 
v Commission, ecli:eu:C:1975:174, paragraph 612. And C- 219/ 95 P, Ferriere Nord v 
Commission, quoted above, paragraph 38.
 52 C- 40/ 73, Suiker Unie and Others v Commission, quoted above, paragraphs 619– 620. T- 347/ 
94, Mayr- Melnhof Kartongesellschaft v Commission, ecli:eu:T:1998:101, paragraph 235.
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Where an infringement has been committed by several undertakings, the 
Commission must consider the relative gravity of the participation of each 
separate undertaking.53 The gravity of participation implies an analysis of the 
roles played by each undertaking in the infringement and the duration of their 
participation.54
In Archer Daniels Midland, the cfi has shown that the impact of a cartel on 
the market necessarily involves recourse to assumptions. In this respect, the 
Commission must in particular consider what the price of the relevant prod-
uct would have been in the absence of a breach of competition law. However, 
when examining the causes of actual price developments, it is hazardous to 
speculate on the part played by each of those causes. In this situation, the 
Commission cannot be criticised for referring to the actual impact on the mar-
ket of a cartel having an anti- competitive object, such as a price or sales quota 
cartel, even though it does not quantify that impact or provide any assessment 
in figures in this respect. Rather, the actual impact of a cartel on the market 
must be regarded as having been demonstrated if the Commission is able to 
provide specific and credible evidence indicating with reasonable probability 
that the cartel had an impact on the market.55 In addition, having regard to 
the administrative and management costs associated with the sound function-
ing of a complex cartel, and taking account of the risks inherent in the cartel 
activities, it is reasonable to assume that when undertakings persist with the 
infringement over a long period of time, this indicates that the cartel members 
made a certain profit from that cartel which, in turn suggests that the cartel 
had an actual impact on the relevant market.56
The Commission’s discretion also extends to the seriousness of the infringe-
ment and its composing elements.57 The Commission also retains a large mar-
gin of discretion in relation to the application of aggravating and attenuating 
circumstances.58
The cfi noted that the adoption of the Guidelines has not rendered irrele-
vant the previous case- law under which the Commission enjoys a discretion as 
to whether or not to take account of certain matters when setting the amount 
of the fines. Thus, “in the absence of any binding indication in the Guidelines 
 53 C- 40/ 73, Suiker Unie and Others v Commission, quoted above, paragraph 623.
 54 C- 49/ 92 P, Commission v Anic Partecipazioni, ecli:eu:C:1999:356, paragraph 150. And T- 6/ 
89, Enichem Anic v Commission, ecli:eu:T:1991:74, paragraph 264.
 55 T- 59/ 02, Archer Daniels Midland v Commission, ecli:eu:T:2006:272, paragraphs 160– 161.
 56 T- 59/ 02, Archer Daniels Midland v Commission, ecli:eu:T:2006:272, paragraph 166.
 57 Joined cases T- 101/ 05 and T- 111/ 05, basf v Commission, ecli:eu:T:2007:290, paragraph 65.














regarding the mitigating circumstances that may be taken into account, it must 
be concluded that the Commission has retained a degree of latitude in making 
an overall assessment of the extent to which a reduction of fines may be made 
in respect of mitigating circumstances”.59
Lastly, the Commission’s discretion extends to the cooperation offered by 
the members of a cartel during the proceedings.60 This means that only an 
obvious error of assessment by the Commission is capable of being censured, 
since the Commission enjoys a wide discretion in assessing the quality and 
usefulness of the cooperation provided by the undertakings that are being 
investigated. The quality and usefulness of the cooperation is further qualified 
in relation to the contributions made by other undertakings.61
16.6 The Right to a Fair Legal Process in EU Law
Two periods can be distinguished concerning the development of the right to a 
fair trial in EU law: before the adoption of the Charter on Fundamental Rights 
and after the adoption of the Charter.
Before the adoption of the Charter, the cjeu has recognized the existence 
and importance of the right to a fair trial in European law in general and in 
European competition law in particular.62
Thus, in Schindler Holding and Others, the applicants argued that, since the 
infringements of EU competition law fall within the scope of criminal law, the 
procedure before the Commission must satisfy the requirements of Article 6(1) 
echr. The applicants claimed that administrative authorities cannot impose 
penal sanctions unless there is full judicial review. They complained that an 
action for annulment before the Courts of the European Union was no more 
than an appeal before an administrative court of last resort and was limited to 
the pleas in law put forward by the applicants.63
The cfi initiated its argument by recalling the general principle of 
European Union law that everyone is entitled to a fair legal process.64 The 
right to a fair legal process has been reaffirmed by Article 47 of the Charter 
 59 T- 127/ 04, kme Germany and Others v Commission, quoted above, paragraph 115.
 60 C- 328/ 05, sgl Carbon ag v Commission, ecli:eu:C:2007:277, paragraph 88.
 61 T- 127/ 04, kme Germany and Others v Commission, quoted above, paragraph 141.
 62 C- 185/ 95, Baustahlgewebe GmbH v Commission of the European Communities, 
ecli:eu:C:1998:608, paragraph 21.
 63 T- 138/ 07, Schindler Holding and Others v Commission, ecli:eu:T:201:362, paragraph 49.
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of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and is inspired by the fun-
damental rights which form an integral part of the general principles of EU 
law which the EU Courts enforce, drawing inspiration from the constitutional 
principles common to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied, 
in particular, by the ECtHR.65
The cfi explained, however, that the Commission’s decisions imposing 
fines for the infringement of competition law are not criminal in nature and 
that, furthermore, the Commission is not a ‘tribunal’ for the purpose of Article 
6(1) echr. However, the cfi found that the review of Commission decisions 
which the Courts of the Union carry out ensures that the requirements of a 
fair process, as enshrined in Article 6(1) echr are satisfied because the appli-
cants may call upon it to undertake an “exhaustive review of both the sub-
stantive findings of fact and the Commission’s legal appraisal of those facts”.66 
Furthermore, in so far as concerns the fines, the EU Courts have unlimited 
jurisdiction.
On appeal, the applicants complained that the Commission’s procedure 
infringes the principle of the separation of powers and does not comply 
with the principles of the rule of law that are applicable to criminal proce-
dures under Article 6(1) echr. They argued that the case- law to which the 
cfi referred to in its judgment was obsolete due to the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon and the direct applicability of the echr.67
The cjeu noted first of all that the contested decision was adopted before 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Second, whilst, as Article 6(3) teu 
confirms that fundamental rights recognised by the echr constitute general 
principles of the European Union’s law and whilst Article 52(3) of the Charter 
requires rights contained in the Charter which correspond to rights guaranteed 
by the echr to be given the same meaning and scope as those laid down by 
the echr, the latter does not constitute, as long as the European Union has not 
acceded to it, a legal instrument which has been formally incorporated into 
European Union law.68 Despite the ECtHR’s judgment in Menarini Diagnostics, 
the fact that decisions imposing fines in competition matters are adopted by 
the Commission is not in itself contrary to Article 6(1) echr. On contrary, the 
 65 T- 138/ 07, Schindler Holding and Others v Commission, quoted above, paragraph 51.
 66 T- 138/ 07, Schindler Holding and Others v Commission, quoted above, paragraph 56.
 67 C- 501/ 11 P, Schindler Holding and Others v Commission, ecli:eu:C:2013:522, para-
graphs 24– 29.











cjeu argued that the review performed by the European judicature was com-
patible with the requirements of Article 6(1) echr.69
Figure 12 below offers a visual representation of the design of the notion 
“fair legal process” as summarised by the EU Courts in Schindler Holding and 
Others and applied consistently in the case- law. This visual representation sug-
gests that the notion of “fair legal process” is a fundamental right, part of the 
general principles of EU law, which is inspired by the ECtHR’s case- law and 
the constitutional principles common to the member states. The right to a fair 
legal process is reaffirmed in Article 47 of the Charter.
The cjeu interpreted the right to a fair legal process to “comprise the right to 
a tribunal that is independent of the executive power in particular”.70 The cjeu 
also found that the right to a fair legal process comprised “the right to a legal 
process within a reasonable time”.71 The cjeu have also had the opportunity to 
apply the right to a fair legal process in relation to national insolvency proceed-
ings. In Eurofood, the ecj noted that the right to be notified of procedural doc-
uments and, more generally, the right to be heard, “occupy an eminent position 
in the organisation and conduct of a fair legal process. In the context of insol-
vency proceedings, the right of creditors or their representatives to participate 
in accordance with the equality of arms principle is of particular importance”.72
 69 C- 501/ 11 P, Schindler Holding and Others v Commission, quoted above, paragraphs 30– 39.
 70 C- 174/ 98 P (joined with C- 189/ 98 P), Kingdom of the Netherlands and Gerard van der Wal 
v Commission of the European Communities, ecli:eu:C:2000:1, paragraph 17.
 71 C- 185/ 95, Baustahlgewebe GmbH v Commission of the European Communities, quoted 
above, paragraph 21.
 72 C- 341/ 04, Eurofood ifsc Ltd., ecli:eu:C:2006:281, paragraph 66.
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The ecj also added that although
the specific detailed rules concerning the right to be heard may vary 
according to the urgency for a ruling to be given, any restriction on the 
exercise of that right must be duly justified and surrounded by proce-
dural guarantees ensuring that persons concerned by such proceedings 
actually have the opportunity to challenge the measures adopted in 
urgency.73
Moreover, the right to a fair trial plays an important role in the practice of EU 
institutions. First, it is important to highlight that since, the entry into force 
of the Charter, most letters and petitions received by the EU Commission in 
relation to the Charter concern access to justice. Figure 13 below indicates that 
36% of the letters received by the EU Commission in 2010 concerned ques-
tions about access to justice, including questions about the right to a fair trial 
and rights of defence.
The cjeu has also increasingly referred to the Charter in its decisions. From 
2011 to 2014, the number of decisions quoting the Charter in their reasoning 
increased from 43 to 210. Since 2014, that number stayed at around 200.74 As 
Figure 14 below shows, the Charter is most often invoked by the cjeu in rela-
tion to questions concerning access to justice.
Lastly, the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial is the most referred 
to provision of the Charter by the cjeu. Figure 15 below describes the statistics 
for 2017 as an example.
The cjeu has invoked or relied on Article 47 of the Charter in almost 800 
cases since 2010.75 As the cases below indicate, the cjeu has embraced a wide 
interpretation of the right to effective judicial review in many cases. First, in 
cases concerning review of restrictive measures such as freezing of assets, the 
cjeu highlighted that, in light of fundamental rights forming an integral part 
of the EU legal order, they must ensure the full review of the lawfulness of all 
the acts of the EU.76 In a recent case, the cjeu highlighted the following:
 73 C- 341/ 04, Eurofood ifsc Ltd., quoted above, paragraph 66.
 74 European Commission. 2017 Report on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, p. 25. Available at https:// ec.europa.eu/ info/ aid- development- cooperation- 
fundamental- rights/ your- rights- eu/ eu- charter- fundamental- rights/ application- charter/ 
annual- reports- application- charter_ en accessed on 23 February 2021.
 75 This information has been collected from InfoCuria, using the search function. Available 
at: http:// curia.europa.eu, accessed on 23 February 2021.
 76 Joined Cases C- 584/ 10 P, C- 593/ 10 P and C- 595/ 10 P, European Commission and Others v 













The effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the 
Charter requires (…) that, as part of the review of the lawfulness of the 
grounds which are the basis of the decision to include or to maintain a 
person’s name on the lists of persons subject to restrictive measures, the 
Courts of the European Union are to ensure that that decision, which 
affects that person individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual 
basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary 
of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judi-
cial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the 
abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those rea-
sons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself 















Right to a fair trial 






 figure 13  Letters received by the EU Commission in relation to the Charter divided by subject
  source: european commission. 2010 report on the application of the eu 
charter of fundamental rights, p. 76. available at: https:// op.europa.eu/ 
en/ publication- detail/ - / publication/ 3883477d- a821- 40db- b01e- 890439fa8942/ 
language- en accessed on 23 February 2021.
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 figure 14  Overview of cjeu case- law which quotes the Charter or mentions it in its reasoning
  source: european commission. 2017 report on the application of the eu 






Percentage of references to particular articles of the Charter in 
decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union 2017
Art 17 right to property
Art 21 non-discrimination
Art 41 right to good administration
Art 47 right to an effective remedy
and to a fair trial
Other rights
 figure 15  Most quoted Charter provisions in the case- law of the cjeu in 2017
  source: european commission. 2017 report on the application of the eu 




Second, in relation to the right to an effective remedy concerning EU rules 
on asylum, the cjeu found that Article 47 of the Charter, read together with 
Articles 18 and 19(2) of the Charter, required that applicants for international 
protection should be able to enforce their rights effectively before a judicial 
authority.78
Despite these developments, the entry into force of the Charter has not 
affected the limited approach to judicial review preferred by the cjeu in com-
petition law cases. On the one hand, the EU courts ceased to refer to Article 6(1) 
echr, arguing that “Article 47 of the Charter implements in European Union 
law the protection afforded by Article 6(1) of the echr. It is necessary, there-
fore, to refer only to Article 47”.79
On the other hand, the cjeu has recently highlighted in relation to Article 
47 of the Charter that the system of judicial review of Commission decisions 
relating to proceedings under Articles 101 and 102 tfeu “consists in a review of 
the legality of the acts of the institutions for which provision is made in Article 
263 tfeu, which may be supplemented, pursuant to Article 261 tfeu and at 
the request of applicants, by the General Court’s exercise of unlimited jurisdic-
tion with regard to the penalties imposed in that regard by the Commission”.80
The case- law described in this chapter exemplifies what Conway qualified 
as a lack of a unifying principle of interpretation. He has shown that “the ecj has 
never set out a systematic scheme of interpretative principles”.81 Instead, the 
ecj has a “long- standing practice (…) to downplay the significance of legisla-
tive and Treaty texts, in favour of a pro- integration innovation and extension of 
existing legal rules related, at a high level of generality, to the purpose of inte-
gration”.82 This conclusion finds evidence easily in the area of effective judicial 
protection in the EU.
Three periods of interpretation can be deduced from the case- law described 
above in relation to the right to a fair trial in EU law. First, ignoring the wording 
of the Treaties, the cjeu established that the right to effective judicial protec-
tion was a general principle of EU law derived from the constitutional tradi-
tions common to the Member States and from Articles 6 and 13 echr. Second, 
the cjeu established the right to a fair legal process derived from the consti-
tutional traditions common to the Member States and the guidelines offered 
 78 C- 175/ 17, X v Belastingdienst/ Toeslagen, ecli:eu:C:2018:776.
 79 C- 386/ 10 P, Chalkor v Commission, paragraph 51.
 80 C- 99/ 17, Infineon Technologies ag v Commission, ecli:eu:C:2018:773, paragraph 47.
 81 Conway, Gerard. The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 147.
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by the ECtHR. Lastly, following the entry into force of the Charter, the cjeu 
has abandoned Article 6(1) echr and the guidance offered by the ECtHR as a 
benchmark for the interpretation of the effective judicial protection and of the 
right to a fair legal process.
Before the entry into force of the Charter, the cjeu has chosen to define 
the principle of judicial protection and the right to a fair trial in the EU hav-
ing Article 6(1) echr as a benchmark. In other words, the cjeu has opted 
for a high level of generality in the interpretation of these concepts. This 
choice should have led to a progressive widening of the concept of fair legal 
process because its benchmark – Article 6(1) echr – has enlarged its scope 
as well. As shown above, in EU competition law proceedings this has not 
been the case and the cjeu chose a minimal approach to due process in 
this area.
Following the entry into force of the Charter, the cjeu has narrowed the 
level of generality applied in relation to the interpretation of the right to a 
fair trial by abandoning the previous, Article 6(1) echr benchmark.
I have shown in this chapter that the cjeu has not only established gen-
eral principles of EU law inexistent in the Treaties, but has used a high 
level of generality for their definition. The cjeu appears to have followed 
the strategy employed by the ECtHR concerning rights creation and rights 
interpretation. They have defined effective judicial protection and fair trial 
using Article 6(1) echr as a benchmark in order to capture disputes within 
the net of its jurisdiction which would otherwise not be justiciable. At the 
same time, the case- law on competition law indicates that cjeu the has 
maintained a narrow interpretation of effective judicial protection and fair 
trial. This narrow interpretation of effective judicial protection and fair trial 
focuses on substantive fair trial issues such as access to documents or rea-
soning of decisions. At the same time, this interpretation ignores the struc-
tural issues related to effective judicial protection and fair trial, such as the 
independence of the EU Commission as an adjudicator and deferential 
judicial review.
© Cristina Teleki, 2021 | DOI:10.1163/9789004447493_022
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
 chapter 17
Is Judicial Review a Cure for Bigness?
Closing a chapter on the judicial review of EU competition law decisions 
should be an easy task for a lawyer trained in echr matters. The case- law of 
the ECtHR described in this book suggests that the system of competition law 
enforcement in the EU does not comply with the requirements of the right to a 
fair trial as guaranteed by Article 6(1) echr. The system of EU competition law 
enforcement is based on the exercise of administrative discretion as policing 
powers (Section 8.4.). The EU Commission investigates and prosecutes, opens 
investigations, searches premises and fines undertakings (Chapters 10 and 11). 
Such proceedings are considered to be criminal in nature by the ECtHR, irre-
spective of their domestic qualification (Section 5.3.4.). The judicial review 
required by Article 6(1) echr in such cases should involve a full review of the 
decision concerned and the power to quash in all respects the disputed admin-
istrative decision (Chapters 14 and 15).
These safeguards are not met in EU competition law. The judicial review 
performed by the EU Courts cannot correct the structural lack of indepen-
dence of the EU Commission. Moreover, the review of legality combined with 
the full review of fines cannot lead to a competition law decision adopted by 
the EU Commission being declared void in full, decided de novo by the EU 
Courts or sent for re- consideration (Chapter 16). Hence, the judicial review 
of competition law decisions in the EU does not comply with Article 6(1) 
echr.
This conclusion might be valuable in itself, especially in relation to the 
Treaty- based rules of interpretation of the Charter that establish a link of 
equivalence between the echr, the interpretation of the echr by the ECtHR 
and the provisions of the Charter. This conclusion will be of particular impor-
tance if the EU will conclude its accession to the echr.
At this point, however, it remains important to understand the reasons 
that could be grounding the EU Courts’ preference for deferential judicial 
review despite the fact that it is highly contested by practitioners and aca-
demics. Such a pursuit is important for a few reasons. First, despite the grow-
ing investigative powers of the EU Commission and the growing amounts 
of fines imposed for breaches of EU competition law, there is little evidence 
that cartels are disappearing or that the dominant firms are abusing less their 
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concentration of economic power is becoming more obvious and more 
serious.1
The second reason to understand the defence of the current system of EU 
competition law enforcement by the EU Courts is linked to the litigation of 
such cases. The increased use of commitment and settlement proceedings sug-
gests that undertakings prefer to negotiate and to close competition cases as 
soon as possible. Some authors have voiced concerns that this would lead to 
a worrying decrease in court proceedings in EU competition law.2 These con-
cerns have not been validated. Despite the litigation costs involved, undertak-
ings continue to bring actions against the decisions of the EU Commission and 
to challenge the Commission’s assessments, its independence and the defer-
ential judicial review performed by the EU Courts. In other words, even if the 
undertakings concerned know that they have little chance to overturn the EU 
Commission’s decisions, they continue to attempt to do so.
Lastly, calls from within the EU adjudicatory establishment indicate a desire 
to reconceive judicial review in the EU. Thus, Prek and Lefèvre – judge and 
legal secretary at the gc respectively – acknowledged that the judicial review 
practiced by the EU Courts should be calibrated according to the type of 
administrative discretion deployed by the EU Commission.3 Prek and Lefèvre 
distinguish between, first, the “power of appraisal” or “discretion proper” 
when “a rule is intended to delegate to the administration a freedom to decide 
between different equally lawful course of action”. EU Commission exercises 
“discretion proper” in competition law when it initiates or closes infringement 
proceedings. In light of the permissive language, the judicial review performed 
by the cjeu in such cases should be more limited. At the same time, judicial 
review should take into account the “legal context to which the provision in 
question belongs”.4
Second, they note that the EU Commission benefits from a “margin of 
appraisal” when assessing whether a rule is applicable. However, they argue 
that neither the interpretation of the law, nor the establishment of facts are 
source of administrative discretion. On contrary,
 1 Wu, op. cit.
 2 Barbier de la Serre, Eric. “Competition Law Cases before the EU Courts: Is the Well Running 
Dry.” The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases. Eds. 
Massimo Merola and Jacques Derennes. Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2012, pp. 87– 100.
 3 Prek, Miro and Silvère Lefèvre. “ ‘Administrative Discretion’, ‘Power of Appraisal’ and ‘Margin 
of Appraisal’ in Judicial Review Proceedings Before the General Court.” Common Market Law 
Review 56 (2019): pp. 339– 380.










under Article 19 teu, the ecj must ensure that in the interpretation and 
application of the Treaties the law is observed. Thus, providing a mean-
ing to the legislation is a task entrusted to the EU Courts and not to the 
administration. The General Court is therefore duty- bound to carry out 
a thorough review of the interpretation favoured by the administra-
tion and, if it disagrees, to substitute its interpretation for that of the 
administration.5
Finally, Prek and Lefèvre acknowledge that the administration may enjoy a 
margin of discretion when conducting legal appraisal of facts, that is confront-
ing the factual basis of a case with its statutory basis.6
In the sections below I propose to comprehend deferential judicial review 
from novel perspectives. For this purpose, I attempt to solve the conundrum 
posed to adjudication by economic and technical evidence, by the ethos sur-
rounding the role of the administration, by bias and monoculture and by prob-
lems of organized complexity.
17.1 Adjudication and Economic Evidence
Vos has shown that “decision- makers often act in the face of scientific uncer-
tainty and complex technical issues regarding matters ranging from competi-
tion law to environmental protection or food safety”.7 Vos has also suggested 
that in some areas, such as agriculture, environment and pharma, the EU 
courts have abandoned their deferential standard of review in favour of a more 
activist stance.8 In the field of EU competition law, however, the EU courts 
continue to employ judicial restraint and deferral to the EU Commission’s 
margin of discretion.
As shown above, the cjeu limits its power of review in cases that pres-
ent complex economic appraisals made by the EU Commission. In these 
instances, the cjeu will confine its review to verifying whether the procedural 
rules have been respected, whether the facts have been correctly stated and 
 5 Prek and Lefèvre (2019), op. cit., p. 355– 356.
 6 Prek and Lefèvre (2019), op. cit., p. 357.
 7 Vos, Ellen. “The European Court of Justice in the face of scientific uncertainty and complex-
ity.” Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice. Eds. Mark Dawson, Bruno De Witte and 
Elise Muir. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013, p. 142.
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whether there has been any manifest error of appraisal or misuse of powers.9 
The accompanying reasoning offered by the cjeu is that the EU Commission 
enjoys a wide margin of appreciation when dealing with complex economic or 
technical matters.
Ibáñez Colomo has argued that the scope of the notion “complex economic 
assessments” over which the EU Commission enjoys a margin of appreciation 
remains “relatively obscure”.10 Furthermore, he highlighted that “if one exam-
ines carefully the behaviour of the EU courts, it appears not only that they are 
less likely to be deferential to the Commission where the analysis of the author-
ity contradicts mainstream economic principles, but that consensus positions 
have been relied upon to define the substantive boundaries of administrative 
action”.11 In other words, the EU Courts defer not to the EU Commission as an 
agency, but to the mainstream economic consensus.
There are at least two arguments, however, that challenge the EU Courts’ 
self- limitation for judicial review. First, the EU Treaties do not treat economic 
evidence, or any other type of expert evidence for that matter, as a superior or 
privileged category of evidence. Nor do the EU Treaties speak about the priv-
ileged margin of appreciation that the EU Commission has when performing 
economic assessments. Therefore, when the EU Courts limit their powers of 
review on the ground of the special place occupied by economic evidence or 
the EU Commission’s wide margin of appreciation to assess it, the EU Courts 
appear to be interfering with the constitutional hierarchy established by EU 
Treaties. In fact, it could be argued that deference to the EU Commission’s 
appraisals of economic evidence affects the separation of powers within 
the Union.
There is a second reason why limiting judicial review because of the eco-
nomic assessments prepared by the EU Commission is problematic, this sec-
ond reason is supplied from within the corps of economists themselves. In 
fact, when policy- makers and courts – domestic or international – assess eco-
nomic evidence, they tend to treat it as if it was scientific evidence, subject to 
consensus. However, economists themselves are contesting the strong reliance 
of policy- makers on economic evidence.
Keynes and Hayek were two of the most important economic theorists of 
the last century. It is important to note that, despite the fact that they belong 
 9 See, between many, T- 109/ 02, T- 118/ 02, T- 122/ 02, T- 125/ 02, T- 126/ 02, T- 128/ 02, T- 129/ 02, T- 
132/ 02 and T- 136/ 02 (joined cases), Bolloré sa and Others v. Commission, ecli:eu:T:2007:115, 
paragraph 664.
 10 Ibáñez Colomo, op. cit., p. 719.








to the opposite sides of the political spectrum, they were both concerned with 
the growing authority of economics over other social fields.
John Maynard Keynes was probably the first to argue against the growing 
influence of economics, by highlighting that “the ideas of economists and 
political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are 
more powerful than what is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled 
by little else”.12
The Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences has been introduced in 
1968, following the successful lobbying and financing by Sweden’s central 
bank, Sveriges Riksbank. Friedrich August von Hayek was awarded the Nobel 
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1974. The speech Hayek offered at the 
Nobel Banquet starts by acknowledging that if he had been consulted whether 
to establish a Nobel Memorial Prize in economics, he would “have decidedly 
advised against it”.13 Hayek offers two compelling reasons for his attitude. First, 
he highlights that a Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences “would tend to accentu-
ate the swings of scientific fashion”. The second reason merits to be quoted in 
full because it is directly relevant to the topic of this book. Hayek declared that:
the Nobel Prize confers on an individual an authority which in econom-
ics no man ought to possess. This does not matter in the natural sciences. 
Here the influence exercised by an individual is chiefly an influence on 
his fellow experts; and they will soon cut him down to size if he exceeds 
his competence. But the influence of the economists that matters is an 
influence over laymen: politicians, journalists, civil servants and the pub-
lic generally. There is no reason why a man who has made a distinctive con-
tribution to economic science should be omnicompetent on all problems of 
society – as the press tends to treat him till in the end he may himself be 
persuaded to believe. One is even made to feel it a public duty to pro-
nounce on problems to which one may not have devoted special atten-
tion.14 (emphasis added)
This speech Hayek offered in 1974 was not an expression of humility, he was 
speaking from personal experience. Offer and Söderberg showed that Hayek, 
 12 Keynes, John Maynard. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. 
London: Macmillan, 1961, p. 383.
 13 Von Hayek, Friedrich August. Banquet Speech. 10 Dec 1974. Nobel Media ab 2019. Available 
at https:// www.nobelprize.org/ prizes/ economic- sciences/ 1974/ hayek/ speech/ accessed 
on 23 February 2021.
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with the support of American business foundations, initiated the Mont Pélerin 
Society in 1947. The Mont Pélerin Society gathered economists, journalists 
and businessmen and became “the intellectual focus of resistance to Social 
Democracy”.15 Eight of the members of the Mont Pélerin Society went on to 
win the Nobel Prizes in Economic Sciences.
As Milton Friedman later wrote about his activity as a member of the Mont 
Pélerin Society, “the threat to a free society that we envisaged at the founding 
meeting of the Mont Pélerin Society is very different from the threat to a free 
society that has developed over the intervening period. Our initial fear was 
of central planning and extensive nationalization. The developing threat has 
been via the welfare state and redistribution”.16
Thaler, another winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences 
wrote in an influential work that economics was the most powerful of the 
social sciences.17 First, he argued that “of all the social scientists, economists 
carry the most sway when it comes to influencing public policy. In fact, they 
hold a virtual monopoly on giving policy advice”.18 Second, Thaler showed 
that economics was the most powerful of the social sciences in an intellec-
tual sense: “that power derives from the fact that economics has a unified, core 
theory from which nearly everything else follows”. The basic premise of the 
economic theory is that people choose by optimizing and that such choices 
are unbiased.
The problem is, however, that neither people, nor markets appear to 
behave as described in the models proposed by economic theory. Raworth 
wrote in the opening of her book Doughnut Economics that “economics is 
broken. It has failed to predict, let alone, prevent, financial crises that have 
shaken the foundations of our society. Its outdated theories have permitted 
a world in which extreme poverty persists (…). And its blind spots have led 
to policies that are degrading the living world on a scale that threatens all of 
our futures”.19
Raworth criticises the fact that economic theory taught in universities 
around the world, Econ 101, is a textbook written after wwii. She shows 
 15 Offer, Avner, and Gabriel Söderberg. The Nobel Factor: The Prize in Economics, Social 
Democracy, and the Market Turn (1st ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016, p. 9.
 16 Friedman to Max Hartwell,10 July 1985. Hoover Institution, Friedman Papers, pp. 200– 210.
 17 Thaler, Richard H. Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics. New York: W. 
W. Norton & Company, 2016.
 18 Thaler, op. cit., p. 5.
 19 Raworth, Kate. Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st- Century Economist. 












that the “citizens of 2050 are being taught an economic mindset that is 
rooted in the textbooks of 1950, which in turn are rooted in the theories of 
1850”.20
Finally, in The Economists Hour: How the False Prophets of Free Markets 
Fractured Our Societies, Appelbaum offered numerous examples of pol-
icy work that resulted in market failures or crashes despite sober economic 
assessments.21
The practitioners involved with EU competition law have been concerned 
with the growing importance of economic evidence in competition law as well. 
They acknowledge this to be a form of “economic imperialism over other social 
sciences”.22 The same authors note that “under the legitimate aim of avoid-
ing excessive formalism in the formulation and application of legal principles, 
economists have conquered competition law. In a way, this is perhaps fair since 
we jurists have failed to adequately defend the virtues of keeping competition 
law as a legal construct”.23
Bishop, instead, highlights that within a competition law case, economic 
analysis cannot be disentangled from the legal analysis provided. This implies 
that the answer to a competition law case “is usually not to be found in the 
pages of academic journals but rather in close examination of the observed 
market data; in other words, in a close examination of the market or the eco-
nomic evidence”.24
Bishop highlights – unwillingly – the contradiction that is at the core of the 
debate described in this section. On the one hand, economic evidence is sim-
ply expert evidence which can be regularly sought in court proceedings. From 
this point of view, economic evidence should not be distinguished from med-
ical or forensic evidence submitted during court proceedings. On the other 
hand, he acknowledges that “one can always find an economist to support any 
position”. In addition, “the fact that expert evidence necessarily reflects the 
 20 Raworth, op. cit., p. 21.
 21 Appelbaum, Binyamin. The Economists’ Hour: False Prophets, Free Markets, and the 
Fracture of Society. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2019.
 22 Blanco, Luis Ortiz, and Alfonso Lamadrid de Pablo. “Expert Economic Evidence and 
Effects- Based Assessments in Competition Law Cases.” The Role of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union in Competition Law Cases. Eds. Massimo Merola and Jacques 
Derennes. Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2012, pp. 305– 312, p. 308.
 23 Blanco and Lamadrid de Pablo, op. cit.
 24 Bishop, Simon. “Expert Economic Evidence in European Competition Law Cases: Some 
Personal Views.” The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Competition Law 
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expert’s opinion doesn’t render the evidence of little or no value, at least not 
in principle”.25 What is more, Bishop writes that “those familiar with economic 
theory will know that a large number of results can be reversed by making an 
alternative assumption. This is particularly true of modern economic analysis 
which employs game theoretic methodology”.26
Bishop concludes that economic evidence should be treated in the same 
way as other expert evidence and be subjected to cross- examination at the 
earliest stages of competition law proceedings. In practice, though, there is an 
extremely limited scrutiny of economic evidence within the EU Commission 
and, in addition, this scrutiny remains internal.27
Kaupa goes a step forward in proposing that the EU Courts might be suf-
fering from a neoliberal bias.28 This bias was made obvious in the Viking and 
Laval cases.29 He noted that the EU courts may have fallen victim to a “conven-
tional wisdom trap” in which “the arguments of the economic mainstream are 
assumed also to represent a neutral position”.30
Kaupa shows that
this is a fallacious belief: not only is the economic mainstream divided in 
terms of economic theory (…). Economic knowledge also cannot simply 
be transferred into the legal discourse without losing most of its validity. 
The arguments of economists may sometimes boil down to simple rules, 
but they are based on a complex set of assumptions and preconditions 
(…). Legal scholars and practitioners, however, cannot possibly operate 
these complex economic apparatuses. Instead, they employ radically 
simplified versions of economic positions, which are no longer valid in 
a scientific sense.31
 25 Bishop, op. cit., p. 300.
 26 Bishop, op. cit., p. 294.
 27 Bishop, op. cit., pp. 300– 301.
 28 Kaupa, Clemens. “Maybe not Activist Enough? On the Court’s Alleged Neoliberal Bias 
in its Recent Labor Cases.” Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice. Eds. Mark 
Dawson, Bruno de Witte and Elise Muir. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013, pp. 56– 75.
 29 C- 438/ 05, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking 
Line abp and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, ecli:eu:C:2007:772. C- 341/ 05, Laval un Partneri Ltd 
v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, 
Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet, ecli:eu:C:2007:809.
 30 Kaupa, op. cit., p. 68.
















The following quote offers a good way to close this section and a description 
of the compromise needed to embrace economics in competition law without 
defeating all the other surrounding issues:
the influence of economics is at odds with its shortcomings as a philos-
ophy, as a scientific doctrine, and as a set of policy norms. The invisible 
hand is magical thinking, and its repeated disconfirmation has had little 
effect. On the other hand, economics has a set of empirical disciplines 
and achievements, with enclaves of technical and even scientific credi-
bility. This suggests some downgrading of authority, but not all the way. 
Economics is not superior to other sources of authority, but is not nec-
essarily inferior to them either; it should be taken as one voice among 
many.32
17.2 Adjudication and the Administrative Man
Political scientists like Herbert A. Simon have contested the omnipotence of 
economic thought, understood as monopole of rationality, within the theory 
of administration. His ideas remain relevant today.
Simon highlighted that social sciences suffer from
a case of acute schizophrenia in their treatment of rationality. At one 
extreme, we have the economists, who attribute to economic man a 
preposterously omniscient rationality. Economic man has a complete 
and consistent system of preferences that allows him always to choose 
among the alternatives open to him; he is always completely aware of 
what these alternatives are; there are no limits on the complexity of com-
putations he can perform in order to determine which alternatives are 
the best; probability calculations are neither frightening nor mysterious 
to him. At the other extreme, we have those tendencies in social psychol-
ogy traceable to Freud that try to reduce all cognition to affect.33 (empha-
sis added)
Simon notes, however, that the rationality exhibited in an organization “has 
none of the global omniscience that is attributed to economic man”.34 He 
 32 Offer and Söderberg, op. cit., p. 15.
 33 Simon, op. cit., p. xxiii.
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makes therefore the classical distinction between the economic man, always 
maximizing and presumed to be in charge of organisational decisions, and 
the administrative man, only satisficing instead of maximising and having the 
actual control of an organisation. For Simon, the economic man can deal with 
the real world and all its complexity. The administrative man, on the other 
hand, because of his focus on efficiency, perceives only a simplified model of 
the real world and “makes his choices using a simple picture of the situation 
that takes into account just a few of the factors that he regards as most rele-
vant and crucial”.35 Two consequences result from this limited perception of 
the world. First, the administrative man takes decisions without having con-
sidered all the available alternatives. Second, the administrative man “is able 
to make his decisions with relatively simple rules of thumb that do not make 
impossible demands upon its capacity for thought”.36
In one instance, the administrative man is equal in his decision- making 
powers to the economic man, more precisely in the pursuit of the principle of 
efficiency:
the theory of administration is concerned with how an organisation 
should be constructed and operated in order to accomplish its work 
efficiently. A fundamental right of administration, which follows almost 
immediately from the rational character of ‘good’ administration, is 
that among several alternatives involving the same expenditure the 
one should be selected which leads to the greatest accomplishment of 
administrative objectives; and among several alternatives that lead to 
the same accomplishment the one should be selected which involves 
the least expenditure. Since this principle of efficiency is characteristic 
of any activity that attempts rationally to maximize the attainment of 
certain ends with the use of scarce means, it is characteristic of economic 
theory as it is of administrative theory.37
In a supranational setting like the EU every interaction between the admin-
istrative and the judicial branch is meaningful. Conflict between branches of 
government can be detrimental to integration pursuits. This is obvious from a 
survey of the literature that questions the shape of the separation of powers in 
the EU. Conway wrote that “the EU clearly does not represent a pure expres-
sion of the tripartite separation of powers between legislative, executive and 
 35 Simon, op. cit., p. xxv.
 36 Simon, op. cit., p. xxvi.








judicial branches” and that “the main way in which the EU departs from the 
tripartite conception of a separation of powers is the role of the Court itself”.38 
Höreth, on the other hand, has argued that the EU “has not only the most for-
malized and complex set of decision- making rules of any political system of 
the world but also a unique system of checks and balances”.39
The interesting question to ask within the context of the existing checks 
and balances within the EU is the extent to which the three branches of gov-
ernment in an incomplete supranational integration project owe each other 
loyalty and support.
The work of Simon highlights the primordial place occupied by the admin-
istration in modern societies and the attempt to equate rationality and ratio-
nal choice with the administrative exercise of power. In this model of the 
administration, facts become evidence and the administrators translate real-
ity into decisions maximizing the image and power of the administration. If 
courts were to challenge frequently these decisions, they might be appearing 
as challenging the principle of rationality itself. Consequently, if courts were 
to contest frequently the rationality of the decisions reached by the adminis-
tration, this might lead to the withering of trust in the administration. In turn, 
defence of trust in the administration is important not only for the swift dem-
ocratic processes in a political system, but also for the healthy functioning of 
the courts themselves. In fact, a lack of trust in the administration might lead 
to a higher number of administrative decisions being contested. Individuals 
might seek a defence of the principle of rationality in a court instead of in the 
administrative agency charged with the matter. The courts’ agendas could thus 
be significantly affected.
Courts must therefore strike a gentle balance when performing judicial 
review between the need to preserve the exercise of the principle of ratio-
nality by the administration and the need to preserve a manageable size of 
applications against the administration. Deference meets both these needs: on 
the one hand, by deferring to the decision of the administration, the courts 
strengthen the image of the administration being a specialist in a certain field. 
This can also empower the administration to build technical expertise in the 
field deferred to it. On the other hand, deference can limit the number of 
 38 Conway, op. cit., p. 200.
 39 Höreth, Marcus. “The least Dangerous Branch of European Governance? The European 
Court of Justice Under the Checks and Balances Doctrine.” Judicial Activism at the European 
Court of Justice. Eds. Mark Dawson, Bruno de Witte and Elise Muir. Cheltenham: Edward 
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applications being lodged with a court because of the applicants’ knowledge 
that courts will defer.
In the field of EU competition law, the EU Commission seeks to represent 
the economic man that Simon described. As I have suggested in Part 3 of this 
work, dg comp employs a method of investigation based on fact finding and 
economic theory. Competition law investigations last for many years and 
involve vital EU Commission resources. Cases are carefully selected by the EU 
Commission because “policy is often formulated through the choice of indi-
vidual cases and thus by establishing that a given line of conduct is in breach 
of a legal provision”.40 Questioning the EU Commission’s competition law 
decisions through constant judicial review would amount to questioning the 
principle of rationality that the EU Commission is called to embody. Moreover, 
this would imply sanctioning a way of functioning and policy- making that is 
considered very successful. If such sanctioning were to happen often, serious 
questions would arise about the competence of the EU Commission in com-
petition law matters and about the efficiency of the EU Commission’s admin-
istrative action. This is especially true in light of the fact that only a handful of 
competition decisions are issued yearly.
To conclude, the deferential judicial review practiced by the EU courts in 
competition law might be deemed to be necessary for the preservation of effi-
cient administrative action and of the image of the economic man that the EU 
Commission embodies.
17.3 Adjudication, Bias and Monoculture
A recent trend in social sciences describes the interest psychologists have 
shown for adjudication and the interest that adjudicators have shown for work 
on cognitive bias. Sood writes that “there has been a burgeoning of interdisci-
plinary scholars who are combining tools of psychology and legal scholarship 
to ask new questions about the law”.41 Sood’s academic work has been focused 
on a bias called motivated cognition, which is “a human tendency to reason 
toward preferred outcomes by perceiving, interpreting, or evaluating informa-
tion in a biased manner, without realizing one is doing so”.42
 40 Ibáñez Colomo, op. cit., p. 187.
 41 Sood, Avani Mehta. “Applying Empirical Psychology to Inform Courtroom Adjudication – 
Potential Contributions and Challenges.” Harvard Law Review Forum 130.301 (2017).










The research on cognitive bias affecting adjudication is in its incipient 
phase. However, it can be suspected that cognitive bias that affects the general 
population also affects adjudicators. Bias in favour of jurisprudential status 
quo or against it could be at work in the minds of legal professionals and the 
general public.
On the one hand, there might be a bias in favour of judicial activism. 
Lawyers and the public at large might prefer a judicial branch that is active. 
Those affected by this bias might be convinced that judicial restraint is bad for 
democracy at all times.
On the other hand, a version of the progress fallacy might affect the 
interpretation of fundamental rights. Those holding this bias might be con-
vinced that the interpretation of fundamental rights should always expand, 
that stagnation or shrinking in rights interpretation negatively affects 
democracy.
On the opposite side of the spectrum, individuals who favour the mainte-
nance of the current system of judicial review might be victims of the big on 
big bias. Big on big describes the preference for large, powerful institutions as 
a necessary evil to address the most important problems in the society, such as 
big companies. With this belief in mind, fighting cartels, for example, is only 
possible by a large, commanding administrative agency.
A more powerful and pervasive bias is provided by what Michaels calls 
monoculture.43 Combining research from economics, anthropology, ethics and 
psychology, Michaels suggests that “the governing pattern that a culture obeys 
is a master story – one narrative in society that takes over the others, shrinking 
diversity and forming a monoculture”.44
In the seventeenth century a religious monoculture was replaced by a sci-
entific monoculture during which “life was understood as a series of questions 
with knowable answers, and the world became methodical and precise”.45 
Michaels argues that the master story that has succeeded the scientific mono-
culture is the economic monoculture. Although money plays an important role 
in the economic monoculture, Michaels argues that “the economic story rep-
resents a much more nuanced and insidious tapestry of beliefs and assump-
tions that defines who we are as human beings, what we think the world is like, 
and how we and the world interact”.46
 43 Michaels, F.S. Monoculture: How One Story is Changing Everything. Canada: Red Clover 
Press, 2011.
 44 Michaels, op. cit., p. 4.
 45 Michaels, op. cit., p 6.
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The concept of monoculture can be used to describe the persistent atti-
tudes of adjudicators, such as preference for limited review. Arold, Groussot 
and Petursson have conducted interviews with judges from the cjeu which 
indicate that two elements contribute to the creation and maintenance of a 
legal monoculture within the cjeu: socialization of new judges and lack of 
dissenting opinions.47 The idea of calling the cjeu a ‘family’ has been devel-
oped early on and the socialization of new judges was an important part of this 
process. One of their interviewees described this process:
There was a culture at the Court of developing good social relations 
between the members of the Court by social means. An incoming judge 
was invited during a year by his/ her colleagues. This helped to form a 
good professional functioning of the Court. Because, if you know your 
colleagues better, you know more about their personal backgrounds and 
family backgrounds, and then it might be easier to discuss issues.48
Since there is no in- house training, judges learn with and from their colleagues 
the practical aspects of the procedure. Since, the stability of the system and 
coherence of the case- law are important, “newcomers are not expected to 
change things” and “are not advised, in a collegiate court, to pursue individual 
ideological goals”.49
The second element that contributes to the creation of a monoculture 
within the European judicature is the collegiate nature of the court, with 
its corollary principle – lack of dissenting opinion. The judges that Arold, 
Groussot and Petursson interviewed described the adjudication process as a 
team- work whereby “we come together and then you see what is common in 
our thinking and you see that there is a lot that is in common although the 
approaches are different, but you see at the end that we are able to come to a 
common solution”.50
As Arold, Groussot and Petursson acknowledge, “in this atmosphere of com-
munality, a strong individualistic view would irritate”.51 As a result, consen-
sus is the preferred option and judges prefer to make concessions in order to 
reach consensus instead of pursuing majority voting. When consensus cannot 
be reached, voting takes place in reverse order of seniority to avoid that new 
 47 Arold Lorenz, Groussot and Petursson, op. cit.
 48 Arold Lorenz, Groussot and Petursson, op. cit., p 29.
 49 Arold Lorenz, Groussot and Petursson, op. cit., p. 30.
 50 Arold Lorenz, Groussot and Petursson, op. cit., p. 31.












judges are influenced by the votes of senior judges.52 Finally, in relation to the 
type of disputes that lead to majority voting, the judges that Arold, Groussot 
and Petursson interviewed noted that all cases – raising human rights issues, 
but also very technical matters – can result in strong discussions on the bench. 
The cjeu judges also noted that “if a question requires specific technical 
knowledge it can also be quite difficult to arrive at a legal solution”.53
17.4 Adjudication and Problems of Organized Complexity
“Science and engineering have been unable to keep pace with the second 
order effects produced by their first order victories”.
Gerald Weinberg
In a paper published in 1948, Warren Weaver argued that there were three types 
of problems that science was called to solve.54 The first type were the problems 
of simplicity characteristic of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies which dealt with problems having one or two variables.
Starting with 1900, “physical sciences developed an attack on nature of 
an essentially and dramatically new kind”, developing analytical methods 
which could deal with two billion variables. Thus, techniques of probability 
theory and of statistical mechanism offered an opportunity to the scientific 
community to deal with what Weaver calls problems of disorganized complex-
ity.55 Problems of disorganized complexity are those in which “the number 
of variables is very large, and one in which each of the many variables has a 
behaviour which is individually erratic, or perhaps totally unknown. However, 
in spite of this helter- skelter, or unknown, behaviour of all the individual vari-
ables, the system as a whole possesses certain orderly and analysable average 
properties”.56
Weaver argued that in the space between problems with two variables and 
problems with two billion variables lies a middle region whose prime charac-
teristic is not the number of variables involved in the scientific phenomenon. 
Weaver argued that “the really important characteristic of the problems of this 
middle region, which science has as yet little explored or conquered, lies in 
 52 Arold Lorenz, Groussot and Petursson, op. cit., p. 32.
 53 Arold Lorenz, Groussot and Petursson, op. cit., p. 151.
 54 Weaver, Warren. “Science and Complexity.” American Scientist 36 (1948): pp. 536– 544.
 55 Weaver, op. cit., p. 538.












Is Judicial Review A Cure for Bigness? 339
the fact that these problems, as contrasted with the disorganized situations 
with which statistics can cope, show the essential feature of organization”.57 
In other words, these are problems of organized complexity, which can answer 
challenges in the biological, medical, but also psychological, economic and 
political sciences.
Weaver highlighted that “science must (…) learn to deal with these prob-
lems of organized complexity”.58 He predicted that three developments could 
contribute to this. First, quantitative experimental methods and mathematical 
analytical methods used in the physical sciences are embraced by the biolog-
ical, the medical and the social sciences. Second, the new types of electronic 
computing devices developed during wartime could be used for scientific 
research as well. Finally, Weaver places emphasis on another wartime devel-
opment, the use of mixed- teams approach to operations analysis. Initiated by 
the British Army during the wwii’s most complex anti- submarine and air cam-
paigns, Weaver praised the wisdom of the mixed teams composed of engineers 
and physicists, but also psychologists, biochemists, endocrinologists and spe-
cialists from other social sciences.59
The theory developed by Weaver in his 1948 paper can shed light on the 
topic of the current book in two ways. On the one hand, the legal questions 
that EU courts are called to answer in EU competition law cases concern prob-
lems of organized complexity. The functioning of markets and the behaviour 
of economic agents on the market concern a large number of variables that 
are, however, operating as a whole. On the other hand, one could argue that 
the EU Courts’ deferential judicial review is justified by the fact that the EU 
Commission is better placed to deal with problems of organized complexity. 
The cjeu employs lawyers and interpreters. The EU Commission, on the other 
hand, recruits both generalists and specialists from a wide pool of applicants 
that are trained throughout their career. This can lead, as Weaver envisioned, 
to mixed, multi- disciplinary teams which are better placed to tackle problems 
of organized complexity.
…
I have offered in Part 4 of the current book to test whether the judicial review 
performed by the cjeu in EU competition law is compatible with the right 
to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6(1) echr. For this, Chapter 14 described 
 57 Weaver, op. cit., p. 540.
 58 Weaver, op. cit., p. 541.










the case- law of the ECtHR concerning the right to an effective judicial rem-
edy. Chapter 15 argued that the ECtHR distinguished between three situations 
requiring three types of judicial review depending on the type of administra-
tive discretion exercised.
First, Section 15.1. showed that when administrative discretion was exercised 
in polycentric issues, the review of legality did not breach the right to a fair trial. 
In these instances, the administrative discretion concerned wide policy mat-
ters and was in fact the expression of the electorate’s will.
Second, Section 15.2. showed that when administrative discretion concerned 
monocentric issue, only full judicial review was compatible with the right to a 
fair trial. Such judicial review performed a quality control function over the 
administrative branch.
Third, Section 15.3. argued that when administrative discretion was exercised 
as policing powers, only full judicial review was acceptable in a democratic 
society.
Turning to EU competition law then, Chapter 16 showed that, despite the 
entry into force of the Charter and the wide interpretation offered by the cjeu 
to the right to an effective remedy in various fields of law, the cjeu maintained 
their deferential judicial review in EU competition law.
Chapter 17 was devoted to analysing the reasons for which the cjeu pre-
fers judicial deference to EU Commission’s practice in competition law. It was 
suggested that the privileged place occupied by economics within social sci-
ences, the distinction between the economic man and the administrative man, 
biases, monoculture and the problems of organized complexity can clarify this 
preference.
To conclude, I must first observe, as it has been shown in particular in 
Chapters 11 to 13 above, that the EU Commission is exercising not only a wide 
discretion when enforcing EU competition law. The EU Commission exercises 
policing powers by investigating, searching, seizing and interrogating. Also, the 
EU Commission has largely interpreted the breadth of its own powers. It must 
then follow that the judicial review applied by the cjeu should be full and 
constant. However, the combined effect of, on the one hand, Articles 261 and 
263 tfeu and, on the other hand, the interpretation of these provisions by the 
cjeu, is that the cjeu continues to apply a limited judicial review of competi-
tion law decisions. Therefore, I suggest that such review is incompatible with 
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Step into the Future: Bigness and Judicial Power
We have created a Star Wars civilization, with Stone Age emotions, 
medieval institutions, and godlike technology.
edward o. wilson
∵
In this book I have endeavoured to understand the right to a fair trial in EU 
competition law, particularly in relation to attempts to tackle corporate big-
ness. On a general level, I have inevitably dealt with the exercise of power, the 
meaning of law within the exercise of power and the individual person. I will 
address them here in order to conclude this book.
Power – The most difficult profession – The principle of separation of powers 
is associated with the name of Charles- Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède 
et de Montesquieu who argued that every government should have three 
branches – the legislative, the executive and the judiciary.1 The three powers 
should be separate and should interact in such a way with each other, so that 
to allow each individual to live in peace with his community:
The political liberty of the subject is a tranquillity of mind arising from 
the opinion each person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it 
is requisite the government be so constituted as one man need not be 
afraid of another.
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same per-
son, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because 
apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact 
tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from 
the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life 
and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the 
judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, 
the judge might behave with violence and oppression.
There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same 
body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three 
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powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, 
and of trying the causes of individuals.2
A contemporary challenge to the principle of separation of powers has been 
posed by the growth of the executive power and the accompanying process 
of establishing administrative agencies. Through the process of delegation of 
power, the legislative establishes new agencies or other types of administra-
tive institutions and invests them with discretionary powers to carry on their 
mandate. These institutions are often created to operate in technical fields, 
requiring specialized expertise. In addition, these agencies can be mandated 
to perform policing and adjudicatory functions to enforce the newly- adopted 
mandate. This process is called delegation and this, in itself, is an interesting 
denomination. Since delegation means transferring authority from the holder 
to the receiver, this implies that the legislative power is the holder and cre-
ator – at least temporarily – of the two other powers: bureaucratic- executive 
and judicial. This denomination is in line with the democratic principles that 
vest power in the legislative through the voting process.
Within this setup, a question arises concerning the fate of the judicial 
power. When the legislative branch delegates adjudicatory tasks to executive 
officials, what shall the judicial branch do? This question is important espe-
cially because judges have traditionally been highly trained specialists, under-
going lengthy periods of study and training and held to high standards of eth-
ical behaviour. This is also important because adjudication traditionally took 
place in courts of law, on the basis of procedural codes and due process rights. 
Moreover, adjudication produced written decisions available to the public.
The judicial branch has only two choices in this situation. The first choice 
is to acquiesce and perform what came to be known as administrative control, 
with deferential judicial review as a type.3 The other option – which is not the 
preferred option in most developed countries – is to engage in in- depth control 
of the administrative agency performing policing and adjudicatory tasks.
This book examined this question from the point of view of EU competition 
law enforcement and described the deferential judicial review performed by 
the cjeu justified by the complexity of the case and the need to safeguard the 
institutional balance in the Union. Deferential judicial review can be justified 
using arguments concerning the constitutional design of the Union or the eco-
nomic expertise that the EU Commission exhibits in competition law cases.
2 Montesquieu, op. cit., pp. 173– 174.
3 Gerber, op. cit.Türk, Alexander. “Oversight of Administrative Rulemaking: Judicial Review.” 
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One argument that is sometimes overlooked concerns the litigation style of 
cases involving economic law matters. In 1910, when Justice White delivered 
his opinion in Standard Oil, he started by noticing that the case file was “inor-
dinately voluminous, consisting of twenty- three volumes of printed matter, 
aggregating about twelve thousand pages, containing a vast amount of con-
fusing and conflicting testimony relating to innumerable, complex and varied 
business transactions, extending over a period of nearly forty years”.4 Justice 
White further complained that the bill and exhibits covered one hundred and 
seventy pages of the printed record. In the same vein, Ramsey has argued that 
“having realized that they had much to lose at the bar in antitrust proceedings, 
the Standard Oil team has adopted what would become a prominent strategy 
in future antitrust litigation – forestalling government action by drowning gov-
ernment attorneys in data and actual findings”.5 (emphasis added)
Still, the existing arguments concerning deferential judicial review in EU 
competition law do not answer the question about its compatibility with 
the principle of separation of powers. At its core, this question boils down to 
whether the judicial branch can choose to adjudicate or not, knowing that 
choosing to adjudicate against the executive might be criticized as judicial 
activism and choosing not to adjudicate – that is to defer – might be perceived 
as a betrayal of the judicial function.
In this respect, the ECtHR positions itself as a clear defender of the judicial 
function. Its case- law concerning disputes between individual persons and 
administrative agencies performing adjudicative powers is clear and prescrip-
tive: domestic courts must exercise effective judicial control over the executive 
in order to comply with the right to a fair trial. The type of dispute, the length 
of the file, the complexity of the evidence cannot justify deferential judicial 
review.
In other words, the ECtHR conceives of the judicial function as a monopoly 
to be exercised by courts or controlled by courts when adjudicative tasks are 
performed by administrative agencies. The cjeu, on the other hand, conceives 
of the judicial function as a shared function that can be divided between the 
executive and the judiciary.
The concomitant exercise of investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicatory 
powers by the EU Commission in EU competition law and the overtly blunt 
participation of the political branch in competition policy and enforcement 
are highly problematic. In the context of the discussion about separation 
of powers it is interesting to note that there is a solution that can satisfy the 
4 Standard Oil Company of New Jersey et Al v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910).
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standards of fairness of both the ECtHR and the cjeu. This solution would 
imply a separation of functions within the EU Commission, more precisely the 
separation of the adjudicatory function from the investigative and prosecuto-
rial tasks. The separation of the adjudicatory function would satisfy both the 
vision of fairness that perceives the judicial function as a monopoly and the 
cjeu’s vision that the judicial function can be shared. Indeed, a separate divi-
sion in dg comp or in the Legal Service can be both independent and, at the 
same time, remain in the EU Commission.
It is important to highlight that this idea, although discrete, is pursued in 
some jurisdictions. The icn has shown in a recent study that a large majority 
of competition authorities require staff to get involved with the legal analysis 
of a case without being part of the case team.6 This, in fact, could be the begin-
ning of having separate adjudicating units.
Law – genealogy and kinship – The second topic addressed in this book con-
cerned the law on fundamental rights and competition law, its sources and 
interpretation by the ECtHR and the cjeu.
The works needed for this book were collected and read not based on a pre- 
defined bibliography or in the chronological order of their publication. Rather 
these works were consulted or thoroughly studied based on availability in 
libraries, recommendations or hunches. This style of reading brought about a 
realization on the relations that law has with social sciences.
Until recently, the only other social science in the genealogical tree of law 
was philosophy. It suffices to revert to the works quoted in Chapter 3.1 and 
one can discern with difficulty the border between law and philosophy, pre-
scription and argumentation. This law- philosophy duo appeared to have been 
successful, cross- fertilizing and far- reaching.
This situation started to change somewhere in the middle of the last century 
when academics schooled in both law and economics called for interdiscipli-
narity and towered a slightly condescending attitude towards the traditional 
legal scholarship. Richard Posner, a representative of the Chicago School, and 
himself both a lawyer and an economist, wrote in one of his famous papers 
that doctrinal analysis views law as largely autonomous in the sense that “its 
practitioners do not have to know any other field of learning in order to contrib-
ute to it”.7 (emphasis added)
6 icn. Report on Agency Effectiveness Through Organisational Design. Available at: https:// 
www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2019/ 05/ AEWG- 
Organisational- design- 2019- report.pdf accessed on 23 February 2021.
7 Posner, Richard A. “The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship.” Yale Law Journal 90.5 (1981): 
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He added that the traditional method of legal analysis was
a humane rather than scientific discipline. As in other humanities, 
great emphasis is placed on writing well (sometimes on writing impres-
sively – which is not the same thing), footnoting copiously, treating every 
topic exhaustively, and staying within the linguistic and conceptual 
parameters of the doctrines analysed. Soundness is valued above origi-
nality, thoroughness above brevity; (…). In these respects, doctrinal anal-
ysis also resembles appellate legal practice. The writing style, the research 
interest, the overall approach of the doctrinal analyst are close to those of 
judges and brief writers and doctrinal analysists move smoothly between 
academic positions and positions in private practice, in the judiciary, in 
the governmental legal service, and in legislative and quasi- legislative 
drafting positions.8
Posner continued his quest for “fitting interdisciplinary research in the law- 
school mold” in a later paper in which he argued that the decline of faith in law 
as an autonomous discipline was affected by the breakdown of the political 
consensus and the “continuing rise in the prestige and authority of scientific 
and other exact modes of inquiry”.9
Law has become increasingly interdisciplinary, but its relations with other 
social sciences are analogous to kinship relationships. Indeed, in the last fifty 
years of the last century law has forged relationships with economics, political 
science, literature, anthropology, to name just a few. In the field of competi-
tion law, interdisciplinarity was inevitable taking into account that in the large 
majority of developed countries competition agencies employ an almost even 
number of economists and lawyers.10
It can thus be asked if deferential judicial review is a form of resistance to 
interdisciplinarity. If a case file is based on economic theories or scientific data 
which the judge is not trained to understand, deferring is not only the wisest, 
but also the most democratic way of decision- making.
From this vantage point, the difference between the ECtHR and the cjeu 
is important to grasp. The ECtHR deems deferential judicial review incompat-
ible with the right to a fair trial and stands thus in the camp of the kinship 
defenders. In essence, the ECtHR argues in favour on interdisciplinarity. The 
8  Posner (1981), op. cit., p. 1122.
9  Posner, Richard A. “The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962– 1987.” Harvard 
Law Review 100 (1987): pp. 761– 780, p. 772.
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cjeu, on the other hand, defers to the EU Commission generously and appears 
to be standing firmly in the more protective camp of the genealogy defenders 
leaving others to deal with interdisciplinary. This categorization joins the class 
of scholars who defines the relationship between the ECtHR and the cjeu as a 
relationship of rivalry, at least at the ideological level.11
This account can explain why the cjeu is bold when interpreting funda-
mental rights – which involve a deep consideration of law and its close relative 
philosophy – but defers on matters that could border speculation, such as the-
ories of harm or the amount of sanctions to be applied in competition cases.
The individual person – Neil Walker noted that the decline of the Keynesian- 
Westphalian frame, “remains, at root, the erosion of a political settlement” 
which require a realignment of the new points at which power is articulated.12 
This book has followed the realignment of the political settlement through the 
emergence of two new points of power in the freshly globalized world, the big 
businesses and the individual person.
The right to individual petition at the ECtHR has significantly affected pro-
cedural participatory rights of individuals in Europe. The progressive enlarge-
ment of the field of application of Article 6(1) echr meant that individuals 
could claim having a right to a fair trial in proceedings traditionally considered 
belonging to public law and, thus, not justiciable. The numbers speak to sup-
port this view. Of all the provisions of the echr, the right to a fair trial is the 
most invoked provision and is at the origin of most violations found by the 
ECtHR. Interestingly, since the adoption of the Charter and of all its provisions, 
Article 47 which guarantees the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial pro-
duces most complaints and is invoked most often by the EU courts.
These numbers indicate that breaches to the right to life or the prohibition 
against torture are rare in Europe. They speak in favour of healthy democra-
cies and respect of fundamental rights. At the same time, the large number of 
applications concerning due process – relying on the echr or the Charter – 
speak about something more profound. They might reflect the distrust in the 
justice system generated by the administrative state, the growing presence 
of the executive in the citizens’ life and the diminishing sense of individual 
agency that accompanies it. These numbers may be the reflection of frustrated 
citizens who feel that they are not heard in the administrative state and that 
their interests are not taken into account during the policy- making process. 
 11 Dawson, Mark. “How Does the European Court of Justice Reason? A Review Essay on the 
Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice.” European Law Journal 20.3 (2014): pp. 
423– 435.
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In this sense, it is interesting to note that the recent protests in France have 
requested that the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ena) be dismantled. 
France is a well- documented case of how the domestic order interacts with 
the supranational order.13 Lasser followed the legal debates that led to the 2008 
constitutional amendment in France introducing for the first time a posteriori 
constitutional review of legislation on fundamental rights grounds. He found 
that the rise of judicial review in Europe and the rethinking of the French 
high courts’ procedures in light of Article 6(1) echr litigation has had pro-
found effects. He concluded that “the explosive surge of fundamental rights 
arguments throughout the legal order has drastically reworked the basics of 
French legal debate; and this stunning argumentative change strongly suggests 
an important shift in governing mentalities in the direction of more pluralistic 
and individualistic perspectives”.14
In the EU, individuals continue having limited procedural participatory 
rights. Chalmers argued that this is due to the fact that the EU lacks the stat-
ist vision wherein constitutional rights are put in place against transgressions 
that affect individuals. Instead, the EU has embraced a substitute vision – the 
vision of the European political economy:
Its fundamental rights, as a reflection of this, can be more managerial, 
partial and sympathetic to modern market excesses than national coun-
terparts and less attentive to the singularity, vulnerability and potential 
of human existence. They can also be more attuned to its complexities 
and the stresses and demands posed for individuals by these market 
processes. As a consequence, it is unsurprising that there has often been 
innovation. This is not an argument for disposing with EU fundamental 
rights but for lowering the expectations and seeing fundamental rights as 
part of a wider EU legal context, which will inevitably contain much to 
criticize and much to offer.15 (emphasis added)
The “managerial, partial and sympathetic to modern market excesses” fun-
damental rights might be in tune with the philosophy broadcasted by the 
npm movement and its incessant focus on efficiency and avoidance of red 
 13 The Economist. “Why Emmanuel Macron Wants to Abolish ENA, France’s Most Elite 
College.” The Economist. 4 May 2019. Available at: https:// www.economist.com/ europe/ 
2019/ 05/ 04/ why- emmanuel- macron- wants- to- abolish- ena- frances- most- elite- college 
accessed on 23 February 2021.
 14 Lasser, op. cit., p. 298.
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tape.16 The problem, however, with this view of fundamental rights is that an 
individual affected by an action of the EU might not be willing to understand 
what “managerial fundamental rights” imply. In addition, this “managerial” 
vision of human rights risks spilling over the national understanding of the 
same rights.
The two visions on fundamental rights in Europe stand in stark contrast, 
but do not collide. Even if rivalling each other, the ECtHR and the cjeu are not 
in a race. There is necessarily a relational element in the self- understanding 
and self- definition of a nonstate entity, “a sense that its normative purpose 
and its effectiveness alike are dependent on the cultivation of a network of 
relations with other entities”.17 It is this relational capital that includes both 
the ECtHR and the cjeu into the same Pan- European system of fundamental 
rights protection, characterized by a shared history, a multilingual community 
and commitment to the same values. This is to say, however, that utmost care 
should be exercised when dealing with the relational capital between the two 
supranational courts.
The fact that the cjeu continues to block the accession of the EU to the 
echr and jurisprudential developments in the recent case- law of the cjeu 
that unmoored effective judicial protection in the EU from the interpretation 
of Article 6(1) echr should be taken seriously. They might diminish the rep-
utational capital of the ECtHR or they might lead the ECtHR to lower the fun-
damental rights standards it applies. Neither Europe, nor the EU, nor their half 
a billion citizens need a weak or irrelevant ECtHR. Rather, they need highly- 
capable and strong supranational courts to contribute solving current chal-
lenges, many of which are legal questions.
One such issue is bigness – both corporate and administrative – as a chal-
lenge to modern democracies. In light of this, the ECtHR and its case law on 
due process remains relevant. The ECtHR has consistently defended the right 
to a fair trial not simply as a human right, but as a democratic principle. Due 
process requires the separation of powers within the state and the separation 
of functions within administrative agencies. Due process requires indepen-
dence of action and independence of decision. Due process requires effective 
judicial review of administrative discretion. More importantly, however, the 
ECtHR has defended a version of due process that requires concern both for 
the individual person, for the executive action and for the judicial function. 
The individual interests should be assessed during the policy- making pro-
cess, but also during policy implementation. Also, individual rights should be 
 16 See Section 2.2. above for a detailed analysis of npm.
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considered when administrative agencies exercise administrative discretion as 
a form of policing powers. Placing such proceedings in the realm of admin-
istrative law and under the expectation that fair trial does not apply might 
breach the human rights of the individuals affected by these proceedings. 
What is more serious, however, is that such a situation might erode democracy.
As long as the EU practices “managerial” fundamental rights in fields such 
as EU competition law, the powers of the ECtHR should be safeguarded as the 
only supranational bastion of procedural participatory rights.
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